UC-NRLF 


B    3    13fl 


GIFT   OF 
MICHAEL  REESE 


THE   SECOND  ADMINISTRATION 


OP 


THOMAS    JEFFEKSON 


1805—1809 


'HISTORY 


UNITED  STATES-  OF  AMERICA 


DURING  THE  SECOND  ADMINISTRATION  OF 


THOMAS     JEFFERSON 


BY    HENRY    ADAMS 


VOL. 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES     SCRIBNER'S     SONS 
1890 


\ 


Copyright,  1890 
BY   CHARLES   SCRIBNER'S   SONS 

#  •)  3  2_  - 


Press: 
JOHN  WILSON  AND  SON,  CAMBRIDOK. 


CONTENTS   OF  VOL. 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.     THE  "CHESAPEAKE"  AND  "LEOPARD"     .  1 


II.  DEMANDS  AND  DISAVOWALS      ...... 

III.  PERCEVAL  AND  CANNING       ....          .     . 

IV.  THE  ORDERS  ix  COUNCIL    ^     ...... 

V.  No  MORE  NEUTRALS    .     .  '         ...... 

VI.  INSULTS  AND  POPULARITY  , 

VII.  THE  EMBARGO.    .     .  ....  152 

VIII.  THE  MISSION  OF  GEORGE  Uosi:     .          .     .  178 

IX.  MEASURES  OF  DEFENCE    .          .  .  200 

X.  THE  RISE  OF  A  BRITISU  PARTY    .     .          .  225 

XI.  THE  ENFORCEMENT  OF  EMBARGO  ...          .  249  * 

XII.  THE  COST  OF  EMBARGO    .  272 

XIII.  THE  Dos  DE  MAIO  .     .     .  290 

XIV.  ENGLAND'S  REPLY  TO  THE  EMBARGO  317  t 
XV.  FAILURE  OF  EMBARGO                                         .  339 

XVI.  PERPLEXITY  AND  CONFUSION     .  361 

XVII.  DIPLOMACY  AND  CONSPIRACY    .  384  * 

XVIII.  GENERAL  FACTIOUSNESS  .  408 

XIX.  REPEAL  OF  EMBARGO  .  432 

XX.  JEFFERSON'S  RETIREMENT        __.     .          .     .     ,  454  . 


INDEX  .     .     475 


\ 


Copyright,  1890 
BY   CHARLES   SCRIBNER'S   Soxs. 

^  -}  3  2- 


JOHN  WILSON  AND  SON,  CAMBRIDGE. 


CONTENTS   OF  VOL.^flf 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.  THE  "  CHESAPEAKE  "  AND  "LEOPARD"     .  1    * 

II.  DEMANDS  AND  DISAVOWALS 27  ' 

III.  PERCEVAL  AND  CANNING       ....          .     .  55 

IV.  THE  ORDERS  IN  COUNCIL     .-..,...  79 
V.  No  MORE  NEUTRALS    .     .          105 

VI.  INSULTS  AND  POPULARITY                          .     .     .  128  • 

VII.  THE  EMBARGO.    .-     .                          .....  152 

VIII.  THE  MISSION  OF  GEORGE  llosi:     .          .     .  178  • 

IX.  MEASURES  OF  DEFENCE    .          .                     .  200 

X.  THE  RISE  OF  A  BRITISH  PARTY    .     .  225 

XI.  THE  ENFORCEMENT  OF  EMBARGO  ...          .  249  «. 

XII.  THE  COST  OF  EMBARGO    .  272 

XIII.  THE  Dos  DE  MAIO  ...  290 
XTV.  ENGLAND'S  REPLY  TO  THE  EMBARGO          .  317  i 

XV.  FAILURE  OF  EMBARGO                                         .  339 

XVI.  PERPLEXITY  AND  CONFUSION     .     .  361 

XVII.  DIPLOMACY  AND  CONSPIRACY    .     .  384  *' 

XVIII.  GENERAL  FACTIOUSNESS  .  408 

XIX.  REPEAL  OF  EMBARGO                                            .  432 

XX.  JEFFERSON'S  RETIREMENT        __.     .          .     .     ,  454  . 


INDEX  .  .     .     475 


n 

V 


HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 


CHAPTER   I. 

JUNE  22,  1807,  while  Jefferson  at  Washington  was 
fuming  over  Chief-Justice  Marshall's  suhpoena,  and 
while  the  grand  jury  at  Richmond  were  on  the  point 
of  finding  their  indictment  against  Burr,  an  event 
occurred  at  sea,  off  the  entrance  to  Chesapeake  Bay, 
which  threw  the  country  into  violent  excitement,  dis 
tracting  attention  from  Burr,  and  putting  to  a  supreme 
test  the  theories  of  Jefferson's  statesmanship. 

That  the  accident  which  then  happened  should  not 
have  happened  long  before  was  matter  for  wonder, 
considering  the  arbitrary  character  of  British  naval 
officers  and  their  small  regard  for  neutral  rights.  For 
many  years  the  open  encouragement  offered  to  the 
desertion  of  British  seamen  in  American  ports  had 
caused  extreme  annoyance  to  the  royal  navy ;  and 
nowhere  had  this  trouble  been  more  serious  than  at 
Norfolk.  Early  in  1807  a  British  squadron  happened 
to  be  lying  within  the  Capes  watching  for  some 
French  frigates  which  had  taken  refuge  at  Annapolis. 

VOL.  IV. —  1 


2  HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  1. 

One  or  more  of  these  British  ships  lay  occasionally  in 
Hampton  Roads,  or  came  to  the  navy -yard  at  Gosport 
for  necessary  repairs.  Desertions  were  of  course 
numerous ;  even  the  American  ships-of-war  had  much 
difficulty  from  loss  of  men,  —  and  March  7  a_whole 
boat's  crew  of  the  British  sixteen-gun  sloop  "Halifax" 
made  off  with  the  jolly-boat  and  escaped  to  Norfolk. 
The  commander  ofjthe  "  Halifax  "  was  informed  that 
these  men  had  enlisted  in  the  American  frigate 
"Chesapeake,"  then  under  orders  for  the  Mediterra 
nean.  He  complained  to  the  British  consul  and  to 
Captain  Decatur,  but  could  get  no  redress.  He  met 
two  of  the  deserters  in  the  streets  of  Norfolk,  and 
asked  them  why  they  did  not  return.  One  of  them, 
Jenkin  Ratford  by  name,  replied,  with  abuse  and  oaths, 
that  he  was  in  the  land  of  liberty  and  would  do  as  he 
liked.  The  British  minister  at  Washington  also  made 
complaint  that  three  deserters  from  the  "  Melampus  " 
frigate  had  enlisted  on  the  "  Chesapeake."  The  Sec 
retary  of  the  Navy  ordered  an  inquiry,  which  proved 
that  the  three  men  in  question,  one  of  whom  was  a 
negro,  were  in  fact  on  board  the  "  Chesapeake,"  but 
that  they  were  native  Americans  who  had  been  im 
properly  impressed  by  the  "  Melampus,"  and  therefore 
were  not  subjects  for  reclamation  by  the  British  gov 
ernment.  The  nationality  was  admitted,  and  so  far  as 
these  men  were  concerned  the  answer  was  final ;  but 
the  presence  of  Jenkin  Ratford,  an  Englishman,  on 
board  the  "  Chesapeake  "  under  the  name  of  Wilson 
escaped  notice. 


1807.     THE   "CHESAPEAKE"   AND  "LEOPARD." 

The  admiral  in  command  of  the  British  ships  on  the 
North  American  station  was  George  Cranfield  Berkeley, 
a  brother  of  the  Earl  of  Berkeley.  To  him,  at  Halifax, 
the  British  officers  ki  Chesapeake  Bay  reported  their 
grievances ;  and  Admiral  Berkeley,  without  waiting  for 
authority  from  England,  issued  the  following  orders, 
addressed  to  all  the  ships  under  his  command :  — 

"  Whereas  many  seamen,  subjects  of  his  Britannic 
Majesty,  and  serving  in  his  ships  and  vessels  as  per  mar 
gin  ["Bellona,"  u  Belleisle,"  "Triumph,"  "  Chichester," 
44  Halifax,"  "Zenobia"],  while  at  anchor  in  the  Chesa 
peake,  deserted  and  entered  on  board  the  United  States 
frigate  called  the  '  Chesapeake,'  and  openly  paraded  the 
streets  of  Norfolk,  in  sight  of  their  officers,  under  the 
American  flag,  protected  by  the  magistrates  of  the  town 
and  the  recruiting  officer  belonging  to  the  above-mentioned 
American  frigate,  which  magistrates  and  naval  officer  re 
fused  giving  them  up,  although  demanded  by  his  Britan 
nic  Majesty's  consul,  as  well  as  the  captains  of  the  ships 
from  which  the  said  men  had  deserted  : 

"  The  captains  and  commanders  of  his  Majesty's  ships 
and  vessels  under  my  command  are  therefore  hereby  re 
quired  and  directed,  in  case  of  meeting  with  the  American 
frigate  '  Chesapeake '  at  sea,  and  without  the  limits  of  the 
United  States,  to  show  to  the  captain  of  her  this  order, 
and  to  require  to  search  his  ship  for  the  deserters  from 
the  before-mentioned  ships,  and  to  proceed  and  search 
for  the  same ;  and  if  a  similar  demand  should  be  made 
by  the  American,  he  is  to  be  permitted  to  search  for  any 
deserters  from  their  service,  according  to  the  customs  and 
usage  of  civilized  nations  on  terms  of  peace  and  amity 
with  each  other." 


4  HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  1. 

The  admiral's  conception  of  the  "customs  and  usage 
of  civilized  nations"  did  not  expressly  require  the  use 
of  force ;  and  any  captain  or  commander  who  received 
this  circular  must  at  once  have  asked  whether,  in 
case  the  American  captain  should  refuse  to  allow  a 
search.  —  as  was  certain,  —  force  should  be  employed. 
The  order,  dated  June  1,  1807,  was  sent  to  Chesa 
peake  Bay  by  the  frigate  "  Leopard,"  commanded  by 
Captain  S.  P.  Humphreys  ;  and  since  the  "  Leopard  " 
was  the  admiral's  flagship,  Captain  Humphreys  was 
probably  acquainted  with  the  meaning  of  his  in 
structions.  The  "  Leopard "  arrived  at  Lynnhaven 
on  the  morning  of  June  21 ;  and  Captain  Humphreys 
reported  his  arrival  and  orders  to  Captain  John 
Erskine  Douglas  of  the  "  Bellona,"  a  line-of-battle 
ship,  then  lying  with  the  "  Melampus "  frigate  in 
Lynnhaven  Bay,  enjoying  the  hospitality  of  the  Amer 
ican  government.  Apparently  Captain  Douglas  car 
ried  verbal  explanations  of  the  order  from  Captain 
Humphreys,  for  he  made  no  attempt  to  qualify  its 
extremes!  meaning.  The  "  Leopard  "  remained 
twenty-four  hours  with  the  "  Bellona,"  while  the 
two  commanders  were  in  consultation.  The  next 
morning,  June  22,  at  4  A.M.,  the  "Leopard"  made 
sail,1  and  two  hours  later  re-anchored  a  few  miles  to 
the  eastward,  and  about  three  miles  north  of  Cape 
Henry  Lighthouse. 

The  "  Chesapeake,"  during  the  difficulties  at  Norfolk 
and  afterward,  lay  in  the  Eastern  Branch  at  Wash- 
1  James's   Naval  History,  iv.  329. 


1807.     THE   "CHESAPEAKE"   AND   "LEOPARD."          5 

ington.     The  inefficiency  of  the  Government  in  doing 
those  duties  which  governments   had  hitherto  been 
created  to  perform,  was  shown  even  more  strikingly 
in  the  story  of  the  "  Chesapeake "  than  in  the  con 
spiracy  of   Burr.      The   frigate  "  Constitution "    had 
sailed  for  the  Mediterranean  in  August,  1803.     The 
Government  knew   that  her  crew  were   entitled   to 
their  discharge,  and  that  the  President  had  no  right 
to  withhold  it.     The  country  was  at  peace  ;  no  emer 
gency  of  any  kind  existed.     A  single  ship  of  about 
one  thousand   tons   burden  needed   to  be  fitted   for 
sea  at  a  date  fixed  three  years  beforehand ;  yet  when 
the   time   came    and    the   "  Constitution "   ought  to 
have  reached   home,  the  "  Chesapeake "  had  not   so 
much  as  begun  preparation.     Captain  James  Barron 
was  selected  to  command  her  as  commodore  of  the 
Mediterranean  squadron;  Captain  Charles  Gordon — a 
native  of  the  eastern  shore  of  Maryland,  the  youngest 
master-commandant  on  the  list  —  was  appointed  as 
her  captain.     Both  were  good  officers  and  seamen  ; 
but  Gordon   received   his  orders  only  February   22, 
and   could  not  take  command  until  May  1,  —  long- 
after  he  should  have  reached  Gibraltar.     Such  was 
the  inefficiency  of  the  navy-yard  at  Washington  that 
although  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  had  the  "  Chesa 
peake  "  under  his  eye  and  was  most  anxious  to  fit  her 
out,  and  although  Gordon  fretted  incessantly,  making 
bitter  complaints  of  delay,  the  frigate  still  remained 
in  the  mechanics'  hands   until   the  month  of  May. 
According   to   Commodore    Barron   the   Washington 


6  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  1. 

navy-yard  was  more  than  incompetent.1  "  I  have 
long  known,"  he  claimed  to  have  written,  "the  per 
verse  disposition  of  the  rulers  of  that  establishment." 
Yet  he  urged  Gordon  to  complete  his  outfit  at  Wash 
ington,  because  the  Norfolk  yard  was  worse.2  "  I 
would  by  no  means  advise  your  leaving  the  navy- 
yard  with  any  unfinished  work  and  depend  on  Nor 
folk.  You  will  experience  more  difficulty  and  trouble 
than  you  can  imagine."  As  Burr's  trial  showed  that 
the  army  was  honeycombed  by  incompetence  and 
conspiracy,  so  Barren's  court-martial  proved  that 
nothing  in  naval  administration  could  be  depended 
upon. 

For  much  of  this,  Congress  and  the  people  were 
responsible,  and  they,  accepted  their  own  feebleness  as 
the  necessary  consequence  of  a  system  which  acted 
through  other  agencies  than  force ;  but  much  was  also 
due  to  the  Administration  and  to  the  President's  in 
stincts,  which  held  him  aloof  from  direct  contact  with 
both  services.  Jefferson  did  not  love  the  deck  of  a 
man-of-war  or  enjoy  the  sound  of  a  boatswain's  whis 
tle.  The  ocean  was  not  his  element ;  and  his  appe 
tite  for  knowledge  never  led  him  to  criticise  the  man 
agement  of  his  frigates  or  his  regiments  so  long  as 
he  could  shut  his  eyes  to  their  shortcomings.  Thus 
while  Wilkinson  was  left  at  his  own  pleasure  to 
create  or  to  stifle  a  rebellion  at  New  Orleans,  the 
crew  of  the  "  Constitution  "  were  in  a  state  of  mutiny 

1  Barren's  Court-martial,  p.  241. 

2  Barron  to  Gordon,  May  1,  1807;  Court-martial,  p.  239. 


1807.      THE   "CHESAPEAKE"  AND   "LEOPARD."          7 

in  the  Mediterranean,  and  the  officers  of  the  "  Chesa 
peake  "  were  helpless  under  the  control  of  the  navy- 
yard  at  Washington. 

At  length,  in  the  earliest  days  of  June,  Gordon 
.dropped  down  the  Potomac.  __The^M]hesapeake  "  was 
<&»  cafry  on  this  cruise  an  armament  of  forty  guns, — 
twenty-eight  18-pounders  and  twelve  32-pound  carron- 
ades  ;  but  owing  to  the  shoals  in  the  river  she  took 
but_t\velve  guns  on  board  at  Washington,  the  rest 
waiting  her  arrival  at  Norfolk.  With  these  twelve 
guns  Gordon  tried  to  fire  the  customary  salute  in 
passing  Mount  Vemon ;  and  he  wrote  to  the  sec 
retary  in  exasperation  at  the  result  of  this  first 
experience : l  — 

' '  Had  we  been  engaged  in  an  active  war  I  should  sus 
pect  the  officers  of  the  yard  with  having  a  design  on  my 
character  ;  but  fortunately  Mount  Vernon  drew  our  atten 
tion  to  the  guns  before  we  could  apprehend  any  danger 
from  an  enemy.  In  the  act  of  saluting  that  place  I 
was  struck  with  astonishment  when  the  first  lieutenant 
reported  to  me  that  neither  the  sponges  nor  cartridges 
would  go  in  the  guns.  I  immediately  arrested  my  gun 
ner  ;  but  on  his  satisfying  me  that  he  had  received  them 
from  the  gunner  of  the  yard  I  released  him,  and  hold  Mr. 
Stevenson  responsible." 

The  mistakes  were  easily  corrected,  and  the  ship 
arrived  in  Hampton  Roads  without  further  incident. 
Commodore  Barron,  who  first  came  aboard  June  6, 

1  Captain  Gordon  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  June  22,  1807; 
Court-martial,  p.  259. 


8  HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  1. 

wrote l  at  once  to  the  secretary,  "  that  from  the  ex 
treme  cleanliness  and  order  in  which  I  found  her  I 
am  convinced  that  Captain  Gordon  and  his  officers 
must  have  used  great  exertions.  Captain  Gordon 
speaks  in  high  terms  of  his  lieutenants.  The  state 
of  the  ship  proves  the  justice  of  his  encomiums." 

Nevertheless  much  remained  to  be  done,  and  in 
spite  of  the  secretary's  urgency  the  ship  was  still  de 
layed  in  Hampton  Roads.  From  June  6  to  June  19, 
notwithstanding  bad  weather,  the  w^hole  ship's  com 
pany  were  hard  worked.  The  guns  were  taken  on 
board  and  fitted  ;  water  was  got  in  ;  spars  and  rig 
ging  had  to  be  overhauled,  and  stores  for  four  hundred 
men  on  a  three-years  cruise  were  shipped.  June  19 
the  guns  were  all  fitted,  and  the  crew  could  for  the 
first  time  be  assigned  to  their  stations  at  quarters. 
According  to  the  custom  of  the  service,  the  guns 
were  charged  with  powder  and  shot.  They  had  no 
locks,  and  were  fired  by  the  old-fashioned  slow-match, 
or  by  loggerheads  kept  in  the  magazine  and  heated 
red-hot  in  the  galley  fire  whenever  need  for  them 
arose. 

June  19  Captain  Gordon  considered  the  ship  ready 
for  sea,  and  wrote  to  the  commodore  on  shore, 2  "  We 
are  unmoored  and  ready  for  weighing  the  first  fair 
wind."  Both  Captain  Gordon  and  Commodore  Bar- 
ron  were  aware  that  the  decks  were  more  or  less 

1  Barren  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  June  6,  1807;  Court- 
martial,  p.  371. 

8  Gordon  to  Barren,  June  19,  1807,  p.  367. 


1807.      THE   "CHESAPEAKE"   AND  "LEOPARD."          9 

encumbered,  and  that  the  crew  had  not  been  exer 
cised  at  the  guns  ;  but  they  were  not  warranted  in 
detaining  her  on  that  account,  especially  since  the 
guns  could  be  better  exercised  at  sea,  and  the  ship 
was  already  four  months  behind  time.  Accordingly, 
June  21,  Commodore  Barron  came  on  board,  and  at 
four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  the  "  Chesapeake " 
weighed  anchor  and  stood  down  the  Roads ;  at  six 
o'clock  she  came  to,  dropped  anchor,  called  all  hands 
to  quarters,  and  prepared  to  start  for  sea  the  next 
morning.  From  Lynnhaven  Bay  the  "  Leopard," 
which  had  arrived  from  Halifax  only  a  few  hours 
before,  could  watch  every  movement  of  the  American 
frigate. 

At  a  quarter-past  seven  o'clock  on  the  morning  of 
June  22  the  "  Chesapeake  "  got  under  way  with  a  fair 
breeze.  Her  ship's  company  was  short  of  its  full 
complement,  but  she  carried  about  three  hundred  and 
seventy-five  men  and  boys,  all  told.  Much  sickness 
prevailed  among  the  crew,  and  by  the  doctor's  order 
the  sick  seamen  were  allowed  to  lie  in  the  sun  and 
air  on  the  upper  deck.  The  gun-deck  between  the 
guns  was  encumbered  with  lumber  of  one  sort  or 
another  ;  the  cables  were  not  yet  stowed  away ;  four 
of  the  guns  did  not  fit  quite  perfectly  to  their  car 
riages,  and  needed  a  few  blows  with  a  maul  to  drive 
the  trunnions  home,  but  this  defect  escaped  the  eye ; 
in  the  magazine  the  gunner  had  reported  the  powder- 
horns,  used  in  priming  the  guns,  as  filled,  whereas 
only  five  were  in  fact  filled.  Otherwise  the  ship, 


10  HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  1. 

except  for   the  freshness   of  her   crew,  was  in  fair 
condition. 

At  nine  o'clock,  passing  Lynnhaven  Bay,  the  officers 
on  deck  noticed  the  "  Bellona  "  and  "  Melampus  "  at 
anchor.  The  "  Leopard "  lay  farther  out,  and  the 
"  Bellona "  was  observed  to  be  signalling.  A  story 
had  been  circulated  at  Norfolk  that  the  captain  of  the 
"  Melampus  "  threatened  to  take  his  deserters  out  of 
the  u  Chesapeake ; "  but  rumors  of  this  sort  roused 
so  little  attention  that  no  one  on  board  the  American 
frigate  gave  special  notice  to  the  British  squadron. 
The  "  Melampus  "  lay  quietly  at  anchor.  Had  Barron 
been  able  to  read  the  "  Bellona's "  signals  he  would 
have  suspected  nothing,  for  they  contained  merely  an 
order  to  the  "  Leopard  "  to  weigh  and  reconnoitre  in 
the  southeast  by  east.1  The  British  squadron  was 
in  the  habit  of  keeping  a  cruiser  outside  to  overhaul 
merchant-vessels  ;  and  when  the  "  Leopard "  stood 
out  to  sea,  the  officers  of  the  "  Chesapeake  "  naturally 
supposed  that  this  was  her  errand. 

At  noon  Cape  Henry  bore  southwest  by  south,  dis 
tant  one  or  two  miles.  The  day  was  fine ;  but  the 
breeze  then  shifted  to  the  south-southeast,  and  be 
gan  to  blow  fresh.  The  change  of  wind  brought  the 

!  "  Leopard  "  to  windward.  At  about  a  quarter-past 
two  the  "  Chesapeake "  tacked  in  shore  to  wait  for 
the  pilot-boat  which  was  to  take  off  the  pilot.  The 

1  "  Leopard "  tacked  also,  about  a  mile  distant.     At 
the  same  time  dinner  was  served  at  the  commodore's 
1  James's  Naval  History,  iv.  329. 


1807.     THE   "CHESAPEAKE"   AND   "LEOPARD."        11 

table,  and  Barren,  Gordon,  Captain  Hall  of  the  ma 
rines,  Dr.  Bullus  and  his  wife  sat  down  to  it.  Cap 
tain  Gordon  afterward  testified  that  as  they  were 
dining  Commodore  Barren  noticed  the  British  frigate 
through  the  larboard  forward  port  of  the  cabin,  and 
made  the  remark  "  that  her  movements  appeared  sus 
picious,  but  she  could  have  nothing  to  do  with  us."  l 
Barren  positively  denied  ever  having  made  the  re 
mark  ;  but  whether  he  said  it  or  not,  nothing  more 
than  a  passing  doubt  occurred  to  him  or  to  any  other 
person  on  board.  Gordon  returned  to  his  work ;  the 
crew  began  to  stow  away  the  cable  ;  and  at  a  quar 
ter  before  three  o'clock,  the  pilot-boat  nearing,  the 
"  Chesapeake  "  again  stood  out  to  sea,  the  "  Leopard  " 
immediately  following  her  tack. 

At  about  half-past  three  o'clock,  both  ships  being 
eight  or  ten  miles, southeast  by  east  of  Cape  Henry, 
the  "  Leopard "  came  down  before  the  wind,  and 
rounding  to,  about  half  a  cable's  length  to  windward, 
hailed,  and  said  she  had  despatches  for  the  commo 
dore.  Barron  returned  the  hail  and  replied,  "  We 
will  heave  to  and  you  can  send  your  boat  on  board 
of  us."  British  ships-of-war  on  distant  stations  not 
infrequently  sent  despatches  by  the  courtesy  of  Ameri 
can  officers,  and  such  a  request  implied  no  hostile 
purpose.  British  ships  also  arrogated  a  sort  of  right 
to  the  windward  ;  and  the  "  Leopard's  "  manoeuvre, 
although  one  which  no  commander  except  an  Eng 
lishman  would  naturally  have  made,  roused  no  pecu- 
1  Court-martial,  p.  101. 


12  HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  1. 

liar  attention.  The  "  Leopard's  "  ports  were  seen  to 
be  triced  up ;  but  the  season  was  midsummer,  the 
weather  was  fine  and  warm,  and  the  frigate  was  in 
sight  of  her  anchorage.  Doubtless  Barron  ought  not 
to  have  allowed  a  foreign  ship-of-war  to  come  along 
side  without  calling  his  crew  to  quarters,  —  such  was 
the  general  rule  of  the  service ;  but  the  condition  of 
the  ship  made  it  inconvenient  to  clear  the  guns,  and 
the  idea  of  an  attack  was  so  extravagant  that,  as 
Barren  afterward  said,  he  might  as  well  have  expected 
one  when  at  anchor  in  Hampton  Roads.  After  the 
event  several  officers,  including  Captain  Gordon,  af 
firmed  that  they  felt  suspicions;  but  they  showed  none 
at  the  time,  and  neither  Gordon  nor  any  one  else  sug 
gested,  either  to  the  commodore  or  to  each  other,  that 
it  would  be  well  to  order  the  crew  to  quarters. 

Barron  went  to  his  cabin  to  receive  the  British  offi 
cer,  whose  boat  came  alongside.  At  a  quarter  before 
four  o'clock  Lieutenant  Meade  from  the  "Leopard" 
arrived  on  board,  and  was  shown  by  Captain  Gordon 
to  the  commodore's  cabin.  He  delivered  the  follow 
ing  note :  — 

"  The  captain  of  his  Britannic  Majesty's  ship  '  Leop 
ard  '  has  the  honor  to  enclose  the  captain  of  the  United 
States  ship  '  Chesapeake '  an  order  from  the  Honora 
ble  Vice-Admiral  Berkeley,  commander-in-chief  of  his 
Majesty's  ships  on  the  North  American  station,  respect 
ing  some  deserters  from  the  ships  (therein  mentioned) 
under  his  command,  and  supposed  to  be  now  serving  as 
part  of  the  crew  of  the  i  Chesapeake.' 


1807.     THE   "CHESAPEAKE"   AND   "LEOPARD."       13 

"  The  captain  of  the  'Leopard'  will  not  presume  to 
say  anything  in  addition  to  what  the  commander-in-chief 
has  stated,  more  than  to  express  a  hope  that  every  cir 
cumstance  respecting  them  may  be  adjusted  in  a  manner 
that  the  harmony  subsisting  between  the  two  countries 
may  remain  undisturbed." 

Having  read  Captain  Humphrey's  note,  Commodore 
Barren  took  up  the  enclosed  order  signed  by  Admiral 
Berkeley.  This  order,  as  the  note  mentioned,  desig 
nated  deserters  from  certain  ships.  Barron  knew  that 
he  had  on  board  three  deserters  from  the  "  Melam- 
pus,"  and  that  these  three  men  had  been  the  only 
deserters  officially  and  regularly  demanded  by  the 
British  minister.  His  first  thought  was  to  look  for 
the  "  Melampus  "  in  the  admiral's  list ;  and  on  seeing 
that  Berkeley  had  omitted  it,  Barron  inferred  that  his 
own  assurance  would  satisfy  Captain  Humphreys,  and 
that  the  demand  of  search,  being  meant  as  a  mere 
formality,  would  not  be  pressed.  He  explained  to 
the  British  lieutenant  the  circumstances  relating  to 
the  three  men  from  the  "  Melampus,"  and  after  some 
consultation  with  Dr.  Bullus,  who  was  going  out  as 
consul  to  the  Mediterranean,  he  wrote  to  Captain 
Humphreys  the  following  reply  :  — 

44 1  know  of  no  such  men  as  you  describe.  The  officers 
that  were  on  the  recruiting  service  for  this  ship  were  par 
ticularly  instructed  by  the  Government,  through  me,  not 
to  enter  any  deserters  from  his  Britannic  Majesty's  ships, 
nor  do  I  know  of  any  being  here.  I  am  also  instructed 
never  to  permit  the  crew  of  any  ship  that  I  command 


14  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  1. 

to  be  mustered  by  any  other  but  their  own  officers.  It 
is  my  disposition  to  preserve  harmony,  and  I  hope  this 
answer  to  your  despatch  will  prove  satisfactory." 

Such  an  answer  to  such  a  demand  was  little  suited 
to  check  the  energy  of  a  British  officer  in  carrying 
out  his  positive  orders.  If  Barrpn  had  wished  to 
invite  an  attack,  he  could  have  done  nothing  more 
to  the  purpose  than  by  receiving  Berkeley's  orders 
without  a  movement  of  self-defence. 

Meanwhile,  at  a  quarter-past  four  the  officer  of  the 
deck  sent  down  word  that  the  British  frigate  had  a 
signal  flying.  The  lieutenant  understood  it  for  a  sig 
nal  of  recall,  as  he  had  been  half  an  hour  away,  and 
as  soon  as  the  letter  could  be  written  he  hurried  with 
it  to  his  boat.  No  sooner  had  he  left  the  cabin  than 
Barron  sent  for  Gordon  and  showed  him  the  letters 
which  had  passed.  Although  the  commodore  hoped 
that  the  matter  was  disposed  of,  and  assumed  that 
Captain  Humphreys  would  give  some  notice  in  case 
of  further  action,  he  could  not  but  feel  a  show  of 
energy  to  be  proper,  and  he  directed  Gordon  to  order 
the  gun-deck  to  be  cleared.  Instantly  the  officers 
began  to  prepare  the  ship  for  action. 

Had  the  British  admiral  sent  the  u  Bellona "  or 
some  other  seventy-four  on  this  ugly  errand,  Barren's 
error  would  have  been  less  serious  ;  for  the  captain 
of  a  seventy-four  would  have  felt  himself  strong 
enough  to  allow  delay.  Sending  the  "  Leopard  "  was 
arrogance  of  a  kind  that  the  British  navy  at  that  time 
frequently  displayed.  In  1804,  when  the  Spanish 


1807.      THE   "CHESAPEAKE"  AND   "LEOPARD."        15 

treasure-ships  were  seized,  the  bitterest  complaint  of 
Spain  was  not  that  she  had  been  made  the  unsuspect 
ing  victim  of  piracy,  but  that  her  squadron  had  been 
waylaid  by  one  of  only  equal  force,  and  could  not  in 
honor  yield  without  a  massacre  which  cost  four  ships 
and  three  hundred  lives,  besides  the  disgrace  of  sub 
mission  to  an  enemy  of  not  superior  strength.  The 
"  Leopard  "  did  indeed  carry  fifty-two  guns,  while  the 
"  Chesapeake  "  on  this  cruise  carried  only,  forty  ;  but 
the  "  Chesapeake's  "  twelve  carronades  threw  heavier 
shot  than  the  "  Leopard's  "  heaviest,  and  her  broad 
side  weighed  444  pounds,  while  that  of  the  "Leopard" 
weighed  447.  In  tonnage  the  "  Chesapeake  "  was  a 
stronger  ship  and  carried  a  larger  crew  than  the 
"  Leopard ; "  and  a  battle  on  fair  terms  would  have 
been  no  certain  victory.  That  Captain  Humphreys 
felt  it  necessary  to  gain  and  retain  every  possible 
advantage  was  evident  from  his  conduct.  He  could 
not  afford  to  run  the  risk  of  defeat  in  such  an  under 
taking  ;  and  knowing  that  the  "  Chesapeake  "  needed 
time  to  prepare  for  battle,  he  felt  not  strong  enough 
to  disregard  her  power  of  resistance,  as  he  might 
have  done  had  he  commanded  a  ship  of  the  line.  To 
carry  out  his  orders  with  as  little  loss  as  possible 
was  his  duty ;  for  the  consequences,  not  he  but  his 
admiral  was  to  blame.  Without  a  moment  of  delay, 
edging  nearer,  he  hailed  and  cried  :  "  Commodore 
Barron,  you  must  be  aware  of  the  necessity  I  am  un 
der  of  complying  with  the  orders  of  my  commander- 
in-chief." 


16  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  1. 

Hardly  more  than  five  minutes  passed  between  the 
moment  when  the  British  officer  left  Commodore 
Barren's  cabin  and  the  time  when  Barron  was  hailed. 
To  get  the  ship  ready  for  action  required  fully  half 
an  hour.  Barron,  after  giving  the  order  to  clear  the 
guns,  had  come  on  deck  and  was  standing  in  the  gang 
way  watching  the  "  Leopard  "  with  rapidly  increasing 
anxiety,  as  he  saw  that  the  tompions  were  out  of  her 
guns  and  that  her  crew  were  evidently  at  quarters. 
He  instantly  repeated  the  order  to  prepare  for  battle, 
and  told  Gordon  to  hurry  the  men  to  their  stations 
quietly  without  drum-beat.  Gordon  hastened  down  to 
the  gun-deck  with  the  keys  of  the  magazine  ;  the  crew 
sprang  to  their  quarters  as  soon  as  they  understood 
the  order.  Barron,  aware  that  his  only  chance  was  to 
gain  time,  remained  at  the  gangway  and  replied 
through  his  trumpet :  "  I  do  not  hear  what  you  say." 
Captain  Humphreys  repeated  his  hail,  and  Barron 
again  replied  that  he  did  not  understand.  The  "  Leop 
ard  "  immediately  fired  a  shot  across  the  "  Chesa- 
peake's  "  bow  ; l  a  minute  later  another  shot  followed  ; 
and  in  two  minutes  more,  at  half-past  four  o'clock, 
the  "  Leopard "  poured  her  whole  broadside  of  solid 
shot  and  canister,  at  the  distance  of  one  hundred  and 
fifty  or  two  hundred  feet,  point-blank  into  the  helpless 
American  frigate.  Before  the  gunner  of  the  "Chesa 
peake"  got  to  his  magazine  he  heard  the  first  gun 
from  the  "  Leopard  ;  "  just  as  he  opened  and  entered 
the  magazine  the  "Leopard's"  broadside  was  fired. 
1  James's  Naval  History,  iv.  330. 


UNIVE 
1807.     THE   "CHESAPEAKE"  AND   "LEOPARD."       IT 


No  situation  could  be  more  trying  to  officers  and 
crew  than  to  be  thus  stationed  at  their  guns  without 
a  chance  to  return  a  fire.  The  guns  of  the  "  Chesa 
peake  "  were  loaded,  but  could  not  be  discharged  for 
want  of  lighted  matches  or  heated  loggerheads  ;  and 
even  if  discharged,  they  could  not  be  reloaded  until 
ammunition  should  be  handed  from  the  magazine. 
Time  was  required  both  to  clear  the  guns  and  to  fire 
them;  but  the  "Leopard's"  first  broadside  was  thrown 
just  as  the  creAV  were  beginning  to  clear  the  deck. 
The  crew  were  fresh  and  untrained  ;  but  no  complaint 
was  made  on  this  account,  —  all  were  willing  enough 
to  fight.  The  confusion  was  little  greater  than  might 
have  occurred  under  the  same  circumstances  in  the 
best-drilled  crew  afloat  ;  and  the  harshest  subsequent 
scrutiny  discovered  no  want  of  discipline,  except  that 
toward  the  end  a  few  men  left  their  guns,  declaring 
that  they  were  ready  to  fight  but  not  to  be  shot 
down  like  sheep.  About  the  magazine  the  confusion 
was  greatest,  for  a  crowd  of  men  and  boys  were 
clamoring  for  matches,  powder-flasks,  and  logger 
heads,  while  the  gunner  and  his  mates  were  doing 
their  utmost  to  pass  up  what  was  needed  ;  but  in 
reasonable  time  all  wants  could  have  been  supplied. 
On  the  upper  deck  both  officers  and  men  behaved 
well.  Barron,  though  naturally_miLch  excited,  showed 
both  sense  and  courage.  Standing  in  the  open  gang 
way  fully  exposed  to  the  "  Leopard's  "  guns,  he  was 
wounded  by  the  first  broadside,  but  remained  either 
there  or  011  the  quarter-deck  without  noticing  his 

VOL.  IV.  —  2 


18          HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  1. 

wound,  while  he  repeatedly  hailed  the  "  Leopard  "  in 
the  hope  of  gaining  a  moment's  time,  and  sent  officer 
after  officer  below  to  hurry  the  men  at  the  guns. 
Neither  among  the  officers  nor  among  the  crew  was 
courage  the  resource  that  tailed  them.  Many  of  the 
men  on  the  upper  deck  exposed  themselves  unneces 
sarily  to  the  flying  grapeshot  by  standing  on  the  guns 
and  looking  over  the  hammocks,  till  Barron  ordered 
them  down.  Careful  subsequent  inquiry  could  detect 
no  lack  of  gallantry  except  in  the  pilot,  who  when 
questioned  as  to  the  commodore's  behavior  had  the 
manliness  to  confess  his  alarm,  —  "I  was  too  bad 
scared  myself  to  observe  him  very  particularly." 

The  British  account,  which  was  very  exact,  said 
that  the  "  Leopard's "  fire  lasted  fifteen  minutes,  — 
from  4.30  to  4.45  P.M., —  during  which  time  three  full 
broadsides  were  discharged  without  return.  No  one 
could  demand  that  Commodore  Barron  should  subject 
his  crew  and  ship  to  a  longer  trial  when  he  had  no 
hope  of  success.  The  time  in  which  the  "  Leopard  " 
could  have  sunk  the  "  Chesapeake  "  might  be  a  mat 
ter  of  doubt ;  but  in  the  next  battle  between  similar 
ships,  five  years  afterward,  the  "  Constitution,"  with 
about  the  " Leopard's"  armament,  totally  disabled  the 
"  Guerriere  "  in  less  than  thirty  minutes,  so  that  she 
sank  within  twenty-four  hours,  —  though  at  the  time 
of  the  action  a  heavy  sea  was  running,  and  the  "  Guer 
riere  "  fought  desperately  with  her  whole  broadside 
of  twenty-five  guns.  June  22, 1807,  the  sea  was  calm  ; 
the  "  Leopard "  lay  quietly  within  pistol-shot ;  the 


1807.     THE  "CHESAPEAKE"   AND  "LEOPARD."       19 

"Chesapeake"  could  not  injure  her;  and  if  the  "Leop 
ard  "  was  as  well  fought  as  the  "  Constitution  "  she 
should  have  done  at  least  equal  damage.  'If  she  did 
not  succeed,  it  was  not  for  want  of  trying.  The 
official  survey,  taken  the  next  day,  showed  twenty- 
two  round-shot  in  the  "  Chesapeake's  "  hull,  ten  shot- 
holes  in  the  sails,  all  three  masts  badly  injured,  the 
rigging  much  cut  by  grape,  three  men  killed,  eight 
severely  and  ten  slightly  wounded,  including  Commo 
dore  Barron,  —  which  proved  that  of  the  seventy  or 
eighty  discharges  from  the  "  Leopard's  "  guns  a  large 
proportion  took  effect. 

After  enduring  this  massacre  for  fifteen  minutes, 
while  trying  to  fire  back  at  least  one  gun  for  the 
honor  of  the  ship,  Commodore  Barron  ordered  the 
flag  to  be  struck.  It  was  hauled  down  ;  and  as  it 
touched  the  taffrail  one  gun  was  discharged  from 
the  gun-deck  sending  a  shot  into  the  "  Leopard." 
This  single  gun  was  fired  by  the  third  lieutenant, 
Allen,  by  means  of  a  live  coal  which  he  brought  in 
hie  fingers  from  the  galley. 

The  boats  of  the  "  Leopard "  then  came  on  board, 
bringing  several  British  officers,  who  mustered  the 
ship's  company.  They  selected  the  three  Americans 
who  had  deserted  from  the  "  Melampus,"  and  were 
therefore  not  included  in  Berkeley's  order.  Twelve 
or  fifteen  others  were  pointed  out  as  English  desert 
ers,  but  these  men  were  not  taken.  After  a  search 
of  the  ship,  Jenkin  Ratford  was  dragged  out  of  the 
coal-hole ;  and  this  discovery  alone  saved  Captain 


20          HISTORY  OF    THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  1. 

• 
Humphreys  from  the  blame  of  committing  an  outrage 

not  only  lawless  but  purposeless.  At  about  seven 
o'clock  the  British  officers  left  the  ship,  taking  with 
them  the  three  Americans  and  Jenkin  Ratford.  Im 
mediately  afterward  Commodore  Barron  sent  Lieuten 
ant  Allen  on  board  the  "  Leopard  "  with  a  brief  letter 
to  Captain  Humphreys  :  - 

44 1  consider  the  frigate  4  Chesapeake'  your  prize,  and 
am  ready  to  deliver  her  to  any  officer  authorized  to  re 
ceive  her.  By  the  return  of  the  boat  I  shall  expect  your 
answer." 

The  British  captain  immediately  replied  as  follows  : 

44  Having  to  the  utmost  of  my  power  fulfilled  the  in 
structions  of  my  commander-in-chief ,  I  have  nothing  more 
to  desire,  and  must  in  consequence  proceed  to  join  the  re 
mainder  of  the  squadron,  —  repeating  that  I  am  ready  to 
give  you  every  assistance  in  my  power,  and  do  most  sin 
cerely  deplore  that  any  lives  should  have  been  lost  in  the 
execution  of  a  service  which  might  have  been  adjusted 
more  amicably,  not  only  with  respect  to  ourselves  but  the 
nations  to  which  we  respectively  belong." 

At  eight  o'clock  Barron  called  a  council  of  offi 
cers  to  consider  what  was  best  to  be  done  with  the 
ship,  and  it  was  unanimously  decided  to  return  to 
the  Roads  and  wait  orders.  Disgraced,  degraded, 
with  officers  and  crew  smarting  under  a  humiliation 
that  was  never  forgotten  or  forgiven,  the  unlucky 
"  Chesapeake "  dragged  her  way  back  to  Norfolk. 

There  she  lay  for  many  months.  Barren's  wrong- 
was  in  the  nature  of  a  crime.  His  brother  officers 


1807.      THE   "CHESAPEAKE"   AND   "LEOPARD."       21 

made  severe  comments  on  his  conduct ;  and  Captain 
Gordon  and  some  of  his  fellow-sufferers  joined  in  the 
cry.  One  of  his  harshest  critics  was  Stephen  Decatur. 
Public  sentiment  required  a  victim.  A  court  of  in 
quiry  which  sat  at  Norfolk  in  October  reported 
strongly  against  the  commodore.  He  was  charged 
with  neglect  of  duty,  with  having  failed  to  prepare 
his  ship  for  action,  with  having  surrendered  prema 
turely,  with  having  discouraged  his  men  ;  but  beneath 
all  these  charges  lay  an  unjust  belief  in  his  want  of 
courage.  After  six  months  delay,  Barren  was  brought 
before  a  court-martial  Jan.  4,  1808,  and  allowed  to 
make  his  defence. 

The  court-martial  took  place  at  Norfolk,  on  board 
the  "  Chesapeake,"-  —  his  own  ship,  which  recalled  at 
every  moment  his  disgrace.  The  judges  were  his 
juniors,  with  the  single  exception  of  Captain  John 
Rodgers,  who  was  president  of  the  court.  Among 
them  sat  Stephen  Decatur,  —  a  brilliant  officer,  but 
one  who  had  still  to  undergo  the  experience  of  striking 
his  flag  and  of  hearing  the  world  suspect  his  surren 
der  to  be  premature.  Decatur  held  strong  opinions 
against  Barron,  and  not  only  expressed  them  strongly, 
but  also  notified  Barron  of  them  in  order  that  he 
might,  if  he  pleased,  exercise  the  privilege  of  chal 
lenging.  Barron  made  no  objection,  and  Decatur  un 
willingly  kept  his  place.  In  other  respects  Barron 
was  still  more  hardly  treated  by  fortune ;  the  first 
lieutenant  of  the  "  Chesapeake  "  had  died  in  the  inter 
val  ;  Dr.  Bullus,  whose  evidence  was  of  the  utmost 


22  HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        OH.  i. 

importance,  could  not  appear ;  Captain  Gordon  turned 
against  him,  and  expressed  the  free  opinion  that 
Barron  had  never  meant  to  resist ;  Captains  Murray, 
Hull,  and  Chauncey,  on  the  court  of  inquiry,  had 
already  made  a  hostile  report ;  and  the  government 
prosecutor  pressed  every  charge  with  a  persistency 
that,  as  coming  from  the  Department,  seemed  almost 
vindictive. 

From  January  4  to  February  8  the  court-martial 
tried  charges  against  Barron,  after  which  it  continued 
until  February  22  trying  Captain  Gordon,  Captain 
Hall  of  the  marines,  and  William  Hook  the  gunner. 
The  result  of  this  long,  searching,  and  severe  investi 
gation  was  remarkable,  for  it  ended  in  a  very  elaborate 
decision 1  that  Barron  was  blameless  in  every  particu 
lar  except  one.  He  had  not  been  negljgent_of  his 
duty  ;  he  was  not  to  blame  for  omitting  to  call  the 
crew  to  quarters  before  he  received  Captain  Hum- 
phreys'  letter ;  he  did  well  in  getting  the  men  to 
quarters  secretly  without  drum-beat;  he  did  not  dis- 
courage  his  men ;  he  had  shown  coolness^ ^reflection, 
and  personal  courage  under  the  most  trying  circum- 
stances  ;  he  was  right  in  striking  his  flag  when  he 
did,  —  but  he  was  wrong  in  failing  to  prepare  for  ac 
tion  instantly  on  reading  Admiral  Berkeley's  order  ; 
and  for  this  mistake  he  was  condemned  to  suspen- 
sion  for  five  years  from  the  service,  without  pay  or 
emoluments. 

Barron  had  argued  that  although  his  judgment  on 
1  Court-martial,  pp.  337-350. 


1807.      THE   "CHESAPEAKE"   AND   "LEOPARD."        23 

this  point  proved  to  be  mistaken,  it  was  reasonable, 
and  in  accord  with  his  instructions.  He  produced 
the  orders  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  dated  May 
15,  1807,  written  with  full  knowledge  that  the  de 
serters  from  the  "  Melampus  "  had  been  claimed  by  the 
British  minister,  and  that  a  British  squadron  was 
lying  in  Chesapeake  Bay.  "  Our  interest  as  well  as 
good  faith  requires,"  said  the  secretary,  "...  that 
we  should  cautiously  avoid  whatever  may  have  a 
tendency  to  bring  us  into  collision  with  any  other 
Power."  Barren  urged  that  if  he  had  given  the  or 
der  to  prepare  for  battle  as  required  by  the  court- 
martial,  he  must  have  detained  by  force  the  British 
lieutenant  and  his  boat's  crew,  which  would  have  had 
a  direct  "  tendency  to  bring  us  into  collision,"  or  he 
must  have  let  them  go,  which  would  have  hurried  the 
collision.  He  said  that  he  had  tried  to  gain  time  by 
keeping  the  appearances  of  confidence  and  good-will. 
He  admitted  that  he  had  failed,  but  claimed  that 
the  failure  was  due  to  no  fault  which  could  have  been 
corrected  at  that  moment  by  those  means. 

The  defence  was  open  to  criticism,  especially  be 
cause  Barron  himself  could  claim  to  have  made  no 
use  of  the  time  he  gained.  Yet  perhaps,  on  the  whole, 
the  court-martial  might  have  done  better  to  punish 
Barron  for  his  want  of  caution  in  permitting  the 
British  frigate  to  approach.  This  was  his  first  error, 
which  could  not  be  retrieved ;  and  Barron  could 
hardly  have  complained  of  his  punishment,  even 
though  every  officer  in  the  service  knew  that  the  rule 


24          HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  1. 

of  going  to  quarters  in  such  cases  was  seldom  strictly 
observed.  The  President  and  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  could  alone  say  whether  Barren  had  understood 
their  orders  correctly,  and  whether  his  plea,  founded 
on  the  secretary's  instructions,  was  sound.  In  the 
light  of  Jefferson's  diplomacy,  Barren's  coarse  ac 
corded  with  his  instructions  ;  and  perhaps,  had  the 
President  claimed  his  own  share  in  the  "  Chesa- 
peake's  "  disaster,  he  would  have  refused  to  degrade 
a  faithful,  able,  and  gallant  seaman  for  obeying  the 
spirit  and  letter  of  his  orders.  Unfortunately  such 
an  interference  would  have  ruined  the  navy ;  and  so 
it  happened  that  what  Jefferson  had  so  long  foreseen 
took  place.  He  had  maintained  that  the  frigates 
were  a  mere  invitation  to  attack  ;  that  they  created 
the  dangers  they  were  built  to  resist,  and  tempted  the 
aggressions  of  Great  Britain,  which  would,  but  for 
these  ships,  find  no  object  to  covet ;  and  when  the 
prediction  turned  true,  he  was  still  obliged  to  main 
tain  the  character  of  the  service.  He  approved  the 
sentenjc^jiLJtJie_CQiiJljiiartial. 

So  far  as  the  service  was  concerned,  Barren's  pun 
ishment  was  not  likely  to  stimulate  its  caution,  for  no 
American  captain,  unless  he  wished  to  be  hung  by  his 
own  crew  at  his  own  yard-arm,  was  likely  ever  again 
to  let  a  British  frigate  come  within  gunshot  without 
taking  such  precautions  as  he  would  have  taken 
against  a  pirate ;  but  though  the  degradation  could 
do  little  for  the  service,  it  cost  Barron  his  honor,  and 
ended  by  costing  Decatur  his  life. 


1807.     THE   "CHESAPEAKE"   AND   "LEOPARD."        25 

Meanwhile,  Captain  Humphreys  reported  to  Captain 
Douglas  on  the  u  Bellona,"  and  Captain  Douglas  re 
ported  the  whole  affair  to  Admiral  Berkeley  at  Hali 
fax,  who  received  at  the  same  time  accounts  from 
American  sources.  The  admiral  immediately  wrote 
to  approve  the  manner  in  which  his  orders  had  been 
carried  out.  "  As  far  as  I  am  enabled  to  judge,"  he 
said  l  in  a  letter  to  Captain  Humphreys,  dated  July  4, 
"  you  have  conducted  yourself  most  properly."  The 
inevitable  touch  of  unconscious  comedy  was  not  want 
ing  in  the  British  admiral,  whose  character  recalled 
Smollett's  novels  and  memories  of  Commodore  Haw 
ser  Trunnion.  "  I  hope  you  mind  the  public  accounts 
which  have  been  published  of  this  affair  as  little 
as  I  do,"  he  continued ;  "  we  must  make  allowances 
for  the  heated  state  of  the  populace  in  a  country 
where  law  and  every  tie,  both  civil  and  religious,  is 
treated  so  lightly."  No  broader  humor  could  be 
found  in  "  Peregrine  Pickle "  than  in  one  breath  to 
approve  an  act  so  lawless  that  no  man  of  common- 
sense  even  in  England  ventured  to  defend  it  as  law 
ful,  and  in  the  next  to  read  the  Americans  a  moral 
lecture  on  their  want  of  law  and  religion  ;  yet  gro 
tesque  as  this  old-fashioned  naval  morality  might  be, 
no  man  in  England  noticed  either  its  humor  or  its 
absurdity. 

As  though  to  show  that  he  meant  no  humor  by  it, 
the  admiral,  August  25,  called  a  court-martial,  which 
the  next  day  sentenced  Jenkin  Ratford  to  be  hanged, 
1  Marshall's  Naval  Biography,  iv.  895, 


26          HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  i. 

and  the  three  American  deserters  from  the  "  Melain- 
pus  "  to  receive  five  hundred  lashes  each.  The  last 
part  of  the  sentence  was  not  carried  out,  and  the 
three  Americans  remained  quietly  in  prison ;  but  Au 
gust  31,  Jenkin  Ratford  was  duly  hanged  from  the 
f oreyard-arm  of  his  own  ship,  the  "  Halifax." 


CHAPTER  II. 

FOR  the  first  time  in  their  history  the  people  of  the 
United  States  learned,  in  June,  1807,  the  feeling  of  a 
true  national  emotion.  Hitherto  every  public  passion 
had  been  more  or  less  partial  and  one-sided  ;  even 
the  death  of  Washington  had  been  ostentatiously 
mourned  in  the  interests  and  to  the  profit  of  party : 
but  the  outrage  committed  on  the  "  Chesapeake " 
stung  through  hide-bound  prejudices,  and  made  demo 
crat  and  aristocrat  writhe  alike.  The  brand  seethed 
and  hissed  like  the  glowing  olive-stake  of  Ulysses 
in  the  Cyclops'  eye,  until  the  whole  American  people, 
like  Cyclops,  roared  with  pain  and  stood  frantic  on 
the  shore,  hurling  abuse  at  their  enemy,  who  taunted 
them  from  his  safe  ships.  The  mob  at  Norfolk,  furi-. 
ous  at  the  sight  of  their  dead  and  wounded  comrades 
from  the  "  Chesapeake,"  ran  riot,  and  in  the  want  of 
a  better  object  of  attack  destroyed  the  water-casks  i 
of  the  British  squadron.  July  29  the  town  forbade 
communication  with  the  ships  in  Lynnhaven  Bay, 
which  caused  Captain  Douglas  to  write  to  the  Mayor 
of  Norfolk  a  letter  much  in  the  tone  of  Admiral 
Berkeley. 


28          HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  2. 

"You  must  be  perfectly  aware,"  said  he,  "that  the 
British  flag  never  has  been,  nor  will  be,  insulted  with 
impunity.  You  must  also  be  aware  that  it  has  been,  and 
still  is,  in  my  power  to  obstruct  the  whole  trade  of  the 
Chesapeake  since  the  late  circumstance ;  which  I  desisted 
from,  trusting  that  general  unanimity  would  be  restored. 
.  .  .  Agreeably  to  my  intentions,  I  have  proceeded  to 
Hampton  Roads,  with  the  squadron  under  my  command, 
to  await  your  answer,  which  I  trust  you  will  favor  me 
with  without  delay." 

He  demanded  that  the  prohibition  of  intercourse 
should  be  "  immediately  annulled."  The  Mayor  sent 
Lyttleton  Tazewell  to  carry  an  answer  to  this  war 
like  demand  from  the  "  Bellona,"  and  Tazewell  was 
somewhat  surprised  to  find  Captain  Douglas  highly 
conciliatory,  and  unable  to  see  what  the  people  of 
Norfolk  could  have  found  in  his  letter  which  could  be 
regarded  as  "  menacing  ;  "  but  meanwhile  all  Virginia- 
was  aroused,  an  attack  on  Norfolk  was  generally  ex 
pected,  the  coast  was  patrolled  by  an  armed  force, 
and  the  British  men-of-war  were  threatened  by 
mounted  militia. 

In  the  Northern  States  the  feeling  was  little  less 
violent.  Public  meetings  were  everywhere  held.  At 
New  York,  July  2,  the  citizens,  at  a  meeting  over 
which  De  Witt  Clinton  presided,  denounced  "  the  das 
tardly  and  unprovoked  attack  "  on  the  "  Chesapeake," 
and  pledged  themselves  to  support  the  government 
"  in  whatever  measures  it  may  deem  necessary  to 
adopt  in  the  present  crisis  of  affairs."  At  Boston, 


1807.  DEMANDS   AND  DISAVOWALS.  29 

where  the  town  government  was  wholly  Federalist, 
a  moment  of  hesitation  occurred.1  The  principal 
Federalists  consulted  with  each  other,  and  decided 
not  to  call  a  town-meeting.  July  10  an  informal 
meeting  was  called  by  the  Republicans,  over  which 
Elbridge  Gerry  presided,  and  which  Senator  J.  Q. 
Adams  alone  among  the  prominent  Federalists  at 
tended.  There  also  a  resolution  was  adopted, 
pledging  cheerful  co-operation  "  in  any  measures, 
however  serious,"  which  the  Administration  might 
deem  necessary  for  the  safety  and  honor  of  the 
country.  In  a  few  days  public  opinion  compelled 
the  Federalists  to  change  their  tone.  A  town-meet 
ing  was  held  at  Faneuil  Hall  July  16,  and  Senator 
Adams  again  reported  resolutions,  which  were  unani 
mously  adopted,  pledging  effectual  support  to  the  gov 
ernment.  Yet  the  Essex  Junto  held  aloof ;  neither 
George  Cabot,  Theophilus  Parsons,  nor  Timothy 
Pickering  would  take  part  in  such  proceedings,  and 
the  Federalist  newspaper  which  was  supposed  to 
represent  their  opinions  went  so  far  as  to  assert 
that  Admiral  Berkeley's  doctrine  was  correct,  and 
that  British  men-of-war  had  a  right  to  take  deserters 
from  the  national  vessels  of  the  United  States.  In 
private,  this  opinion  was  hotly  maintained  ;  in  public, 
its  expression  was  generally  thought  unwise  in  face 
of  popular  excitement. 

President  Jefferson  was  at  Washington  June  25, 
the  day  when  news  of  the  outrage  arrived  ;  but  his 
1  New  England  Federalism,  p.  182. 


J 


30          HISTORY  OF   THE   UXTTED   STATES.        CH.  2. 

Cabinet  was  widely  scattered,  and  some  time  passed 
before  its  members  could  be  reassembled.  Gallatin 
was  last  to  arrive ;  but  July  2,  at  a  full  meeting,  the 
President  read  the  draft  of  a  proclamation,  which 
was  approved,  and  the  proclamation  issued  on  the 
same  day.  It  rehearsed  the  story  of  American 
injuries  and  forbearance,  and  of  British  aggressions 
upon  neutral  rights ;  and  so  moderate  was  its  tone 
as  to  convey  rather  the  idea  of  deprecation  than 
of  anger :  — 

"  Hospitality  under  such  circumstances  ceases  to  be  a 
duty ;  and  a  continuance  of  it,  with  such  uncontrolled 
abuses,  would  tend  only,  by  multiplying  injuries  and 
irritations,  to  bring  on  a  rupture  between  the  two  nations. 
This  extreme  resort  is  equally  opposed  to  the  interests  of 
both,  as  it  is  to  assurances  of  the  most  friendly  disposi 
tions  on  the  part  of  the  British  government,  in  the  midst 
of  which  this  outrage  has  been  committed.  In  this  light 
the  subject  cannot  but  present  itself  to  that  government, 
and  strengthen  the  motives  to  an  honorable  reparation  of 
the  wrong  which  has  been  done,  and  to  that  effectual 
control  of  its  naval  commanders  which  alone  can  justify 
the  government  of  the  United  States  in  the  exercise  of 
those  hospitalities  it  is  now  constrained  to  discontinue." 

With  this  preamble  the  proclamation  required  all 
armed  vessels  of  Great  Britain  to  depart  from  Ameri 
can  waters ;  and  in  case  of  their  failing  to  do  so,  the 
President  forbade  intercourse  with,  them,  and  prohi 
bited  supplies  to  be  furnished  them. 

At  the  same  Cabinet  meeting,  according  to  Jeffer- 


1807  DEMANDS   AND  DISAVOWALS.  31 

son's  memoranda,1  other  measures  were  taken.  The 
gunboats  were  ordered  to  points  where  attack  might 
be  feared.  The  President  was  to  u  recall  all  our 
vessels  from  the  Mediterranean,  by  a  vessel  to  be 
sent  express,  and  send  the  '  Revenge '  to  England 
with  despatches  to  our  minister  demanding  satisfac 
tion  for  the  attack  on  the  '  Chesapeake ; '  in  which 
must  be  included  —  (1)  a  disavowal  of  the  act  and 
of  the  principle  of  searching  a  public  armed  vessel; 
(2)  a  restoration  of  the  men  taken ;  (3)  a  recall  of 
Admiral  Berkeley.  Communicate  the  incident  which 
has  happened  to  Russia."  Two  days  afterward,  at 
another  Cabinet  meeting,  it  was  "  agreed  that  a  call 
of  Congress  shall  issue  the  fourth  Monday  of  August 
(24),  to  meet  the  fourth  Monday  in  October  (26), 
unless  new  occurrences  should  render  an  earlier  call 
necessary.  Robert  Smith  wished  an  earlier  call." 
He  was  not  alone  in  this  wish.  Gallatin  wrote 
privately  to  his  wife  that  he  wanted  an  immediate 
call,  and  that  the  chief  objection  to  it,  which  would 
not  be  openly  avowed,  was  the  unhealthiness  of 
Washington  city.2 

The  news  of  Captain  Douglas's  threatening  conduct 
and  language  at  Norfolk  produced  further  measures. 
July  5  "  it  was  agreed  to  call  on  the  governors  of  the 
States  to  have  their  quotas  of  one  hundred  thousand 
militia  in  readiness.  The  object  is  to  have  the  por 
tions  on  the  sea-coast  ready  for  any  emergency  ;  and 

1  Cabinet  Memoranda,  Jefferson  MSS. 

2  Adams's  Gallatin,  p.  358. 


32          HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  2. 

for  those  in  the  North  we  may  look  to  a  winter  expe 
dition  against  Canada."  July  7  it  was  "  agreed  to 
desire  the  Governor  of  Virginia  to  order  such  portion 
of  militia  into  actual  service  as  may  be  necessary  for 
defence  of  Norfolk  and  of  the  gunboats  at  Hampton 
and  in  Matthews  County."  Little  by  little  Jefferson 
was  drawn  into  preparations  for  actual  war. 

Even  among  earnest  Republicans  the  tone  of  Jeffer 
son's  proclamation  and  the  character  of  his  measures 
were  at  first  denounced  as  tame.  John  Randolph 
called  the  proclamation  an  "  apology  ;  "  Joseph  Nich 
olson  wrote  to  Gallatin  a  remonstrance. 

"But  one  feeling  pervades  the  nation,"  said  he;1 
"  all  distinctions  of  Federalism  and  Democracy  are  van 
ished.  The  people  are  ready  to  submit  to  any  depriva 
tion  ;  and  if  we  withdraw  ourselves  within  our  own  shell, 
and  turn  loose  some  thousands  of  privateers,  we  shall 
obtain  in  a  little  time  an  absolute  renunciation  of  the 
right  of  search  for  the  purposes  of  impressment.  A 
parley  will  prove  fatal ;  for  the  merchants  will  begin  to 
calculate.  They  rule  us,  and  we  should  take  them  before 
their  resentment  is  superseded  by  considerations  of  profit 
and  loss.  1  trust  in  God  the  '  Revenge '  is  going  out  to 
bring  Monroe  and  Pinkney  home." 

Gallatin,  who  had  hitherto  thrown  all  his  influence 
on  the  side  of  peace,  was  then  devoting  all  his 
energies  to  provision  for  war.  He  answered  Nichol 
son  that  the  tone  of  Government,  though  he  thought 

1  Nicholson  to  Gallatin,  July  14,  1807  ;  Adams's  Gallatin, 
p.  360. 


1807.  DEMANDS  AND  DISAVOWALS.  33 

it  correct,  was  of  little  consequence,  for  in  any  case 
the  result  would  be  the  same ;  he  was  confident 
that  England  would  give  neither  satisfaction  nor 
security.1 

44 1  will,  however,  acknowledge  that  on  that  particular 
point  I  have  not  bestowed  much  thought ;  for  having 
considered  from  the  first  moment  war  was  a  necessary 
result,  and  the  preliminaries  appearing  to  me  but  matters 
of  form,  my  faculties  have  been  exclusively  applied  to 
the  preparations  necessary  to  meet  the  times.  And  al 
though  I  am  not  very  sanguine  as  to  the  brilliancy  of  our 
exploits,  the  field  where  we  can  act  without  a  navy  being 
very  limited,  and  perfectly  aware  that  a  war,  in  a  great 
degree  passive,  and  consisting  of  privations,  will  become 
very  irksome  to  the  people,  I  feel  no  apprehension  of  the 
immediate  result.  We  will  be  poorer  both  as  a  nation 
and  as  a  government,  our  debt  and  taxes  will  increase, 
and  our  progress  in  every  respect  be  interrupted ;  but 
all  those  evils  are  not  only  not  to  be  put  in  competition 
with  the  independence  and  honor  of  the  nation,  they  are; 
moreover  temporary,  and  a  very  few  years  of  peace\ 
will  obliterate  their  effects.  Nor  do  I  know  whether  thej 
awakening  of  nobler  feelings  and  habits  than  avarice 
and  luxury  might  not  be  necessary  to  prevent  our  de 
generating,  like  the  Hollanders,  into  a  nation  of  mere 
calculators." 

Jefferson  followed  without  protest  the  impulse 
toward  war  ;  but  his  leading  thought  was  to  avoid  it. 
Peace  was  still  his  passion,  and  his  scheme  of  peace- 

1  Gallatin  to  Nicholson,  July  17,  1807  ;  Adams's  Gallatin, 
p.  361. 

VOL.  IT.  —  8 


34          HISTORY  OF   THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  2. 

ful  coercion  had  not  yet  been  tried.  Even  while  the 
nation  was  aflame  with  warlike  enthusiasm,  his  own 
mind  always  reverted  to  another  thought.  The  tone 
of  the  proclamation  showed  it ;  his  unwillingness  to 
call  Congress  proved  it ;  his  letters  dwelt  upon  it. 

"  We  have  acted  on  these  principles,"  he  wrote  in  re 
gard  to  England,1 — "  (1)  to  give  that  Government  an 
opportunity  to  disavow  and  make  reparation  ;  (2)  to  give 
ourselves  time  to  get  in  the  vessels,  property,  and  sea 
men  now  spread  over  the  ocean ;  (3)  to  do  no  act  which 
might  compromit  Congress  in  their  choice  between  war, 
non-intercourse,  or  any  other  measure." 

To  Vice-President  Clinton  he  wrote,2  that  since  the 
power  of  declaring  war  was  with  the  Legislature,  the 
Executive  should  do  nothing  necessarily  committing 
them  to  decide  for  war  in  preference  to  non-inter 
course,  "  which  will  be  preferred  by  a  great  many." 
Every  letter3  written  by  the  President  during  the 
crisis  contained  some  allusion  to  non-intercourse, 
which  he  still  called  the  "  peaceable  means  of  re 
pressing  injustice,  by  making  it  the  interest  of  the 
aggressor  to  do  what  is  just,  and  abstain  from  future 
wrong."  As  the  war  fever  grew  stronger  he  talked 
more  boldly  about  hostilities,  and  became  silent  about 

1  Jefferson  to  Bidwell,  July  11,  1807  ;  Works,  v.  125. 

2  Jefferson   to   the   Vice-President,  July  6,  1 807  ;  Works,  v. 
115. 

8  Jefferson  to  Governor  Cabell,  June  29,  1807,  Works,  v.  114; 
to  Mr.  Bowdoin,  July  10,  1807,  Works,  v.  123  ;  to  M.  Dupont, 
July  14,  1807,  Works,  v.  127;  to  Lafayette,  July  14,  1807,  Works, 
v.  129. 


1807.  DEMANDS  AND  DISAVOWALS.  35 

non-intercourse ; l  but  the  delay  in  calling  Congress 
was  certain  to  work  as  he  wished,  and  to  prevent  a 
committal  to  the  policy  of  war. 

To  no  one  was  this  working  of  Jefferson's  mind 
more  evident  than  to  General  Turreau,  whose  keen 
eyes  made  the  President  uneasy  under  the  sense  of 
being  watched  and  criticised.  Turreau,  who  had  left 
Washington  for  the  summer,  hurried  back  on  hearing 
of  the  "  Chesapeake  "  disaster.  On  arriving,  he 
went  the  same  evening  to  the  White  House,  "  where 
there  had  been  a  dinner  of  twenty  covers,  composed, 
they  say,  of  new  friends  of  the  Government,  to  whom 
Mr.  Madison  had  given  a  first  representation  two  days 
before.  Indeed,  I  knew  none  of  the  guests  except 
the  Ambassador  of  England  and  his  secretary  of 
legation.  The  President  received  me  even  better 
than  usual,  but  left  me,  presently,  to  follow  with 
the  British  minister  a  conversation  that  my  entrance 
had  interrupted."  2 

Then  came  a  touch  of  nature  which  Turreau 
thought  strikingly  characteristic.  No  strong  power 
of  imagination  is  needed  to  see  the  White  House 
parlor,  on  the  warm  summer  night,  with  Jefferson, 
as  Senator  Maclay  described  him,  sitting  in  a  loun 
ging  manner  on  one  hip,  with  his  loose,  long  figure, 
and  his  clothes  that  seemed  too  small  for  him,  talk 
ing,  without  a  break,  in  his  rambling,  disjointed  way, 

1  Jefferson  to  Colonel  Taylor,  Aug.  1,  1807  ;  Works,  v   148. 

2  Turreau  to  Talleyrand,  July  18,   1808  ;  Archives  ties  Aff. 
Etr.  MSS. 


36          HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.       CH.  2. 

showing  deep  excitement  under  an  affectation  of  cool 
ness,  and  at  every  word  and  look  betraying  himself 
to  the  prying  eyes  of  Talleyrand's  suspicious  agent. 
What  Jefferson  said,  and  how  he  said  it,  can  be 
told  only  in  Turreau's  version  ;  but  perhaps  the  few 
words  used  by  the  prejudiced  Frenchman  gave  a 
clearer  idea  of  American  politics  than  could  be  got 
from  all  other  sources  together :  — 

"  This  conversation  with  the  British  minister  having 
been  brought  to  an  end,  Mr.  Jefferson  came  and  sat 
down  by  my  side  ;  and  after  all  the  American  guests  had 
successively  retired,  Mr.  Erskine,  who  had  held  out 
longest, — in  the  hope,  perhaps,  that  I  should  quit  the 
ground,  —  went  away  also.  The  President  spoke  to  me 
about  the  <  Chesapeake '  affair,  and  said  :  '  If  the  English 
do  not  give  us  the  satisfaction  we  demand,  we  will  take 
Canada,  which  wants  to  enter  the  Union ;  and  when, 
together  with  Canada,  we  shall  have  the  Floridas,  we 
shall  no  longer  have  any  difficulties  with  our  neighbors ; 
and  it  is  the  only  way  of  preventing  them.  I  expected 
that  the  Emperor  would  return  sooner  to  Paris,  —  and 
then  this  affair  of  the  Floridas  would  be  ended.'  Then, 
changing  the  subject,  he  asked  me  what  were  the  means 
to  employ  in  order  to  be  able  to  defend  the  American 
harbors  and  coasts.  I  answered  that  the  choice  of  means 
depended  on  local  conditions,  and  that  his  officers,  after 
an  exact  reconnoissance,  ought  to  pronounce  on  the 
application  of  suitable  means  of  defence.  — '  We  have 
no  officers  !  ' —  He  treated  twenty-seven  different  sub 
jects  in  a  conversation  of  half  an  hour ;  and  as  he 
showed,  as  usual,  no  sort  of  distrust,  this  conversation 
of  fits  and  starts  (a  batons  rompus)  makes  me  infer  that 


1807.  DEMANDS  AND  DISAVOWALS.  37 

the  event  would  embarrass  him  much,  —  and  Mr.  Madison 
seemed  to  me  to  share  this  embarrassment.  .  .  .  Once 
for  all,  whatever  may  be  the  disposition  of  mind  here, 
though  every  one  is  lashing  himself  (se  batte  les  flancs) 
to  take  a  warlike  attitude,  I  can  assure  your  Highness 
that  the  President  does  not  want  war,  and  that  Mr. 
Madison  dreads  it  still  more.  I  am  convinced  that  these 
two  personages  will  do  everything  that  is  possible  to 
avoid  it,  and  that  if  Congress,  which  will  be  called 
together  only  when  an  answer  shall  have  arrived  from 
England,  should  think  itself  bound,  as  organ  of  public 
opinion,  to  determine  on  war,  its  intention  will  be 
crossed  by  powerful  intrigues,  because  the  actual  Admin 
istration  has  nothing  to  gain  and  everything  to  lose 
by  war." 

Turreau  was  not  the  only  observer  who  saw  beneath 
the  surface  of  American  politics.  The  young  British 
minister,  Erskine,  who  enlivened  his  despatches  by 
no  such  lightness  of  touch  as  was  usual  with  his 
French  colleague,  wrote  to  the  new  Foreign  Secre 
tary  of  England,  George  Canning,  only  brief  and  dry 
accounts  of  the  situation  at  Washington,  but  showed 
almost  a  flash  of  genius  in  the  far-reaching  policy 
he  struck  out. 

"•  The  ferment  in  the  public  mind,"  he  wrote  July  21, 1 
"  has  not  yet  subsided,  and  I  am  confirmed  in  the  opinion 
.  .  .  that  this  country  will  engage  in  war  rather  than  sub 
mit  to  their  national  armed  ships  being  forcibly  searched 
on  the  high  seas.  .  .  .  Should  his  Majesty  think  fit  to 
cause  an  apology  to  be  offered  to  these  States  on  ac- 

1  Erskine  to  Canning,  July  21,  1807  ;  MSS.  British  Archives. 


38  HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.       Cn.2. 

count  of  the  attack  of  his  Majesty's  ship  '  Leopard '  on 
the  United  States  frigate  '  Chesapeake,'  it  would  have 
the  most  powerful  effect  not  only  on  the  minds  of  the 
people  of  this  country,  but  would  render  it  impossible  for 
the  Congress  to  bring  on  a  war  upon  the  other  points  of 
difference  between  his  Majesty  and  the  United  States  at 
present  under  discussion." 

A  single  blow,  however  violent,  could  not  weld  a 
nation.  Every  one  saw  that  the  very  violence  of 
temper  which  made  the  month  of  July,  1807,  a  mo 
ment  without  a  parallel  in  American  history  since 
the  battle  of  Lexington,  would  be  followed  by  a  long 
reaction  of  doubt  and  discord.  If  the  President,  the 
Secretary  of  State,  and  great  numbers  of  their  stanch- 
est  friends  hesitated  to  fight  when  a  foreign  nation, 
after  robbing  their  commerce,  fired  into  their  ships 
of  war,  and  slaughtered  or  carried  off  their  fellow- 
citizens,  —  if  they  preferred  "  peaceable  means  of  re 
pressing  injustice  "  at  the  moment  when  every  nerve 
would  naturally  have  been  strung  to  recklessness  with 
the  impulse  to  strike  back,  —  it  was  in  the  highest 
degree  unlikely  that  they  would  be  more  earnest  for 
war  when  time  had  deadened  the  sense  of  wrong. 
Neither  England,  France,  nor  Spain  could  fail  to 
see  that  the  moment  when  aggression  ceased  to  be 
safe  had  not  yet  arrived. 

The  people  were  deeply  excited,  commerce  for  the 
moment  was  paralyzed,  no  merchant  dared  send  out  a 
ship,  and  the  country  resounded  with  cries  of  war 
when  the  "  Revenge "  sailed,  bearing  instructions  to 


1807.  DEMANDS   AND   DISAVOWALS.  39 

Monroe  to  demand  reparation  from  the  British  gov 
ernment.  These  instructions,  dated  July  6,  1807, 
were  framed  in  the  spirit  which  seemed  to  charac 
terize  Madison's  diplomatic  acts.  Specific  redress  for 
a  specific  wrong  appeared  an  easy  demand.  That  the 
attack  on  the  "  Chesapeake "  should  be  disavowed ; 
that  the  men  who  had  been  seized  should  be  re 
stored  ;  that  punctilious  exactness  of  form  should 
mark  the  apology  and  retribution,  —  was  matter  of 
course ;  but  that  this  special  outrage,  which  stood  on 
special  ground,  should  be  kept  apart,  and  that  its 
atonement  should  precede  the  consideration  of  every 
other  disputed  point,  was  the  natural  method  of  deal 
ing  with  it  if  either  party  was  serious  in  wishing  for 
peace.  Such  a  wound,  left  open  to  fester  and  smart, 
was  certain  to  make  war  in  the  end  inevitable.  Both 
the  President  and  Madison  wanted  peace  ;  yet  their 
instructions  to  Monroe  made  a  settlement  of  the 
"  Chesapeake "  outrage  impracticable  by  binding  it 
to  a  settlement  of  the  wider  dispute  as  to  impress 
ments  from  merchant  vessels. 

"  As  a  security  for  the  future,"  wrote  Madison,1  "  an 
entire  abolition  of  impressments  from  vessels  under  the 
flag  of  the  United  States,  if  not  already  arranged,  is  also 
to  make  an  indispensable  part  of  the  satisfaction." 

Among  the  many  impossibilities  which  had  been 
required  of  Monroe  during  the  last  four  years,  this 
was 'one  of  the  plainest.  The  demand  was  prelimi- 


Madison  to  Monroe,  July  6,  1807  ;  State  Papers,  iii.  183. 


40  HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        Cn.2. 

nary,  in  ordinary  diplomatic  usage,  to  a  declaration 
of  war ;  and  nothing  in  Jefferson's  Presidency  was 
more  surprising  than  that  he  should  have  thought 
such  a  policy  of  accumulating  unsettled  causes  for 
war  consistent  with  his  policy  of  peace. 

While  the  "  Revenge "  was  slowly  working  across 
the  Atlantic,  Monroe  in  London  was  exposed  to  the 
full  rigor  of  the  fresh  storm.  News  of  the  "  Chesa 
peake  "  affair  reached  London  July  25 ;  and  before 
it  could  become  public  Canning  wrote  to  Monroe  a 
private  note,1  cautiously  worded,  announcing  that  a 
"  transaction "  had  taken  place  "  off  the  coast  of 
America,"  the  particulars  of  which  he  was  not  at 
present  enabled  to  communicate,  and  was  anxious  to 
receive  from  Monroe :  — 

"But  whatever  the  real  merits  and  character  of  the 
transaction  may  turn  out  to  be,  Mr.  Canning  could  not 
forbear  expressing  without  delay  the  sincere  concern 
and  sorrow  which  he  feels  at  its  unfortunate  result, 
and  assuring  the  American  minister,  both  from  him 
self  and  on  the  behalf  of  his  Majesty's  government, 
that  if  the  British  officers  should  prove  to  have  been 
culpable,  the  most  prompt  and  effectual  reparation  shall 
be  afforded  to  the  government  of  the  United  States." 

When  on  Monday  morning,  July  27,  Monroe  read 
in  the  newspapers  the  account  of  what  had  taken 
place,  and  realized  that  Canning,  while  giving  out 
that  he  knew  not  the  particulars,  must  have  had 
Admiral  Berkeley's  official  report  within  his  reach 

1  Canning  to  Monroe,  July  25,  1807 ;  State  Papers,  iii.  187. 


1807.  DEMANDS   AND  DISAVOWALS.  41 

if  not  on  his  table,  the  American  minister  could  not 
but  feel  that  the  British  secretary  might  have  spoken 
with  more  frankness.  In  truth  ministers  were  wait 
ing  to  consult  the  law,  and  to  learn  whether  Berkeley 
could  be  sustained.  The  extreme  Tories,  who  wanted 
a  quarrel  with  the  United  States ;  the  reckless,  who 
were  delighted  with  every  act  of  violence,  which 
they  called  energy ;  the  mountebanks,  represented 
by  Cobbett,  who  talked  at  random  according  to  per 
sonal  prejudices,  —  all  approved  Berkeley's  conduct. 
The  Ministry,  not  yet  accustomed  to  office,  and  dis 
posed  to  assert  the  power  they  held,  could  not  easily 
reconcile  themselves  to  disavowing  a  British  admiral 
whose  popular  support  came  from  the  ranks  of  their 
own  party.  Seeing  this,  Monroe  became  more  and 
more  alarmed. 

The  tone  of  the  press  was  extravagant  enough 
to  warrant  despair.  July  27  the  "  Morning  Post," 
which  was  apt  to  draw  its  inspiration  from  the  For 
eign  Office,  contained  a  diatribe  on  the  "  Chesapeake  " 
affair. 

44  America,"  it  said,  "  is  not  contented  with  striking  at 
the  very  vitals  of  our  commercial  existence  ;  she  must  also, 
by  humbling  our  naval  greatness  and  disputing  our  su 
premacy,  not  only  lessen  us  in  our  own  estimation,  but 
degrade  us  in  the  eyes  of  Europe  and  of  the  world.  .  .  . 
It  will  never  be  permitted  to  be  said  that  the  *  Royal 
Sovereign'  has  struck  her  flag  to  a  Yankee  cockboat." 

In  the  whole  press  of  England,  the  "  Morning 
Chronicle "  alone  deprecated  an  American  war  or 


42          HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.        Cn.2. 

blamed  Berkeley's  act ;   and  the  "  Morning  Chroni 
cle"  was  the  organ  of  opposition. 

Monroe  waited  two  days,  and  heard  no  more 
from  Canning.  July  29,  by  a  previous  appointment, 
he  went  to  the  Foreign  Office  on  other  business.1 
He  found  the  Foreign  Secretary  still  reticent,  ad 
mitting  or  yielding  nothing,  but  willing  to  satisfy 
the  American  government  that  Berkeley's  order 
had  not  been  the  result  of  instructions  from  the 
Tory  ministry.  Monroe  said  he  would  send  a  note 
on  the  subject,  and  Canning  acquiesced.  Monroe 
on  the  same  day  sent  his  letter,  which  called  at 
tention  to  the  outrage  that  had  been  committed 
and  to  its  unjustifiable  nature,  expressing  at  the 
same  time  full  confidence  that  the  British  gov 
ernment  would  at  once  disavow  and  punish  the 
offending  officer.  The  tone  of  the  note,  though 
strong,  was  excellent,  but  on  one  point  did  not 
quite  accord  with  the  instructions  on  their  way  from 
Washington. 

"I  might  state,"  said  Monroe,  "other  examples  of 
great  indignity  and  outrage,  many  of  which  are  of  re 
cent  date ;  .  .  .  but  it  is  improper  to  mingle  them  with 
the  present  more  serious  cause  of  complaint." 

Monday,  August  3.  Canning  sent  a  brief  reply. 
Since  Monroe's  complaint  was  not  founded  on  official 
knowledge,  said  Canning,  the  King's  government  was 
not  bound  to  do  more  than  to  express  readiness  to 

1  Monroe  to  Madison,  Aug.  4,  1807  ;  State  Papers,  iii.  186. 


1807.  DEMANDS   AND   DISAVOWALS.  43 

make  reparation  if  such  reparation  should  prove  to 

be  due : l  — 

"  Of  the  existence  of  such  a  disposition  on  the  part  of 
the  British  government  you,  sir,  cannot  be  ignorant.  I 
have  already  assured  you  of  it,  though  in  an  unofficial 
form,  by  the  letter  which  I  addressed  to  you  on  the  first 
receipt  of  the  intelligence  of  this  unfortunate  transac 
tion  ;  and  I  may  perhaps  be  permitted  to  express  my 
surprise,  after  such  an  assurance,  at  the  tone  of  that  rep 
resentation  which  I  have  just  had  the  honor  to  receive 
from  you.  But  the  earnest  desire  of  his  Majesty  to 
evince  in  the  most  satisfactory  manner  the  principles 
of  justice  and  moderation  by  which  he  is  uniformly  ac 
tuated,  has  not  permitted  him  to  hesitate  in  commanding 
me  to  assure  you  that  his  Majesty  neither  does  nor  has  at 
any  time  maintained  the  pretension  of  a  right  to  search 
ships  of  war  in  the  national  service  of  any  State  for 
deserters." 

If  it  should  prove  that  Berkeley's  order  rested 
on  no  other  ground  than  the  simple  and  unqualified 
pretension  to  such  a  right,  the  King  had  no  difficulty 
in  disavowing  it,  and  would  have  none  in  showing  his 
displeasure  at  it. 

Although  Monroe  thought  this  reply  to  be  "  ad 
dressed  in  rather  a  harsh  tone,"  as  was  certainly  the 
case,  he  considered  it  intended  to  concede  the  essen 
tial  point,  and  he  decided  to  say  no  more  without  in 
structions.  He  might  well  be  satisfied,  for  Canning's 
"  surprise "  was  a  mild  expression  of  public  feeling. 

1  Canning  to  Monroe,  Aug.  3,  1807 ;  American  State  Papers, 
iii.  188. 


44  HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  2. 

Hitherto  the  British  press  had  shown  no  marked 
signs  of  the  insanity  which  sometimes  seized  a  peo 
ple  under  the  strain  of  great  excitement,  but  the 
"  Chesapeake  "  affair  revealed  the  whole  madness  of 
the  time.  August  6,  three  days  after  Canning  had 
disavowed  pretension  to  search  national  vessels,  the 
"  Morning  Post "  published  an  article  strongly  in 
favor  of  Berkeley  and  war.  "  Three  weeks  block 
ade  of  the  Delaware,  the  Chesapeake,  and  Boston 
Harbor  would  make  our  presumptuous  rivals  repent 
of  their  puerile  conduct."  August  5  the  "  Times " 
declared  itself  for  Berkeley,  and  approved  not  only 
his  order,  but  also  its  mode  of  execution.  The 
"  Courier "  from  the  first  defended  Berkeley.  Cob- 
bett's  peculiar  powers  of  mischief  were  never  more 
skilfully  exerted  :  — 

44 1  do  not  pretend  to  say  that  we  may  not  in  this  in 
stance  have  been  in  the  wrong,  because  there  is  nothing 
authentic  upon  the  subject ;  nor  am  I  prepared  to  say 
that  our  right  of  search,  in  all  cases,  extends  to  ships 
of  war.  But  of  this  I  am  certain,  that  if  the  laws  of 
nations  do  not  allow  you  to  search  for  deserters  in  a 
friend's  territory,  neither  do  they  allow  that  friend  to 
inveigle  away  your  troops  or  your  seamen,  to  do  which 
is  an  act  of  hostility ;  and  I  ask  for  no  better  proof  of 
inveigling  than  the  enlisting  and  refusing  to  give  up  such 
troops  or  seamen." 

Owing  to  his  long  residence  in  the  United  States, 
Cobbett  was  considered  a  high  authority  on  American 
affairs;  and  he  boldly  averred  that  America  could 


1807.  DEMANDS   AND  DISAVOWALS.  45 

not  go  to  war  without  destroying  herself  as  a  politi 
cal  body.  More  than  half  the  people  of  America,  he 
said,  were  already  disgusted  with  the  French  bias  of 
their  government. 

In  the  face  of  a  popular  frenzy  so  general,  Monroe 
might  feel  happy  to  have  already  secured  from  Can 
ning  an  express  disavowal  of  the  pretension  to  search 
ships  of  war.  He  was  satisfied  to  let  the  newspapers 
say  what  they  would  while  he  waited  his  instructions. 
A  month  passed  before  these  arrived.  September  3 
Monroe  had  his  next  interview,  and  explained  the 
President's  expectations,  —  that  the  men  taken  from 
the  "  Chesapeake "  should  be  restored,  the  offend 
ers  punished,  a  special  mission  sent  to  America  to 
announce  the  reparation,  and  the  practice  of  impress 
ment  from  merchant-vessels  suppressed.1  Canning 
listened  with  civility,  for  he  took  pride  in  tempering 
the  sternness  of  his  policy  by  the  courtesy  of  his  man 
ner.  He  made  no  serious  objection  to  the  President's 
demands  so  far  as  they  concerned  the  "  Chesapeake ; " 
but  when  Monroe  came  to  the  abandonment  of  im 
pressment  from  merchant-vessels,  he  civilly  declined 
to  admit  it  into  the  discussion. 

Monroe  wrote  the  next  day  a  note,2  founded  on 
his  instructions,  in  which  he  insisted  on  the  propo 
sition  which  he  had  expressly  discarded  in  his  note  of 
July  29,  that  the  outrages  rising  from  impressment 
in  general  ought  to  be  considered  as  a  part  of  the 

1  Monroe  to  Madison,  Oct.  10,  1807  ;  State  Papers,  iii.  191. 

2  Monroe  to  Canning,  Sept.  7,  1807  ;  State  Papers,  iii.  189. 


46          HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.        CH.  2. 

"  Chesapeake  "  affair ;  and  he  concluded  his  argument 
by  saying  that  his  Government  looked  on  this  com 
plete  adjustment  as  indispensably  necessary  to  heal 
the  deep  wound  which  had  been  inflicted  on  the 
national  honor  of  the  United  States.  After  the  se 
verity  with  which  Monroe  had  been  rebuked  for  dis 
regarding  his  instructions  on  this  point  barely  a  few 
months  before,  he  had  no  choice  but  to  obey  his 
orders  without  the  change  of  a  letter ;  but  he  doubt 
less  knew  in  advance  that  this  course  left  Canning 
master  of  the  situation.  The  British  government  was 
too  well  acquainted  with  the  affairs  of  America  to  be 
deceived  by  words.  That  the  United  States  would 
fight  to  protect  their  national  vessels  was  possible ; 
but  every  one  knew  that  no  party  in  Congress  could 
be  induced  to  make  war  for  the  protection  of  mer 
chant  seamen.  In  rejecting  such  a  demand,  not 
only  was  Canning  safe,  but  he  was  also  sure  of 
placing  the  President  at  odds  with  his  own  follow 
ers  and  friends. 

A  fortnight  was  allowed  to  pass  before  the  British 
government  replied.  Then,  September  23,  Canning 
sent  to  the  American  legation  an  answer.1  He  began 
by  requesting  to  know  whether  the  President's  procla 
mation  was  authentic,  and  whether  it  would  be  with 
drawn  on  a  disavowal  of  the  act  which  led  to  it; 
because,  as  an  act  of  retaliation,  it  must  be  taken 
into  account  in  adjusting  the  reparation  due.  He 
insisted  that  the  nationality  of  the  men  seized  must 

1  Canning  to  Monroe,  Sept.  23,  1807;  State  Papers,  iii.  199. 


1807.  DEMANDS   AND  DISAVOWALS.  47 

also  be  taken  into  account,  not  as  warranting  their 
unauthorized  seizure,  but  as  a  question  of  redress 
between  government  and  government.  In  respect  to 
the  general  question  of  impressment  in  connection 
with  the  specific  grievance  of  the  "  Chesapeake,"  he 
explained  at  some  length  the  different  ground  on 
which  the  two  disputes  rested ;  and  while  profes 
sing  his  willingness  to  discuss  the  regulation  of  the 
practice,  he  affirmed  the  rights  of  England,  which, 
he  said, — 

"  existed  in  their  fullest  force  for  ages  previous  to  the 
establishment  of  the  United  States  of  America  as  an 
independent  government ;  and  it  would  be  difficult  to 
contend  that  the  recognition  of  that  independence  can 
have  operated  any  change  in  this  respect,  unless  it  can 
be  shown  that  in  acknowledging  the  government  of  the 
United  States,  Great  Britain  virtually  abdicated  her  own 
rights  as  a  naval  Power,  or  unless  there  were  any  express 
stipulations  by  which  the  ancient  and  prescriptive  usages 
of  Great  Britain,  founded  in  the  soundest  principles  of 
natural  law,  though  still  enforced  against  other  indepen 
dent  nations  of  the  world,  were  to  be  suspended  whenever 
they  might  come  in  contact  with  the  interests  or  the  feel 
ings  of  the  American  people." 

After  disposing  of  the  matter  with  this  sneer,  Can 
ning  closed  by  earnestly  recommending  Monroe  to 
consider  whether  his  instructions  might  not  leave  him 
at  liberty  to  adjust  the  case  of  the  "Chesapeake" 
by  itself :  — 

"  If  your  instructions  leave  you  no  discretion,  I  cannot 
press  you  to  act  in  contradiction  to  them.  In  that  case 


48  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  2. 

there  can  be  no  advantage  in  pursuing  a  discussion  which 
you  are  not  authorized  to  conclude  ;  and  I  shall  have  only 
to  regret  that  the  disposition  of  his  Majesty  to  terminate 
that  difference  amicably  and  satisfactorily  is  for  the  pres 
ent  rendered  unavailing. 

"  In  that  case  his  Majesty,  in  pursuance  of  the  dispo 
sition  of  which  he  has  given  such  signal  proofs,  will  lose 
no  time  in  sending  a  minister  to  America,  furnished  with 
the  necessary  instructions  and  powers  for  bringing  this 
unfortunate  dispute  to  a  conclusion  consistent  with  the 
harmony  subsisting  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States ;  but  in  order  to  avoid  the  inconvenience  which 
has  arisen  from  the  mixed  nature  of  your  instructions, 
that  minister  will  not  be  empowered  to  entertain,  as  con 
nected  with  this  subject,  any  proposition  respecting  the 
search  of  merchant-vessels." 

Monroe  replied,1  September  29,  that  his  instruc 
tions  were  explicit,  and  that  he  could  not  separate 
the  two  questions.  He  closed  by  saying  that  Can 
ning's  disposition  and  sentiments  had  been  such 
as  inspired  him  with  great  confidence  that  they 
should  soon  have  been  able  to  bring  the  dispute 
to  an  honorable  and  satisfactory  conclusion.  With 
this  letter  so  far  as  concerned  Monroe,  the  "  Chesa 
peake"  incident  came  to  its  end  in  failure  of 
redress. 

One  more  subject  remained  for  Monroe  to  finish. 
His  unfortunate  treaty  returned  by  Madison  with  a 
long  list  of  changes  and  omissions,  had  been  made  by 
Monroe  and  Pinkney  the  subject  of  a  letter  to  Can- 

1  Monroe  to  Canning,  Sept.  29,  1807;  State  Papers,  iii.  201. 


1807.  DEMANDS  AND  DISAVOWALS.  49 

ning  as  early  as  July  24 ; 1  but  the  affair  of  the 
"  Chesapeake  "  intervened,  and  Canning  declined  to 
touch  any  other  subject  until  this  was  adjusted.  No 
sooner  did  he  succeed  in  referring  the  "  Chesapeake  " 
negotiation  to  Washington  than  he  turned  to  the 
treaty.  That  a  measure  which  had  been  the  most 
unpopular  act  of  an  unpopular  Whig  ministry  could 
expect  no  mercy  at  Canning's  hands,  was  to  be  ex 
pected  ;  but  some  interest  attached  to  the  manner  of 
rejection  which  he  might  prefer.  In  a  formal  note, 
dated  October  22,  Canning  addressed  the  American 
government  in  a  tone  which  no  one  but  himself  could 
so  happily  use,  —  a  tone  of  mingled  condescension 
and  derision.2  He  began  by  saying  that  his  Majesty 
could  not  profess  to  be  satisfied  that  the  American 
government  had  taken  effectual  steps  in  regard  to 
the  Berlin  Decree  ;  but  the  King  had  nevertheless 
decided,  in  case  the  President  should  ratify  Monroe's 
treaty,  to  ratify  it  in  his  turn,  "  reserving  to  himself 
the  right  of  taking,  in  consequence  of  that  decree, 
and  of  the  omission  of  any  effectual  interposition  on 
the  part  of  neutral  nations  to  obtain  its  revocation, 
such  measures  of  retaliation  as  his  Majesty  might 
judge  expedient."  Without  stopping  to  explain  what 
value  a  ratification  under  such  conditions  would  have, 
Canning  continued  that  the  President  had  thought 

1  Monroe   and   Pinkney  to   Canning,   July   24,   1807 ;  State 
Papers,  iii.  194. 

2  Canning  to   Monroe  and  Pinkney,    Oct.    22,    1807;    State 
Papers,  iii.  198. 

VOL.  iv.  —  4 


50          HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.       CH.  2. 

proper  to   propose   alterations    in   the   body   of   the 
treaty :  — 

' '  The  undersigned  is  commanded  distinctly  to  protest 
against  a  practice  altogether  unusual  in  the  political  trans 
actions  of  States,  by  which  the  American  government 
assumes  to  itself  the  privilege  of  revising  and  altering 
agreements  concluded  and  signed  on  its  behalf  by  its 
agents  duly  authorized  for  that  purpose,  of  retaining  so 
much  of  those  agreements  as  may  be  favorable  to  its  own 
views,  and  of  rejecting  such  stipulations,  or  such  parts 
of  stipulations,  as  are  conceived  to  be  not  sufficiently 
beneficial  to  America." 

Without  discussing  the  correctness  of  Canning's 
assertion  that  the  practice  was  "  altogether  unusual 
in  the  political  transactions  of  States,"  Monroe  and 
Pinkney  might  have  replied  that  every  European 
treaty  was  negotiated,  step  by  step,  under  the  eye 
of  the  respective  governments,  and  that  probably  no 
extant  treaty  had  been  signed  by  a  British  agent  in 
Europe  without  first  receiving  at  every  stage  the  ap 
proval  of  the  King.  No  American  agent  could  con 
sult  his  government.  Canning  was  officially  aware 
that  Monroe  and  Pinkney,  in  signing  their  treaty,  had 
done  so  at  their  own  risk,  in  violation  of  the  Presi 
dent's  orders.  The  requirement  that  the  President 
of  the  United  States  should  follow  European  rules 
was  unreasonable  ;  but  in  the  actual  instance  Can 
ning's  tone  was  something  more  than  unreasonable. 
His  own  note  assumed  for  the  British  government 
"  the  privilege  of  revising  and  altering "  whatever 


1807.  DEMANDS   AND  DISAVOWALS.  51 

provisions  of  the  treaty  it  pleased ;  and  after  a  condi 
tion  so  absolute,  he  violated  reciprocity  in  rejecting 
conditions  made  by  the  President  because  they  were 
"  unusual  in  the  political  transactions  of  States  :  " 

"The  undersigned  is  therefore  commanded  to  apprise 
the  American  commissioners  that,  although  his  Majesty 
will  be  at  all  times  ready  to  listen  to  any  suggestions 
for  arranging,  in  an  amicable  and  advantageous  manner, 
the  respective  interests  of  the  two  countries,  the  proposal 
of  the  President  of  the  United  States  for  proceeding 
to  negotiate  anew  upon  the  basis  of  a  treaty  already 
solemnly  concluded  and  signed,  is  a  proposal  wholly 
inadmissible." 

With  this  denial  of  the  right  of  others  to  exercise 
arbitrary  methods,  Canning  declared  the  field  open 
for  the  British  government  to  give  full  range  to  its 
arbitrary  will.  A  week  afterward  Monroe  left  Lon 
don  forever.  He  had  taken  his  audience  of  leave 
October  7,  and  resigned  the  legation  to  Pinkney. 
October  29  he  started  for  Portsmouth  to  take  ship 
for  Virginia.  His  diplomatic  career  in  Europe  was  at 
an  end ;  but  these  last  failures  left  him  in  a  state  of 
mind  easy  to  imagine,  in  which  his  irritation  with 
Jefferson  and  Madison,  the  authors  of  his  incessant 
misfortunes,  outran  his  suspicions  of  Canning,  whose 
pretence  of  friendship  had  been  dignified  and  smooth. 

For  reasons  to  be  given  hereafter,  the  Ministry  de 
cided  to  disavow  Admiral  Berkeley's  attack  on  the 
"  Chesapeake ; "  but  in  order  to  provide  against  the 
reproach  of  surrendering  British  rights,  a  proclama- 


52  HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  2. 

tion1  almost  as  offensive  to  the  United  States  as 
Admiral  Berkeley's  order  was  issued,  October  16. 
Beginning  with  the  assertion  that  great  numbers  of 
British  seamen  "  have  been  enticed  to  enter  the  ser 
vice  of  foreign  States,  and  are  now  actually  serving  as 
well  on  board  the  ships  of  war  belonging  to  the  said 
foreign  States  as  on  board  the  merchant-vessels  be 
longing  to  their  subjects,"  the  proclamation  ordered 
such  seamen  to  return  home,  and  commanded  all 
naval  officers  to  seize  them,  without  unnecessary  vio 
lence,  in  any  foreign  merchant-vessels  where  they 
might  be  found,  and  to  demand  them  from  the  cap 
tains  of  foreign  ships  of  war,  in  order  to  furnish 
government  with  the  necessary  evidence  for  claim 
ing  redress  from  the  government  which  had  detained 
the  British  seamen.  Further,  the  proclamation  gave 
warning  that  naturalization  would  not  be  regarded  as 
relieving  British  subjects  of  their  duties,  but  that, 
while  such  naturalized  persons  would  be  pardoned 
if  they  returned  immediately  to  their  allegiance,  all 
such  as  should  serve  on  ships-of-war  belonging  to 
any  State  at  enmity  with  England  would  be  guilty  of 
high  treason,  and  would  be  punished  with  the  utmost 
severity  of  the  law. 

That  the  British  public,  even  after  the  battle  of 
Trafalgar  and  the  firing  upon  the  "  Chesapeake," 
might  have  felt  its  pride  sufficiently  flattered  by  such 
a  proclamation  seemed  only  reasonable  ;  for  in  truth 
this  proclamation  forced  war  upon  a  government  which 
1  American  State  Papers,  iii.  25. 


1807.  DEMANDS  AND  DISAVOWALS.  53 

wished  only  to  escape  it,  and  which  cowered  for  years 
in  submission  rather  than  fight  for  what  it  claimed  as 
its  due ;  but  although  to  American  ears  the  proclama 
tion  sounded  like  a  sentence  of  slavery,  the  British 
public  denounced  it  as  a  surrender  of  British  rights. 
The  "  Morning  Post,"  October  20  and  22,  gave  way  to 
a  paroxysm  of  wrath  against  ministers  for  disavow 
ing  and  recalling  Berkeley.  "  With  feelings  most 
poignantly  afflicting,"  it  broke  into  a  rhapsody  of  un 
restrained  self-will.  The  next  day,  October  23,  the 
same  newspaper  —  then  the  most  influential  in  the 
kingdom  —  pursued  the  subject  more  mildly  :  — 

"Though  the  British  government,  from  perhaps  too 
rigid  an  adherence  to  the  law  of  nations,  outraged  as 
they  are  by  the  common  enemy,  may,  however  irritated 
by  her  conduct,  display  a  magnanimous  forbearance  to 
ward  so  insignificant  a  Power  as  America,  they  will  not, 
we  are  persuaded,  suffer  our  proud  sovereignty  of  the 
ocean  to  be  mutilated  by  any  invasion  of  its  just  rights 
and  prerogatives.  Though  the  right,  tacitly  abandoned 
for  the  last  century,  may  be  suffered  to  continue  dor 
mant,  the  Americans  must  not  flatter  themselves  that  the 
principle  will  be  permitted  to  have  any  further  extent. 
In  the  mildness  of  our  sway  we  must  not  suffer  our  sove 
reignty  to  be  rebelled  against  or  insulted  with  impunity. 
.  .  .  The  sovereignty  of  the  seas  in  the  hands  of  Great 
Britain  is  an  established,  legitimate  sovereignty,  —  a  sove 
reignty  which  has  been  exercised  on  principles  so  equi 
table,  and  swayed  with  a  spirit  so  mild,  that  the  most 
humble  of  the  maritime  Powers  have  been  treated  as  if 
they  were  on  a  perfect  equality  with  us." 


54  HISTORY  OF   THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  2. 

The  same  lofty  note  ran  through  all  the  "  Morning 
Post's  "  allusions  to  American  affairs  :  — 

"A  few  short  months  of  war,"  said  a  leading  article, 
October  24,  "would  convince  these  desperate  politicians 
of  the  folly  of  measuring  the  strength  of  a  rising,  but 
still  infant  and  puny,  nation  with  the  colossal  power  of 
the  British  empire." 

The  "  Times "  declared  that  the  Americans  could 
not  even  send  an  ambassador  to  France,  —  could 
hardly  pass  to  Staten  Island,  —  without  British  per 
mission.1  "  Right  is  power  sanctioned  by  custom," 
said  the  "  Times ; "  and  October  20  and  22  it  joined 
the  "  Morning  Post "  in  denouncing  the  disavowal  of 
Berkeley.  The  "  Morning  Chronicle  "  alone  resisted 
the  torrent  which  was  sweeping  away  the  traditions 
of  English  honor. 

"  Our  Government,"  it  said,2  in  support  of  its  enemy, 
Canning,  "in  acting  with  prudence  and  wisdom,  have  to 
resist  the  pressure  of  a  spirit  not  popular,  like  that  in 
America,  but  as  violent  and  as  ignorant,  with  the  addition 
of  being  in  the  highest  degree  selfish  and  sordid." 

In  the  case  of  the  "  Chesapeake  "  the  Ministry  re 
sisted  that  "  selfish  and  sordid  "  interest ;  but  Ameri 
cans  soon  learned  that  the  favor,  such  as  it  was, 
had  been  purchased  at  a  price  beyond  its  value. 
Canning's  most  brilliant  stroke  was  for  the  moment 
only  half  revealed. 

1  The  Times,  Aug.  26,  1807. 

2  The  Morning  Chronicle,  Aug.  6,  1807. 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE  new  Ministry  which  succeeded  "  All  the  Tal 
ents"  and  took  seat  in  Parliament  April  8,  1807, 
represented  everything  in  English  society  that  was 
most  impervious  to  reason.  In  its  origin  a  creature 
of  royal  bigotry  trembling  on  the  verge  of  insanity, 
before  it  had  been  a  few  short  weeks  in  office  every 
liberal  or  tolerant  Englishman  was  shocked  to  find 
that  this  band  of  Tories,  whose  prejudices  were  such 
as  modern  society  could  scarcely  understand,  and  who 
had  been  forced  into  office  by  the  personal  will  of 
an  almost  imbecile  King,  did  in  reality  represent  a 
great  reaction  of  the  English  people  against  tolerant 
principles,  and  reflected  the  true  sense  of  the  nation 
as  it  had  never  been  reflected  'by  Grenville  or  Fox. 
Parliament  was  dissolved  April  27,  though  only  four 
months  old ;  and  June  22,  when  the  "  Leopard  "  was 
firing  into  the  "  Chesapeake,"  the  new  Parliament 
met  at  Westminster  Hall,  with  a  ministerial  majority 
of  more  than  two  hundred  country  squires,  elected  on 
the  cry  that  the  Church  was  in  danger. 

From  its  nominal  head,  this  Ministry  was  called  the 
Portland  administration ;  but  its  leader  was  Spencer 
Perceval,  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  and  its 


56  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  3, 

mouthpiece  was  George  Canning,  the  Foreign  Secre 
tary.  These  two  commoners  —  men  of  no  special 
family  connection,  of  no  estates,  and  little  so-called 
"  stake  in  the  country  "  —  guided  the  aristocratic  and 
conservative  society  of  England,  and  exaggerated  its 
tendencies.  In  modern  days  little  is  remembered  of 
Spencer  Perceval  except  that  he  became  at  last  one 
of  the  long  list  of  victims  to  lunatic  assassins ;  but 
for  a  whole  generation  no  English  Liberal  mentioned 
the  name  of  the  murdered  prime  minister  without 
recalling  the  portrait  drawn  by  Sydney  Smith  in  the 
wittiest  and  keenest  of  his  writings,1  in  which 
Perceval  was  figured  as  living  at  Hampstead  upon 
stewed  meats  and  claret,  and  walking  to  church  every 
Sunday  before  eleven  young  gentlemen  of  his  own 
begetting,  with  their  faces  washed  and  their  hair 
pleasingly  combed. 

In  Sydney  Smith's  caricature  there  was  little  exag 
geration.  Spencer  Perceval  was  forty-five  years  old, 
a  lawyer  of  the  best  character,  devoted  to  his  family, 
his  church,  and  sovereign ;  a  man  after  Lord  Eldon's 
heart,  who  brought  to  the  Treasury  Bench  the  legal 
knowledge  and  mental  habits  of  a  leader  at  the  Chan 
cery  Bar  and  the  political  morality  of  a  lawyer's 
brief.  The  criticism  was  not  less  revolting  than  re 
markable,  that  many  of  the  men  whose  want  of  politi 
cal  morality  was  most  conspicuous  in  this  story  were, 
both  in  England  and  in  America,  models  of  private 
respectability  and  fanatical  haters  of  vice.  That 
1  Peter  Plymley's  Letters,  ix. 


1807.  PERCEVAL   AND  CANNING.  57 

Timothy  Pickering  and  Roger  Griswold  should  join 
hands  with  Aaron  Burr  was  less  wonderful  than  that 
Spencer  Perceval  and  his  friend  James  Stephen,  the 
author  of  "  War  in  Disguise,"  should  adopt  the  vio 
lence  of  Napoleon  as  the  measure  of  their  own 
morals,  and  avow  that  they  meant  to  respect  no 
other  standard.  With  the  same  voice  Spencer  Per 
ceval  expressed  fear  lest  calling  Parliament  on  a 
Monday  should  lead  members  into  Sunday  travel,  and 
justified  the  bombardment  of  Copenhagen  and  the 
robbery  of  American  commerce. 

The  Whigs  thought  little  of  his  abilities.  Sydney 
Smith,  who  delighted  to  ridicule  him,  said  that  he 
had  the  head  of  a  country  parson  and  the  tongue  of 
an  Old  Bailey  lawyer.1  The  Tories  admired  and 
followed  him  as  readily  as  they  had  once  followed 
Pitt ;  but  to  an  American,  necessarily  prejudiced, 
Sydney  Smith's  estimate  seemed  just.  Every  Ameri 
can  critic  placed  Perceval  in  an  order  of  intelligence 
not  only  below  the  Whigs,  but  below  Lord  Sidmouth. 
When  confronted  with  the  dulness  of  Spencer  Per 
ceval,  Americans  could  even  feel  relief  in  the  sarcasm 
of  George  Canning,  which,  unlike  Perceval's  speeches, 
had  at  least  the  merit  of  rhetoric. 

Of  George  Canning,  who  passed  so  rapidly  across 
the  scene,  and  yet  left  so  sharp  an  impression  on  the 
memory  of  America,  something  must  be  said,  if  only 
to  explain  how  a  man  so  gifted,  and  in  later  life  so 
different  in  influence,  should  have  thought  it  worth 
1  Peter  Plymley's  Letters,  i. 


58  HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  3. 

his  while  to  challenge  the  hatred  of  a  people  whose 
future  he,  unlike  his  colleague  Perceval,  had  imagi 
nation  enough  to  foresee.  George  Canning  was 
thirty-seven  years  old  when  he  took  charge  of  the 
Foreign  office.  His  father,  who  came  from  a  very 
respectable  but  in  no  way  eminent  family,  died  in 
1771 ;  his  mother  having  no  means  of  support  be 
came  a  provincial  actress,  and  the  boy  was  adopted  by 
an  uncle,  who  sent  him  to  Eton  and  Oxford.  He  left 
Oxford  at  the  time  when  the  French  Revolution 
promised  a  new  birth  to  Europe,  and  Canning  was 
then  a  warm  Republican  from  sympathy  and  convic 
tion.  The  political  reaction  which  followed  swept 
the  young  man  to  the  opposite  extreme ;  and  his 
vehemence  for  monarchy  and  the  Tories  gave  point 
to  a  Whig  sarcasm,  —  that  men  had  often  been 
known  to  turn  their  coats,  but  this  was  the  first  time 
that  a  boy  had  turned  his  jacket.  In  consequence 
of  his  conversion  Pitt  brought  him  into  Parliament 
in  1793,  and  placed  him  in  office  in  1796.  In  the 
hotbed  of  Pitt's  personal  favor l  Canning's  natural 
faults  were  stimulated,  until  the  irritation  caused 
by  his  sarcastic  wit  and  by  what  the  stolid  gentry 
thought  his  flippancy  roused  a  sort  of  insurrection 
against  him.  Few  men  were  more  admired,  and  none 
was  more  feared  or  hated  ;  for  it  was  impossible  to 
say  what  time-honored  monument  he  might  overthrow 
in  defending. 

No  man  in  England  flung  himself  more  violently 
1  Malmesbury's  Diary,  iv.  376. 


1807.  PERCEVAL   AND   CANNING.  59 

into  the  reaction  against  Republican  ideas  than  this 
young  Republican  of  1789.  Canning's  contempt  was 
unbounded  for  everything  that  savored  of  liberal 
principles ;  and  in  following  the  impulses  of  his 
passion  he  lost  whatever  political  morality  he  had  pos 
sessed.  If  one  act  in  Bonaparte's  career  concentrated 
more  than  another  the  treason  and  violence  of  a 
lifetime,  it  was  the  coup  d'etat  of  the  18th  Brumaire, 
in  1799,  when  he  drove  the  Legislature  at  the  point 
of  the  bayonet  from  the  hall  at  St.  Cloud,  and  annihi 
lated  French  liberty,  as  he  hoped,  forever;  yet  this 
act,  which  might  have  been  applauded  by  some 
English  statesmen  whose  heads  paid  on  Tower  Hill 
the  penalty  for  such  treason  to  the  liberties  of  their 
own  country,  threw  Canning  into  paroxysms  of 
delight. 

u  Huzza!  huzza!  huzsa !  "  he  wrote1  on  hearing  the 
news;  "for  no  language  but  that  of  violent  and  tumul 
tuous  and  triumphant  exclamation  can  sufficiently  de 
scribe  the  joy  and  satisfaction  which  I  feel  at  this 
complete  overthrow  and  extinction  of  all  the  hopes  of 
the  proselytes  to  new  principles.  ...  It  is  the  lasting 
ridicule  thrown  upon  all  systems  of  democratic  equality, 
—  it  is  the  galling  conviction  carried  home  to  the  minds 
of  all  the  brawlers  for  freedom  in  this  and  every  other 
country,  —  that  there  never  was,  nor  will  be,  nor  can  be, 
a  leader  of  a  mob  faction  who  does  not  mean  to  be  the 
lord  and  not  the  servant  of  the  people.  It  is  this  that 
makes  the  name  of  Bonaparte  dear  to  me.  .  .  .  Hence- 

1  Canning  to  Boringdon,  Nov.  19,  1799;  Stupleton's  Canning, 
p.  43. 


60  HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  3. 

forth,  with  regard  to  France  and  the  principles  of  France, 
or  to  any  country  similarly  circumstanced  as  to  extent, 
population,  manners,  etc.,  Republican  and  fool  are  sy 
nonymous  terms." 

Canning  had  several  qualities  in  common  with 
Bonaparte,  and  one  of  them  was  the  habit  of  classify 
ing  under  the  head  of  fools  persons  whose  opinions 
he  did  not  fancy,  —  from  the  man  who  believed  in  a 
republic  to  the  man  who  liked  dry  champagne.  In 
his  mouth  such  persons  were  either  fools  or  liars ; 
and  Americans,  with  few  exceptions,  came  under  one 
or  the  other  of  these  heads.  After  the  18th  Brumaire 
the  world  contained  but  one  leader  of  a  mob  faction, 
brawling  for  liberty ;  but  he  was  President  of  the 
United  States.  No  miraculous  sagacity  was  needed 
to  foretell  what  treatment  he  was  likely  to  receive  at 
the  hands  of  two  men  like  Canning  and  Bonaparte, 
should  the  empire  of  the  world  ever  be  divided  be 
tween  them.  To  throw  lasting  ridicule  upon  all 
systems  of  democratic  equality  was  Canning's  most 
passionate  wish,  and  his  success  was  marvellous. 
Even  his  squibs  exploded  like  rockets.  In  literature, 
his  "  Needy  Knife-grinder  "  was  a  harmless  piece  of 
clever  satire,  but  in  the  "  Anti-Jacobin "  it  was  a 
political  event. 

In  Parliament  Canning's  influence  was  not  yet 
very  great.  He  relied  too  much  on  wit,  and  what 
was  then  called  quizzing,  or  he  imitated  Pitt's  ora-~ 
tory  too  closely ;  but  even  in  the  House  of  Com 
mons  he  steadily  won  ground,  and  while  Burke,  Pitt, 


1807  PERCEVAL  AND  CANNING.  61 

Fox,  Windham,  and  Sheridan,  one  after  another,  dis 
appeared  or  were  thrown  into  the  shade,  Canning's 
figure  became  more  prominent  on  the  Treasury  Bench 
between  two  such  foils  as  Spencer  Perceval  and  Lord 
Castlereagh.  Although  his  mind  ripened  slowly,  and 
was  still  far  from  maturity,  he  was  already  a  master 
in  choice  of  language  ;  he  always  excelled  in  clear 
ness  of  statement  and  skill  of  illustration ;  and  if  his 
taste  had  been  as  pure  as  his  English,  he  would  have 
taken  rank  with  the  greatest  English  orators.  Some 
of  his  metaphors  survived,  with  those  of  Burke  and 
Sheridan.  When  Napoleon  was  forced  back  to  the 
Elbe,  "  the  mighty  deluge,  by  which  the  Continent  had 
been  overwhelmed,  began  to  subside ;  the  limits  of 
nations  were  again  visible  ;  and  the  spires  and  turrets 
of  ancient  establishments  began  to  reappear  above 
the  subsiding  wave."  In  addressing  the  people  at 
Plymouth,  he  likened  England  to  a  line-of-battle 
ship ;  "  one  of  those  stupendous  masses  now  reposing 
on  their  shadows  in  perfect  stillness,"  but  ready  at 
a  sign  to  ruffle,  as  it  were,  its  swelling  plumage, 
to  awaken  its  dormant  thunder.  Such  eloquence 
recalled  Burke  at  his  less  philosophical  moments.  It 
contained  more  rhetoric  than  thought;  but  Canning 
was  there  at  his  best.  At  his  worst,  as  Americans 
commonly  saw  him,  his  natural  tones  seemed  artifi 
cial,  and  only  his  imitations  seemed  natural.  To 
Americans  Canning  never  showed  himself  except  as 
an  actor.  As  an  instance  of  his  taste,  Americans 
could  best  appreciate  the  climax  with  which  he  once 


62          HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        C».  3. 

electrified  the  House  of  Commons  in  speaking  of  the 
Spanish  American  Republics :  "  I  called  the  new 
world  into  existence  to  redress  the  balance  of  the 
old."  The  House  cheered  to  the  echo,  while  America 
stood  open-mouthed  in  astonishment  at  the  success  of 
such  extravagant  egoism. 

In  the  new  Ministry  of  1807,  the  lead  was  to  the 
strongest  ;  and  Canning,  who  treated  with  almost 
open  contempt  his  rival  Lord  Castlereagh,  a  man 
intellectually  his  inferior,  could  count  upon  a  great 
destiny.  Less  scrupulous  or  less  broad  than  Pitt, 
he  held  that  Napoleon's  course  had  absolved  England 
from  ordinary  rules  of  morals.  To  fight  Bonaparte 
with  his  own  weapons  had  become  the  duty  of 
Englishmen ;  and  the  first  act  of  the  new  Adminis 
tration  showed  what  meaning  was  to  be  put  on  this 
favorite  phrase. 

February  8,  Napoleon  fought  the  desperate  battle  of 
Eylau,  which  closely  resembled  a  defeat.  His  posi 
tion  was  critical ;  but  before  Canning  could  fairly  get 
control  of  Bvents,  Napoleon,  June  14,  again  attacked 
the  Russians  at  Friedland  and  won  a  decisive  victory. 
June  25  Napoleon  and  Alexander  held  an  interview 
on  an  island  in  the  Niemen.  The  chief  point  in  ques 
tion  was  whether  Alexander  would  abandon  England  ; 
and  this  he  was  almost  glad  to  do,  for  England  had 
abandoned  him.  Alexander  yielded  to  the  force  and 
flattery  of  Napoleon,  and  signed  July  7  the  treaty  of 
Tilsit.  By  a  private  understanding  the  remaining 
neutrals  were  left  to  Napoleon  to  be  dealt  with  as  he 


1807.  PERCEVAL  AND  CANNING.  68 

pleased.  Denmark  was  the  only  neutral  power  the 
control  of  which  was  necessary  for  the  success  of 
Napoleon's  system,  and  August  2  he  sent  orders 
to  Bernadotte,  who  was  to  command  at  Hamburg: 
"  If  England  does  not  accept  the  mediation  of  Russia, 
Denmark  must  declare  war  upon  her,  or  I  will  de 
clare  war  on  Denmark."  1  Finding  that  the  Prince 
Royal  hesitated,  Napoleon,  August  17,  sent  orders 2 
to  Bernadotte  to  hold  himself  ready  with  all  his 
troops  to  march  into  Denmark  either  as  ally  or 
enemy,  according  to  the  issue  of  the  pending  nego 
tiation.  Threatened  by  this  overwhelming  danger, 
the  Prince  Royal  of  Denmark  alternately  promised 
and  evaded  the  declaration  of  war  ;  when  suddenly 
his  doubts  were  brought  to  an  end  by  the  diplomacy 
of  Canning. 

The  British  ministry  had  been  secretly  informed  of 
what  took  place  at  Tilsit,  and  even  without  secret  in 
formation  could  not  have  doubted  the  fate  of  Denmark. 
Vigor  was  necessary  ;  and  as  early  as  July  19,  before 
news  had  arrived  of  the  formal  signature  of  the  Tilsit 
treaty,  the  Cabinet  decided  on  sending  to  Copenhagen 
a  large  naval  expedition  which  had  been  collected 
for  a  different  purpose.  July  26  the  expedition,  com 
manded  by  Lord  Gambier,  sailed  from  the  Downs. 
It  consisted  of  some  twenty  ships  of  the  line,  forty 
frigates,  and  transports  containing  twenty-seven 

1  Correspondance,  xv.  467. 

2  Napoleon  to  Berth ier,  Aug.  17,  1807  ;  Correspondance,  xv. 
504. 


64  HISTORY  OF   THE  UNITED   STATES.        CH.  3. 

thousand  troops  commanded  by  Lord  Cathcart ;  and 
it  carried  a  diplomatic  agent  with  instructions  to  re 
quire  from  the  Prince  Royal  of  Denmark  the  delivery 
of  the  Danish  fleet,  as  a  temporary  security  for  the 
safety  of  England. 

The  man  whom  Canning  charged  with  this  un 
pleasant  duty  was  the  same  Jackson  whose  ap 
pointment  as  Minister  to  the  United  States  had 
been  opposed  by  Rufus  King,  and  who  had  subse 
quently  gone  as  British  minister  to  Berlin.  Jackson's 
dogmatic  temper  and  overbearing  manners  made  him 
obnoxious  even  to  the  clerks  of  the  Foreign  Office  ; l 
but  he  was  a  favorite  with  Lord  Malmesbury,  who 
since  Pitt's  death  had  become  Canning's  political 
mentor,  and  Lord  Malmesbury's  influence  was  freely 
used  in  Jackson's  behalf.  Obeying  his  instructions, 
the  British  envoy  went  to  Kiel  ;md  had  an  interview 
with  the  Prince  Royal  early  in  August,  at  about 
the  time  when  Napoleon  issued  his  first  orders  to 
Bernadotte.  The  Prince  could  only  refuse  with  indig 
nation  Jackson's  demand,  and  sent  orders  to  Copen 
hagen  to  prepare  for  attack.  He  was  in  the  situation 
of  Barron  on  the^  u  Chesapeake."  Copenhagen  had 
hardly  a  gun  in  position,  and  no  troops  to  use  in 
defence. 

The  British  demand  was  in  itself  insulting  enough, 

but  Jackson's  way  of  presenting  it  was  said  to  have 

been  peculiarly  offensive,  and  London  soon  rang  with 

stories   of  his   behavior   to  the   unfortunate   Prince 

1  Malmesbury's  Diary,  iv.  392. 


1807.  PERCEVAL   AND   CANNING.  65 

Royal.1  Even  the  King  of  England  seemed  to  think 
that  his  agent  needed  rebuke.  Lord  Eldon,  who  was 
one  of  the  advisers  and  most  strenuous  supporters 
of  the  attack  on  Copenhagen,  —  although  he  said 
in  private  that  the  story  made  his  heart  ache  and 
his  blood  run  cold,  —  used  to  relate,2  on  the  authority 
of  old  King  George  himself,  that  when  Jackson  was 
presented  at  Court  on  his  return  from  Copenhagen 
the  King  abruptly  asked  him,  "  Was  the  Prince 
Royal  upstairs  or  down,  when  he  received  you  ? " 
"  He  was  on  the  ground  floor,"  replied  Jackson. 
"  I  am  glad  of  it !  I  am  glad  of  it !  "  rejoined  the  old 
King ;  "  for  if  he  had  half  the  spirit  of  his  uncle 
George  III.,  he  would  infallibly  have  kicked  you 
downstairs."  The  Prince  did  not  kick  Mr.  Jackson, 
though  the  world  believed  he  had  reason  to  do  so, 
but  he  declined  to  accept  the  British  envoy's  remark 
that  in  war  the  weak  must  submit  to  the  strong; 
and  Lord  Gambier  landed  twenty  thousand  men,  es 
tablished  batteries,  and  for  three  days  and  nights, 
from  September  1  to  September  5,  bombarded  Copen 
hagen.  The  city  was  neither  invested  nor  assaulted 
nor  intended  to  be  occupied ;  it  was  merely  destroyed, 
little  by  little,  —  as  a  bandit  would  cut  off  first  an 
ear,  then  the  nose,  then  a  finger  of  his  victim,  to 
hasten  payment  of  a  ransom.  At  the  end  of  the 
third  day's  bombardment,  when  at  last  the  Danish 
ships  were  delivered,  the  bodies  of  near  two  thousand 

1  Morning  Chronicle,  Oct.  7,  1807. 

2  Campbell's  Lord  Chancellors,  ix.  288,  n. 

VOL.  IV.  —  5 


66  HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.       CH.  3. 

non-combatants  lay  buried  in  the  smoking  ruins  of 
about  one  half  the  city.  At  the  same  time  all  the 
Danish  merchant-vessels  in  English  waters,  with  their 
cargoes,  to  the  value  of  ten  million  dollars,  were 
seized  and  confiscated ;  while  the  Danish  factory  in 
Bengal  was,  without  warning,  swept  into  England's 
pouch. 

At  the  news  of  the  awful  tragedy  at  Copenhagen, 
Europe,  gorged  as  for  fifteen  years  she  had  been 
with  varied  horrors,  shuddered  from  St.  Petersburg 
to  Cadiz.  A  long  wail  of  pity  and  despair  rose  on 
the  Continent,  was  echoed  back  from  America,  and 
found  noble  expression  in  the  British  Parliament. 
The  attack  upon  the  "  Chesapeake  "  was  a  caress  of 
affection  compared  with  this  bloody  and  brutal  deed. 
As  in  1804  Bonaparte  —  then  only  First  Consul,  but 
about  to  make  himself  a  bastard  Emperor  —  flung  be 
fore  the  feet  of  Europe  the  bloody  corpse  of  the  Due 
d'Enghien,  so  George  Canning  in  1807,  about  to 
meet  Bonaparte  on  his  own  field  with  his  own 
weapons,  called  the  world  to  gaze  at  his  handiwork 
in  Copenhagen ;  and  the  world  then  contained  but 
a  single  nation  to  which  the  fate  of  Copenhagen  spoke 
in  accents  of  direct  and  instant  menace.  The  anni 
hilation  of  Denmark  left  America  almost  the  only 
neutral,  as  she  had  long  been  the  only  Republican 
State.  In  both  characters  her  offences  against  Can 
ning  and  Perceval,  Castlereagh  and  Eldon,  had  been 
more  serious  than  those  of  Denmark,  and  had  roused 
to  exasperation  the  temper  of  England.  A  single 


1807.  PERCEVAL  AND  CANNING.  67 

ship  of  the  line,  supported  by  one  or  two  frigates, 
could  without  a  moment's  notice  repeat  at  New 
York  the  tragedy  which  had  required  a  Vast  arma 
ment  at  Copenhagen ;  and  the  assault  on  the  "  Chesa 
peake  "  had  given  warning  of  what  the  British  navy 
stood  ready  to  do.  Other  emphatic  omens  were  not 
wanting. 

About  July  27  —  the  day  after  Lord  Gambier's 
fleet  sailed  from  the  Downs,  and  the  day  when  Mon 
roe  first  saw  in  the  newspapers  an  account  of  the 
"  Leopard's  "  attack  on  the  "  Chesapeake  "  —  the 
American  minister  might  have  read  a  report  made 
by  a  committee  of  the  House  of  Commons  on  the 
commercial  state  of  the  West  Indian  Islands.  The 
main  evil,  said  the  committee,1  was  the  very  unfavor 
able  state  of  the  foreign  market,  in  which  the  Brit 
ish  merchant  formerly  enjoyed  nearly  a  monopoly. 
"  The  result  of  all  their  inquiries  on  this  most  impor 
tant  part  of  the  subject  has  brought  before  their  eyes 
one  grand  and  primary  evil  from  which  all  the  others 
are  easily  to  be  deduced  ;  namely,  the  facility*^  inter 
course  between  the  hostile  colonies  and  Europe  un 
der  the  American  neutral  flag,  by  means  of  which 
not  only  the  whole  of  their  produce  is  carried  to  a 
market,  but  at  charges  little  exceeding  those  of 
peace,  while  the  British  planter  is  burdened  with 
all  the  inconvenience,  risk,  and  expense  resulting 
from  a  state  of  war."  To  correct  this  evil,  a  block- 

1  Cobbett's  Debates,  ix.,  Appendix  Ixxx.;  Atcheson's  Ameri 
can  Encroachments,  Appendix  No.  viii.  1 14. 


68  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  3. 

ade  of  the  enemies'  colonies  had  been  suggested ; 
"  and  such  a  measure,  if  it  could  be  strictly  enforced, 
would  undoubtedly  afford  relief  to  our  export  trade. 
But  a  measure  of  more  permanent  and  certain  ad 
vantage  would  be  the  enforcement  of  those  restric 
tions  on  the  trade  between  neutrals  and  the  ene 
mies'  colonies  which  were  formerly  maintained 
by  Great  Britain,  and  from  the  relaxation  of  which 
the  enemies'  colonies  obtain  indirectly,  during  war, 
all  the  advantages  of  peace." 

In  its  way  this  West  Indian  Report  was  stamped 
with  the  same  Napoleonic  character  as  the  bombard 
ment  of  Copenhagen  or  the  assault  on  the  "  Chesa 
peake  ; "  in  a  parliamentary  manner  it  admitted  that 
England,  with  all  her  navy,  could  not  enforce  a  block 
ade  by  lawful  means,  and  therefore  it  had  become  "  a 
matter  of  evident  and  imperious  necessity  "  that  she 
should  turn  pirate.  The  true  sense  of  the  recommen 
dation  was  neither  doubted  nor  disputed  in  England, 
except  as  matter  of  parliamentary  form.  That  the 
attempt  to  cut  off  the  supply  of  French  and  Spanish 
sugar  from  Europe,  either  by  proclaiming  a  paper 
blockade  or  the  Rule  of  1756,  might  result  in  war 
with  the  United  States  was  conceded,  and  no  one  in 
private  denied  that  America  in  such  a  case  had  just 
cause  for  war.  The  evidence  upon  which  the  Report 
founded  its  conclusion  largely  dealt  with  the  probable 
effect  on  the  colonies  of  a  war  with  the  United  States  ; 
and  the  Report  itself,  in  language  only  so  far  veiled 
as  to  be  decent,  intimated  that  although  war  would 


1807.  PERCEVAL  AND   CANNING.  69 

be  essentially  detrimental  to  the  islands  it  would  not 
be  fatal,  and  would  be  better  than  their  actual  con 
dition.  The  excuse  for  what  every  reasonable  Eng 
lishman  frankly  avowed  to  be  "  a  system  of  piracy,"  1 
was  that  the  West  Indian  colonies  must  perish  with 
out  it,  and  England  must  share  their  fate.  In  vain 
did  less^  terrified  men,  like  Alexander  Baring  or 
William  Spence,  preach  patience,  explaining  that  the 
true  difficulty  with  the  West  Indies  was  an  over 
production  of  sugar,  with  which  the  Americans  had 
nothing  to  do. 

"  To  charge  the  distresses  of  the  West  Indian  planters 
upon  the  American  carriers,"  said  Spence,2  "  is  almost 
as  absurd  as  it  would  be  for  the  assassin  to  lay  the  blame 
of  murder  upon  the  arsenic  which  he  had  purposely 
placed  in  the  sugar-dish  of  his  friend." 

Thus  Parliament,  Ministry,  navy,  colonies,  the  ship 
ping  and  the  landed  interest  of  England  had  wrought 
public  opinion  to  the  point  of  war  with  the  United 
States  at  the  moment  when  Lord  Gambier  bombarded 
Copenhagen  and  the  "  Leopard  "  fired  into  the  "  Ches 
apeake."  The  tornado  of  prejudice  and  purposeless 
rage  which  broke  into  expression  on  the  announce 
ment  that  a  British  frigate  had  fired  into  an  Ameri 
can,  surpassed  all  experience.  The  English  news 
papers  for  the  year  that  followed  the  "  Chesapeake  " 
affair  seemed  irrational,  the  drunkenness  of  power 
incredible.  The  Americans,  according  to  the  "  Morn- 

1  The  Radical  Cause,  etc.,  by  William  Spence,  1808,  p.  43. 

2  The  Radical  Cause,  etc.,  by  William  Spence,  1808,  p.  19. 


70  HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  3. 

ing  Post "  of  Jan.  14,  1808,  "  possess  all  the  vices  of 
their  Indian  neighbors  without  their  virtues ; "  and 
two  days  afterward  the  same  newspaper  —  which 
gave  tone  to  the  country  press  —  declared  that  Eng 
land  was  irresistible :  "  Our  vigor  and  energy  have 
just  reached  that  sublime  pitch  from  which  their 
weight  must  crush  all  opposition." 

No  one  could  say  for  how  much  of  this  extrava 
gance  Canning  was  directly  responsible ;  but  the 
tone  of  the  press  was  certainly  an  echo  of  the  tone 
he  had  so  long  taken,  and  which  he  stimulated. 
That  he  was  really  so  reckless  as  he  seemed  need  not 
be  imagined  ;  although  eighteen  months  afterward, 
Lord  Grenville  with  the  utmost  emphasis  said  in 

the  House  of  Lords,1  "  I  do  firmly  believe  that  it  is 

the  object  of  his  Majesty's  ministers  to  do  everything 
in  their  power  to  force  America  into  hostility  with 
this  country."  Lord  Grenville  occasionally  exagger 
ated,  and  he  was  probably  mistaken  in  this  instance  ; 
but  he  found  it  possible  to  believe  ministers  capable 
of  acting  with  the  motive  he  charged  on  them.  In 
truth  he  had  strong  ground  for  the  opinion  he  held, 
which  was  by  no  means  peculiar  to  him.  As  early 
as  July  27,  1807,  the  "Morning  Chronicle,"  in  an 
nouncing  the  first  news  of  the  "  Chesapeake  "  affair, 
added : — 

"  We  trust  it  is  of  a  nature  to  be  adjusted  without  that 
most  ruinous  of  all  follies  yet  left  us  to  be  guilty  of,  — 
an  American  war.  We  have  rather  more  fear  than  hope 

1  Gobbett's  Debates  (Feb.  17,  1809),  xii.  776. 


1807.  PERCEVAL  AND  CANNING.  71 

however  on  the  subject,  when  we  reflect  that  the  present 
ministers  are  of  those  who  consider  an  American  war  as 
rather  desirable." 

Within  a  short  time  the  "  Morning  Post "  avowed 
and  proclaimed,  in  articles  evidently  inspired  by 
Government,  the  wish  for  war  with  America : 1  — 

"  A  war  of  a  very  few  months,  without  creating  to  us 
the  expense  of  a  single  additional  ship,  would  be  suffi 
cient  to  convince  her  of  her  folly  by  a  necessary  chas 
tisement  of  her  insolence  and  audacity." 

In  January,  1808,  the  same  newspaper  spoke  even 
more  plainly  :  2  — 

"  For  us,  we  have  always  been  of  the  opinion  that  in 
the  present  temper  of  the  American  government  no  rela 
tions  of  amity  can  be  maintained  with  that  nation  unless 
at  the  expense  of  our  dearest  rights  and  most  essential 
interests." 

Perhaps  this  tone  was  taken  partly  with  the  idea  of 
terrifying  the  Americans  into  obedience ;  but  beyond 
question  a  strong  party  leaned  to  violence.  Monroe, 
who  had  the  best  means  of  knowing,  felt  no  doubts 
on  this  point,  and  warned  the  President  of  the  danger 
to  the  United  States. 

"There  has  been,"  he  wrote  Aug.  4,  1807,3  "  at  all 
times  since  the  commencement  of  the  present  war,  a 
strong  party  here  for  extending  its  ravages  to  them. 
This  party  is  composed  of  the  shipowners,  the  navy,  the 

1  The  Morning  Post,  Nov.  12,  1807. 

a  The  Morning  Post,  Jan.  13,  1808. 

8  Monroe  to  Madison,  Aug.  4,  1807;  State  Papers,  iii.  186. 


72          HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  3. 

East  and  West  India  merchants,  and  certain  political 
characters  of  great  consideration  in  the  State.  So 
powerful  is  this  combination  that  it  is  most  certain 
that  nothing  can  be  obtained  of  the  government  on 
any  point  but  what  may  be  extorted  by  necessity." 

Insane  as  such  a  policy  might  seem,  Lord  Gren- 
ville's  charge  against  ministers  had  solid  ground. 

Special  interests  were  commonly  blind  to  the  gen 
eral  good.  That  the  navy,  the  mercantile  marine, 
and  the  colonies  should  have  favored  war  with  Amer 
ica  was  not  surprising;  but  that  the  mania  should 
have  seized  upon  the  English  nation  at  large  was  a 
phenomenon  to  be  explained  only  by  general  causes- 
The  true  explanation  was  not  far  to  seek  ;  the  secret, 
if  secret  it  could  be  called,  was  the  inevitable  result 
-ef  Jefferson's  passion  for  peace,  —  social  and  political 
contempt.  This  feeling  was  unbounded,  pervading 
all  parties  and  all  classes,  and  finding  expression 
in  the  most  gross  as  in  the  simplest  and  least  inten 
tional  forms. 

"Hatred  of  America,"  said  one  of  the  numerous  Brit 
ish  pamphleteers  of  the  time,1  "  seems  a  prevailing  senti 
ment  in  this  country.  Whether  it  be  that  they  have  no 
crown  and  nobility,  and  are  on  this  account  not  quite  a 
genteel  Power ;  or  that  their  manners  are  less  polished 
than  our  own  ;  or  that  we  grudge  their  independence, 
and  hanker  after  our  old  monopoly  of  their  trade  ;  or 
that  they  closely  resemble  us  in  language,  character,  and 

1  Orders  in  Council ;  or,  An  Examination  of  the  Justice, 
Legality,  and  Policy  of  the  New  System,  etc.  (London,  1808), 
p.  61. 


180T.  PERCEVAL   AND   CANNING.  73 

laws ;  or  finally,  that  it  is  more  our  interest  to  live  well 
with  them  than  with  any  other  nation  in  the  world,  —  the 
fact  is  undeniable  that  the  bulk  of  the  people  would  fain 
be  at  war  with  them." 

The  Somersetshire  squire  and  the  chancery  barris 
ter  in  Westminster  Hall  —  the  extremes  of  national 
obtuseness  and  professional  keenness  —  agreed  in  de 
spising  America.  The  pompous  Lord  Sidmouth,  the 
tedious  Lord  Sheffield,  the  vivacious  Canning,  the 
religious  Perceval,  and  the  merry-andrew  -  Cobbett  — 
whose  genius  was  peculiar  in  thinking  itself  popular 
-joined  hands  in  spreading  libels  against  a  people 
three  thousand  miles  away,  who  according  to  their 
own  theory  were  too  contemptible  to  be  dangerous. 
Except  a  few  Whig  noblemen,  a  number  of  York 
shire  and  Lancashire  manufacturers  and  a  great  mass 
of  the  laboring  people,  or  American  merchants  like 
the  Barings,  and  one  or  two  Scotch  Liberals  who 
wrote  in  the  "  Edinburgh  Review,"  the  English  public 
had  but  one  voice  against  Americans.  Young  Henry 
Brougham,  not  yet  thirty  years  old,  whose  restless 
mind  persistently  asked  questions  which  parsons  and 
squires  thought  absurd  or  impious,  speculated  much 
upon  the  causes  of  this  prejudice.  Was  it  because 
the  New  York  dinners  were  less  elegant  than  those 
of  London,  or  because  the  Yankees  talked  with  an 
accent,  or  because  their  manners  were  vulgar  ?  No 
doubt  a  prejudice  might  seize  on  any  justification, 
however  small ;  but  a  prejudice  so  general  and  so 
deep  became  respectable,  and  needed  a  correct  ex- 


74          HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  3. 

planation.  The  British  nation  was  sometimes  slow- 
witted,  and  often  narrow-minded,  but  was  not  insane. 
For  a  thousand  years  every  step  in  the  progress  of 
England  had  been  gained  by  sheer  force  of  hand 
and  will.  In  the  struggle  for  existence  the  English 
people,  favored  by  situation,  had  grown  into  a  new 
human  type,  —  which  might  be  brutal,  but  was  not 
weak ;  which  had  little  regard  for  theory,  but  an 
immense  and  just  respect  for  facts.  America  con 
sidered  herself  to  be  a  serious  fact,  and  expected 
England  to  take  her  at  her  own  estimate  of  her 
own  value  ;  but  this  was  more  than  could  reasonably 
be  asked.  England  required  America  to  prove  by 
acts  what  virtue  existed  in  her  conduct  or  character 
which  should  exempt  her  from  the  common  lot  of 
humanity,  or  should  entitle  her  to  escape  the  tests 
of  manhood,  —  the  trials,  miseries,  and  martyrdoms 
through  which  the  character  of  mankind  had  thus 
far  in  human  history  taken,  for  good  or  bad,  its  vig 
orous  development.  England  had  never  learned  to 
strike  soft  in  battle.  /She  expected  her  antagonists 
to  fight ;  and  if  they  would  not  fight,  she  took  them 
to  be  cowardly  or  mean.  Jefferson  and  his  gov 
ernment  had  shown  over  and  over  again  that  no 
provocation  would  make  them  fight;  and  from  the 
moment  that  this  attitude  was  understood,  America 
became  fair  prey.  Jefferson  had  chosen  his  own 
methods  of  attack  and  defence ;  but  he  could  not 
require  England  or  France  to  respect  them  before 
they  had  been  tried. 


1807. 


PERCEVAL   AND   CANNING.  75 


Contempt  for  America  was  founded  on  belief  in 
American  cowardice ;  but  beneath  the  disdain  lurked 
an  uneasy  doubt  which  gave  to  contempt  the  viru 
lence  of  fear. '  The  English  nation,  and  especially 
the  aristocracy,  believed  that  America  was  biding  her 
time  ;  that  she  expected  to  become  a  giant ;  and  that 
if  she  succeeded,  she  would  use  her  strength  as  every 
other  giant  in  the  world's  history  had  done  before 
her.  The  navy  foresaw  a  day  when  American  fleets 
might  cover  the  ocean.  The  merchant  dreaded  com 
petition  with  Yankee  shrewdness,  for  he  well  knew 
the  antiquated  processes,  the  time-honored  percent 
ages,  the  gross  absurdities  of  English  trade,  the 
abuses  of  the  custom-house,  the  clumsiness  and  ex 
travagance  of  government.  The  shipowners  had 
even  more  cause  for  alarm.  Already  the  American 
ship  was  far  in  advance  of  the  British  model,  —  a 
swifter  and  more  economical  sailer,  more  heavily 
sparred  and  more  daringly  handled.  In  peace  com 
petition  had  become  difficult,  until  the  British  ship 
owner  cried  for  war ;  yet  he  already  felt,  without 
acknowledging  it  even  to  himself,  that  in  war  he 
was  likely  to  enjoy  little  profit  or  pleasure  on  the  day 
when  the  long,  low,  black  hull  of  the  Yankee  priv 
ateer,  with  her  tapering,  bending  spars,  her  long- 
range  gun,  and  her  sharp-faced  captain,  should  ap 
pear  on  the  western  horizon,  and  suddenly,  at  sight 
of  the  heavy  lumbering  British  merchantman,  should 
fling  out  her  white  wings  of  canvas  and  fly  down 
on  her  prey. 


76  HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  3. 

Contempt,  mingled  with  vague  alarm,  was  at  the 
bottom  of  England's  conduct  toward  America;  and 
whatever  the  swarm  of  newspaper  statesmen  might 
say  or  think,  the  element  of  alarm  was  so  great  that 
the  Tory  ministers,  although  they  might  expect  war, 
did  not  want  it,  and  hoped  to  prevent  it  by  the  very 
,  boldness  of  their  policy.  Even  Canning  was  cautious 
enough  to  prefer  not  to  give  America  occasion  for 
learning  her  strength.  He  meant  to  clip  her  wings 
only  so  far  as  she  would  submit  to  have  her  wings 
clipped ;  and  he  not  only  astonished  but  disgusted 
the  over-zealous  politicians  who  applauded  Admiral 
Berkeley,  by  disavowing  the  admiral's  doctrines  of 
international  law  and  recalling  the  admiral  himself. 
The  war  faction  broke  into  a  paroxysm  of  rage1  when 
this  decision  became  known,  and  for  a  time  Canning 
seemed  likely  to  be  devoured  by  his  own  hounds,  so 
vociferous  was  their  outcry.  Monroe  and  Pinkney 
were  loud  in  praise  of  Canning's  and  Perceval's  tem 
perate  and  candid  behavior.2 

Canning  was  obliged  to  defend  himself,  and  under 
his  promptings  a  long  reply  to  his  critics  was  writ 
ten  for  the  "Morning  Post,"3  —  a  newspaper  version 
of  the  instructions  carried  by  his  special  minister  to 
Washington.  He  excused  his  treatment  of  Admiral 

1  Brougham  to  Lord  Howick,  Nov.  7,  1807 ;  Brougham's  Me 
moirs,  i.  386. 

2  Brougham  to  Lord  Howick,  Nov.  7,  1807;  Brougham's  Me 
moirs,  i.  383. 

8  The  Morning  Post,  Oct.  23,  1807. 


1807.  PERCEVAL   AND   CANNING.  77 

Berkeley  on  the  ground  that  lawyers  recognized  no 
right  of  search  in  national  ships.  The  excuse  was 
evidently  feeble.  The  law,  or  at  least  the  lawyers, 
of  England  had  hitherto  justified  every  act  which 
the  government  had  chosen  to  commit,  —  the  seiz 
ure  of  the  Spanish  treasure-ships  in  1804,  accompa 
nied  by  the  unnecessary  destruction  of  hundreds  of 
lives  ;  the  secret  seizure  of  the  larger  part  of  Ameri 
can  commerce  in  1805,  by  collusion  with  the  Admi 
ralty  judges  ;  the  paper  blockade  of  Charles  James 
Fox  in  1806 ;  the  Order  in  Council  of  January,  1807, 
by  which  Lord  Howick  cut  off  another  main  branch 
of  neutral  commerce  with  which  England  had  no 
legal  right  to  interfere ;  finally,  the  lawyers  justified 
the  bombardment  of  Copenhagen  as  an  act  of  neces 
sary  defence,  and  were  about  to  justify  a  general  con 
trol  of  all  neutral  commerce  as  an  act  of  retaliation. 
To  suppose  that  law  so  elastic,  or  lawyers  with  minds 
so  fertile,  could  discover  no  warrant  for  Berkeley's 
act  was  preposterous.  To  neutral  commerce  England 
had  no  legal  right ;  yet  she  took  it,  and  her  lawyers 
invented  a  title.  To  her  citizens  and  seamen  she  act 
ually  had  a  legal  right,  recognized  by  every  court  in 
Christendom  ;  and  if  after  a  fair  demand  on  the  neu 
tral  government  she  found  that  her  right  could  be 
satisfied  only  by  violating  neutral  jurisdiction,  the 
lawyers,  in  view  of  all  their  other  decisions,  must 
hold  that  such  violation  was  a  matter  of  expediency 
and  not;  of  law.  Canning's  critics  in  reply  to  his 
assertion  that  the  lawyers  would  recognize  no  right 


78          HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED   STATES.        CH.  3. 

of  search  in  national  ships,  could  fairly  say  that  he 
was  alone  to  blame,  —  he  should  have  ordered  them 
to  find  it.  George  Canning  could  not  seriously  pro 
pose  to  sacrifice  a  vital  English  interest  in  obedience 
to  the  scrupulous  legal  morality  of  Spencer  Perce 
val,  Lord  Eldon,  Sir  William  Scott,  and  Sir  Vicary 
Gibbs. 

In  truth,  Canning  had  reasons  more  forcible.  With 
a  character  not  unlike  that  which  Dryden  ascribed  to 
Lord  Shaftesbury,  he  was  pleased  with  the  danger 
when  the  waves  ran  high ;  and  if  he  steered  too  near 
the  shoals  in  order  to  prove  his  wit,  he  did  not  wish 
to  run  the  vessel  ashore.  He  disavowed  Admiral 
Berkeley,  not  because  the  lawyers  were  unable  to 
prove  whatever  the  government  required,  but  because 
the  right  of  searching  foreign  ships-of-war  was  not 
worth  asserting,  and  would  cost  more  than  it  could 
ever  bring  in  return.  Besides  this  obvious  reason, 
he  was  guided  by  another  motive  which  would  alone 
have  turned  the  scale.  Perceval  had  invented  a 
scheme  for  regulating  neutral  commerce.  This  meas 
ure  had  begun  to  take  a  character  so  stern  that  even 
its  author  expected  it  to  produce  war  with  the  United 
States ;  and  if  war  could  be  avoided  at  all,  it  could  be 
avoided  only  by  following  Erskine's  advice,  and  by 
sending  to  America,  before  the  new  Orders  in  Council, 
an  apology  for  the  attack  on  the  "  Chesapeake." 


CHAPTER   IV. 

THE  Orders  in  Council  of  Nov.  11,  1807,  gave  an 
impulse  so  energetic  to  the  history  of  the  United 
States ;  they  worked  so  effectually  to  drive  America 
into  a  new  path,  and  to  break  the  power  and  blot 
out  the  memory  of  Virginia  and  Massachusetts  prin 
ciples, —  that  every  detail  of  their  history  was  im 
portant.  Englishmen  were  little  likely  to  dwell  on 
acts  of  which  even  at  the  time  England  was  at  heart 
ashamed,  and  which  she  afterward  remembered  with 
astonishment.  To  Americans  alone  the  statesman 
ship  of  Spencer  Perceval  and  George  Canning  was  a 
matter  of  so  much  interest  as  to  deserve  study. 

At  the  close  of  the  year  1806  American  merchants 
might,  as  always  before,  send  cargoes  of  West  Indian 
produce  to  any  port  on  the  continent  not  blockaded, 
provided  they  could  satisfy  British  cruisers  and 
courts  that  the  cargo  was  in  good  faith  neutral, — 
not  French  or  Spanish  property  disguised.  Jan.  7, 
1807,  Lord  Howick  issued  the  Order  in  Council 
which,  under  pretence  of  retaliation  for  Napoleon's 
Berlin  Decree,  cut  off  the  coasting  rights  of  neutrals. 
After  that  time  the  American  merchant  might  stilbk^^ 
send  a  ship  to  Bordeaux ;  but  if  the  ship,  finding  no 


80  HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  4. 

market  at  Bordeaux,  should  resume  her  voyage,  and 
make  for  Amsterdam  or  the  Mediterranean,  she  be 
came  fair  prize.  Something  has  been  already  said1 
upon  the  character  of  Lord  Howick's  order,  and  on 
the  subsequent  debate  in  Parliament,  when,  Febru 
ary  4,  Spencer  Perceval  attacked  the  Whig  minis 
try  for  not  carrying  the  principle  of  retaliation  far 
enough.  Two  objects  were  to  be  gained,  said  Per 
ceval  2  from  the  opposition  bench :  the  first  and 
greatest  was  to  counteract  the  enemy's  measures 
and  protect  English  trade  ;  the  second  was  to  dis 
tress  France.  Howick's  order  neither  did  nor  could 
effect  either  object ;  and  Perceval  called  for  a  meas 
ure  which  should  shut  out  colonial  produce  from 
France  and  Spain  altogether,  unless  it  came  from 
England  and  had  paid  a  duty  at  a  British  custom 
house  to  enhance  the  price.  If  Lord  Howick's  princi 
ple  of  retaliation  was  good  for  anything,  Perceval 
contended  it  was  good  to  this  extent ;  and  as  for 
neutrals,  there  was  no  necessity  for  consulting  them, 
—  all  they  could  reasonably  expect  was  a  notice. 

The  Whigs  naturally  replied  to  Perceval  that  be 
fore  further  punishing  America  for  the  acts  of  France, 
"America  should  be  allowed  time  to  assert  her  own 
rights.  This  suggestion  called  out  Lord  Castlereagh, 
who  frequently  spoke  the  truth  in  ways  inconvenient 
to  his  colleagues  and  amusing  to  his  enemies.  In 
this  instance  he  admitted  and  even  accented  a  point 

1  See  vol.  iii.  p.  416. 

2  Cobbett's  Debates,  Feb.  4,  1807,  viii.  620-656. 


OF  rwf 


1807.  THE  ORDERS     fcdGtaffGlt?  "  81 

which  became  afterward  the  strongest  part  of  the 
American  argument.  He  ridiculed  the  idea  of  wait 
ing  for  America  to  act,  because  notoriously  the  Ber 
lin  Decree  had  not  been  enforced  against  American 
commerce  :  — 

u  This  is  one  ground  why  we  should  look  upon  Amer 
ica  with  jealousy.  It  is  an  aggravation  that  she  has,  by 
a  secret  understanding  with  the  French  government,  con 
trived  to  take  her  shipping  out  of  the  operation  of  the 
decree,  that  was  at  first  general,  and  placed  herself  in  a 
situation  of  connivance  with  the  French  government." 

A  few  weeks  afterward  Perceval  and  Castlereagh 
took  office.  One  of  their  first  acts  set  on  foot  a  parlia 
mentary  inquiry  into  the  state  of  West  Indian  com 
merce.  The  report  of  this  committee,  presented 
to  the  House  July  27,  was  ordered  to  be  printed 
August  8.  August  10  the  House  voted  to  take  it  into 
consideration  early  in  the  next  session  ;  and  four  days 
afterward  Parliament  was  prorogued,  leaving  minis 
ters  to  deal  at  their  leisure  with  the  "  Chesapeake  " 
affair,  the  Danish  fleet,  and  Napoleon's  attempts  to 
exclude  English  manufactures  and  commerce  from 
Europe. 

Napoleon's  Berlin  Decree  of  Nov.  21,  1806,  had' 
remained  till  then  almost  a  dead  letter.  The  under 
writers  at  Lloyds,  alarmed  at  first  by  the  seizures 
made  under  that  decree,  recovered  courage  between 
April  and  August,  1807,  so  far  as  to  insure  at  low 
rates  neutral  vessels  bound  to  Holland  and  Ham 
burg.  This>  commerce  attracted  Napoleon's  notice. 

VOL.  IV.  —  6 


82          HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.       CH.  4. 

August  19  he  threatened  his  brother  Louis,  King  of 
Holland,  to  send  thirty  thousand  troops  into  his  king 
dom  if  the  ports  were  not  shut ; 1  August  24  he  sent 
positive  orders2  that  his  decree  of  Berlin  should  be 
executed  in  Holland;  and  in  the  last  days  of  August 
/  news  reached  London  that  a  general  seizure  of  neu 
tral  vessels  had  taken  place  at  Amsterdam.3  From 
that  moment  no  ship  could  obtain  insurance,  and 
trade  with  the  Continent  ceased.  Soon  afterward  the 
American  ship  "  Horizon "  was  condemned  by  the 
French  courts  under  the  Berlin  Decree,  and  no  one 
could  longer  doubt  that  the  favor  hitherto  extended 
to  American  commerce  had  also  ceased. 

These  dates  were  important,  because  upon  them 
hung  the  popular  defence  of  Perceval's  subsequent 
Orders  in  Council.  No  argument  in  favor  of  these 
orders  carried  so  much  weight  in  England  as  the 
assertion  that  America  had  acquiesced  in  Napoleon's 
Berlin  Decree.  The  President  had  in  fact  submitted 
to  the  announcement  of  Napoleon's  blockade,  as  he 
had  submitted  to  Sir  William  Scott's  decisions,  Lord 
Howick's  Order  in  Council,  the  blockade  of  New 
York,  and  the  custom  of  impressment,  without  effect 
ual  protest ;  but  the  Berlin  Decree  was  not  enforced 
against  American  commerce  until  about  Sept.  1, 1807, 

1  Napoleon  to   Champagny,  Aug.  19,  1807;  Correspondance, 
xv.  509. 

2  Same  to  Same,  Aug.  24,  1807 ;  Ibid.,  p.  542. 

8  Parliamentary  Inquiry,  1808;  Evidence  of  Robert  Shedden 
and  Mr.  Hadley. 


1807.  THE  ORDERS  IN   COUNCIL.  83 

and  no  one  in  America  knew  of  the  enforcement,  or 
could  have  acted  upon  it,  before  the  British  govern 
ment  took  the  law  into  its  own  hands. 

The  month  of  September  passed,  and  the  British 
ministry  was  sufficiently  busy  with  the  bombardment 
of  Copenhagen  and  the  assault  on  the  "  Chesapeake," 
without  touching  neutral  trade  ;  but  October  1  Lord 
Castlereagh  wrote  a  letter l  to  Perceval,  urging  retali 
ation  upon  France  in  order  to  make  her  feel  that  Na 
poleon's  anti-commercial  system  was  useless,  and  in 
order  to  assert  for  future  guidance  the  general  prin 
ciple  that  England  would  reject  any  peace  which  did 
not  bring  commerce  with  it.  The  idea  presented  by 
Castlereagh  was  clear  and  straightforward,  —  the 
double-or-quits  of  a  gambler  ;  and  however  open  to 
the  charge  of  ignorance  or  violence,  it  was  not  mean 
or  dishonest. 

In  reply  Perceval  drew  up  a  paper  of  suggestions2 
for  the  use  of  the  Cabinet,  dealing  first  with  the  jus 
tice,  next  with  the  policy  of  retaliation.  Of  its  justice 
as  against  France  he  thought  there  could  be  no  doubt, 
while  Lord  Howick's  order  had  already  asserted  the 
principle  as  against  neutrals,  even  before  it  could  be 
known  whether  neutrals  would  retaliate  on  their  own 
account;  but  apart  from  this  precedent,  "  the  injury 
which  neutrals  sustain  is  consequential ;  the  measure 

1  Castlereagh  to  Perceval,  Oct.  1,  1807;  Castlereagh  Corres 
pondence,  viii.  87. 

2  Original  Suggestions  to  the  Cabinet,  Oct.   12,  1807;   Per 
ceval  MSS. 


84          HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  4. 

is  not  adopted  with  a  view  to  injure  the  neutrals,  but 
to  injure  the  enemy."  Perhaps  Perceval  felt  that  this 
argument  might  lead  too  far,  and  that  on  such  a  doc 
trine  England  might  appropriate  the  world  on  every 
declaration  of  war ;  for  in  the  next  paragraph  he 
pleaded  the  particular  war  in  which  England  was 
actually  engaged  as  his  warranty :  — 

"  When  an  enemy  arises  who  declares  to  all  the  world 
that  he  will  trample  upon  the  law  of  nations,  and  hold  at 
nought  all  the  privileges  of  neutral  nations  when  they  do 
not  suit  his  belligerent  interests ;  and  when  by  the  great 
extent  of  his  power  he  is  enabled  in  great  measure  to  act 
up  to  his  declaration,  —  it  is  evident  that  if  those  Powers 
with  which  he  is  at  war  should  continue  to  hold  them 
selves  bound  to  rules  and  obligations  of  which  he  will  not 
acknowledge  the  force,  they  cannot  carry  on  the  contest 
on  equal  terms.  And  the  neutral  who  would  control  their 
hostility  by  those  rules  and  laws  which  their  enemy  re 
fuses  to  recognize,  and  which  such  neutral  does  not 
compel  that  enemy  to  observe,  ceases  to  be  a  neutral  -by 
ceasing  to  observe  that  impartiality  which  is  the  very  life 
and  soul  of  neutrality." 

This  allegation  differed  from  the  first.  Perceval 
began  by  maintaining  that  England  possessed  a  right, 
if  she  chose,  to  suppress  the  existence  of  America 
or  of  any  other  neutral,  provided  the  suppression 
were  consequential  on  an  intent  to  injure  France. 
He  next  argued  that  the  existence  of  America  might 
be  equally  suppressed  because  she  had  not  yet  suc 
ceeded  in  compelling  France  to  observe  neutral  privi- 


1807.  THE,  ORDERS   IN  COUNCIL.  85 

leges,  which  so  far  as  she  was  concerned  had  not  been 
violated.  If  these  two  propositions  were  worth  mak 
ing,  they  should  have  settled  the  question.  Yet  Per 
ceval  was  not  satisfied  ;  he  took  a  third  ground  :  - 

"This  question,  however,  need  not  now  be  argued  to 
the  extent  which  was  necessary  to  justify  the  assertion 
of  the  late  Government ;  because  whatever  might  be  the 
doubts  upon  it  when  the  decree  of  France  first  issued, 
and  before  it  was  known  to  what  extent  neutrals  would 
resist  or  acquiesce  in  it,  since  those  neutrals  have  acqui 
esced  in  it,  or  at  least  have  not  resisted  or  resented  it  to 
the  extent  of  obtaining  a  formal  recall  of  the  decree  and 
an  open  renunciation  of  the  principle  which  dictated  it, 
nor  the  abandonment  of  the  practices  which  flow  from  it, 
—  they  by  their  acquiescence  and  submission  have  given 
to  Great  Britain  a  right  to  expect  from  them  (when  her 
interests  require  the  exertion  of  measures  of  correspond 
ent  efficacy)  a  forbearance  similar  to  that  which  they 
have  shown  toward  her  enemy." 

i  If  Perceval's  two  opening  premises  gave  a  strange 
idea  of  English  statesmanship,  his  third  was  little 
creditable  to  the  English  bar.  He  took  the  ground 
that  England  might  do  what  she  would  with  Ameri 
can  commerce,  because  America,  whatever  effort  she 
might  have  made,  had  not  already  forced  Napoleon  to  s 
recall  a  decree  from  the  application  of  which  the' 
United  States  notoriously  had  till  within  six  weeks 
been  exempted.  Lord  Castlereagh's  doctrine  that 
America's  exemption  aggravated  her  offence  was  a 
wide-minded  argument  by  the  side  of  Perceval's  asser 
tion  that  America's  acquiescence  was  proved  by  the 


86  HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.        CH.  4. 

French  decree  itself.  Considering  that  America  had 
in  this  sense  acquiesced  in  Sir  William  Scott's  de 
cisions  and  the  wholesale  confiscation  of  her  com 
merce,  in  the  impressment  of  her  native  citizens  and 
their  compulsory  service  in  the  British  navy,  in  the 
blockade  of  New  York,  in  Fox's  paper  blockade  of 
the  German  coast,  in  Lord  Ho  wick's  Order  in  Council, 
and  perhaps  even  in  the  "Chesapeake"  outrage,— 
Perceval's  argument  must  have  seemed  convincing  to 
Napoleon,  if  not  to  President  Jefferson.  If  the  law 
of  nations  thus  laid  down  was  sound,  the  continued 
presence  of  American  citizens  in  British  ships  of 
war  was  alone  sufficient  proof  of  American  acqui 
escence  in  impressment  to  warrant  Napoleon  in  act 
ing  without  regard  to  neutral  rights.  From  a  neu 
tral  or  French  point  of  view  Perceval's  reasoning  not 
only  conceded  the  legality  of  the  Berlin  Decree,  but 
barred  his  own  right  of  retaliation,  since  England,  as 
the  first  and  worst  offender,  could  not  properly 
profit  by  her  own  misdeeds. 

There  Perceval  rested  his  case,  so  far  as  con 
cerned  the  law.  His  three  grounds  were — (1)  That 
as  a  neutral  the  United  States  could  complain  of  no 
retaliation  between  belligerents,  unless  this  retalia 
tion  was  avowedly  adopted  with  a  view  to  injure  neu 
trals  ;  (2)  That  America  ceased  to  be  a  neutral  from 
the  moment  that  she  wished  England  to  observe 
rules  which  France  refused  to  recognize,  and  which 
America  did  not  at  once  compel  France  to  rec 
ognize  ;  and  (3)  That  the  continued  existence  and 


1807.  THE   ORDERS  IN   COUNCIL.  87 

recent  enforcement  of  the  Berlin  Decree  were  suf 
ficient  proof  of  the  neutral's  acquiescence. 

Thus  a  measure  of  vital  consequence  to  England 
was  proposed  to  the  Cabinet  on  grounds  which  would 
hardly  have  been  sufficient  to  warrant  an  injunc 
tion  to  restrain  a  private  nuisance.  So  far  as  argu 
ment  was  concerned,  Perceval  had  no  more  to  say. 
Having  in  his  opinion  established  his  legal  right 
to  do  what  he  pleased  with  American  commerce, 
he  next  discussed  the  policy  and  extent  of  the  pro 
posed  interference.  His  first  idea  was  comparatively 
moderate. 

"If  we  actually  prohibit  all  intercourse  between  neu 
trals  and  the  enemies'  colonies,"  he  continued,  "  or 
between  neutrals  and  the  enemies'  continental  posses 
sions,  it  would  be  such  a  severe  blow  upon  the  trade  of 
America  as  might  make  it  no  unreasonable  choice  on  her 
part  to  prefer  the  dangers  and  chances  of  war  to  such  a 
restriction  upon  her  trade.  I  should  therefore  wish  to 
leave  such  advantages  still  to  neutral  trade  as  to  make  it 
quite  clear  to  be  the  policy  of  America,  if  she  is  wise,  to 
prefer  the  neutral  trade  that  will  be  left  to  her  to  the 
total  stoppage  of  her  trade  with  the  ^snerny  and  with 
ourselves  which  a  war  might  occasion.  .  .  .  With  this 
view,  therefore,  I  would  recommend  to  relax  thus  far  in 
the  rigor  of  our  retaliatory  prohibitions  as  to  leave  to 
neutral  nations  the  right  of  trading  directly  in  articles  of 
their  own  growth,  produce,  and  manufacture  exported 
in  their  own  vessels  to  enemies'  countries,  and  of  import 
ing  from  the  enemies'  countries  for  their  own  use  articles 
the  growth,  produce,  and  manufacture  of  such  enemies' 


88  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  4. 

countries ;  that  is,  leaving  to  them  free  the  direct  trade 
between  the  enemy  and  themselves  in  articles  of  their 
respective  growth,  etc.,  but  to  prohibit  the  re-exporta 
tion  of  any  articles  the  growth,  etc.,  of  the  enemies' 
countries  or  their  colonies,  or  the  carriage  of  them  to 
any  other  country  but  their  own." 

Perceval's  first  suggestion  was  far  from  being  so 
radical  as  the  measure  at  last  adopted.  He  pro 
posed  to  cut  off  France  from  her  colonies  and  force 
all  trade  between  those  colonies  and  Europe  to  pass 
through  British  hands ;  but  an  American  ship  laden 
with  American  cotton  or  wheat  might  still  sail  from 
the  United  States  direct  to  France  and  return  to 
the  United  States,  or  might  carry  provisions  and 
lumber  to  Martinique  and  Cuba,  carrying  French 
or  Spanish  sugar  back  to  New  York.  This  so- 
called  "  direct "  trade  was  to  be  untouched ;  the 
indirect "  or  carrying  trade  between  tho  West  In 
dies  and  the  continent  of  Europe  was  to  be  per 
mitted  only  under  special  licenses  to  be  issued  by 
British  authorities. 

In  this  shape  Perceval  sent  his  suggestions  to  the 
Prime  Minister,  the  Duke  of  Portland,  who  gave 
his  entire  approval  to  the  principle  of  retaliation  as 
against  France,  but  wished  to  retaliate  against  France 
alone  : 1  "  Considering  the  unpopularity  wrhich,  it  can 
not  be  denied,  we  are  held  in  throughout  the  Conti 
nent,  I  very  much  doubt  whether  we  should  limit 
this  intercourse  beyond  the  actual  dominions  of 
1  Opinion  of  the  Duke  of  Portland ;  Perceval  MSS. 


1807.  THE   ORDERS  IN   COUNCIL.  89 

France.  I  am  well  aware  that  by  admitting  the  in 
tercourse  with  Holland  and  Spain,  France  will  obtain 
circuitously  those  supplies  which  she  will  stand  in 
want  of." 

This  disadvantage,  the  Duke  thought,  could  be 
largely  compensated  by  a  rigid  observance  of  the 
navigation  laws.  The  Duke's  opinion  was  very  short, 
and  barely  hinted  at  the  American  question. 

John  Fane,  Earl  of  Westmoreland,  Lord  Privy 
Seal, —  Sot  Prive,  or  Privy  Fool,  as  Canning  after 
ward  nicknamed  him  by  a  pun  on  the  French  word 
sceau,1  —  gave  next  his  written  opinion  on  the  sub 
ject.2  Going  beyond  either  Perceval  or  Portland,  he 
urged  the  expediency  of  stopping  all  trade  with  the 
enemy  except  through  the  medium  of  England,— 
"  the  effect  of  which  must  be  either  to  distress  them 
to  such  a  degree  as  to  induce  a  relaxation  of  their 
decrees,  or  to  cause  a  great  trade  from  this  country. 
Its  effect  in  case  of  an  extension  of  hostility  can  cer 
tainly  not  be  ascertained ;  but  I  am  disposed  to  think 
that  we  cannot  carry  on  war  allowing  our  enemy 
advantages  of  commerce  as  in  peace,  and  that  if  we 
only  do  what  is  right  we  must  take  our  chance  for 
the  consequences." 

The   next    opinion   was   apparently   that   of   Lord  IT 
Hawkesbury,  the  Home  Secretary,  who  was  also  clear 
that  Perceval's  plan  wanted  energy.     While  support 
ing  the   Duke    of   Portland   in   narrowing  its   scope 

1  Stapleton's  Canning,  p.  411. 

2  Opinion  of  the  Earl  of  Westmoreland  ;  Perceval  MSS. 


90  HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  4. 

to  France,  or  at  the  utmost  to  Holland,  he  favored 
harsher  treatment  of  America : l 

"  I  incline  strongly  to  the  opinion  that  it  is  expedient 
to  put  an  end,  as  far  as  in  us  lies,  to  all  intercourse  hy 
sea  between  neutrals  and  the  continental  dominions  of 
France,  and  possibly  of  Holland.  I  am  satisfied  that 
the  measure  of  retaliation  as  proposed  in  the  enclosed 
paper  would  have  no  other  effect  than  to  raise  the 
price  of  colonial  produce  in  France  to  a  small  degree. 
It  would  offend  neutrals,  particularly  the  Americans, 
and  inflict  no  adequate  injury  upon  the  enemy.  But  if 
we  should  determine  to  prevent  all  intercourse  whatever 
with  the  ports  of  France  except  by  British  license,  we 
should  have  it  in  our  power  to  destroy  at  once  all  the 
remaining  commerce  of  France,  which  by  means  of  neu 
trals  is  not  inconsiderable,  and  to  strike  a  most  important 
blow  against  her  agriculture  by  preventing  the  exporta 
tion  of  her  wines." 

Lord  Hawkesbury  kept  in  view  the  retaliatory  char 
acter  of  the  measure  as  a  punishment  of  France.  Lord 
Castlereagh,  the  Secretary  for  War,  was  not  quite  so 
careful.2  He  acquiesced  in  Perceval's  scheme,  pro 
vided  it  should  reserve  the  right  to  extend  its  own 
application  whenever  the  balance  of  advantage  should 
favor  the  extension  ;  but  he  added,  — 

''I  am  of  opinion  that  some  decisive  measure,  in  vin 
dication  of  our  own  commerce  and  in  counteraction  of 
the  unsocial  system  of  France,  —  the  principle  of  which 
is  not  the  growth  of  this  war,  but  was  acted  upon  by 

1  Opinion  of  Lord  Hawkesbury ;  Perceval  MSS. 

2  Opinion  of  Lord  Castlereagh ;  Perceval  MSS. 


1807.  THE   ORDERS  IN   COUNCIL.  91 

her  throughout  the  late  short  peace,  —  is  become  indis 
pensable,  not  merely  as  a  measure  of  commercial  policy, 
but  in  order  to  put  the  contest  in  which  we  are  engaged 
upon  its  true  grounds  in  the  view  of  our  own  people 
and  of  the  world.  It  is  no  longer  a  struggle  for  terri 
tory  or  for  a  point  of  honor,  but  whether  the  existence 
of  England  as  a  naval  power  is  compatible  with  that  of 
France." 

Avowing  that  a  commercial  transaction  was  his 
object,  and  that  the  punishment  of  France  was  sec 
ondary  to  a  "  vindication  of  our  own  commerce,"  Cas- 
tlereagh  assumed  that  punishment  of  France  and 
"  vindication "  of  English  commerce  were  both  bel 
ligerent  rights,  as  though  the  right  to  kill  an  adver 
sary  in  a  duel  implied  the  right  to  pick  a  bystander's 
pocket.  His  colleague  arid  rival  Canning  was  not  so 
confused,  for  Canning's  duties  obliged  him  to  defend 
the  new  policy  against  neutral  objections.  Carefully 
as  the  other  ministers  mingled  the  ideas  of  retaliation 
and  of  commerce,  the  double  motive  of  Perceval's 
measure  had  never  been  concealed  ;  the  intention  to 
permit  a  licensed  trade  with  France  was  avowed. 
Perceval  and  Castlereagh  wanted,  not  to  take  com 
merce  from  France,  but  to  force  commerce  upon  her ; 
and  none  of  their  colleagues  could  detect  this  incon 
sistency  so  readily  as  Canning,  whose  duties  would 
oblige  him  to  assert  before  the  world  that  retaliation 
alone  was  the  object  of  a  measure  which  he  privately 
knew  to  have  no  motive  but  that  of  commercial 
rivalry.  Canning's  written  opinion,  beginning  by 


92  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  4 

affirming  in  strong  terms   the   right   and   justice   of 
retaliation,  continued  as  follows  : J  — 

"The  question  of  policy  is  all  that  remains;  and  in 
this  view  I  should  think  all  such  modifications  as  go 
to  lighten  the  burden  imposed  upon  neutrals,  and  as 
are  obviously  intended  for  that  purpose,  more  advisa 
ble  than  any  direct  reservations  for  our  own  interest 
and  advantage.  For  this  reason  I  would  rather  confine 
the  measure  to  a  part  of  the  countries  in  the  occupation 
of  the  enemy  (a  large  part  to  be  sure,  —  France  and 
Holland,  for  instance),  and  apply  it  in  all  its  rigor  to 
that  part,  than  extend  it  to  the  whole  and  relax  it  gen 
erally  by  complicated  exceptions  and  regulations.  And 
I  would  keep  out  of  sight  the  exceptions  in  favor  of  ships 
going  from  this  country,  the  benefit  of  which  might  be 
equally  obtained  by  licenses  ;  but  the  publication  of  that 
exception  would  give  to  the  measure  the  air  of  a  com 
mercial  rather  than  a  political  transaction." 

By  the  end  of  October  all  the  Cabinet  opinions  were 
in  Perceval's  hands,  and  he  began  the  task  of  drafting 
the  proposed  orders.  His  original  draft 2  contained  an 
elaborate  preamble,  asserting  that  Napoleon's  decrees 
violated  the  laws  of  nations,  which  Perceval  broadly 
maintained  were  binding  on  one  belligerent  only  when 
the  obligation  was  reciprocally  acknowledged  by  the 
other ;  that  neutrals  had  not  resented  and  resisted 
outrage,  "  nor  interposed  with  effect  for  obtain- 
the  revocation  of  those  orders,  but  on  the  con- 

1  Opinion  of  Mr.  Canning;  Perceval  MSS. 

2  First  Draft  of  Orders  in   Council,  with  remarks  by  Earl 
Bathurst;  Perceval  MSS. 


1807.  THE  ORDERS  IN  COUNCIL.  93 

trary  the  same  have  been  recently  reinforced ; "  that 
Lord  Howick's  retaliatory  order  had  served  only  to 
encourage  Napoleon's  attempts ;  that  his  Majesty  had 
a  right  to  declare  all  the  dominions  of  France  and  her 
allies  in  a  state  of  blockade ;  but  "  not  forgetting  the 
interests  of  neutral  nations,  and  still  desirous  of  re 
taliating  upon  the  commerce  of  his  enemies  with  as 
little  prejudice  to  those  interests"  as  was  consistent 
with  his  purpose,  he  would  for  the  present  prohibit 
only  trade  which  neutrals  might  be  disposed  to 
pursue  in  submission  to  the  French  decrees,  and 
require  that  such  trade  should  pass  to  or  from  some 
British  port.  . — - 

Then    followed    the    order,   which   prohibited    all         . 
neutral   trade   with    the    whole    European    sea-coast  \r 
from  Copenhagen  to  Trieste,  leaving  only  the  Baltic 
open.    No  American  vessel  should  be  allowed  to  enter 
any  port  in  Europe  from  which  British  vessels  were 
excluded,   unless   the   American   should    clear    from 
some  British  port  under  regulations  to  be  prescribed 
at  a  future  time.  ^_ 

This  draft  was  completed  in  the  first  days  of 
November,  and  was  sent  to  Lord  Bathurst,  President 
of  the  Board  of  Trade,  who  mercilessly  criticised  the 
preamble,  and  treated  his  colleague's  law  with  as 
little  respect  as  though  Bathurst  were  an  American,  v 

"  I  wish  the  principle  of  retaliation,"  wrote  Lord 
Bathurst,  "  not  to  be  unqualifiedly  advanced,  for  which 
I  think  there  is  no  necessity.  May  it  not  be  said  that 
in  a  contest  with  an  unprincipled  enemy  the  doctrine  of 


94          HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED   STATES.        CH.  4. 

retaliation  is  one  dangerous  to  admit  without  qualifica 
tions?  I  own  I  do  not  like  the  word.  If  my  enemy 
commits  an  act  of  injustice,  I  am  not  therefore  justified 
in  committing  the  same,  except  so  far  as  may  be  neces 
sary,  in  consequence  of  his  act,  either  to  protect  myself 
from  injury,  or  prevent  a  recurrence  to,  or  continuance 
in,  such  acts  of  injustice.  All  operations  of  war  are 
justified  only  on  the  principle  of  defence.  Retaliation 
seems  to  admit  something  of  a  vindictive  spirit." 

The  Board  of  Trade  was  not  usually  scrupulous 
in  dealing  with  American  commerce ;  but  in  this 
instance  Earl  Bathurst  let  it  be  plainly  seen  that  he 
wished  to  have  no  share  of  responsibility  for  Perce 
val's  casuistry.  The  longer  he  studied  the  proposed 
order  the  less  he  liked  it ;  and  in  the  end  he  wrote 
an  opinion  contrary  to  his  first.  He  withdrew  his 
assent  to  the  order  altogether,  and  hinted  some  un 
pleasant  truths  in  regard  to  it. 

"  Our  ability  to  continue  the  war,"  he  said,1  "  depends 
on  our  commerce  ;  for  if  our  revenues  fail  from  a  diminu 
tion  'of  our  commerce,  additional  imports  will  only  add 
to  the  evil.  The  enemy  forms  one  great  military  empire. 
The  extent  of  country  he  covers  does  not  render  him  so 
dependent  on  an  export  and  import  trade.  The  whole 
of  that  trade  might  perish  and  he  could  still  continue  the 
war.  If  one  third  of  ours  were  to  fail  we  should  be  soon 
reduced  to  peace." 

The  proposed  order,  Bathurst  argued,  not  only 
restricted  the  neutral  trade  still  further  than  had 

1  Opinion  of  Lord  Bathurst  in  dissent  to  the  Principle  of  Mr. 
Perceval's  proposed  Order  ;  Perceval  MSS. 


1807.  THE   ORDERS   IN  COUNCIL.  95 

been  done  by  Napoleon,  but  risked  war  with  Russia 
and  America,  without  materially  hurting  France ;  he 
added  an  argument  which  struck  at  the  foundation 
of  Perceval's  policy  :  — 

"  The  object  of  the  proposed  order,  though  general,  is 
in  fact  nothing  but  the  colonial  trade  carried  on  through 
America ;  and  by  making  it  general  we  unite  Russia  in 
defence  of  a  trade  with  which  she  has  no  concern  or  any 
interest  to  defend.  As  far  as  America  is  concerned,  it 
must  be  expected  she  will  resist  it ;  and  an  American  war 
would  be  severely  felt  by  our  manufacturers,  and  even 
by  the  very  class  of  merchants  now  so  eager  for  some 
measure  of  relief.  We  might  therefore  have  to  fight  for 
a  rule  of  war,  new,  the  policy  of  which  would  be  ques 
tionable,  to  support  an  interest  which  would  be  the  first 
to  suffer  by  the  war,  —  against  two  countries,  one  of 
which  the  order  unnecessarily  mixes  in  the  question,  and 
with  both  of  which  we  have  great  commercial  relations." 

Bathurst  closed  by  expressing  a  preference  for  the 
Rule  of  1T56,  or  for  a  blockade  of  the  West  Indian 
Islands, — which,  if  the  Admiralty  thought  it  prac 
ticable,  Bathurst  considered  as  the  best  of  all  the 
measures  proposed ;  but  besides  this  radical  change, 
he  demanded  certain  alarming  reforms.  He  com 
plained  to  Perceval  that  already,  even  under  the 
existing  orders,  such  abuses  prevailed  that  in  order 
to  prevent  a  public  parliamentary  inquiry  he  had 
been  obliged  by  the  general  clamor  of  merchants  to 
investigate  their  grievances  :  l  — 

1  Lord  Bathurst  to  Spencer  Perceval,  Nov.  5,  1807 ;  Perceval 
MSS. 


96  HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH  4. 

"The  result  of  the  examination  established  the  truth 
of  the  vexations  to  which  the  trade  is  now  subject  by 
privateers,  who  are  enabled  to  persevere  in  them  in  con 
sequence  of  the  commercial  restrictions  and  the  proceed 
ings  of  the  Court  of  Admiralty.  In  a  communication  I 
had  with  Sir  William  Scott,  who  had  been  very  angry 
with  the  inquiry,  I  proposed  some  regulations  which,  in 
deed,  I  knew  would  be  unsatisfactory  unless  there  were 
some  alterations  in  the  proceedings  of  his  Court,  —  a 
subject  which  I  did  not  venture  to  touch." 

Lord  Bathurst's  well-meant  efforts  for  reform,  gen 
tle  as  they  were,  showed  him  the  fortresses  in  which 
corruption  was  already  entrenched.  Sir  William 
Scott,  like  his  brother  Lord  Eldon,  never  relaxed  his 
grasp  on  a  profitable  abuse.  He  gave  cogent  rea 
sons  for  rejecting  Lord  Bathurst's  suggestions,  and 
could  afford  to  disregard  the  danger  of  interference, 
for  Spencer  Perceval  was  completely  under  the  in 
fluence  of  Lord  Eldon.  Bathurst  urged  Perceval  to 
reform  the  license-system,  so  that  at  least  the  license 
should  give  complete  protection  to  the  cargo,  no 
matter  to  whom  the  cargo  might  belong ;  and  he 
hoped  that  this  reform  would  put  an  end  to  the 
abuses  of  the  Admiralty  Court.  "  But,"  he  added, 
"  I  did  not  venture  to  give  this  as  my  reason  before 
Sir  John  Nichol  [advocate-general] ,  for  you  must  be 
aware  that  both  his  profits  and  those  of  Sir  William 
Scott  depend  much  on  privateers  and  the  litigations 
which,  it  is  my  hope,  will  by  this  alteration  be  con 
siderably  diminished." 


isor.  THE  OKDEliS  IN  COUNCIL.  97 

Many  members  of  the  British  government  and 
nearly  the  whole  British  navy  were  growing  rich  on  the 
plunder  of  American  commerce.  From  King  George 
downward,  mighty  influences  were  involved  in  main 
taining  a  system  which  corrupted  law  officers,  judges, 
admirals,  and  even  the  King  himself.  Spencer  Per 
ceval's  proposed  Order  in  Council  extended  these 
abuses  over  whatever  branches  of  commerce  had 
hitherto  been  exempt ;  turned  a  new  torrent  of 
corruption  into  the  government  ;  and  polluted  the 
sources  of  British  honor.  In  the  light  of  Lord 
Bathurst's  protest,  and  his  significant  avowal  that 
the  object  of  the  proposed  order,  though  general 
in  form,  was  in  fact  nothing  but  the  colonial  trade 
carried  on  through  America,  Canning  might  well 
wish  to  publish  nothing  that  would  draw  attention 
to  what  he  called  the  "  commercial "  side  of  the 
affair.  Jefferson's  measures  of  peaceful  coercion 
bore  unexpected  results,  reacting  upon  foreign  na 
tions  by  stimulating  every  mean  and  sordid  mo 
tive.  No  possible  war  could  have  so  degraded 
England. 

As  the  Cabinet  came  closer  to  the  point,  the  politi 
cal,  or  retaliatory,  object  of  the  new  order  disap 
peared,  and  its  commercial  character  was  exclusively 
set  forth.  In  a  letter  written  about  November  30, 
by  Spencer  Perceval  to  Charles  Abbot,  Speaker  of  the 
House  of  Commons,  not  a  word  was  said  of  retalia 
tion,  or  of  any  political  motive  in  this  process  of  "  re 
casting  the  law  of  trade  and  navigation,  as  far  as 

VOL.  IV.  —  7 


98          HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.        CH.  4. 

belligerent  principles  are  concerned,  for  the   whole 
world." 

"The  short  principle  is,"  said  Perceval,1  "that  trade 
in  British  produce  and  manufactures,  and  trade  either 
from  a  British  port  or  with  a  British  destination,  is  to  be 
protected  as  much  as  possible.  For  this  purpose  all  the 
countries  where  French  influence  prevails  to  exclude  the 
British  flag  shall  have  no  trade  but  to  or  from  this 
country,  or  from  its  allies.  All  other  countries,  the  few 
that  remain  strictly  neutral  (with  the  exception  of  the 
colonial  trade,  which  backward  and  forward  direct  they 
may  carry  on),  cannot  trade  but  through  this  being  done 
as  an  ally  with  any  of  the  countries  connected  with 
France.  If  therefore  we  can  accomplish  our  purpose, 
it  will  come  to  this,  — that  either  those  countries  will  have 
no  trade,  or  they  must  be  content  to  accept  it  through 
us.  This  is  a  formidable  and  tremendous  state  of  the 
world ;  but  all  the  part  of  it  which  is  particularly  har 
assing  to  English  interests  was  existing  through  the  new 
severity  with  which  Bonaparte's  decrees  of  exclusion 
against  our  trade  were  called  into  action.  Our  proceed 
ing  does  not  aggravate  our  distress  from  it.  If  he  can 
.keep  out  our  trade  he  will ;  and  he  would  do  so  if  he 
could,  independent  of  our  orders.  Our  orders  only  add 
this  circumstance :  they  say  to  the  enemy,  '  If  you  will 
not  have  our  trade,  as  far  as  we  can  help  it  you  shall 
have  none;  and  as  to  so  much  of  any  trade  as  you  can 
carry  on  yourselves,  or  others  carry  on  with  you  through 
us,  if  you  admit  it  you  shall  pay  for  it.  The  only  trade, 
cheap  and  untaxed,  which  you  shall  have  shall  be  either 

1  Spencer  Perceval  to  Speaker  Abbot ;  Diary  and  Correspond 
ence  of  Lord  Colchester,  ii.  134. 


1807.  THE   ORDERS  IN   COUNCIL.  99 

direct  from  us,  in  our  own  produce  and  manufactures, 
or  from  our  allies,  whose  increased  prosperity  will  be  an 
advantage  to  us."3 

These  private  expressions  implied  that  retaliation 
upon  France  for  her  offence  against  international  law 
was  a  pretence  on  the  part  of  Perceval  and  Canning, 
under  the  cover  of  which  they  intended  to  force 
British  commerce  upon  France  contrary  to  French 
wishes.  The  act  of  Napoleon  in  excluding  British 
produce  from  French  dominions  violated  no  rule  of 
international  law,  and  warranted  no  retaliation  ex 
cept  an  exclusion  of  French  produce  from  British 
dominions.  The  rejoinder,  "  If  you  will  not  have  our 
trade  you  shall  have  none"  was  not  good  law,  if  law 
could  be  disputed  when  affirmed  by  men  like  Lord 
Eldon  and  Lord  Stowell,  echoed  by  courts,  parlia 
ments,  and  press,  —  not  only  in  private,  but  in  public  ; 
not  only  in  1807,  but  for  long  years  afterward  ;  and 
not  only  at  moments,  but  without  interruption. 

Thus  Canning,  although  he  warned  Perceval  against 
betraying  the  commercial  object  of  his  orders,  in 
structed1  Erskine  at  Washington  to  point  out  that 
American  ships  might  still  bring  colonial  produce 
to  England,  under  certain  regulations,  for  re-export 
to  France.  "  The  object  of  these  regulations  will  be 
the  establishment  of  such  a  protecting  duty  as  shall 
prevent  the  enemy  from  obtaining  the  produce  of  his 
own  colonies  at  a  cheaper  rate  than  that  of  the 
colonies  of  Great  Britain."  Not  to  distress  France^ 

1  Erskine  to  Madison,  Feb.  23,  1808  ;  State  Papers,  iii.  209. 


100        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        Cn.4. 

A)ut  to   encourage    British   trade,  was,  according  to 
^  Canning,  the  object  of  this  "  political "  weapon. 

Thus  Perceval,  in  the  debate  of  Feb.  5,  1808,  in 
discussing  the  policy  of  his  order,  affirmed  that  the 

British  navy  had  been  "  rendered  useless  by  neutral 

ships  carrying  to  France  all  that  it  was  important 

for  France  to  obtain."  l     The  Rule  of  1756,  he  said, 

would  not  have  counteracted  this  result,  —  a  much 
stronger  measure  was  necessary ;  and  it  was  sound 
policy  "  to  endeavor  to  force  a  market."  Lord  Bath- 
urst,  a  few  days  afterward,  very  frankly  told2  the 
House  that  "  the  object  of  these  orders  was  to  regu 
late  that  which  could  not  be  prohibited,  —  the  circui 
tous  trade  through  this  country, "  —  in  order  that 
the  produce  of  enemies'  colonies  might  "  be  subjected 
to  a  duty  sufficiently  high  to  prevent  its  having  the 
advantage  over  our  own  colonial  produce ; "  and  Lord 
Hawkesbury,  in  the  same  debate,  complained3  that 
~~  neutrals  supplied  colonial  produce  to  France  at  a 
much  less  rate  than  the  English  paid  for  it.  "  To 
prevent  this,"  he  said,  "  was  the  great  object  of  the 
Orders  in  Council."  James  Stephen's  frequent  argu 
ments  *  in  favor  of  the  orders  turned  upon  the 
commercial  value  of  the  policy  as  against  neutrals ; 
while  George  Rose,  Vice-President  of  the  Board  of 

1  Cobbett's  Debates,  x.  328. 

2  Debate  of  Feb.  15,  1808  ;  Cobbett's  Debates,  x.  471. 
8  Debate  of  Feb.  15,  1808  ;  Cobbett's  Debates,  x.  485. 

4  Speech  of  James  Stephen,  March  6,  1809  ;  Cobbett's  De 
bates,  xiii.,  Appendix  Ixxvi. 


1807.  THE   ORDERS   IN   COUNCIL.  101 

°v " 
Trade,  went  still  further,  and  not  only  avowed,  in 

the  face  of  Parliament,  the  hope  that  these  Orders 
in  Council  would  make  England  the  emporium  of 
all  trade  in  the  world,  but  even  asserted,  in  an 
unguarded  moment  of  candor,  that  it  was  a  mistake  ~ 
to  call  the  orders  retaliatory,  —  they  were  a  system  of 
self-defence,  a  plan  to  protect  British  commerce.1 

Thus,  too,  the  orders  themselves,  while  licensing 
the  export  through  England  to  France  of  all  other 
American  produce,  imposed  a  prohibitive  duty  on  the 
export  of  cotton,  on  the  ground  —  as  Canning  offi 
cially  informed  2  the  American  government  —  that 
France  had  pushed  her  cotton  manufactures  to  such 
an  extent  as  to  make  it  expedient  for  England  to 
embarrass  them. 

According  to  the  public  and  private  avowals  of  all 
the  Ministry,  the  true  object  of  Perceval's  orders 
was,  not  to  force  a  withdrawal  of  the  Berlin  Decree """ 
so  far  as  it  violated  international  law,  but  to  protect 
British  trade  from  competition.  Perceval  did  not 
wish  to  famish  France,  but  to  feed  her.  His  object  ./ 
was  commercial,  not  political ;  his  policy  aimed  at 
checking  the  commerce  of  America  in  order  to  stimu 
late  the  commerce  of  England.  The  pretence  that 
this  measure  had  retaliation  for  its  object  and  the 
vindication  of  international  law  for  its  end  was  a 
legal  fiction,  made  to  meet  the  objections  of  America 

1  Debate  of  March  3,   1812  ;  report  in  Times  and  Morning 
Chronicle  of  March  4,  1812. 

2  Erskine  to  Madison,  Feb.  23,  1808  ;  State  Papers,  iii.  209. 


102         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  4. 

and  to  help  Canning  in  maintaining  a  position  which 
he  knew  to  be  weak. 

After  this  long  discussion,  and  after  conferences 
not  only  with  his  colleagues  in  the  Cabinet,  but  also 
with  George  Rose,  Vice-President  of  the  Board  of 
Trade,  with  James  Stephen,  who  was  in  truth  the 
author  of  the  war  on  neutrals,  and  with  a  body  of 
merchants  from  the  city, —  at  last,  Nov.  11,  1807, 
Spencer  Perceval  succeeded  in  getting  his  General 
Order  approved  in  Council.  In  its  final  shape  this 
famous  document  differed  greatly  from  the  original 
draft.  In  deference  to  Lord  Bathurst's  objections, 
the  sweeping  doctrine  of  retaliation  was  omitted,  so 
that  hardly  an  allusion  to  it  was  left  in  the  text; 
the  assertion  that  neutrals  had  acquiesced  in  the 
Berlin  Decree  was  struck  out ;  the  preamble  was 
reduced,  by  Lord  Eldon's  advice,  to  a  mere  mention 
of  the  French  pretended  blockade,  and  of  Napoleon's 
real  prohibition  of  British  commerce,  followed  by  a 
few  short  paragraphs  reciting  that  Lord  Howick's 
order  of  Jan.  7, 1807,  had  "not  answered  the  desired 
purpose  either  of  compelling  the  enemy  to  recall 
those  orders  or  of  inducing  neutral  nations  to  inter 
pose  with  effect  to  obtain  their  revocation,  but  on  the 
contrary  the  same  have  been  recently  enforced  with 
increased  rigor ; "  and  then,  with  the  blunt  assertion 
that  "  his  Majesty,  under  these  circumstances,  finds 
himself  compelled  to  take  further  measures  for  assert 
ing  and  vindicating  his  just  rights,"  Perceval,  without 
more  apology,  ordered  in  effect  that  all  American 


1807.  THE   ORDERS   IN   COUNCIL.  103 

commerce,  except  that  to  Sweden  and  the  West 
Indies,  should  pass  through  some  British  port  and 
take  out  a  British  license. 

The  exceptions,  the  qualifications,  and  the  verbiage 
of  the  British  Orders  need  no  notice.  The  ablest 
British  merchants  gave  up  in  despair  the  attempt 
to  understand  them ;  and  as  one  order  followed 
rapidly  upon  another,  explaining,  correcting,  and 
developing  Perceval's  not  too  lucid  style,  the  angry 
Liberals  declared  their  belief  that  he  intended  no 
man  to  understand  them  without  paying  two  guineas 
for  a  legal  opinion,  with  the  benefit  of  a  chance  to 
get  a  directly  contrary  opinion  for  the  sum  of  two 
guineas  more.1  Besides  the  express  provisions  con 
tained  in  the  Order  of  November  11,  it  was  under 
stood  that  American  commerce  with  the  enemies  of 
England  must  not  only  pass  through  British  ports 
with  British  license,  but  that  colonial  produce  would 
be  made  to  pay  a  tax  to  the  British  Treasury  to 
enhance  its  price,  while  cotton  would  not  be  allowed 
to  enter  France. 

The  general  intention,  however  confused,  was 
simple.  After  November  11,  1807,  any  American 
vessel  carrying  any  cargo  was  liable  to  capture  if 
it  sailed  for  any  port  in  Europe  from  which  the 
British  flag  was  excluded.  In  other  words,  Ameri 
can  commerce  was  made  English. 

This  measure  completed,  diplomacy  was  to  resume 
its  work.  Even  Canning's  audacity  might  be  stag- 
1  Baring's  Inquiry,  pp.  14,  15. 


104         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  4. 

gered  to  explain  how  the  government  of  the  United 
States  could  evade  war  after  it  should  fairly  under 
stand  the  impressment  Proclamation  of  October  17, 
the  Order  in  Council  of  November  11,  and  the  In 
structions  of  George  Henry  Rose,  —  who  was  selected 
by  Canning  as  his  special  envoy  for  the  adjustment  of 
the  "  Leopard's "  attack  on  the  "  Chesapeake,"  and 
who  carried  orders  which  made  adjustment  impos 
sible.  Such  outrages  could  be  perpetrated  only  upon 
a  helpless  people.  Even  in  England,  where  Jefferson's 
pacific  policy  was  well  understood,  few  men  believed 
that  peace  could  be  longer  preserved. 


CHAPTER 


THE  curtain  was  about  to  rise  upon  a  new  tragedy, 
—  the  martyrdom  of  Spain.  At  this  dramatic  specta 
cle  the  United  States  government  and  people  might 
have  looked  with  composure  and  without  regret,  for 
they  hardly  felt  so  deep  an  interest  in  history, 
literature,  or  art  as  to  care  greatly  what  was  to 
become  of  the  land  which  had  once  produced  Cortes, 
Cervantes,  and  Murillo ;  but  in  the  actual  condition 
of  European  politics  their  own  interests  were  closely 
entwined  with  those  of  Spain,  and  as  the  vast 
designs  of  Napoleon  were  developed,  the  fortunes  of 
the  Spanish  empire  more  and  more  deeply  affected 
those  of  the  American  Union 

General  A^Kirtroiig  waited  impatiently  at  Paris 
while  Napoleon  carried  on  his  desperate  struggle  with 
the  Emperor  Alexander  amid  the  ice  and  snows  of 
Prussia.  After  the  battle  of  Eylau  the  American 
minister  became  so  restless  that  in  May,  1807,  he 
demanded  passports  for  Napoleon's  headquarters,  but 
was  refused.  Had  he.  gone  as  he  wished,  he  might 
have  seen  the  great  battle  of  Friedland,  June  14,  and 
witnessed  the  peace  of  Tilsit,  signed  July  7,  which 
swept  away  the  last  obstacle  to  Napoleon's  schemes 


106        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  5. 

against  Spain  and  America.  After  the  peace  of 
Tilsit,  Armstrong  could  foresee  that  he  should  have 
to  wait  but  a  short  time  for  the  explanations  so 
mysteriously  delayed. 

Except  Denmark  and  Portugal,  every  State  on  the 
coast  of  Europe  from  St.  Petersburg  to  Trieste  ac 
knowledged  Napoleon's  domination.  England  held 
out;  and  experience  proved  that  England  could  not 
be  reached  by  arms.  The  next  step  in  the  Emperor's 
system  was  to  effect  her  ruin  by  .closing  the  whole  / 
world  to  her  trade.  He  began  with  Portugal.  From 
Dresden,  July  19,  he  issued  orders l  that  the  Portu 
guese  ports  should  be  closed  by  September  1  against 
English  commerce,  or  the  kingdom  of  Portugal  would 
be  occupied  by  a  combined  French  and  Spanish  army. 
July  29  he  was  again  in  Paris.  July  31  he  ordered 
Talleyrand  to  warn  the  Prince  Royal  of  Denmark 
that  he  must  choose  between  war  with  England  and 
war  with  France.  That  the  turn  would  next  come  I 
to  the  United  Ct?f^s  was  evident ;  and  Armstrong  j 
was  warned  by  many  signs  ol  ilic  ynj>ending  storm.  i; 
August  2,  at  the  diplomatic  audience,  the  brunt  of 
Napoleon's  displeasure  fell  on  Dreyer,  the  Danish 
minister,  and  on  his  colleague  from  Portugal ;  but 
Armstrong  could  see  that  he  was  himself  expected 
to  profit  by  the  lesson.  He  wrote  instantly  to  the 
Secretary  of  State.3 

1  Napoleon  to  Talleyrand,  July   19,  1807  ;  Correspondance, 
xv.  433. 

2  Armstrong  to  Madison,  Aug.  3,  1807 ;  State  Papers,  iii.  243. 


1807. 


NO  MORE  NEUTRALS.  107 


"We  had  yesterday  our  first  audience  of  the  Emperor 
since  his  return  to  Paris.  Happening  to  stand  near  the 
minister  of  Denmark,  I  overheard  his  Majesty  say  to  that 
minister  :  '  So,  M.  Baron,  the  Baltic  has  been  violated !  * 
The  minister's  answer  was  not  audible  to  me ;  nor  did  it 
appear  to  be  satisfactory  to  the  Emperor,  who  repeated, 
in  a  tone  of  voice  somewhat  raised  and  peremptory,  '  But, 
sir,  the  Baltic,  has  been  violated  !  '  From  M.  Dreyer  he 
passed  to  myself  and  others,  and  lastly  to  the  ambassa 
dor  of  Portugal,  to  whom,  it  is  said,  he  read  a  very 
severe  lecture  on  the  conduct  of  his  Court.  These  cir 
cumstances  go  far  to  justify  the  whispers  that  begin  to 
circulate,  that  an  army  is  organizing  to  the  south  for  the 
purpose  of  taking  possession  of  Portugal,  and  another  to 
the  north  for  a  similar  purpose  with  regard  to  Denmark  ; 
and  generally,  that,  having  settled  the  business  of  bellig 
erents,  with  the  exception  of  England,  very  much  to  his 
own  liking,  he  is  now  on  the  point  of  settling  that  of 
neutrals  in  the  same  way.  It  was  perhaps  under  the 
influence  of  this  suggestion  that  M.  Dreyer,  taking  me 
aside,  inquired  whether  any  application  had  been  made 
to  me  with  regard  to  a  projected  union  of  all  commercial 
States  against  Great  Britain,  and  on  my  answering  in  the 
negative,  he  replied :  '  You  are  much  favored,  but  it  will 
not  last ! '  " 

A  few  days  afterward  another  rumor  ran  through 
Paris.  The  Prince  of  Benevento  was  no  longer  Min 
ister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  his  successor  was  to  be 
M.  de  Champagny,  hitherto  Minister  of  the  Interior. 
At  first  Armstrong  would  not  believe  in  Talley 
rand's  disgrace.  "  It  is  not  probable  that  this  is 
very  serious,  or  that  it  will  be  very  durable,"  he 


108        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  5. 

wrote.1  "  A  trifling  cause  cannot  alienate  such  a 
master  from  such  a  minister ;  and  a  grave  one  could 
not  fail  to  break  up  all  connections  between  them." 
Reasonable  as  this  theory  seemed,  it  was  superficial. 
The  master  and  the  minister  had  not  only  separated, 
but  had  agreed  to  differ  and  to  remain  outwardly 
friends.  Their  paths  could  no  longer  lie  together;  and 
the  overwhelming  power  of  Bonaparte  —  who  con 
trolled  a  million  soldiers  with  no  enemy  to  fight  — 
made  cabals  and  Cabinet  opposition  not  only  useless 
but  ridiculous.  Yet  with  all  this,  Talleyrand  stood  in 
silent  and  cold  disapproval  of  the  Emperor's  course ; 
and  since  Talleyrand  represented  intelligent  con 
servatism,  it  was  natural  to  suppose  that  the  Emperor 
meant  to  be  even  more  violent  in  the  future  than  in 
the  past.  The  new  minister,  Champagny,  neither 
suggested  a  policy  of  his  own,  nor  presumed,  as  Tal 
leyrand  sometimes  dared,  to  argue  or  remonstrate 
with  his  master. 

Toward  the  end  of  August  Dreyer's  prophecy  be 
came  true.  Napoleon's  orders  forced  the  King  of 
Denmark  and  King  Louis  of  Holland  to  seize  neutral 
commerce  and  close  the  Danish  and  Dutch  ports. 
The  question  immediately  rose  whether  United  States 
ships  and  property  were  still  to  be  treated  as  exempt 
from  the  operation  of  the  Berlin  Decree  by  virtue  of 
the  treaty  of  1800;  and  the  Emperor  promptly  de 
cided  against  them. 

1  Armstrong  to  Madison,  Aug.  11,  1807  ;  MSS.  State  De 
partment  Archives. 


1807. 


NO  MORE   NEUTRALS.  109 


"  In  actual  circumstances,"  he  wrote  to  Decres,1  "  navi 
gation  offers  all  sorts  of  difficulties.  France  cannot 
regard  as  neutral  flags  which  enjoy  no  consideration. 
That  of  America,  however  exposed  it  may  be  to  the  in 
sults  of  the  English,  has  a  sort  of  existence,  since  the 
English  still  keep  some  measure  in  regard  to  it,  and  it 
imposes  on  them.  That  of  Portugal  and  that  of  Den 
mark  exist  no  longer." 

This  opinion  was  written  before  the  British  ministry 
touched  the  Orders  in  Council ;  and  the  "  sort  of 
existence"  which  Napoleon  conceded  to  the  United 
States  was  already  so  vague  as  to  be  not  easily 
known  from  the  extinction  which  had  fallen  upon 
Portugal  and  Denmark.  A  few  days  afterward  Gen 
eral  Armstrong  received  officially  an  order2  from 
the  Emperor  which  expressly  declared  that  the  Berlin 
Decree  admitted  of  no  exception  in  favor  of  American 
vessels  ;  and  this  step  was  followed  by  a  letter  3  from 
Champagny,  dated  October  7,  to  the  same  effect.  At 
the  same  time  the  Council  of  Prizes  pronounced 
judgment  in  the  case  of  the  American  ship  "  Horizon," 
wrecked  some  six  months  before  near  Morlaix.  The 
Court  decreed  that  such  part  of  the  cargo  as  was  not 
of  English  origin  should  be  restored  to  its  owners ; 
but  that  the  merchandise  which  was  acknowledged  to 
be  of  English  manufacture  or  to  come  from  English 

1  Napoleon  to  Decres,  Sept.  9,  1807  ;  Correspondance,  xvi.  20. 

2  M.  Regnier  to  the  Procureur  General,  Sept.  18,  1807  ;  State 
Papers,  iii.  244. 

8  Champagny  to  Armstrong,  Oct.  7,  1807  ;  State  Papers, 
iii.  245. 


110         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   SPATES.        CH.  5. 

territory  should  be  confiscated  under  the  Berlin  De 
cree.  To  this  decision  Armstrong  immediately  re 
sponded  in  a  strong  note1  of  protest  to  Champagny, 
which  called  out  an  answer  from  the  Emperor  him 
self. 

"Reply  to  the  American  minister,"  wrote  Napoleon2 
to  Champagny  November  15,  "  that  since  America  suf 
fers  her  vessels  to  be  searched,  she  adopts  the  principle 
that  the  flag  does  not  cover  the  goods.  Since  she  recog 
nizes  the  absurd  blockades  laid  by  England,  consents  to 
having  her  vessels  incessantly  stopped,  sent  to  England, 
and  so  turned  aside  from  their  course,  why  should  the 
Americans  not  suffer  the  blockade  laid  by  France  ?  Cer 
tainly  France  is  no  more  blockaded  by  England  than 
England  by  France.  Why  should  Americans  not  equally 
suffer  their  vessels  to  be  searched  by  French  ships? 
Certainly  France  recognizes  that  these  measures  are 
unjust,  illegal,  and  subversive  of  national  sovereignty ; 
but  it  is  the  duty  of  nations  to  resort  to  force,  and  to 
declare  themselves  against  things  which  dishonor  them 
and  disgrace  their  independence." 

Champagny  wrote  this  message  to  Armstrong 
November  24,  taking  the  ground  that  America 
must  submit  to  the  Berlin  Decree  because  she  sub- 
V  mitted  to  impressments  and  search.3 

As  a  matter  of  relative  wrong,  Napoleon's   argu- 

1  Armstrong  to  Champagny,   Nov.   12,   1807 ;  State   Papers, 
iii.  245. 

2  Napoleon  to  Champagny,  Nov.  15,  1807  ;  Correspondance, 
xvi.  165. 

3  Champagny  to  Armstrong,   Nov.    24,  1807  ;  State  Papers, 
iii.  247. 


1807  NO  MORE  NEUTRALS.  Ill 

ment  was  more  respectable  than  that  of  Spencer  Per 
ceval  and  George  Canning,  He  could  say  with  truth 
that  the  injury  he  did  to  America  was  wholly  conse 
quential  on  the  injury  he  meant  to  inflict  on  England. 
He  had  no  hidden  plan  of  suppressing  American 
commerce  in  order  to  develop  the  commerce  of 
France ;  as  yet  he  was  not  trying  to  make  money 
by  theft.  His  Berlin  Decree  interfered  in  no  way 
with  the  introduction  of  American  products  directly 
into  France;  it  merely  forbade  the  introduction  of 
English  produce  or  the  reception  of  ships  which  came 
from  England.  Outrageous  as  its  provisions  were, 
"  unjust,  illegal,  and  subversive  of  national  sove 
reignty,"  as  Napoleon  himself  admitted  and  avowed, 
they  bore  their  character  and  purpose  upon  their 
face,  and  in  that  sense  were  legitimate.  He  had  no 
secrets  on  this  point.  In  a  famous  diplomatic  audi 
ence  at  Fontainebleau  October  14,  Armstrong  wit 
nessed  a  melodramatic  scene,  in  which  the  Emperor 
proclaimed  to  the  world  that  his  will  was  to  be  law.1 
"  The  House  of  Braganza  shall  reign  no  more,"  said 
he  to  the  Portuguese  minister ;  then  turning  to  the 
representative  of  the  Queen  of  Etruria,  —  the  same 
Spanish  princess  on  whose  head  he  had  five  years  be 
fore  placed  the  shadowy  crown  of  Tuscany,— 

"  Your  mistress,"  he  said,  "  has  her  secret  attachments 
to  Great  Britain,  —  as  you,  Messieurs  Deputies  of  the 
Hanse  Towns  are  also  said  to  have ;  but  I  will  put  an 

1  Armstrong  to  Madison,  Oct.  15,  1807  ;  MSS.  State  Depart 
ment  Archives. 


112        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  5. 

end  to  this.  Great  Britain  shall  be  destroyed.  I  have 
the  means  of  doing  it,  and  they  shall  be  employed.  I 
have  three  hundred  thousand  men  devoted  to  this  ob 
ject,  and  an  ally  who  has  three  hundred  thousand  to 
support  them.  I  will  permit  no  nation  to  receive  a  min 
ister  from  Great  Britain  until  she  shall  have  renounced 
her  maritime  usages  and  tyranny ;  and  I  desire  you, 
gentlemen,  to  convey  this  determination  to  your  respec 
tive  sovereigns." 

Armstrong  obeyed  the  order;  and  in  doing  so  he 
might  easily  have  pointed  out  the  machinery  by  which 
Napoleon  expected  to  insure  the  co-operation  of 
America  in  securing  the  destruction  of  England.  He 
could  combine  the  Berlin  Decree  with  the  baffled 
negotiations  for  Florida,  and  could  understand  why 
the  Emperor  at  one  moment  dangled  the  tempting 
bait  before  Jefferson's  eyes,  and  the  next  snatched 
it  away.  This  diplomatic  game  was  one  which  Napo 
leon  played  with  every  victim  he  wished  to  ensnare, 
and  the  victim  never  showed  enough  force  of  char 
acter  to  resist  temptation.  German,  Italian,  Rus 
sian,  Spaniard,  American,  had  all  been  lured  by  this 
decoy ;  one  after  another  had  been  caught  and 
devoured,  but  the  next  victim  never  saw  the  trap, 
or  profited  by  the  cries  of  the  last  unfortunate. 
Armstrong  knew  that  whenever  Napoleon  felt  the 
United  States  slipping  through  his  lingers,  Florida 
would  again  be  offered  to  keep  Jefferson  quiet;  yet 
even  Armstrong,  man  of  the  world  as  he  was,  tried 
to  persuade  himself  that  Napoleon  did  not  know  his 


1807.  NO  MORE   NEUTRALS.  113 

own  mind.  One  of  his  despatches  at  this  crisis 
related  a  curious  story,  which  he  evidently  believed 
to  be  true,  and  to  prove  the  vacillating  temper  of 
Napoleon's  Florida  negotiation. 

November  15  Armstrong  wrote  that  the  Emperor 
had  left  Fontainebleau  for  Italy ;  that  great  changes 
were  predicted,  among  which  it  was  rumored  "  that 
Portugal,  taken  from  the  Braganzas,  may  be  lent  to 
the  children  of  the  Toscan  House,  and  that  the  Bour 
bons  of  Spain  are  at  last  to  make  way  for  Lucien 
Bonaparte,  who,  in  atonement  or  from  policy,  is  to 
marry  the  Queen  Regent  of  Etruria."  That  the 
American  minister  should  at  that  early  day  have 
been  so  well  informed  about  projects  as  yet  carefully 
concealed,  was  creditable  to  his  diplomacy.  Not  till 
nearly  a  month  later  did  Lucien  himself,  in  his  Italian 
banishment,  receive  notice  of  the  splendid  bribe  in 
tended  for  him. 

In  the  same  despatch  of  November  15  Armstrong 
discussed  the  Emperor's  plans  in  their  bearing  on 
Florida.  "  We  are,  it  seems,  to  be  invited  to  make 
common  cause  against  England,  and  to  take  the  guar 
anty  of  the  Continent  for  a  maritime  peace  which 
shall  establish  the  principle  of '  free  ships,  free  goods.'  " 
Armstrong  argued  that  it  was  wiser  to  act  alone, 
even  in  case  of  war  with  England ;  in  regard  to 
Florida,  France  had  done  all  that  was  to  be  expected 
from  her,  and  had  latterly  become  sparing  even  of 
promises.  Finally,  he  told  the  anecdote  already 
alluded  to  :  — 

VOL.  IV. -—8 


114         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  5. 

"The  fact  appears  to  be,  which  I  communicate  with 
the  most  intimate  conviction  of  its  truth,  that  some  syco 
phant,  entering  into  the  weakness  of  the  Emperor,  and 
perceiving  that  he  was  only  happy  in  giving  a  little  more 
circumference  to  the  bubble,  seized  the  moment  of  Iz- 
quierdo's  nomination,  and  pointing  to  the  United  States, 
said :  4  These  are  destined  to  form  the  last  labor  of  the 
modern  Hercules.  The  triumph  over  England  cannot  be 
complete  so  long  as  the  commerce  and  republicanism  of 
this  country  be  permitted  to  exist.  Will  it  then  be  wise 
to  insulate  it,  —  to  divest  yourselves  or  your  allies  of 
those  points  which  would  place  you  at  once  in  the  midst 
of  it?  With  what  view  was  it  that  after  selling  Louisi 
ana,  attempts  were  made  by  France  to  buy  the  Florid  as 
from  Spain?  Was  it  not  in  the  anticipation  of  events 
which  may  make  necessary  to  you  a  place  in  the  neigh 
borhood  of  these  States,  —  a  point  on  which  to  rest  your 
political  lever?  Remember  that  Archimedes  could  not 
move  the  world  without  previously  finding  a  resting-place 
for  his  screw.  Instead,  therefore,  of  parting  with  the 
Floridas,  I  would  suggest  whether  we  should  not  make 
the  repossession  of  Canada  a  condition  of  a  peace  with 
England.'  The  conception  itself,  and  the  manner  in 
which  it  was  presented,  struck  the  Emperor  forcibly. 
He  mused  a  moment  upon  it,  and  then  in  the  most  per 
emptory  manner  ordered  that  the  negotiation  should 
not  go  on." 

Armstrong  regarded  this  anecdote  as  important. 
Perhaps  he  had  it,  directly  or  indirectly,  from  Talley 
rand,  who  used  more  freedom  of  speech  than  was 
permitted  to  any  other  man  in  France ;  but  the  task 
of  penetrating  the  depths  of  Napoleon's  mind  was 


1807.  'NO  MORE   NEUTRALS.  115 

one  which  even  Talleyrand  attempted  in  vain.  From 
the  first,  Florida  had  been  used  by  Napoleon  as  a 
means  of  controlling  President  Jefferson.  "  To  en 
large  the  circumference  of  his  bubble"  was  a  phrase 
keen  and  terse  enough  to  have  come  from  Talley 
rand  himself ;  but  this  was  not  the  purpose  for  which 
Florida  had  hitherto  been  used  in  Napoleon's  diplo 
macy,  and  in  ordering  that  the  negotiation  should  be 
stopped,  the  Emperor  might  well  have  other  motives, 
which  he  preferred  keeping  to  himself. 

An  observer  far  less  intelligent  than  Armstrong 
might  have  seen  that  in  face  of  the  great  changes 
which  his  despatch  announced  for  Italy,  Portugal, 
and  Spain,  the  time  when  Napoleon  would  need  sup 
port  from  the  United  States  had  not  yet  come.  The 
critical  moment  was  still  in  the  future.  Perhaps 
America  might  be  forced  into  war  by  the  "  Chesa 
peake  "  outrage ;  at  all  events,  she  was  further  than 
ever  from  alliance  with  England,  and  the  Emperor 
could  safely  wait  for  her  adhesion  to  the  continental 
system  until  his  plans  for  consolidating  his  empire 
were  more  mature.  For  the  present,  Don  Carlos  IY. 
and  the  Prince  of  Peace  were  the  chief  objects  of 
French  diplomacy. 

The  story  of  Toussaint  and  St.  Domingo  was  about 
to  be  repeated  in  Spain.  Even  while  Armstrong  wrote 
these  despatches,  the  throne  of  Don  Carlos  IY.  crum 
bled,  almost  without  need  of  a  touch  from  without. 
France  had  drawn  from  Spain  everything  she  once 
possessed,  —  her  navy,  sacrificed  at  Trafalgar  to  Na- 


116        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.       CH.  5. 

poleon's  orders  ;  her  army,  nearly  half  of  which  was 
in  Denmark ;  her  treasures,  which,  so  far  as  they 
had  not  been  paid  in  subsidies  to  Napoleon,  were  shut 
up  in  Mexico.  Nothing  but  the  shell  was  left  of  all 
that  had  made  Spain  great.  This  long  depletion  had 
/  not  been  effected  without  extreme  anxiety  on  the  part 
of  the  Spanish  government.  At  any  time  after  the 
Prince  of  Peace  returned  to  power  in  1801,  he  would 
gladly  have  broken  with  France,  as  he  proved  in 
1806 ;  but  he  stood  in  much  the  same  position  as 
Jefferson,  between  the  selfishness  of  England  and 
the  immediate  interests  of  Spain.  King  Charles, 
anxious  beyond  measure  for  his  own  repose  and  for 
the  safety  of  his  daughter  the  Queen  of  Etruria, 
shrank  from  every  strong  measure  of  resistance  to 
Napoleon's  will,  yet  was  so  helpless  that  only  a  traitor 
or  a  coward  could  have  deserted  him  ;  and  Godoy, 
with  all  his  faults,  was  not  so  base  as  to  secure  his 
own  interests  by  leaving  the  King  to  Napoleon's 
mercy.  For  a  single  moment  the  King  yielded  to 
Godoy 's  entreaties.  When  the  fourth  European  coali 
tion  was  formed  against  Napoleon,  and  Prussia  de 
clared  war,  the  Prince  of  Peace  was  allowed  to  issue, 
Oct.  6, 1806,  a  proclamation  calling  the  Spanish  peo 
ple  to  arms.  October  14  the  battle  of  Jena  was 
fought,  and  the  news  reaching  Madrid  threw  the 
King  and  court  into  consternation ;  Godoy's  influ 
ence  was  broken  by  the  shock ;  the  proclamation  was 
recalled,  and  the  old  King  bowed  his  head  to  his  fate. 
Had  he  held  firm,  and  thrown  in  his  fortunes  with 


1807.  NO  MORE  NEUTRALS.  117 

those  of  England,  Russia,  and  Prussia,  the  battle  of 
Eylau  might  have  stopped  Napoleon's  career ;  and  in 
any  case  the  fate  of  Spain  could  not  have  been  more 
terrible  than  it  was. 

The  Prince  of  Peace  begged  in  vain  that  King 
Charles  would  dismiss  him  and  form  a  new  minis 
try  ;  the  King  could  not  endure  a  change.  Napoleon  ^^ 
laughed  at  the  proclamation,  but  he  knew  Godoy  to  .X 
be  his  only  serious  enemy  at  Madrid.  He  took  infi 
nite  pains,  and  exhausted  the  extraordinary  resources 
of  his  cunning,  in  order  to  get  possession  of  Spain 
without  a  blow.  To  do  this,  he  forced  Portugal  into 
what  he  called  a  war.  Without  noticing  Godoy's 
offence,  immediately  after  the  peace  of  Tilsit,  as  has 
been  already  told,  the  Emperor  ordered  the  King  of 
Portugal  to  execute  the  Berlin  Decree.  Unable  to 
resist,  Portugal  consented  to  shut  her  ports  to  Eng 
lish  commerce,  but  objected  to  confiscating  British 
property.  Without  a  moment's  delay,  Napoleon, 
October  12,1  ordered  General  Junot,  with  an  army  of 
twenty  thousand  men,  to  enter  Spain  within  twenty- 
four  hours,  and  march  direct  to  Lisbon;  simultane 
ously  he  notified2  the  Spanish  government  that  his 
troops  would  be  at  Burgos,  November  1  :  and  that 
this  time  "  it  was  not  intended  to  do  as  was  done  in 
the  last  war,  —  he  must  march  straight  to  Lisbon." 

1  Napoleon  to  General  Clarke,  Oct.  12,  1807;  Correspondance, 
xvi.  80. 

2  Napoleon  to  Champagny,  Oct.   12,   1807  ;   Correspondance, 
xvi.  79. 


118        HISTORY    OF   THE    UNITED   STATES.        CH.  6. 

After  the  peace  of  Tilsit,  no  Power  in  Europe  pre 
tended  to  question  Napoleon's  will,  and  for  Spain  to 
do  so  would  have  been  absurd.  King  Charles  had 
to  submit,  and  he  sent  an  army  to  co-operate  with 
Junot  against  Portugal.  The  Emperor,  who  might 
at  a  single  word  have  driven  King  Charles  as  well 
as  the  King  of  Portugal  from  the  throne,  did  not  say 
the  word.  Godoy's  proclamation  had  given  France 
cause  for  war;  but  Napoleon  took  no  notice  of  the 
proclamation.  He  did  not  ask  for  the  punishment  of 
Godoy ;  he  not  only  left  the  old  King  in  peace,  but 
took  extraordinary  care  to  soothe  his  fears.  On  the 
same  day  when  he  ordered  Junot  to  march,  he  wrote 
personally  to  reassure  the  King : 1  "I  will  concert  with 
your  Majesty  as  to  what  shall  be  done  with  Portugal ; 
in  any  case  the  suzerainty  shall  belong  to  you,  as 
you  have  seemed  to  wish."  Yet  four  days  later  he 
ordered 2  another  army  of  thirty  thousand  men  to 
be  collected  at  Bayonne,  to  support  Junot,  who  had 
no  enemy  to  fear.  That  his  true  campaign  was 
against  Spain,  not  against  Portugal,  never  admitted 
of  a  doubt ;  his  orders  to  Junot  hardly  concealed 
his  object:3  — 

'  *  Cause  descriptions  to  be  made  for  me  of  all  the 
provinces  through  which  you  pass,  —  the  roads,  the  na- 

1  Napoleon  to  Charles  IV.,  Oct.  12,  1807;  Correspondance, 
xvi.  83. 

3  Napoleon  to  General  Clarke,  Oct.  16,  1807 ;  Correspondance, 
xvi,  91. 

3  Napoleon  to  Junot,  Oct.  17,  1807;  Correspondance,  xvi.  98. 


1807.  NO   MORE   NEUTRALS.  119 

ture  of  the  ground ;  send  me  sketches.  Charge  engineer 
officers  with  this  work,  which  it  is  important  to  have ;  so 
that  I  can  see  the  distance  of  the  villages,  the  nature 
of  the  country,  the  resources  it  offers.  ...  I  learn  this 
moment  that  Portugal  has  declared  war  on  England 
and  sent  away  the  English  ambassador :  this  does  not 
satisfy  me  ;  continue  your  march ;  I  have  reason  to  be 
lieve  that  it  is  agreed  upon  with  England  in  order  to 
give  time  for  the  English  troops  to  come  from  Copen 
hagen.  You  must  be  at  Lisbon  by  December  1,  as 
friend  or  as  enemy.  Maintain  the  utmost  harmony 
with  the  Prince  of  Peace." 

Junot  entered  Spain  October  17,  the  same  day  that 
these  orders  were  written,  while  Napoleon  at  Fon- 
tainebleau  forced  on  the  Spanish  agent  Tzquierdo  a 
treaty  which  might  keep  King  Charles  and  Godoy 
quiet  a  little  longer.  This  document,  drafted  by  Na 
poleon  himself,  resembled  the  letter  to  Toussaint 
and  the  proclamation  to  the  negroes  of  St.  Domingo, 
with  which  Leclerc  had  been  charged;1  its  motive 
was  too  obvious,  and  its  appeal  to  selfishness  too 
gross  to  deceive.  It  declared2  that  Portugal  should 
be  divided  into  three  parts.  The  most  northerly, 
with  Oporto  for  a  capital  and  a  population  of  eight 
hundred  thousand  souls,  should  be  given  to  the  Queen 
of  Etruria  in  place  of  Tuscany,  which  was  to  be 
swallowed  up  in  the  kingdom  of  Italy.  The  next 
provision  was  even  more  curious.  The  southern  part 

1  See  History  of  First  Administration,  i.  392. 

2  Correspondance  de  Napoleon  I.;  Projet  de  Convention,  Oct. 
23,  1807,  xvi.  111. 


120         HISTORY  OF   THE    UNITED   STATES.        CH.  5. 

of  Portugal,  with  a  population  of  four  hundred  thou 
sand  souls,  should  be  given  to  the  Prince  of  Peace  as 
an  independent  sovereignty.  The  central  part,  with 
a  population  of  two  millions,  and  Lisbon  for  a  capital, 
should  be  held  by  France  subject  to  further  agree 
ment.  By  a  final  touch  of  dissimulation  worthy  of 
Shakespeare's  tragic  invention,  Napoleon,  in  the  last 
article  of  this  treaty,  promised  to  recognize  Don 
Carlos  IV.  as  Emperor  of  the  two  Americas. 

The  so-called  treaty  of  Fontainebleau  was  signed 
Oct.  27,  1807.  That  it  deceived  Godoy  or  King 
Charles  could  hardly  be  imagined,  but  the  internal 
and  external  difficulties  of  Spain  had  reached  a  point 
where  nothing  but  ruin  remained.  In  the  whole  of 
Spain  hardly  twenty  thousand  troops  could  be  assem 
bled  ;  barely  half-a-dozen  frigates  were  fit  for  sea ; 
the  treasury  was  empty  ;  industry  was  destroyed. 
Napoleon  himself  had  no  idea  how  complete  was  the 
process  by  which  he  had  sucked  the  life-blood  of 
this  miserable  land.  Even  in  the  court  at  Madrid  and 
among  the  people  signs  of  an  immediate  catastrophe 
were  so  evident  that  Napoleon  could  afford  to  wait 
until  chaos  should  call  for  his  control. 

Meanwhile  Junot  marched  steadily  forward.  He 
was  at  Burgos  on  the  day  fixed  by  Napoleon  ;  he 
established  permanent  French  depots  at  Valladolid 
and  at  Salamanca.  Leaving  Salamanca  November 
12,  he  advanced  to  Ciudad  Rodrigo.  and  after  estab 
lishing  another  depot  there,  he  made  a  rapid  dash 
at  Lisbon.  The  inarch  was  difficult,  but  Junot  was 


1807.  NO  MORE  NEUTRALS.  121 

ready  to  destroy  his  army  rather  than  fail  to  carry 
out  his  orders ;  and  on  the  morning  of  November  30 
he  led  a  ragged  remnant  of  fifteen  hundred  men  into 
the  city  of  Lisbon.  He  found  it  without  a  govern 
ment.  The  Prince  Regent  of  Portugal,  powerless  to 
resist  Napoleon,  had  gone  on  board  his  ships  with  the 
whole  royal  family  and  court,  and  was  already  on  his 
way  to  found  a  new  empire  at  Rio  Janeiro.  Of  all 
the  royal  houses  of  Europe,  that  of  Portugal  was  the 
first  to  carry  out  a  desperate  resolution. 

Napoleon's  object  was  thus  gained.  Dec.  1,  1807, 
Junot  was  in  peaceable  possession  of  Lisbon,  and 
French  garrisons  held  every  strategical  point  be^ 
tween  Lisbon  and  Bayonne.  In  regard  to  Portugal 
Junot's  orders  were  precise  : l  — 

"  So  soon  as  you  have  the  different  fortified  places  in 
your  hands,  you  will  put  French  commandants  in  them, 
and  will  make  yourself  sure  of  these  places.  I  need  not 
tell  you  that  you  must  not  put  any  fortress  in  the  power 
of  the  Spaniards,  especially  in  the  region  which  is  to 
remain  in  my  hands." 

November  3,  without  the  knowledge  of  Spain,  the 
Emperor  gave  orders2  that  the  army  of  reserve  at 
Bayonne,  under  General  Dupont,  shall  be  ready  to 
inarch  by  December  1 ;  and  November  11  he  ordered  3 

1  Napoleon    to    Junot,    October    31,    1807;    Correspondance, 
xvi.  128. 

2  Napoleon  to  General  Clarke,  Nov.  3,  1807;  Correspondance, 
xvi.  136. 

8  Napoleon  to  General  Clarke,  Nov.  11,  1807;  Correspondance, 
xvi.  149. 


122        HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.        CH.  5. 

that   the  frontier   fortresses  on  the  Spanish  border 
should  be  armed  and  supplied  with  provisions :  — 

"  All  this  is  to  be  clone  with  the  utmost  possible  se 
crecy,  especially  the  armament  of  the  places  on  the  Span 
ish  frontier  on  the  side  of  the  eastern  Pyrenees.  Give 
secret  instructions,  and  let  the  corps  march  in  such  a 
manner  that  the  first  ostensible  operations  be  not  seen  in 
that  country  before  November  25." 

At  the  same  time  a  new  army  of  some  twenty 
thousand  men  was  hurried  across  France  to  take  the 
place,  at  Bayonne,  of  Dupont's  army,  which  was  to 
enter  Spain.  November  13,  the  Emperor  ordered 
Dupont  to  move  his  first  division  across  the  frontier 
to  Vittoria  ;  and  on  the  same  day  he  despatched  M. 
de  Tournon,  his  chamberlain,  with  a  letter  to  King 
Charles  at  Madrid,  and  with  secret  instructions l  that 
revealed  the  reasons  for  these  movements  so  carefully 
concealed  from  Spanish  eyes  :  — 

"  You  will  also  inform  yourself,  without  seeming  to  do 
so,  of  the  situation  of  the  places  of  Pampeluna  and  of 
Fontarabia :  and  if  you  perceive  armaments  making  any 
where,  you  will  inform  me  by  courier.  You  will  be  on 
the  watch  at  Madrid  to  see  well  the  spirit  which  animates 
that  city." 

Napoleon's  orders  were  in  all  respects  exactly  car 
ried  out.  Dec.  1,  1807,  Junot  was  in  possession  of 
Portugal;  Dupont  was  at  Vittoria;  twenty-five  thou 
sand  French  troops  would,  by  December  20,  hold 

1  Napoleon  to  M.  de  Tournon,  Nov.  13,  1807;  Correspondance. 
xvi  159. 


1807.  NO  MORE   NEUTRALS.  123 

the  great  route  from  Yittoria  to  Burgos,  and  in  two 
days  could  occupy  Madrid.1  The  Spanish  army  was 
partly  in  Denmark,  partly  in  Portugal.  The  Prince 
of  Peace  heard  what  was  going  on,  and  asked  for 
explanations ;  but  the  moment  for  resistance  had 
long  passed.  He  had  no  choice  but  submission  or 
flight,  and  Don  Carlos  was  too  weak  to  fly. 

In  Armstrong's  despatch  of  November  15,  already 
quoted,  one  more  paragraph  was  worth  noting.  At 
the  moment  he  wrote,  Napoleon  had  just  given  his 
last  orders ;  General  Dupont  had  not  yet  received 
them,  and  neither  Don  Carlos  IV.  nor  Lucien  Bona 
parte  knew  the  change  of  plan  that  was  intended. 
Only  men  like  Talleyrand  and  Duroc  could  see  that 
from  the  moment  of  the  peace  at  Tilsit,  Napoleon's 
movements  had  been  rapidly  and  irresistibly  con 
verging  upon  Madrid,  —  until,  by  the  middle  of  No 
vember,  every  order  had  been  given,  and  the  Spanish 
Peninsula  lay,  as  the  Emperor  told  Lucien,  "  in  the 
hollow  of  his  hand."  Armstrong,  writing  a  fortnight 
before  the  royal  family  of  Portugal  had  turned  their 
vessels'  prows  toward  Brazil,  asked  a  question  which 
Napoleon  himself  would  hardly  have  dared  to  answer : 

"  What  will  become  of  the  royal  houses  of  Portugal 
and  Spain?  I  know  not.  By  the  way,  I  consider  this 
question  as  of  no  small  interest  to  the  United  States.  If 
they  were  sent  to  America,  or  are  even  permitted  to  with 
draw  thither,  we  may  conclude  that  the  colonies  which 

1  Napoleon  to  General  Clarke,  Dec.  6,  1807 ;  Correspondance, 
xvi.  183. 


124        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.        CH.  5. 

excite  the  imperial  longing,  and  which  are  in  its  opinion 
necessary  to  France,  are  not  on  our  side  of  the  Atlantic. 
If  on  the  other  hand  they  are  retained  in  Europe,  it  will 
only  be  as  hostages  for  the  eventual  delivery  of  their 
colonies :  and  then,  at  the  distance  of  three  centuries, 
may  be  acted  over  again  the  tragedy  of  the  Incas,  with 
some  few  alterations  of  scenery  and  names." 

All  these  measures  being  completed  by  November 
15,  the  day  when  Armstrong  wrote  his  despatch,  the 
Emperor  left  Fontainebleau  and  went  to  Italy.  He 
passed  through  Milan  and  Verona  to  Venice ;  and  on 
his  return,  stopped  a  few  hours  at  Mantua,1  on  the 
night  of  December  13,  to  offer  Lucien  the  throne 
of  Spain. 

Lucien's  story 2  was  that  being  summoned  from 
Rome  to  an  interview,  he  found  his  brother  alone,  at 
midnight  of  December  13,  seated  in  a  vast  room  in 
the  palace  at  Mantua,  before  a  great  round  table, 
almost  entirely  covered  by  a  very  large  map  of  Spain, 
on  which  he  was  marking  strategical  points  with 
black,  red.  and  yellow  pins.  After  a  long  interview, 
in  which  the  Emperor  made  many  concessions  to  his 
brother's  resistance,  Napoleon  opened  his  last  and 
most  audacious  offer:  — 

"  '  As  for  you,  choose  ! '  As  he  pronounced  these 
words,"  continued  Lucien,  "  his  eyes  sparkled  with  a 
flash  of  pride  which  seemed  to  me  Satanic ;  he  struck 
a  great  blow  with  his  hand,  spread  out  broadly  in  the 

1  Napoleon  to  Joseph,  Dec.  17, 1807;  Correspondance.  xvi.  198. 

2  Lucien  Bonaparte.  Th.  Jung.  iii.  83.  113. 


1807.  NO  MORE   NEUTRALS.  125 

middle  of  the  immense  map  of  Europe  which  was  ex 
tended  on  the  table  by  the  side  of  which  we  were  stand 
ing.  '  Yes,  choose  ! '  he  said  ;  4  you  see  I  am  not  talking 
in  the  air.  All  this  is  mine,  or  will  soon  belong  to  me  ; 
I  can  dispose  of  it  already.  Do  you  want  Naples?  I  will 
take  it  from  Joseph,  who,  by  the  bye,  does  not  care  for 
it;  he  prefers  Morfontaine.  Italy, — the  most  beautiful 
jewel  in  my  imperial  crown?  Eugene  is  but  viceroy, 
and  far  from  despising  it  he  hopes  only  that  I  shall  give 
it  to  him,  or  at  least  leave  it  to  him  if  he  survives  me : 
he  is  likely  to  be  disappointed  in  waiting,  for  I  shall  live 
ninety  years ;  I  must,  for  the  perfect  consolidation  of 
my  empire.  Besides,  Eugene  will  not  suit  me  in  Italy 
after  his  mother  is  repudiated.  Spain?  Do  you  not 
see  it  falling  into  the  hollow  of  my  hand,  thanks  to  the 
blunders  of  your  dear  Bourbons,  and  to  the  follies  of 
your  friend  the  Prince  of  Peace?  Would  you  not  be 
well  pleased  to  reign  there  where  you  have  been  only 
ambassador?  Once  for  all,  what  do  you  want?  Speak! 
Whatever  you  wish,  or  can  wish,  is  yours,  if  your 
divorce  precedes  mine.' " 

Lucien  refused  a  kingdom  on  such  terms,  and 
Napoleon  continued  his  journey,  reaching  Milan  De 
cember  15.  At  that  time  his  mind  was  intent  on 
Spain  and  the  Spanish  colonies,  with  which  the  ques 
tions  of  English  and  American  trade  were  closely 
connected.  Spencer  Perceval's  Orders  in  Council  had 
appeared  in  the  "  London  Gazette  "  of  November  14, 
and  had  followed  the  Emperor  to  Italy.  Some  weeks 
afterward  war  was  declared  between  England  and 
Russia.  No  neutral  remained  except  Sweden,  which 
was  to  be  crushed  bv  Russia,  and  the  United  States  of 


126        HISTORY   OF   THE    UNITED   STATES.        CH.  5. 

America,  which  Napoleon  meant  to  take  in  hand.  De 
cember  17,  from  the  royal  palace  at  Milan,  in  retalia- 
>tion  for  the  Orders  in  Council,  and  without  waiting  to 
consult  President  Jefferson,  Napoleon  issued  a  new 
proclamation,  compared  with  which  the  Berlin  De 
cree  of  the  year  before  was  a  model  of  legality. 

44  Considering,"  began  the  preamble,1  "that  by  these 
acts  the  English  government  has  denationalized  the  ships 
of  all  the  nations  of  Europe ;  that  it  is  in  the  power  of 
no  government  to  compound  its  own  independence  and 
its  rights,  —  all  the  sovereigns  in  Europe  being  jointly 
interested  in  the  sovereignty  and  independence  of  their 
flag ;  that  if  by  an  inexcusable  weakness,  which  would 
be  an  ineffaceable  stain  in  the  eyes  of  posterity,  we 
should  allow  such  a  tyranny  to  pass  into  a  principle 
and  to  become  consecrated  by  usage,  the  English  would 
take  advantage  of  it  to  establish  it  as  a  right,  as  they 
have  profited  by  the  tolerance  of  governments  to  estab 
lish  the  infamous  principle  that  the  flag  does  not  cover 
the  goods,  and  to  give  to  their  right  of  blockade  an 
arbitrary  extension,  contrary  to  the  sovereignty  of  all 
States,"  - 

^Considering  all  these  matters,  so  important  to  States 
like  Denmark,  Portugal,  and  Spain,  whose  flags  had 

*~  ceased  to  exist,  and  of  whose  honor  and  interests  this 
mighty  conqueror  made  himself  champion,  Napoleon 
decreed  that  every  ship  which  should  have  been 
searched  by  an  English  vessel,  or  should  have  paid 
any  duty  to  the  British  government,  or  should  come 

1  Correspondance  de  Napoleon,  xvi.  192 ;  American  State 
Papers,  iii.  90. 


1807. 


NO   MOKE   NEUTRALS.  127 


from  or  be  destined  for  any  port  in  British  posses 
sion  in  any  part  of  the  world,  should  be  good  prize ; 
and  that  this  rule  should  continue  in  force  until 
England  should  have  "  returned  to  the  principles  of 
international  law,  which  are  also  those  of  justice  and 
honor." 


CHAPTER  VI. 

OCT.  29, 1807,  Monroe  left  London ;  and  November 
14,  the  day  when  the  Orders  in  Council  were  first 
published  in  the  official  "  Gazette,"  he  sailed  from 
Plymouth  for  home. 

Nearly  five  years  had  passed  since  Monroe  re 
ceived  the  summons  from  Jefferson  which  drew  him 
from  his  retirement  in  Virginia  to  stand  forward 
as  the  diplomatic  champion  of  the  United  States  in 
contest  with  the  diplomatists  of  Europe ;  and  these 
years  had  been  full  of  unpleasant  experience. 
Since  signing  the  Louisiana  treaty,  in  May,  1803,  he 
had  met  only  with  defeat  and  disaster.  Insulted  by 
every  successive  Foreign  Secretary  in  France,  Spain, 
and  England  ;  driven  from  Madrid  to  Paris  and  from 
Paris  to  London ;  set  impossible  tasks,  often  contrary 
to  his  own  judgment,  —  he  had  ended  by  yielding  to 
the  policy  of  the  British  government,  and  by  meeting 
with  disapproval  and  disavowal  from  his  own.  As 
he  looked  back  on  the  receding  shores  of  England, 
he  could  hardly  fail  to  recall  the  circumstances  of  his 
return  from  France  ten  years  before.  In  many  re- 
spects  Monroe's  career  was  unparalleled,  but  he  was 
singular  above  all  in  the  experience  of  being  dis- 


1807.  INSULTS   AND  POPULARITY.  129 

owned  by  two  Presidents  as  strongly  opposed  to  each 
other  as  Washington  and  Jefferson,  and  of  being  sac 
rificed  by  two  secretaries  as  widely  different  as  Tim 
othy  Pickering  and  James  Madison. 

In  America  only  two  men  of  much  note  were  pre 
pared  to  uphold  his  course,  and  of  these  the  Presi 
dent  was  not  one  ;  yet  Jefferson  exerted  himself  to 
disguise  and  soften  Monroe's  discredit.  He  kept  the 
treaty  a  secret  when  its  publication  would  have  de- 
stroyed  Monroe's  popularity  and  strengthened  Madi 
son.  When  at  length,  after  eight  months'  delay,  the 
British  note  appended  to  the  treaty  was  revealed, 
Monroe's  friend  Macon,  though  anxious  to  make  him 
President,  privately  admitted  that  "  the  extract  of 
the  treaty  which  has  been  published  has  injured  Mon 
roe  more  than  the  return  of  it  by  the  President."  1 
John  Randolph  alone  held  up  Monroe  and  his  treaty 
as  models  of  statesmanship ;  and  although  Randolph 
was  the  only  Republican  who  cared  to  go  •  this  length, 
Monroe  found  one  other  friend  and  apologist  in  a 
person  who  rivalled  Randolph  in  his  usual  economy 
of  praise.  Timothy  Pickering  held  that  Merry  and 
Erskine  were  no  good  Englishmen,  but  he  was  sat 
isfied  with  Monroe. 

"  I  sincerely  wish  an  English  minister  here  to  be  a 
very  able  man,"  he  wrote  2  privately  from  Washington  to 
a  friend  in  Philadelphia,  —  "  one  who  will  feel  and  justly 

1  Macon  to  Nicholson,  Dec.  2,  1807  ;  Nicholson  MSS. 

2  Pickering  to  Thomas  '  Fitzsimona,  Dec.  4,  1807;    Pickering 
MSS. 

VOL.  IV.  —  9 


130        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  6. 

estimate  the  dignity  of  his  country,  and  bring  down  the 
supercilious  looks  of  our  strutting  Administration.  The 
feebleness  of  Merry  and  Erskine  have  encouraged  them 
to  assume  a  vain  importance  and  haughtiness  as  remote 
from  the  genuine  spirit  and  as  injurious  to  the  solid  inter 
ests  of  our  country  as  they  are  irritating  to  Great  Britain. 
The  ridiculous  gasconade  of  our  rulers  has  indeed  dis 
graced  our  nation.  The  sentiment  above  expressed  is  ex 
cited  by  the  consideration  that  Great  Britain  is  our  only 
shield  against  the  overwhelming  power  of  Bonaparte ; 
and  therefore  I  view  the  maintenance  of  her  just  rights 
as  essential  to  the  preservation  of  our  own.  I  have 
regretted  to  see  our  newspapers  continue  to  reproach 
Monroe.  His  abilities  you  know  how  to  estimate,  but 
I  never  considered  him  as  wanting  in  probity.  An 
enrag6  relative  to  the  French,  and  implicitly  relying  on 
the  advice  of  Jefferson,  his  deportment  did  not  permit 
his  remaining  the  minister  of  the  United  States  at  Paris 
[in  1797]  ;  but  I  have  certain  information  that  at  London 
no  one  could  conduct  with  more  propriety  than  he  does ; 
and,  such  is  his  sense  of  the  proceedings  of  our  rulers,  he 
lately  said  he  did  not  know  how  long  the  British  govern 
ment  would  bear  with  our  petulance." 

This  letter,  written  while  Monroe  .was  at  sea, 
betrayed  a  hope  that  the  notorious  quarrel  between 
him  and  Jefferson  would  prove  to  be  permanent ;  but 
Pickering  could  never  learn  to  appreciate  Jefferson's 
genius  for  peace.  Doubtless  only  personal  friendship 
and  the  fear  of  strengthening  Federalist  influence  pre 
vented  President  Jefferson  from  denouncing  Monroe's 
conduct  as  forcibly  as  President  Washington  had  de 
nounced  it  ten  years  before ;  and  Jefferson's  grounds 


1807.  INSULTS   AND   POPULARITY.  131 

of  complaint  were  more  serious  than  Washington's. 
Monroe  expected  and  even  courted  martyrdom,  and 
never  quite  forgot  the  treatment  he  received.  In  pri 
vate,  George  Hay,  Monroe's  son-in-law,  who  knew  all 
the  secrets  of  his  career,  spoke  afterward  of  Jefferson 
as  "  one  of  the  most  insincere  men  in  the  world  ;  .  .  . 
his  enmity  to  Mr.  Monroe  was  inveterate,  though  dis 
guised,  and  he  was  at  the  bottom  of  all  the  opposi 
tion  to  Mr.  Monroe  in  Virginia."  l  Peacemakers  must 
submit  to  the  charges  which  their  virtues  entail,  but 
Jefferson's  silence  and  conciliation  deserved  a  better 
return  than  to  be  called  insincere. 

Monroe  returned  to  Virginia,  praised  by  George 
Canning  and  Timothy  Pickering,  to  be  John  Ran 
dolph's  candidate  for  the  Presidency,  while  Jefferson 
could  regard  him  in  no  other  light  than  as  a  dupe  of 
England,  and  Madison  was  obliged  to  think  him  a 
personal  enemy.  As  a  result  of  five  years'  honest, 
patient,  and  painstaking  labor,  this  division  from  old 
friends  was  sad  enough ;  but  had  Monroe  been  a  ner 
vous  man,  so  organized  as  to  feel  the  arrows  of  his 
outrageous  fortune,  his  bitterest  annoyance  on  bidding 
final  farewell  to  Europe  would  have  been,  not  the 
thought  of  his  reception  in  America,  not  even  the 
memory  of  Talleyrand's  reproofs,  or  of  the  laurels 
won  by  Don  Pedro  Cevallos,  or  of  Lord  Harrowby's 
roughness,  or  Lord  Mulgrave's  indifference,  or  Lord 
Howick's  friendly  larcenies,  or  Canning's  smooth  im 
pertinences,  —  as  a  diplomatist  he  would  rather  have 
1  Diary  of  J.  Q.  Adams,  May  23,  1824,  vi.  348. 


132         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.        CH.  6. 

felt  most  hurt  that  the  British  ministry  had  contrived 
a  new  measure  of  vital  interest  to  America,  and 
should  have  allowed  him  to  depart  without  a  word 
of  confidence,  explanation,  or  enlightenment  as  to  the 
nature  of  the  fresh  aggression  which  was  to  close  a 
long  list  of  disasters  with  one  which  left  to  America 
only  the  title  of  an  independent  nation. 

As  early  as  October  3  the  "  Morning  Post "  an 
nounced  at  great  length  that  his  Majesty's  government 
had  adopted  the  principle  of  retaliation.  November 
10,  while  Monroe  was  still  waiting  at  Portsmouth  for 
a  fair  wind,  the  "  Times  "  made  known  that  a  procla 
mation  was  in  readiness  for  the  King's  signature,  de 
claring  France  and  all  her  vassal  kingdoms  in  a  state 
of  siege :  "  The  sum  of  all  reasoning  on  the  subject  is 
included  in  this,  that  the  Continent  must  and  will 
have  colonial  productions  in  spite  of  the  orders  and 
decrees  of  its  master,  and  we  are  to  take  care  that 
she  have  no  other  colonial  produce  than  our  own." 
The  fact  that  American  commerce  with  the  Continent 
was  to  be  forbidden  became  a  matter  of  public  noto 
riety  in  London  before  November  13,  and  on  Satur 
day,  November  14,  the  day  when  Monroe's  ship  sailed 
from  Portsmouth,  the  order  appeared  in  the  "  Ga 
zette  ; "  yet  Monroe  himself  would  be  obliged  to  ap 
pear  before  the  President  in  official  ignorance  of  a 
measure  discussed  and  adopted  under  his  eyes. 

George  Henry  Rose,  whom  Canning  selected  -  as 
special  envoy  to  settle  the  "  Chesapeake  "  affair,  and 
who  sailed  in  the  "  Statira "  frigate  two  days  before 


1807.  INSULTS  AND  POPULARITY.  138 

Monroe,  knew  officially  as  little  as  Monroe  himself  of 
the  coming  order ;  but  this  ignorance  was  due  to 
Canning's  settled  plan  of  keeping  the  "  Chesapeake ' 
affair  independent  of  every  other  dispute.  Canning- 
could  have  had  no  deep  motive  in  withholding  official 
knowledge  of  the  order  from  Monroe,  Pinkney,  and 
Rose ;  he  could  not  have  foreseen  when  or  how  the 
winds  would  blow ;  yet,  by  mere  accident,  one  day's 
delay  added  greatly  to  the  coming  embarrassments 
of  the  American  government.  The  departure  of 
vessels  depended  on  a  favorable  wind,  and  for  some 
weeks  before  November  14  westerly  winds  prevailed. 
About  that  day  the  weather  changed,  and  all  the 
ships  bound  to  America  sailed  nearly  together.  The 
"  Statira"~and  "Augustus,"  carrying  Rose  and  Mon 
roe,  started  from  Portsmouth  for  Norfolk ;  the  "  Re 
venge  "  set  sail  from  Cherbourg,  with  despatches  from 
Armstrong ;  the  "  Brutus,"  with  London  newspapers 
of  November  12,  departed  from  Liverpool  for  New 
York ;  and  the  "  Edward,"  with  London  newspapers 
and  letters  to  November  10,  left  Liverpool  for  Bos 
ton.  All  were  clear  of  land  by  November  14,  when 
the  "  Gazette  "  published  the  Order  in  Council ;  but 
for  weeks  afterward  no  other  vessels  crossed  the 
Atlantic. 

After  the  "  Revenge  "  sailed  for  Europe  in  July,  on 
her  errand  of  redress  for  the  "  Chesapeake  "  outrage, 
the  Americans  waited  more  and  more  patiently  for 
her  return.  The  excitement  which  blazed  in  mid 
summer  from  one  end  of  the  countrv  to  the  other 


134        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  6. 

began  to  subside  when  men  learned  that  Admiral 
Berkeley's  orders  had  been  issued  without  the  author 
ity  or  knowledge  of  his  government,  and  would  prob 
ably  be  disavowed.  The  news  that  came  from  Europe 
tended  to  chill  the  fever  for  war.  The  Peace  of 
Tilsit,  the  Tory  reaction  in  England,  the  bombard 
ment  of  Copenhagen,  the  execution  of  the  Berlin 
Decree  in  Holland,  the  threatened  retaliation  by 
Great  Britain  were  events  calculated  to  raise  more 
than  a  doubt  of  the  benefits  which  war  could  bring. 
In  any  case,  the  risks  of  commerce  had  become  too 
great  for  legitimate  trade ;  and  every  one  felt  that 
the  further  pursuit  of  neutral  profits  could  end  only 
in  bringing  America  into  the*  arms  of  one  or  the 
other  of  the  Powers  which  were  avowedly  disputing 
pre-eminence  in  wrong. 

The  attack  on  the  "  Chesapeake,"  the  trial  of  Aaron 
Burr,  and  the  news  from  Copenhagen,  Holland,  and 
London  made  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1807  anx 
ious  and  restless ;  but  another  event,  under  the  eyes 
of  the  American  people,  made  up  a  thousand  fold, 
had  they  but  known  it,  for  all  the  losses  or  risks 
incurred  through  Burr,  Bonaparte,  or  Canning.  That 
the  destinies  of  America  must  be  decided  in  America 
was  a  maxim  of  true  Democrats,  but  one  which  they 
showed  little  energy  in  reducing  to  practice.  A  few 
whose  names  could  be  mentioned  in  one  or  two 
lines,  —  men  like  Chancellor  Livingston,  Dr.  Mitchill, 
Joel  Barlow,  —  hailed  the  17th  of  August,  1807,  as 
the  beginning  of  a  new  era  in  America,  —  a  date 


1807.  INSULTS   AXD   POPULARITY.  135 

which  separated  the  colonial  from  the  independent 
stage  of  growth ;  for  on  that  day,  at  one  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon,  the  steamboat  "  Clermont,"  with  Ro 
ert  Fulton  in  command,  started  on  her  first  voyage. 
A  crowd  of  bystanders,  partly  sceptical,  partly  hostile, 
stood  about  and  watched  the  clumsy  craft  slowly 
forge  its  way  at  the  rate  of  four  miles  an  hour  up 
the  river ;  but  Fulton's  success  left  room  for  little 
doubt  or  dispute,  except  in  minds  impervious  to  proof. 
The  problem  of  steam  navigation,  so  far  as  it  applied 
to  rivers  and  harbors  was  settled,  and  for  the  first 
time  America  could  consider  herself  mistress  of  her,, 
vast  resources.  Compared  with  such  a  step  in  her! 
progress,  the  mediaeval  barbarisms  of  Napoleon  and. 
Spencer  Perceval  signified  little  more  to  her  than ./ 
the  doings  of  Achilles  and  Agamemnon.  Few  mo 
ments  in  her  history  were  more  dramatic  than  the 
weeks  of  1807  which  saw  the  shattered  "  Chesapeake  " 
creep  back  to  her  anchorage  at  Hampton  Roads,  and 
the  "  Clermont "  push  laboriously  up  the  waters  of 
the  Hudson ;  but  the  intellectual  effort  of  bringing 
these  two  events  together,  and  of  settling  the  political 
and  economical  problems  of  America  at  once,  passed 
the  genius  of  the  people.  Government  took  no  notice 
of  Fulton's  achievement,  and  the  public  for  some 
years  continued,  as  a  rule,  to  travel  in  sailing  pack 
ets  and  on  flat-boats.  The  reign  of  politics  showed 
no  sign  of  ending.  Fulton's  steamer  went  its  way, 
waiting  until  men's  time  should  become  so  valuable 
as  to  be  worth  saving. 


136        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.        CH.  6. 

The  unfailing  mark  of  a  primitive  society  was  to 
regard  war  as  the  most  natural  pursuit  of  man ;  and 
history  with  reason  began  as  a  record  of  war,  because, 
in  fact,  all  other  human  occupations  were  secondary 
to  this.  The  chief  sign  that  Americans  had  other 
qualities  than  the  races  from  which  they  sprang,  was 
shown  by  their  dislike  for  war  as  a  profession,  and 
their  obstinate  attempts  to  invent  other  methods  for 
obtaining  their  ends ;  but  in  the  actual  state  of  man 
kind,  safety  and  civilization  could  still  be  secured  only 
through  the  power  of  self-defence.  Desperate  physi 
cal  courage  was  the  common  quality  on  which  all 
great  races  had  founded  their  greatness ;  and  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  in  discarding  military 
qualities,  without  devoting  themselves  to  science, 
were  trying  an  experiment  which  could  succeed  only 
in  a  world  of  their  own. 

In  charging  America  with  having  lost  her  national 
character,  Napoleon  said  no  more  than  the  truth.  As 
a  force  in  the  affairs  of  Europe,  the  United  States 
had  become  an  appendage  to  England.  The  Ameri 
cans  consumed  little  but  English  manufactures,  al 
lowed  British  ships  to  blockade  New  York  and 
Chesapeake  Bay,  permitted  the  British  government 
to  keep  by  force  in  its  naval  service  numbers  of  per 
sons  who  were  claimed  as  American  subjects,  and  to 
take  from  American  merchant-vessels,  at  its  free 
will,  any  man  who  seemed  likely  to  be  useful ;  they 
suffered  their  commerce  with  France  and  Spain  to  be 
plundered  by  Great  Britain  without  resistance,  or  to 


1807.  INSULTS  AND  POPULARITY.  137 

be  regulated  in  defiance  of  American  rights.  Noth 
ing  could  exceed  England's  disregard  of  American 
dignity.  When  the  "  Bellona "  and  her  consorts 
were  ordered  to  depart  from  Chesapeake  Bay,  her 
captain  not  only  disregarded  the  order,  but  threat 
ened  to  take  by  force  whatever  he  wanted  on  shore, 
and  laughed  a~t  the  idea  of  compulsion.  On  land  still 
less  respect  was  shown  to  American  jurisdiction. 
When  after  the  "  Chesapeake "  outrage  the  people 
talked  of  war,  the  first  act  of  Sir  James  Craig,  gov 
ernor-general  of  Canada,  was  to  send  messages1  to 
the  Indian  tribes  in  the  Indiana  Territory,  calling  for 
their  assistance  in  case  of  hostilities ;  and  the  effect 
of  this  appeal  was  instantly  felt  at  Vincennes  and 
Greenville,  where  it  gave  to  the  intrigues  of  the 
Shawanese  prophet  an  impulse  that  alarmed  every 
settler  on  the  frontier.  Every  subordinate  officer  of 
the  British  government  thought  himself  at  liberty  to 
trample  on  American  rights ;  and  while  the  English 
navy  controlled  the  coast,  and  the  English  army  from 
Canada  gave  orders  to  the  northwestern  Indians,  the 
British  minister  at  Washington  encouraged  and  con 
cealed  the  conspiracy  of  Burr. 

The  evil  had  reached  a  point  where  some  corrective 
must  be  found ;  but  four  years  of  submission  had 
broken  the  national  spirit.  In  1805  the  people  were 
almost  ready  for  war  with  England  on  the  question  of 

1  Sir  James  Craig  to  Lieutenant-Governor  Gore,  Dec.  6,  1807; 
Colonial  Correspondence,  Canada,  1807,  1808,  vol.  i.,  MSS. 
British  Archives. 


138        HISTORY   OF  THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  6. 

the  indirect,  or  carrying,  trade  of  the  French  and 
Spanish  West  Indies.  After  submitting  on  that  point, 
in  July,  1807,  they  were  again  ready  to  fight  for  the 
immunity  of  their  frigates  from  impressment ;  but  by 
the  close  of  the  year  their  courage  had  once  more 
fallen,  and  they  hoped  to  escape  the  necessity  of  fight 
ing  under  any  circumstances  whatever,  anxiously 
looking  for  some  expedient,  or  compromise,  which 
would  reconcile  a  policy  of  resistance  with  a  policy  of 
peace.  This  expedient  Jefferson  and  Madison  had 
for  fifteen  years  been  ready  to  offer  them. 
->  So  confident  was  Jefferson  in  his  theory  of  peace- 
\r  able  coercion  that  he  would  hardly  have  thought  his 
administrative  career  complete,  had  he  quitted  office 
without  being  allowed  to  prove  the  value  of  his 
plan.  The  fascination  which  it  exercised  over  his 
mind  was  quite  as  much  due  to  temperament  as 
to  logic  ;  for  if  reason  told  him  that  Europe  could 
be  starved  into  concession,  temperament  added  an 
other  motive  still  more  alluring.  If  Europe  persisted 
in  her  conduct  America  would  still  be  safe,  and  all 
the  happier  for  cutting  off  connection  with  countries 
where  violence  and  profligacy  ruled  supreme.  The 
idea  of  ceasing  intercourse  with  obnoxious  nations  re 
flected  his  own  personality  in  the  mirror  of  states 
manship.  In  the  course  of  the  following  year  he 
wrote  to  a  young  grandson,  Thomas  Jefferson  Ran 
dolph,  a  letter1  of  parental  advice  in  regard  to  the 
conduct  of  life. 

1  Jefferson  to  T.  J.  Randolph,  Nov.  24,  1808;  Works,  v.  388. 


1807.  INSULTS  AND  POPULARITY.  139 

"  Be  a  listener  only,"  he  said ;  "  keep  within  yourself, 
and  endeavor  to  establish  with  yourself  the  habit  of 
silence,  especially  on  politics.  In  the  fevered  state  of 
our  country  no  good  can  ever  result  from  any  attempt  to 
set  one  of  these  fiery  zealots  to  rights,  either  in  fact  or 
principle.  They  are  determined  as  to  the  facts  they 
will  believe,  and  the  opinions  on  which  they  will  act. 
Get  by  them,  therefore,  as  you  would  by  an  angry  bull ; 
it  is  not  for  a  man  of  sense  to  dispute  the  road  with  such 
an  animal." 

The  advice  was  good,  and  did  honor  to  the  gentle 
ness  of  Jefferson's  nature  ;  but  a  course  of  conduct 
excellent  in  social  life  could  not  be  made  to  suit  the 
arena  of  politics.  As  President  of  the  United  States, 
Jefferson  was  bent  upon  carrying  out  the  plan  of 
keeping  within  himself;  but  the  bull  of  which  he 
spoke  as  unfit  for  a  man  of  sense  to  dispute  with,  and 
which  he  saw  filling  the  whole  path  before  him,  was 
not  only  angry,  but  mad  with  pain  and  blind  with 
rage ;  his  throat  and  flanks  were  torn  and  raw  where 
the  Corsican  wolf  had  set  his  teeth ;  a  pack  of  mas 
tiffs  and  curs  were  baiting  him  and  yelling  at  his 
heels,  and  his  blood-shot  eyes  no  longer  knew  friend 
from  foe,  as  he  rushed  with  a  roar  of  stupid  rage 
directly  upon  the  President.  To  get  by  him  was 
impossible.  To  fly  was  the  only  resource,  if  the 
President  would  not  stand  his  ground  and  stop  the 
animal  by  skill  or  force. 

Few  rulers  ever  succeeded  in  running  from  danger 
with  dignity.  Even  the  absolute  Emperor  of  Russia 


140         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  6. 

had  not  wholly  preserved  the  respect  of  his  subjects 
after  the  sudden  somersault  performed  at  Tilsit ;  and 
the  Prince  Regent  of  Portugal  had  been  forced  to 
desert  his  people  when  he  banished  himself  to  Brazil. 
President  Jefferson  had  not  their  excuse  for  flight ; 
7but  resistance  by  force  was  already  impossible.  For 
more  than  six  years  he  had  conducted  government  on 
the  theory  of  peaceable  coercion,  and  his  own  friends 
required  that  the  experiment  should  be  tried.  He 
was  more  than  willing,  he  was  anxious,  to  gratify 
them ;  and  he  believed  himself  to  have  solved  the 
difficult  problem  of  stopping  his  enemy,  while  running 
away  from  him  without  loss  of  dignity  and  without 
the  appearance  of  flight. 

General  Turreau,  after  hoping  for  a  time  that  the 
government  would  accept  the  necessity  of  war  with 
England,  became  more  and  more  bitter  as  he  watched 
the  decline  of  the  war  spirit ;  and  September  4,  barely 
two  months  after  the  assault  on  the  "  Chesapeake," 
and  long  before  the  disavowal  of  Berkeley  was 
known,  he  wrote  to  Talleyrand  a  diatribe  against  the 
Americans  : 1  — 

"  If  the  sentiments  of  fear  and  of  servile  deference  for 
England  with  which  the  inhabitants  of  the  American 
Union  are  penetrated,  were  not  as  well  known  as  their 
indifference  for  everything  which  bears  the  name  of 
French,  what  has  passed  since  the  attack  on  the  frigate 
4  Chesapeake '  would  prove  to  the  most  vulgar  obser  v  er 

1  Turreau  to  Talleyrand,  Sept.  4,  1807;  Archives  des  Aff. 
fitr.  MSS. 


1807.  INSULTS   AND  POPULARITY.  141 

not  only  that  the  Anglo-Americans  have  remained  in 
reality  dependent  on  Great  Britain,  but  even  that  this 
state  of  subjection  conforms  with  their  affections  as  well 
as  with  their  habits.  He  will  also  be  convinced  that 
France  has,  and  will  ever  have,  nothing  to  hope  from  the 
dispositions  of  a  people  that  conceives  no  idea  of  glory, 
of  grandeur,  of  justice ;  that  shows  itself  the  constant 
enemy  of  liberal  principles ;  and  that  is  disposed  to 
suffer  every  kind  of  humiliation,  provided  it  can  satisfy 
both  its  sordid  avarice  and  its  projects  of  usurpation 
over  the  Floridas." 

Scandalized  at  the  rapid  evaporation  of  American 
courage,  Turreau  could  explain  it  only  as  due  to  the 
natural  defects  of  "  a  motley  people,  that  will  never 
have  true  patriotism,  because  it  has  no  object  of  com 
mon  interest ; "  a  nation  which  looked  on  the  most 
shameless  outrages  of  its  own  virtue  as  only  "  unfor 
tunate  events."  Yet  one  point  remained  which,  al 
though  to  every  American  it  seemed  most  natural, 
was  incomprehensible  to  the  Frenchman,  whose  anger 
with  America  was  due  not  so  much  to  the  dependence 
of  the  United  States  on  England,  as  to  their  inde 
pendence  of  France. 

"  What  will  doubtless  astonish  those  who  know  the 
Americans  but  imperfectly,  and  what  has  surprised  me 
myself,  —  me,  who  have  a  very  bad  opinion  of  this  peo 
ple,  and  who  believe  it  just,  —  is  the  aversion  (eloigne- 
w<>nt)  — and  1  soften  the  word  —  which  it  has  preserved 
for  the  French  at  the  very  moment  when  everything 
should  recall  a  glorious  and  useful  memory.  It  is  hardly 
to  be  believed,  yet  is  the  exact  truth,  that  in  perhaps 


142         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  6. 

five  hundred  banquets  produced  by  the  anniversary  of 
July  4,  and  among  ten  thousand  toasts,  but  one  has  been 
offered  in  favor  of  France ;  and  even  this  was  given 
at  an  obscure  meeting,  and  was  evidently  dictated  by 
Duane." 

Even  the  Administration  press,  Turreau  com 
plained,  had  thought  proper  to  repudiate  the  idea 
of  a  French  alliance.  From  his  complaints  the  truth 
/could  be  easily  understood.  In  spite  of  reason,  and 
Jin  defiance  of  every  ordinary  rule  of  politics,  France 
possessed  in  America  no  friend,  or  influence.  The 
conclusion  to  be  drawn  was  inevitable.  If  the  United 
States  would  not  accept  the  only  alliance  which 
could  answer  their  purpose,  England  had  nothing  to 
fear.  "  In  this  state  of  affairs  and  condition  of  minds, 
it  appears  to  me  difficult  to  believe  that  Congress 
will  take  measures  vigorous  enough  to  revenge  the 
insult  offered  to  the  Union,  and  to  prevent  the  re 
newal  of  outrages." 

This  conclusion  was  reached  by  Turreau  September 
4,  while  as  early  as  September  1  the  same  opinion 
was  expressed  by  Erskine,  the  British  minister : l 

"  From  all  the  consideration  which  I  have  been  able  to 
give  to  the  present  state  of  things  in  this  country,  I  am 
confirmed  most  strongly  in  the  opinion  which  I  have  ven 
tured  to  express  in  my  former  despatches,  that,  although 
I  fear  it  might  be  possible  for  this  government  to  lead 
the  people  into  a  war  with  Great  Britain  on  the  point  of 
searching  her  national  armed  ships,  yet  I  do  not  believe 

1  Erskine  to  Canning,  Sept.  1,  1807  ;  MSS.  British  Archives. 


1807.  INSULTS   AND   POPULARITY.  143 

that  there  are  any  other  grounds  which  would  be  power 
ful  enough  to  urge  them  to  so  dangerous  a  measure  to 
the  political  existence  perhaps,  but  certainly  to  the  gen 
eral  prosperity  of  this  country." 

No  two  men  in  America  were  better  informed  or 
more  directly  interested  than  Turreau  and  Erskine, 
and  they  agreed  in  regarding  America  as  passive 
in  the  hands  of  England. 

During  the  month  of  September  the  news  from 
Europe  tended  to  show  that  while  England  would 
not  sustain  the  attack  on  the  "  Chesapeake,"  she 
meant  to  cut  off,  for  her  own  benefit,  another  share 
of  American  commerce.  The  report  on  the  West 
Indian  trade  and  the  debates  in  Parliament  fore 
shadowed  the  enforcement  of  the  so-called  Rule  of 
1756  or  some  harsher  measure.  That  Congress  must 
in  some  way  resent  this  interference  with  neutral 
rights  was  evident,  unless  America  were  to  become 
again  a  British  province.  Erskine  knew  the  strength 
of  British  influence  too  well  to  fear  war;  but  he 
warned  his  Government  that  no  nation  could  be  ex 
pected  to  endure  without  protest  of  some  kind  the 
indignities  which  the  United  States  daily  expe 
rienced  : l  - 

"  I  am  persuaded  that  more  ill- will  has  been  excited  in 
this  country  toward  Great  Britain  by  a  few  trifling  illegal 
captures  immediately  off  this  coast,  and  some  instances 
of  insulting  behavior  by  some  of  his  Majesty's  naval 
commanders  in  the  very  harbors  and  waters  of  the  United 

1  Erskine  to  Canning,  Oct.  5,  1807  ;  MSS.  British  Archives. 


144         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  8. 

States,  than  by  the  most  rigid  enforcement  of  the  mari 
time  rights  of  Great  Britain  in  other  parts  of  the  world. 
It  may  easily  be  conceived  to  be  highly  grating  to  the 
feelings  of  an  independent  nation  to  perceive  that  their 
whole  coast  is  watched  as  closely  as  if  it  was  blockaded, 
and  every  ship  coming  in  or  going  out  of  their  harbors 
examined  rigorously  in  sight  of  the  shore,  by  British 
squadrons  stationed  within  their  waters." 

Erskine  added  that  the  causes  of  difference  were  so 
various  as  to  make  any  good  understanding  improb 
able,  and  any  commercial  treaty  impossible ;  that  the 
Federalists  thought  even  worse  of  Monroe's  treaty 
than  the  Government  did,  which  rejected  it ;  and 
that  a  great  sensation  had  been  produced  by  the 
late  Report  on  the  West  Indian  trade :  — 

"  This  point,  and  his  Majesty's  Order  in  Council  to 
prohibit  all  neutral  trade  from  port  to  port  of  his 
Majesty's  enemies,  —  which,  as  you  would  perceive  by 
Mr.  Madison's  letters  on  the  subject,  which  have  been 
transmitted  to  you,  has  given  great  offence  to  this  Gov 
ernment,  —  together  with  the  other  points  of  difference 
between  the  two  countries,  particularly  that  of  the  im 
pressment  of  British  seamen  out  of  American  ships,  will 
be  taken  up  by  Congress  upon  their  meeting  at  the  close 
of  the  present  month  ;  and  I  am  fully  convinced  that 
unless  some  amicable  adjustment  of  these  points  of  dis 
pute  should  previously  take  place,  or  be  in  a  train  to  be 
concluded,  a  system  of  commercial  restrictions  on  the 
trade  of  Great  Britain  with  this  country  will  be  immedi 
ately  formed,  and  every  step  short  of  actual  war  taken  to 
show  their  dissatisfaction." 


1807.  INSULTS  AND  POPULARITY.  145 

Thus,  on  the  eve  of  the  session,  the  most  careful  I 
critics  agreed  that  Congress  would  avoid  war,  and 
would  resist  England,  if  at  all,  by  commercial  meas 
ures.  The  President  and  Madison,  Turreau  and  Ers- 
kine,  were  united  in  expecting  the  same  course  of 
events.  No  one  knew  that  Napoleon  had  enforced 
against  American  commerce  the  provisions  of  his 
Berlin  Decree.  France  counted  for  nothing  in  the 
councils  of  America ;  but  the  conduct  of  England 
obliged  Congress  to  offer  some  protest  against  ag 
gression, —  and  the  easiest  form  of  protest  was  a  re- > 
fusal  to  buy  what  she  had  to  sell.  The  moment  for 
testing  Jefferson's  statesmanship  had  come ;  and  at 
no  time  since  he  became  President  had  his  theories 
of  peaceable  coercion  enjoyed  so  fair  a  prospect  of 
success.  Abroad,  Napoleon  had  shut  the  whole  .  Con 
tinent  of  Europe  to  English  trade,  which  was  hence 
forward  limited  to  countries  beyond  the  seas.  If 
ever  England  could  be  coerced  by  peaceable  means, 
this  was  the  time ;  while  at  home,  the  prospect 
was  equally  favorable,  for  never  in  American  his- ; 
tory  had  the  authority  of  the  government  been  so  - 
absolute. 

Jefferson's  hope  of  annihilating  domestic  oppose 
tion  was  nearly  gratified.  In  the  three  southernmost! 
States  he  had  never  met  with  serious  attack  ;  beyond 
the  Alleghanies,  in  Tennessee,  Kentucky,  and  Ohio, 
his  word  was  law ;  in  Virginia,  John  Randolph  grew  " 
weaker  day  by  day,  and  even  with  Monroe's  aid 
could  not  shake  the  President's  popularity ;  Pennsyl- 

VOL.  IV.  —  10 


146         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  6. 

vania  was  torn  by  factions,  but  none  of  them  troubled 
Jefferson ;  New  York,  purged  of  Burr,  was  divided 
between  Clintons  and  Livingstons,  who  were  united 
in  matters  of  national  policy.  The  greatest  triumph 
of  all  was  won  in  Massachusetts,  where  the  election 
of  April,  1807,  after  calling  out  81,500  voters,  resulted 
in  the  choice  of  the  Democrat  Sullivan  over  the  head 
of  Governor  Strong  by  about  42,000  votes  against 
39,000,  and  in  the  return  of  a  Democratic  majority 
in  the  State  legislature.  Connecticut  alone  of  the 
New  England  States  held  to  her  old  conservative 
principles ;  but  Connecticut  was  powerless  without 
Massachusetts. 

Still  more  decidedly  the  decline  of  organized  oppo 
sition  was  shown  in  the  character  of  the  Tenth  Con 
gress,  which  was  to  meet  October  26.  Of  the  old 
Federalist  senators,  Plumer  of  New  Hampshire  had 
been  succeeded  by  a  Democrat ;  J.  Q.  Adams  of 
Massachusetts  had  publicly  pledged  himself  to  sup 
port  any  measures  .of  resistance  to  England ;  Tracy 
of  Connecticut  —  a  very  able  opponent  —  was  dead. 
Only  five  senators  could  be  rallied  to  partisan  op 
position  on  matters  of  foreign  policy,  —  Timothy 
Pickering  of  Massachusetts;  James  Hillhouse  and 
Chauncey  Goodrich  of  Connecticut ;  James  A.  Bayard 
and  Samuel  White  of  Delaware.  Pickering,  who 
considered  Plumer  and  Adams  as  deserters  to  the 
Administration,  felt  little  confidence  in  Bayard ;  and 
the  event  proved  him  right.  There  were  limits 
to  Bayard's  partisanship ;  but  even  had  he  been 


1807.  INSULTS   AND  POPULARITY.  147 

willing  to  abet  Pickering,  four  or  five  senators  could 
hope  to  effect  little  against  a  compact  majority  of 
twenty-nine. 

In   the   House   the   whole   strength   of   opposition  • 
could  not  control   thirty  votes,  while   Jefferson  was  I 
supported  by  one  hundred  and  ten  members  or  more. 
The    President    was    the    stronger    for    Randolph's 
departure   into   decided  opposition,  where   he   could 
no  longer  divide  and  mislead  the  majority,  but  must 
act   as   a   Federalist   or   alone.     Of  the   twenty-four 
Federalist  members,  Josiah  Quincy  was  probably  the 
ablest  speaker ;  but  in  the  energy  of  his  Federalism 
he  was  rivalled  by  two  men,  —  Barent  Gardenier  of 
New  York,  and  Philip  Barton  Key  of  Maryland,— 
who  were  likely  to  injure  their  cause  more  than  they 
helped  it. 

In  the   country   and   in   Congress,   not   only   was  j 
Jefferson  supreme,  but  his   enemies   were  prostrate. ' 
Federalism  in  New  England,  for  the  first  time,  lay 
helpless  under  his  feet ;  Burr  and  the  "  little  band  " 
in   New   York   were    crushed;    the   Creoles   in   New 
Orleans,  and  the  Western  revolutionists,  with  Wil 
kinson   at  their  head,  were  cowering  before  the  out 
burst  of  patriotism  which  struck  their  projects  dead. 
The  hand  of  government  rested  heavily  on  them,  and 
threatened  nobler  prey.     Even  Chief-Justice  Marshall! 
felt  himself  marked  for  punishment;  while  Monroe! 
and  Randolph  were  already  under  ban  of  the  republic.' 
These  were  triumphs  which  outweighed  foreign  disas 
ters,  and  warranted  Jefferson  in  self-confidence ;  but 


148        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.         CH.  6. 

they  were  chiefly  due  to  the  undisputed  success  of 
his  financial  management.  Jefferson  and  Madison, 
Dearborn  and  Robert  Smith,  might  do  what  they 
would,  so  long  as  they  left  Gallatin  free  to  control 
the  results  of  their  experiments ;  for  Gallatin  re 
deemed  the  mistakes  of  his  party.  Madison's  for 
eign  policy  had  brought  only  trouble  to  the  govern 
ment  ;  Dearborn's  army  had  shown  itself  to  be  more 
dangerous  to  the  Union  than  to  its  enemies  ;  Smith's 
gunboats  were  a  laughing-stock ;  but  Gallatin  never 

v_ failed  to  cover  every  weak  spot  in  the  Administration, 
and  in  October,  1807,  the  Treasury  was  profuse  of 

s  prosperity.  Congress  might  abolish  the  salt  tax  and 
Mediterranean  Fund  alike,  and  still  the  customs 
would  yield  fourteen  millions  a  year ;  while  the  sales 
of  public  lands  exceeded  284,000  acres  and  brought 
another  half  million  into  the  Treasury.  December 
31,  after  providing  for  all  payments  of  public  debt, 
Gallatin  had  a  balance  of  seven  millions  six  hundred 
thousand  dollars  on  hand.  During  the  Presidency 
of  Jefferson,  twenty-five  and  a  half  millions  had  been 
paid  to  redeem  the  principal  of  the  public  debt,  and 
only  the  restraints  imposed  by  the  law  prevented 

^  more  rapid  redemption.     Even  in  case  of  war,  Gal- ' 
latin  offered  to  sustain  it  for  a  year  without  borrow 
ing  money  or  increasing  taxes. 

There  was  the  secret  of  Jefferson's  strength,  of  his 
vast  popularity,  and  of  the  fate  which,  without  direct 
act  of  his,  never  had  failed  to  overwhelm  his  enemies. 
The  American  people  pardoned  everything  except 


1807.  INSULTS   AND   POPULARITY.  149 

an  empty  Treasury.  No  foreign  insults  troubled 
them  long,  and  no  domestic  incompetence  roused 
their  disgust ;  but  they  were  sensitive  to  any  taxation 
which  they  directly  felt.  Gallatin  atoned  for  starv 
ing  the  government  by  making  it  rich ;  and  if  obliged 
to  endure  disgrace  and  robbery  abroad,  he  gave  the 
President  popularity  at  home.  Conscious  of  this 
reserved  strength,  the  President  cared  the  less  for 
foreign  aggressions.  His  was,  according  to  theory;\ 
the  strongest  government  on  earth ;  and  at  worst  he 
had  but  to  withdraw  from  intercourse  with  foreign  / 
nations  in  order  to  become  impregnable  to  assault. 
He  had  no  misgivings  as  to  the  result.  When  he 
returned,  about  October  8,  from  Monticello  to  Wash 
ington,  his  only  thought  was  to  assert  the  strength 
he  felt.  Nothing  had  then  been  received  from  Eng 
land  in  regard  to  the  "  Chesapeake "  negotiation, 
except  Canning's  letter  of  August  3,  promising  to 
"make  reparation  for  any  alleged  injury  to  the  sov 
ereignty  of  the  United  States,  whenever  it  should  be 
clearly  shown  that  such  injury  has  been  actually  sus 
tained,  and  that  such  reparation  is  really  due."  The 
President  justly  thought  that  this  letter,  though  it 
disavowed  the  pretension  to  search  ships  of  war,  held 
out  no  sufficient  hope  of  reparation  for  the  "  Ches 
apeake  "  outrage ;  and  in  writing  the  first  draft  of 
his  Message,  he  expressed  strongly  his  irritation  at 
the  conduct  of  England.  The  draft  was  sent,  as 
usual,  to  the  members  of  his  Cabinet,  and  called  out 
a  remonstrance  from  Gallatin  :  — 


150         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  6. 

"  Instead  of  being  written  in  the  style  of  the  procla 
mation,  which  has  been  almost  universally  approved  at 
home  and  abroad,  the  Message  appears  to  me  to  be  rather 
in  the  shape  of  a  manifesto,  issued  against  Great  Britain 
on  the  eve  of  a  war,  than  such  as  the  existing  undecided 
state  of  affairs  seems  to  require.  It  may  either  be  con 
strued  into  a  belief  that  justice  will  be  denied,  —  a  result 
not  to  be  anticipated  in  an  official  communication,  —  or 
it  may  be  distorted  into  an  eagerness  of  seeing  matters 
brought  to  issue  by  an  appeal  to  arms."  l 

In  truth,  the  draft  rather  showed  that  Jefferson 
was  ready  to  see  matters  brought  to  an  issue,  pro 
vided  that  the  issue  should  not  be  an  appeal  to  arms. 

A  few  days  later,  after  Congress  met,  (rallatm 
wrote  to  his  wife  :  — 

"  The  President's  speech  was  originally  more  warlike 
than  was  necessary ;  but  I  succeeded  in  getting  it  neu 
tralized  —  this  between  us ;  but  it  was  lucky,  for  Con 
gress  is  certainly  peaceably  disposed."  2 

The  situation  lay  in  these  few  words.  Not  only 
Congress  but  also  the  Government  and  people  were 
peaceably  disposed ;  and  between  the  attitude  of 
Congress  and  that  of  the  President  was  but  the 
difference  that  the  former  knew  not  what  to  do, 
.while  the  latter  had  a  fixed  policy  to  impose.  "I 
observe  among  the  members,"  wrote  a  non-partisan 
senator,  "  great  embarrassment,  alarm,  anxiety,  and 

1  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  Oct.   21,    1807  ;  Gallatin's  Writings, 
i.  853. 

2  Adams's  Gallatin,  p.  363. 


1807. 


INSULTS   AND   POPULARITY.  151 


confusion  of  mind,  but  no  preparation  for  any  mea 
sure  of  vigor,  and  an  obvious  strong  disposition  to 
yield  all  that  Great  Britain  may  require,  to  preserve 
peace  under  a  thin  external  show  of  dignity  and 
bravery."  l  In  such  a  state  of  minds,  and  with  such 
a  reserve  of  popular  authority,  President  Jefferson's 
power  found  no  restraint. 

1  Diary  of  J.  Q.  Adams,  Nov.  17,  1807  ;  i.  476. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

SUCH  was  the  situation  October  26,  when  Congress 
assembled  in  obedience  to  the  President's  call.  An 
unusually  large  number  of  members  attended  on  the 
opening  day,  when  for  the  first  time  the  House,  was 
installed  in  a  chamber  ofits__oj£n.  After  seven 
years  of  residence  at  Washington,  the  government 
had  so  far  completed  the  south  wing  of  the  Capitol 
as  to  open  it  for  use.  A  covered  way  of  rough 
boards  still  connected  the  Senate  Chamber  in  the 
north  wing  with  the  Chamber  of  Representatives  in 
the  southern  extension  of  the  building,  and  no  one 
could  foresee  the  time  when  the  central  structure, 
with  its  intended  dome,  would  be  finished ;  but  the 
new  chamber  gave  proof  that  the  task  was  not 
hopeless.  With  extraordinary  agreement  every  one 
admitted  that  Jefferson's  and  Latrobe's  combined 
genius  had  resulted  in  the  construction  of  a  room 
equal  to  any  in  the  world  for  beauty  and  size.  The 
oval  hall,  with  its  girdle  of  fluted  sandstone  columns 
draped  with  crimson  curtains,  its  painted  ceiling, 
with  alternate  squares  of  glass,  produced  an  effect 
of  magnificence  which  was  long  remembered.  Un 
fortunately,  this  splendor  had  drawbacks.  Many  and 


1807.  THE   EMBARGO.  153 

bitter  were  Randolph's  complaints  of  the  echoes  and 
acoustic  defects  which  marred  the  usefulness  of  the 
chamber. 

That  Randolph  should  feel  no  love  for  it  was  natu 
ral.  The  first  scene  it  witnessed  was  that  of  his 
overthrow.  Macon,  who  for  six  years  had  filled  the 
chair,  retired  without  a  contest,  dragged  down  by 
Randolph's  weight ;  and  of  the  one  hundred  and  sev 
enteen  members  present,  fifty-nine,  a  bare  majority, 
elected  Joseph  Bradley  Varnum  of  Massachusetts 
their  Speaker  ;  while  the  minority  of  fifty-eight  scat 
tered  their  votes  among  half-a-dozen  candidates. 
Varnum,  ignoring  Randolph,  appointed  George  Wash 
ington  Campbell  of  Tennessee  chairman  of  the  Ways 
and  Means  Committee.  Troublesome  as  the  Virginia 
leader  had  been,  he  was  still  the  only  member  com 
petent  to  control  the  House,  and  his  fall  was  greatly 
regretted  by  at  least  one  member  of  the  Cabinet. 
"  Varnum  has,  much  against  my  wishes,  removed 
Randolph  from  the  Ways  and  Means,  and  appointed 
Campbell  of  Tennessee,"  wrote  Gallatin.1  "  It  was 
improper  as  related  to  the  public  business,  and  will 
give  me  additional  labor." 

October  27  the  President's  Message  was  read. 

"  The  love  of  peace,"  it  began,  "  so  much  cherished  in 
the  bosoms  of  our  citizens,  which  has  so  long  guided  the 
proceedings  of  their  public  councils  and  induced  forbear 
ance  under  so  many  wrongs,  may  not  insure  our  continu 
ance  in  the  quiet  pursuits  of  industry." 

1  Adams's  Gallatin,  p.  363, 


154        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  7. 

An  account  of  Monroe's  negotiation  and  treaty 
followed  this  threatening  preamble  ;  and  the  warmest 
friends  of  Monroe  and  Pinkney  could  hardly  find 
fault  with  the  President's  gentle  comments  on  their 
conduct. 

"  After  long  and  fruitless  endeavors  to  effect  the  pur 
poses  of  their  mission,  and  to  obtain  arrangements  within 
the  limits  of  their  instructions,  they  concluded  to  sign 
such  as  could  be  obtained,  and  to  send  them  for  consid 
eration  ;  candidly  declaring  to  their  other  negotiators,  at 
the  same  time,  that  they  were  acting  against  their  in 
structions,  and  that  their  Government,  therefore,  could 
not  be  pledged  for  ratification." 

The  provisions  of  the  proposed  treaty  proved  to  be, 
in  certain  points,  "  too  highly  disadvantageous,"  and 
the  minister  had  been  instructed  to  renew  negotia 
tion.  The  attack  on  the  "  Chesapeake "  followed, 
aggravated  by  the  defiant  conduct  of  the  British 
commanders  at  Norfolk.  Lord  Howick's  Order  in 
Council  had  swept  away  by  seizures  and  condemna 
tions  the  American  trade  in  the  Mediterranean. 
Spain,  too,  had  issued  a  decree  in  conformity  with 
Napoleon's  decree  of  Berlin.  Of  France  alone  no 
complaint  was  made,  and  the  President  could  even 
say  that  commerce  and  friendly  intercourse  had  been 
maintained  with  her  on  their  usual  footing.  He  had 
not  yet  heard  of  the  seizures  made  two  months  be 
fore,  by  Napoleon's  order,  in  the  ports  of  Holland. 

In  the  face  of  these  alarming  events,  it  had  been 
thought  better  to  concentrate  all  defensive  resources 


1807. 


THE  EMBARGO.  155 


on  New  York,  Charleston,  and  New  Orleans;  to 
purchase  such  military  stores  as  were  wanted  in 
excess  of  the  supply  on  hand ;  to  call  all  the  gunboats 
into  service,  and  to  warn  the  States  to  be  ready  with 
their  quotas  of  militia.  "  Whether  a  regular  army  is 
to  be  raised,  and  to  what  extent,  must  depend  on  the 
information  so  shortly  expected." 

If  this  language  had  the  meaning  which  in  other 
times  and  countries  would  have  been  taken  for 
granted,  it  implied  a  resort  to  measures  of  force 
against  foreign  aggressions ;  yet  neither  the  Presi 
dent  nor  his  party  intended  the  use  of  force,  except 
for  self-defence  in  case  of  actual  invasion.  The 
Message  was,  in  reality,  silent  in  regard  to  peace  and 
war.  The  time  had  not  yet  come  for  avowing  a 
policy ;  but  even  had  the  crisis  been  actually  at 
hand,  Jefferson  would  not  have  assumed  the  respon 
sibility  of  pointing  out  a  policy  to  Congress.  The 
influence  he  exerted  could  rarely  be  seen  in  his 
official  and  public  language ;  it  took  shape  in  private, 
in  the  incessant  talk  that  went  on,  without  witnesses, 
at  the  White  House. 

More  pointed  than  the  allusion  to  England  was  the 
menace  to  Chief -Justice  Marshall.  The  threat  against 
the  court,  which  the  President  made  in  the  summer, 
reappeared  in  the  Message  as  a  distinct  invitation  to 
Congress. 

"  I  shall  think  it  my  duty  to  lay  before  you  the  pro 
ceedings  and  the  evidence  publicly  exhibited  on  the 
arraignment  of  the  principal  offenders  before  the  Circuit 


156        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  7. 

Court  of  Virginia.  You  will  be  enabled  to  judge  whether 
the  defect  was  in  the  testimony  or  in  the  law,  or  in  the 
administration  of  the  law ;  and  wherever  it  shall  be 
found,  the  Legislature  alone  can  apply  or  originate  the 
remedy.  The  framers  of  our  Constitution  certainly  sup 
posed  they  had  guarded  as  well  their  government  against 
destruction  by  treason,  as  their  citizens  against  oppres 
sion  under  pretence  of  it ;  and  if  these  ends  are  not 
attained,  it  is  important  to  inquire  by  what  means  more 
effectual  they  may  be  secured." 

This  strong  hint  was  quickly  followed  up.  Burr's 
trial  at  Richmond  had  hardly  closed  when  the  Presi 
dent  sent  this  Message  to  Congress  ;  and  within 
another  month,  November  23,  another  Message  was 
sent,  conveying  a  copy  of  the  evidence  and  judicial 
opinions  given  at  the  trial,  on  which  Congressional 
action  might  be  taken. 

So  far  as  concerned  foreign  relations,  no  one  could 
say  with  certainty  whether  the  Annual  Message 
leaned  toward  war  or  toward  peace ;  but  Gallatin's 
Report,  which  followed  November  5,  could  be  under 
stood  only  as  an  argument  to  show  that  if  war  was 
to  be  made  at  all,  it  should  be  made  at  once.  The 
Treasury  had  a  balance  of  seven  or  eight  millions  in 
specie ;  the  national  credit  was  intact ;  taxes  were 
not  yet  reduced  ;  the  Bank  was  still  in  active 
existence ;  various  incidental  resources  were  within 
reach;  the  first  year  of  war  would  require  neither 
increase  of  debt  nor  of  taxation,  and  for  subsequent 
years  loans,  founded  on  increased  customs  duties, 
would  suffice.  Calmly  and  easily  Gallatin  yielded  to 


1807.  THE   EMBARGO.  157 

the  impulse  of  the  time,  and  dropping  the  objects  for 
which  —  as  he  said  --he  had  been  brought  into 
office,  took  up  again  the  heavy  load  of  taxation  and 
debt  which  his  life  had  been  devoted  to  lightening. 
No  one  could  have  supposed,  from  his  language  in 
1807,  that  within  only  ten  years  he  and  his  party  had 
regarded  debt  as  fatal  to  freedom  and  virtue. 

"  An  addition  to  the  debt  is  doubtless  an  evil,"  he  in 
formed  Congress;  "  but  experience  having  now  shown 
with  what  rapid  progress  the  revenue  of  the  Union  in 
creases  in  time  of  peace,  with  what  facility  the  debt 
formerly  contracted  has  in  a  few  years  been  reduced, 
a  hope  may  confidently  be  entertained  that  all  the  evils 
of  the  war  will  be  temporary  and  easily  repaired,  and 
that  the  return  of  peace  will,  without  any  effort,  afford 
ample  resources  for  reimbursing  whatever  may  have  been 
borrowed  during  the  war." 

If  Gallatin  was  so  willing  to  abandon  his  dogma, 
the  Federalists  might  at  least  be  forgiven  for  asking 
why  he  had  taken  it  up.  For  what  practical  object 
had  he  left  the  country  helpless  and  defenceless  for 
six  years  in  order  to  pay  off  in  driblets  the  capital  of 
a  petty  debt  which,  within  much  less  than  a  century, 
could  be  paid  in  full  from  the  surplus  of  a  single 
year?  The  success  of  his  policy  depended  on  the 
correctness  of  Jefferson's  doctrine,  that  foreign  na 
tions  could  be  coerced  by  peaceable  means  into 
respect  for  neutral  rights ;  but  Gallatin  seemed  to  \ 
have  already  abandoned  the  theory  of  peaceable  J 
coercion  before  it  had  been  tried. 


158        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  7. 

The  same  conflict  of  ideas  was  felt  in  Congress, 
which  had  nothing  to  do  but  to  wait  for  news  from 
Europe  that  did  not  arrive.  The  month  of  November 
was  passed  in  purposeless  debate.  That  the  time 
had  come  when  some  policy  must  be  adopted  for 
defending  the  coasts  and  frontiers  was  conceded,  but 
no  policy  could  be  contrived  which  satisfied  at  once_ 
the  economical  and  the  military  wants  of  the  country. 
In  this  chaos  of  opinions,  Jefferson  alone  held  fixed 
theories ;  and  as  usual  his  opinions  prevailed.  He 
preferred  gunboats  to  other  forms  of  armament,  and 
he  had  his  way. 

The  Cabinet  had  not  adopted  the  gunboat  policy 
without  protest.  When  in  the  preceding  month  of 
February  the  President  sent  to  Congress  his  Message 
recommending  that  two  hundred  gunboats  should  be 
built,  at  a  cost,  as  Gallatin  thought,  of  a  million 
dollars,  the  secretary  remonstrated.  In  his  opinion 
not  one  third  that  number  were  needed  in  peace, 
while  in  case  of  war  any  required  number  could 
be  built  within  thirty  days.  "  Exclusively  of  the  first 
expense  of  building  and  the  interest  of  the  capital 
thus  laid  out,  I  apprehend  that,  notwithstanding  the 
care  which  may  be  taken,  they  will  infallibly  decay 
in  a  given  number  of  years,  and  will  be  a  perpetual 
bill  of  costs  for  repairs  and  maintenance."  *  The 
President  overruled  these  objections,  affirming  that 
the  necessary  gunboats  could  not  be  built  even  in 
six  months ;  that  after  the  beginning  of  a  war  they 
1  Gallatin's  Writings,  i.  330. 


1807.  THE   EMBARGO.  159 

could  not  be  built  in  the  seaports,  "  because  they 
would  be  destroyed  by  the  enemy  on  the  stocks ; " 
and  the  first  act  of  the  enemy  "  would  be  to  sweep 
all  our  seaports  of  their  vessels  at  least ; "  finally,  the 
expense  of  building  and  preserving  them  would  be 
trifling.1  Gallatin  did  not  persist  in  the  argument. 
Jefferson  was  determined  to  have  gunboats,  and  gun 
boats  were  built. 

The  "  Chesapeake "  disaster  riveted  the  gunboat 
policy  on  the  government.  Nearly  every  one,  ex 
cept  the  Federalists,  agreed  in  Randolph's  unwilling 
ness  to  vote  money  for  the  support  of  a  "  degraded 
and  disgraced  navy." 2  Robert  Smith  made  no  ap 
parent  attempt  to  counteract  this  prejudice ;  he 
sacrificed  the  frigates  for  gunboats.  October  22, 
1807,  at  a  full  Cabinet  meeting,  according  to  Jef 
ferson's  memoranda,  the  following  order  was  taken 
in  regard  to  the  frigates,  in  view  of  war  with 
England : 3  — 

"The  'Constitution'  is  to  remain  at  Boston,  having 
her  men  discharged ;  the  4  Wasp  '  is  to  come  to  New 
York  ;  the  '  Chesapeake '  to  remain  at  Norfolk  ;  and  the 
sending  the  '  United  States '  frigate  to  New  York  is  re 
served  for  further  consideration,  inquiring  in  the  mean 
time  how  early  she  could  be  ready  to  go.  It  is  consid 
ered  that  in  case  of  war  these  frigates  would  serve  as 
receptacles  for  enlisting  seamen,  to  fill  the  gunboats 
occasionally." 

1  Jefferson  to  Gallatin,  Feb.  9,  1807  ;  Works,  v.  42. 

2  Annals  of  Congress,  1807-1808,  p.  823. 

a  Cabinet  Memoranda,  Oct.  22,  1807;  Jefferson  MSS. 


160        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  7. 

A  government  which  could  imagine  no  other  use 
for  its  frigates  than  as  receiving  ships  for  gunboats 
in  time  of  war  naturally  cared  to  build  none.  When 
Congress  took  up  the  subject  of  naval  defence,  gun 
boats  alone  were  suggested  by  the  department. 
November  8  Robert  Smith  wrote  to  Dr.  Mitchill, 
chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  defences,  a 
letter  asking  for  eight  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
dollars  to  build  one  hundred  and  eighty-eight  more 
gunboats  in  order  to  raise  the  whole  number  to  two 
hundred  and  fifty-seven.1  A  bill  was  at  once  intro 
duced,  passed  the  Senate  without  a  division,  and  went 
to  the  House,  where  the  Federalists  sharply  assailed 
it.  Randolph  ridiculed  the  idea  of  expelling  by  such 
means  even  so  small  a  squadron  as  that  which  at 
Lynnhaven  Bay  had  all  summer  defied  the  power  of 
the  United  States.  Josiah  Quincy  declared  that  ex 
cept  for  rivers  and  shallow  waters  these  gunboats 
were  a  danger  rather  than  a  defence  ;  and  that  at 
all  times  and  places  they  were  uncomfortable,  un 
popular  in  the  service,  and  dangerous  to  handle  and 
to  fight.  Imprisonment  for  weeks,  months,  or  years 
in  a  ship  of  the  line  was  no  small  hardship,  but 
service  in  a  coop  not  wide  enough  to  lie  straight  in, 
with  the  certainty  of  oversetting  or  running  ashore 
or  being  sunk,  in  case  of  bad  weather  or  hostile  at 
tack,  was  a  duty  intolerable  to  good  seamen  and  fatal 
to  the  navy. 

1  Robert  Smith  to  S.  L.  Mitchill,  Nov.  8,  1807;  Annals  of 
Congress,  1807-1808,  p.  32. 


1807. 


THE   EMBARGO.  161 


All  this  and  much  more  was  true.  Fulton's 
steamer,  the  "  Clermont,"  with  a  single  gun  would 
have  been  more  effective  for  harbor  defence  than  all 
the  gunboats  in  the  service,  and  if  supplemented  by 
Fulton's  torpedoes  would  have  protected  New  York 
from  any  line-of-battle  ship ;  but  President  Jefferson, 
lover  of  science  and  of  paradox  as  he  was,  suggested 
no  such  experiment.  By  the  enormous  majority  of 
111  to  19,  the  House,  December  11,  passed  the  bill 
for  additional  gunboats.  A  million  dollars  were- 
voted  for  fortifications.  In  all,  an  appropriation  of 
one  million  eight  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  dollars 
for  defences  was  the  work  accomplished  by  Congress 
between  October  26  and  December  18, 1807.  In  face 
of  a  probable  war  with  England,  such  action  was 
equivalent  to  inaction  ;  and  in  this  sense  the  public 
accepted  it. 

While  Congress  wrangled  about  systems  of  defence 
almost  equally  inefficient,  —  gunboats  and  frigates, 
militia  and  volunteers,  muskets,  movable  batteries, 
and  fixed  fortifications,  —  the  country  listened  with 
drawn  breath  for  news  from  England.  Time  dragged 
on,  but  still  the  "  Revenge  "  did  not  return.  About 
the  end  of  November,  despatches l  dated  October  10 
arrived  from  Monroe,  announcing  that  Canning  re 
fused  to  couple  the  "  Chesapeake  "  affair  with  the  im 
pressment  of  merchant  seamen  ;  that  he  was  about  to 
send  a  special  envoy  to  Washington  with  the  exclusive 
object  of  settling  the  "  Chesapeake "  affair  ;  that 

1  Monroe  to  Madison,  Oct.  10,  1807;  State  Papers,  iii.  191. 

VOL.  IV.  —  11 


162         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  7. 

Monroe  had  taken  his  final  audience  of  King  George, 
and  that  William  Pinkney  was  henceforward  sole 
minister  of  the  United  States  in  London.  Of  the 
treaty  not  a  hope  seemed  to  exist.  Monroe's  return 
was  ominous  of  failure. 

Erskine,  uneasy  at  hearing  these  reports,  hastened 
to  the  White  House,  and  without  delay  reported  Jeffer 
son's  conversation  to  his  Government : 1  — 

"  I  found  from  my  interview  with  the  President  that 
he  was  much  disappointed  at  the  result  of  the  discussions 
which  had  taken  place,  and,  as  he  expressed  himself, 
greatly  alarmed  by  some  of  the  passages  in  your  letters 
that  a  satisfactory  redress  of  the  injuries  complained  of 
was  not  likely  to  be  afforded  to  the  United  States.  He 
informed  me  that  the  reasons  which  had  induced  him  to 
instruct  the  American  ministers  to  endeavor  to  obtain 
some  arrangement  upon  the  point  of  impressment  of 
British  seamen  out  of  American  ships,  at  the  same  time 
that  a  reparation  for  the  attack  on  the  4  Chesapeake '  by 
his  Majesty's  ship  '  Leopard '  was  demanded,  were  that 
he  conceived  that  if  a  satisfactory  security  against  the 
injuries  arising  to  the  United  States  from  such  impress 
ments  could  have  been  obtained,  a  redress  for  the  attack 
upon  their  national  ship  would  have  been  much  easier 
settled ;  but  that  if  the  point  of  honor  was  to  be  taken 
into  consideration  by  itself,  he  foresaw  greater  difficulties 
in  the  way  of  an  amicable  adjustment  of  it.  ...  The 
President  further  observed,  however,  that  although  he 
feared  the  separating  the  two  subjects  would  increase 
the  difficulty  of  the  negotiation,  and  that  he  considered 

1  Erskine  to  Canning,  Dec.  2,  1807;  MSS.  British  Archives. 


1807.  THE   EMBARGO.  163 

the  determination  of  his  Majesty's  government  to  post 
pone  the  consideration  of  the  point  of  impressment  — 
which  he  said  was  the  most  serious  ground  of  differ 
ence  —  as  an  unfavorable  symptom  of  their  ultimate  in 
tentions  upon  that  subject,  yet  that  he  certainly  would 
not  refuse  upon  the  ground  of  form  only  that  the  affair 
of  the  '  Chesapeake '  should  be  first  concluded ;  but  ex 
pressed  a  hope  that  the  minister  who  should  be  sent  to 
this  country  to  settle  that  subject  of  complaint  should 
also  be  invested  by  his  Majesty  with  powers  to  negotiate 
upon  the  point  of  impressment." 

The  sanguine  temperament  which  challenged  a  duel 
accorded  ill  with  the  afterthought  which  shrank  from 
it.  Voluntarily,  coolly,  with  mature  reflection,  Jeffer 
son  had  invited  Canning's  blow ;  and  when  Canning 
struck,  Jefferson  recoiled.  Monroe  might  well  claim 
that  such  conditions  as  were  imposed  on  him  should 
never  have  been  made,  or  should  never  have  been 
withdrawn ;  that  at  moments  of  violent  irritation  no 
nation  could  afford  to  tease  another  with  demands 
not  meant  to  be  enforced. 

To  increase  the  President's  embarrassment,  the 
Secretary  of  War  Dearborn  made  a  natural  mistake. 
The  original  instructions  to  Monroe,  decided  in  Cab 
inet  meeting  July  2,1  did  not  connect  the  "  Chesa 
peake  "  outrage  with  impressments  of  merchant  sea 
men.  Neither  July  4  nor  July  5,  when  full  Cabinet 
meetings  were  held,  did  the  subject  come  up.2  The 
final  instructions,  dated  July  6,  changed  the  original 

1  See  p.  31. 

2  Cabinet  Memoranda ;  Jefferson  MSS. 


164         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  7. 

demand  by  extending  the  required  redress  over  all 
cases  of  impressment;  but  meanwhile  General  Dear 
born  had  left  Washington  for  New  York,  and  was 
not  told  of  the  change.1  So  it  happened  thai"  when 
in  October  the  Federalist  newspapers  began  to  attack 
Jefferson,  on  the  authority  of  the  English  press,  for 
coupling  the  subject  of  general  impressment  with  the 
attack  on  the  "Chesapeake,"  Dearborn,  who  chanced 
to  be  in  Massachusetts,  denied  the  charge;  and  on 
his  authority  the  Republican  newspapers  asserted  that 
the  alleged  instructions  had  not  been  given.  This 
denial  created  no  little  confusion  among  Republicans, 
who  could  not  understand  why  the  instructions  had 
been  changed,  or  on  what  ground  the  Administration 
meant  to  defend  them. 

In  truth,  the  change  had  been  an  afterthought, 
founded  on  the  idea  that  as  abandonment  of  impress 
ments  was  a  sine  qua  non  in  the  commercial  negotia 
tion,  and  a  point  on  which  the  Government  meant 
inflexibly  to  insist,  it  should  properly  be  made  a  sine 
qua  non  in  this  or  any  other  agreement.2  This  de 
cision  had  been  made  in  July,  with  knowledge  that 
England  would  rather  fight  than  yield  a  point  so 
vital  to  her  supposed  interests.  In  December,  on 
hearing  that  Canning  refused  to  yield,  the  President 
told  Erskine  that  the  sine  qua  non,  so  formally 
adopted,  would  be  abandoned. 

That   conduct  in  appearance  so  vacillating  should 

1  Dearborn  to  Jefferson,  Oct.  18,  1807;  Jefferson  MSS. 

2  R.  Smith  to  Jefferson,  July  17,  1807;  Jefferson  MSS. 


1807.  THE   EMBARGO.  165 

perplex  Jefferson's  friends  and  irritate  his  enemies 
was  natural ;  but  in  reality  nothing  vacillating  was  in 
the  President's  mind.  These  negotiations  were  but 
outpost  skirmishes,  and  covered  his  steady  retreat  to 
the  fortress  which  he  believed  to  be  impregnable. 
He  meant  to  coerce  Canning,  but  his  method  of  co 
ercion  needed  neither  armies  nor  negotiators.  While 
telling  Erskine  that  the  sine  qua  non  should  not  pre 
vent  a  settlement  of  the  "  Chesapeake  "  affair,  he  set 
in  motion  the  first  of  the  series  of  measures  which 
were  intended  to  teach  England  to  respect  American 
rights. 

December  14,  against  strong  remonstrances  from 
the  merchants,  the  Non-importation  Act  of  April  18, 
1806,  went  into  effect.  The  exact  amount  of  British 
trade  affected  by  that  measure  was  not  known.  All 
articles  of  leather,  silk,  hemp,  glass,  silver,  paper, 
woollen  hosiery,  ready-made  clothing,  millinery,  malt 
liquors,  pictures,  prints,  playing-cards,  and  so  forth, 
if  of  English  manufacture,  were  henceforward  pro-' 
hibited  ;  and  any  person  who  had  them  in  his  posses 
sion  incurred  forfeiture  and  fine.  The  measure  was 
in  its  nature  coercive.  The  debates  in  Congress 
showed  that  no  other  object  than  that  of  coercion 
was  in  the  mind  of  the  American  government ;  the 
history  of  the  Republican  party  and  the  consistent 
language  of  Jefferson,  Madison,  and  the  Virginian 
school  proclaimed  that  the  policy  of  prohibition 
was  their  substitute  for  war.  England  was  to  be 
punished,  by  an  annual  fine  of  several  million  dol- 


166         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  7. 

lars,  for  interference   with   American   trade   to  the 
continent  of  Europe. 

Two  days  after  this  law  went  into  effect  Madison 
received  from  the  British  government  a  document 
which  threw  the  Non-importation  Act  into  the  back 
ground,  and  made  necessary  some  measure  more 
energetic.  The  King's  proclamation  of  October  17, 
requiring  all  British  naval  officers  to  exercise  the 
right  of  impressment  to  its  full  extent  over  neutral 
merchant-vessels,  was  printed  in  the  "  National  In 
telligencer  "  of  December  17 ;  and  if  Sir  William 
Scott's  decision  in  the  case  of  the  "  Essex  "  required 
the  Non-importation  Act  as  its  counterpoise,  the  Im 
pressment  Proclamation  could  be  fairly  balanced  only 
by  a  total  cessation  of  relations. 

In  rapid  succession  the  ships  which  had  sailed  a 
month  before  from  Europe  arrived  in  American  har 
bors,  after  unusually  quick  voyages.  Monroe,  in  the 
"  Augustus,"  reached  Norfolk  December  13  ;  the 
"  Edward "  arrived  at  Boston  December  12 ;  the 
"  Brutus "  got  in  at  New  York  December  14,  pre 
ceded  December  12  by  the  "  Revenge."  All  these 
ships  brought  news  to  the  same  effect.  Armstrong's 
despatches  by  the  "  Revenge  "  announced  Napoleon's 
enforcement  of  the  Berlin  Decree.  London  news 
papers  of  November  12  agreed  in  predicting  some 
immediate  and  sweeping  attack  by  the  British  gov 
ernment  upon  American  commerce ;  and  from  Pink- 
ney  and  Monroe  came  the  official  papers  which  put  an 
end  to  all  hope  of  a  commercial  treaty  with  England. 


1807.  THE   EMBARGO.  167 

Private  letters  bore  out  the  worst  public  rumors. 
Among  other  persons  who  were  best  informed  as  to 
the  intentions  of  the  British  government  was  Senator 
Pickering  of  Massachusetts,  whose  nephew  Samuel 
Williams  had  been  removed  by  Jefferson  from  the 
London  consulate,  and  remained  in  that  city  as  an 
American  merchant,  in  connection  with  his  brother 
Timothy  Williams  of  Boston.  December  12  Timothy 
Williams  in  Boston  wrote  to  his  uncle  Senator  Pick 
ering  at  Washington,1  - 

' '  My  brother  writes  me  on  the  9th  of  November  ;  that 
he  was  informed  the  Government  would  in  a  few  days 
declare  Cuba,  Martinique,  and  Guadeloupe  in  a  state  of 
blockade,  and  restrict  still  more  the  trade  of  neutrals 
with  the  Continent.'  The  British  no  doubt  had  or  would 
issue  an  Order  above  referred  to,  to  counteract  our  friend 
Bonaparte's  decree  of  Nov.  21,  1806.  I  cannot  how 
ever  think  the  intercourse  with  the  Continent  will  be 
entirely  cut  off.  The  influence  of  the  West  Indian  plant 
ers  will  procure  the  blockading  of  the  enemy's  islands,  no 
doubt.  What  has  not  this  country  lost  by  the  miserable 
policy  of  the  Administration  !  Your  prudence  will  know 
to  whom  you  can  or  cannot  communicate  any  of  the  above 
paragraphs." 

"  With  much  solicitude  respecting  the  present  state 
of  things,"  Timothy  Williams  concluded  this  letter  of 
warning;  and  his  anxiety  was  shared  by  every  one 
who  read  the  newspapers  which  proclaimed  the  dan 
ger  of  war.  At  Washington  the  alarming  news 
arrived  December  17,  at  the  heels  of  the  Impressment 

1  T.  Williams  to  T.  Pickering,  Dec.  12,  1807;  Pickering  MSS. 


168        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  7. 

Proclamation.  The  President  instantly  called  his 
Cabinet  together.  Under  less  serious  circumstances 
in  1794,  Congress  had  imposed  an  embargo  for  thirty 
days,  forbidding  clearances  to  all  foreign-bound  ves 
sels  while  the  question  of  war  or  peace  was  deciding. 
'By  common  consent  an  embargo  was  the  proper  meas 
ure  to  be  taken  in  the  face  of  an  expected  attack  on 
commerce.  On  reading  the  news  from  France  and 
England,  every  one  assumed  that  an  embargo  would 
be  imposed  until  the  exact  nature  of  the  French  and 
British  aggressions  should  be  learned ;  but  safe  pre 
cedent  required  that  the  law  should  restrict  its  own 
operation  within  some  reasonable  limit  of  time.  An 
embargo  for  thirty  or  sixty  days,  or  even  for  three 
months,  might  be  required  before  reaching  some  de 
cision  as  to  peace  or  war. 

On  a  loose  sheet  of  letter-paper,  which  happened 
to  bear  the  address  of  General  Mason,  the  President 
wrote  a  hasty  draft  of  an  embargo  message  to  Con 
gress.1  After  referring  to  Armstrong's  despatch  an 
nouncing  the  Emperor's  decision  to  enforce  the  Berlin 
Decree,  Jefferson's  draft  noticed  the  threatened  orders 
of  England :  — 

"  The  British  regulations  had  before  reduced  us  to  a 
direct  voyage  to  a  single  port  of  their  enemies,  and  it  is 
now  believed  they  will  interdict  all  commerce  whatever 
with  them.  A  proclamation,  too,  of  that  Government 
(not  officially,  indeed,  communicated  to  us,  yet  so  given 

1  Jefferson  to  Gen.  J.  Mason;  Works,  v.  217.  Cf.  Jefferson  to 
Madison,  July  14,  1824;  Works,  vii.  373. 


1807.  THE    EMBARGO.  169 

out  to  the  public  as  to  become  a  rule  of  action  with  them) 
seems  to  have  shut  the  door  on  all  negotiation  with  us, 
except  as  to  the  single  aggression  on  the  '  Chesapeake.' 
The  sum  of  these  mutual  enterprises  on  our  national 
rights  is  that  France  and  her  allies,  reserving  for  future 
consideration  the  prohibiting  our  carrying  anything  to 
the  British  territories,  have  virtually  done  it  by  restrain 
ing  our  bringing  a  return  cargo  from  them ;  and  Great 
Britain,  after  prohibiting  a  great  proportion  of  our 
commerce  with  France  and  her  allies,  is  now  believed 
to  have  prohibited  the  whole.  The  whole  world  is  thus 
laid  under  interdict  by  these  two  nations,  and  our  vessels, 
their  cargoes,  and  crews  are  to  be  taken  by  the  one  or 
the  other  for  whatever  place  they  may  be  destined  out 
of  our  own  limits.  If,  therefore,  on  leaving  our  harbors 
we  are  certainly  to  lose  them,  is  it  not  better,  as  to 
vessels,  cargoes,  and  seamen,  to  keep  them  at  home? 
This  is  submitted  to  the  wisdom  of  Congress,  who  alone 
are  competent  to  provide  a  remedy." 

Unfortunately,  no  official  document  could  be  pro 
duced  in  proof  of  the  expected  British  interdict,  and 
mere  newspaper  paragraphs  could  not  be  used  for  the 
purpose.  To  avoid  this  difficulty  Madison  wrote,  in 
pencil,  another  draft  which  omitted  all  direct  mention 
of  the  expected  British  order.  He  proposed  to  send 
Congress  the  official  letter  in  which  the  Grand  Judge 
Regnier  announced  that  the  Berlin  Decree  would  be 
enforced,  and  with  this  letter  a  copy  of  the  British 
Impressment  Proclamation  as  printed  in  the  "  Na 
tional  Intelligencer."  On  these  two  documents  he 
founded  his  draft  of  a  Message :  — 


170         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  7. 

"  The  communications  now  made  showing  the  great 
and  increasing  danger  with  which  our  merchandise,  our 
vessels,  and  our  seamen  are  threatened  on  the  high  seas 
and  elsewhere  by  the  belligerent  Powers  of  Europe,  and 
it  being  of  the  greatest  importance  to  keep  in  safety  these 
essential  resources,  I  deem  it  my  duty  to  recommend  the 
subject  to  the  consideration  of  Congress,  who  will  doubt 
less  perceive  all  the  advantages  which  may  be  expected 
from  an  immediate  inhibition  of  the  departure  of  our 
vessels  from  the  ports  of  the  United  States."1 

The  Cabinet,  every  member  being  present,  unani 
mously  concurred  in  the  recommendation  to  Con 
gress;2  but  at  least  one  member  would  have  pre 
ferred  that  the  embargo  should  be  limited  in  time. 
The  Cabinet  meeting  was  held  in  the  afternoon  or 
evening  of  December  17,  and  early  the  next  morning 
Gallatin  wrote  to  the  President  suggesting  a  slight 
change  in  the  proposed  measure,  and  adding  a  seri 
ous  warning  which  Jefferson  would  have  done  well 
to  regard :  — 

"  I  also  think,"  said  Gallatin,3  "  that  an  embargo  for 
aTTimited  time  will  at  this  moment  be  preferable  in  itself 
and  less  objectionable  in  Congress.  In  every  point  of 
view  —  privations,  sufferings,  revenue,  effect  on  the  ene- 
\  my,  politics  at  home,  etc.  —  I  prefer  war  to  a  permanent 
embargo.  Governmental  prohibitions  do  always  more 

1  Draft  of  Embargo  Message,  Jefferson  MSS.     Cf.  Jefferson  to 
Madison,  July  14,  1824;  Works,  vii.  373. 

2  Jefferson  to  John  G.  Jackson,  Oct.  13,  1808;  Jefferson  MSS. 
8  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  Dec.   18,   1807;    Gallatin's  Writings, 

i.  368. 


1807.  THE   EMBARGO.  171 

mischief  than  had  been  calculated ;  and  it  is  not  without 
much  hesitation  that  a  statesman  should  hazard  to  regu 
late  the  concerns  of  individuals,  as  if  he  could  do  it  better 
than  themselves.  The  measure  being  of  a  doubtful  pol 
icy,  and  hastily  adopted  on  the  first  view  of  our  foreign 
intelligence,  I  think  that  we  had  better  recommend  it  with 
modifications,  and  at  first  for  such  a  limited  time  as  will 
afford  us  all  time  for  reconsideration,  and  if  we  think 
proper,  for  an  alteration  in  our  course  without  appearing 
to  retract.  As  to  the  hope  that  it  may  have  an  effect  on 
the  negotiation  with  Mr.  Rose,  or  induce  P^ngland  to  treat 
us  better,  I  think  it  entirely  groundless." 

To  this  remarkable  letter  the  President  immedi 
ately  replied  by  summoning  the  Cabinet  together  at 
ten  o'clock  in  the  morning.1  No  record  of  the  con 
sultation  was  preserved ;  but  when  the  Senate  met  at 
noon  the  Message  was  read  by  the  Vice-president  as 
it  had  been  shaped  by  Madison.  The  suggestion  of 
Gallatin  as  to  a  limit  of  time  had  not  been  adopted. 

The  Senate  instantly  referred  the  Message  to  a 
committee  of  five,  with  General  Smith  and  J.  Q. 
Adams  at  its  head  :  — 

44  We  immediately  went  into  the  committee-room,"  re 
corded  Senator  Adams  in  his  Diary,2  44  and  after  some 
discussion,  in  which  I  suggested  very  strong  doubts  as  to 
the  propriety  of  the  measure  upon  the  papers  sent  with 
the  President's  Message,  I  finally  acquiesced  in  it  as  a 
compliance  with  the  special  call  for  it  in  the  Message. 

1  Jefferson  to  Gallatin,  Dec.   18,   1807;    Gallatin's  WritingSj 
i.  369. 

2  Diary  of  J.  Q.  Adams,  Dec.  18,  1807,  i.  491. 


172        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  7. 

I  inquired  whether  there  were  other  reasons  for  it  besides 
the  diplomatic  papers  sent  with  the  Message,  as  they 
appeared  to  me  utterly  inadequate  to  warrant  such  a 
measure.  Smith,  the  chairman,  said  that  the  President 
wanted  it  to  aid  him  in  the  negotiation  with  England 
upon  which  Mr.  Rose  is  coming  out,  and  that  perhaps  it 
might  enable  us  to  get  rid  of  the  Non-importation  Act. 
I  yielded.  But  I  believe  there  are  yet  other  reasons, 
which  Smith  did  not  tell.  There  was  no  other  opposition 
in  committee." 

Senator  Adams  was  right  in  believing  that  other 
reasons  existed ;  but  although  the  "  National  Intelli 
gencer"  of  the  same  morning  had  published  the  warn 
ings  of  British  newspapers,  —  doubtless  in  order  to 
affect  the  action  of  Congress,  —  no  one  of  the  Repub 
lican  senators  seemed  to  rely  on  the  expected  British 
order  as  the  cause  of  the  embargo.  In  foreign  affairs 
Jefferson  maintained  the  reserve  of  a  European  mon 
arch.  He  alone  knew  what  had  been  done  or  was 
doing,  and  on  him  rested  the  whole  responsibility  of 
action.  The  deference  paid  by  the  Senate  to  the 
Executive  in  matters  of  foreign  policy  seemed  patri 
otic,  but  it  proved  fatal  to  one  senator  at  least,  whose 
colleague  had  grievances  to  revenge.  When  the 
committee,  after  a  short  deliberation,  reported  an 
Embargo  Bill,  and  some  of  the  senators  appealed  for 
delay,  Adams,  who  was  chafing  under  the  delays 
which  had  already  lowered  the  self-respect  of  Govern 
ment  and  people,  broke  into  a  strenuous  appeal  for 
energy.  "  The  President  has  recommended  the  meas- 


1807.  THE   EMBARGO.  173 

ure  on  his  high  responsibility.  I  would  not  consider, 
i  would  not  deliberate ;  I  would  act ! "  The  words 
were  spoken  in  secret  session,  but  Senator  Pickering 
noted  them  for  future  use.1  Among  the  antipathies 
and  humors  of  New-England  politics  none  was  more 
characteristic  than  this  personal  antagonism,  begin 
ning  a  new  conspiracy  which  was  to  shake  the  Union 
to  its  foundations. 

The  Senate  agreed  with  the  committee  that  if  an 
embargo  was  to  be  laid  it  should  be  laid  promptly ; 
and  the  bill,  probably  drawn  by  the  President,  passed 
through  its  three  stages  on  the  same  day,  by  a  vote 
of  twenty-two  to  six.  At  the  second  reading  it  was 
strongly  opposed  by  Hillhouse,  Pickering,  and  Sumter 
of  South  Carolina;  while  William  H.  Crawford,  the 
new  senator  from  Georgia,  asked  only  time  for  consid 
eration.2  Within  four  or  five  hours  after  hearing 
the  Message  read,  the  Senate  sent  its  Embargo  Act 
to  the  House. 

Meanwhile  the  House  also  had  received  the  Presi 
dent's  Message,  and  had,  like  the  Senate,  gone  at  once 
into  secret  session.  No  sooner  was  the  Message  read 
than  John  Randolph  and  Jacob  Crowninshield  sprang 
at  the  same  moment  to  their  feet.  The  Speaker  rec 
ognized  Randolph,  who  instantly  offered  a  Resolution, 
"  that  an  embargo  be  laid  on  all  shipping,  the  prop 
erty  of  citizens  of  the  United  States,  now  in  port, 

1  Pickering's   Letter  to  Governor   Sullivan,  April  22,  1808. 
Cf.  New-England  Federalism,  p.  174,  n. 

2  Diary  of  J.  Q.  Adams,  i.  491,  492. 


174         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  7. 

or  which  shall  hereafter  arrive."  After  some  time 
passed  in  discussion,  on  receiving  the  Senate  bill  the 
House  laid  Randolph's  Resolution  aside,  and  in  se 
cret  session  began  a  long  and  warm  debate,  which 
continued  all  day,  and  was  not  concluded  on  Satur 
day,  December  19,  when  the  House  adjourned  over 
Sunday. 

The  loss  of  this  debate  was  unfortunate ;  for  no 
private  citizen  ever  knew  the  reasons  which  Congress 
considered  sufficient  to  warrant  a  strain  of  the  Con 
stitution  so  violent  as  a  permanent  embargo  implied. 
The  debate  was  certainly  dramatic :  it  was  not  only 
the  first  great  political  crisis  witnessed  in  the  new 
scenery  of  the  Representatives'  Chamber,  but  it  also 
brought  John  Randolph  forward  in  an  attitude  which 
astonished  even  those  who  had  witnessed  the  Vir 
ginian's  growing  eccentricity.  On  Friday  Randolph 
"  scrambled  "  with  Crowninshield  for  the  floor,  eager 
to  force  on  the  House  a  policy  of  embargo  which  he 
had  again  and  again  recommended  as  the  only  proper 
measure  of  national  defence.  On  Saturday  he  rose 
again,  but  only  to  denounce  his  own  measure  as  one 
that  crouched  to  the  insolent  mandates  of  Napoleon, 
and  led  to  immediate  war  with  England.1  The  cry  of 
French  influence,  raised  by  him  and  by  the  Federalist 
members,  began  on  that  day,  and  echoed  in  louder 
and  louder  tones  for  years. 

On  Monday,  December  21,  the  debate  closed,  and 
the  House  consumed  the  day  in  voting.  Amendment 

1  Adams's  Kandolph,  p.  227. 


1807.  THE   EMBARGO.  175 

after  amendment  was  rejected.  Most  significant  of 
all  these  votes  was  the  list  of  yeas  and  nays  on  the 
question  of  limiting  the  embargo  to  the  term  of  two 
months.  Forty-six  members  voted  in  the  affirma- 
tive ;  eighty-two  in  the  negative.  The  New  England 
and  Pennsylvania  Democrats  obeyed  the  wishes  of 
Jefferson,  and  riveted  a  permanent  embargo  on » 
the  people,  without  public  discussion  of  the  principle 
or  explanation  of  the  effect  which  was  expected 
from  a  measure  more  trying  than  war  itself  to  patri 
otism.  The  bill  then  passed  by  a  vote  of  eighty-two 
to  forty-four. 

So  small  a  part  was  played  in  this  debate  by  the 
expected  Order  in  Council  that  members  afterward 
disputed  whether  the  subject  was  mentioned  at  all. 
Probably  the  Administration  preferred  silence  in 
public,  either  for  fear  of  prejudicing  the  expected 
negotiation  with  Rose,  or  of  weakening  the  effect 
of  arguments  which  without  the  order  were  suffi 
ciently  strong ;  but  in  private  no  such  reticence  was 
shown.  The  British  minister  on  Monday,  before  the 
bill  had  become  law,  notified  Canning  not  only  that 
an  embargo  was  about  to  be  laid,  but  of  the  cause 
which  produced  the  measure  : l  — 

"  It  has  been  confidentially  communicated  to  me  that 
an  embargo  on  all  the  shipping  in  the  United  States  has 
been  proposed  in  Congress,  and  although  it  is  strongly 
resisted,  it  is  expected  that  it  will  be  carried,  on  the 
ground  of  expecting  that  a  proclamation  by  his  Majesty 

1  Erskine  to  Canning,  Dec.  21,  1807;  MSS.  British  Archives. 


176        HISTORY  OF   THE  UNITED   STATES.        Cn.7. 

will  be  issued  declaring  France  and  her  dependencies  in 
a  state  of  blockade.  I  hasten  to  send  you  this  letter  for 
fear  of  the  effect  of  an  embargo." 

The  person  from  whom  Erskine  received  this  confi 
dential  communication  was  probably  the  Secretary  of 
State ;  for  two  days  afterward,  when  the  British  min 
ister  wrote  to  say  that  the  embargo  had  been  laid, 
he  added : l  — 

"  I  propose  to  send  off  his  Majesty's  packet-boat  with 
this  intelligence  immediately,  and  avail  myself  of  this 
opportunity  by  a  private  ship  to  inform  you  that  the  em 
bargo  is  not  intended,  as  this  Government  declares,  as  a 
measure  of  hostility  against  Great  Britain,  but  only  as 
a  precaution  against  the  risk  of  the  capture  of  their  ships 
in  consequence  of  the  decree  of  Bonaparte  of  Nov.  21, 
1806,  which  they  have  just  learned  is  to  be  rigorously  en 
forced  ;  and  also  from  an  apprehension  of  a  retaliatory 
order  by  Great  Britain." 

Thus  the  embargo  was  imposed ;  and  of  all  Presi 
dent  Jefferson's  feats  of  political  management,  this 
was  probably  the  most  dexterous.  On  his  mere  rec 
ommendation,  without  warning,  discussion,  or  pub 
licity,  and  in  silence  as  to  his  true  reasons  and  mo 
tives,  he  succeeded  in  fixing  upon  the  country,  beyond 
recall,  the  experiment  of  peaceable  coercion.  His  tri 
umph  was  almost  a  marvel ;  but  no  one  could  fail  to 
see  its  risks.  A  free  people  required  to  know  in  ad 
vance  the  motives  which  actuated  government,  and  the 
intended  consequences  of  important  laws.  Large 

1  Erskine  to  Canning,  Dec.  23,  1807;  MSFv  British  Archives. 


"Tr 


1807. 


THE  EMBACOH  177 


masses  of  intelligent  men  were  slow  to  forgive  what 
they  might  call  deception.  If  Jefferson's  permanent 
embargo  should  fail  to  coerce  Europe,  what  would  the 
people  of  America  "think  of  the  process  by  which  it 
had  been  fastened  upon  them?  What  would  be  said 
and  believed  of  the  President  who  had  challenged 
so  vast  a  responsibility  ? 

VOL.  IV.  —  12 


CHAPTER   VIII. 

DECEMBER  22  Jefferson  signed  the  Embargo  Act; 
four  days  afterward  George  Rose  arrived  at  Norfolk. 
The  avowed  object  of  his  mission  was  to  offer  satis 
faction  for  the  attack  upon  the  "  Chesapeake ;"  the 
true  object  could  be  seen  only  in  the  instructions 
with  which  he  was  furnished  by  Canning.1 

These  instructions,  never  yet  published,  began  by 
directing  that  in  case  any  attempt  should  be  made 
to  apply  the  President's  proclamation  of  July  2  to 
Rose's  frigate,  the  "  Statira,"  he  should  make  a  for 
mal  protest,  and  if  the  answer  of  the  American 
government  should  be  unsatisfactory,  or  unreasona 
bly  delayed,  he  should  forthwith  return  to  England. 
Should  no  such  difficulty  occur,  he  was  on  arriving 
at  Washington  to  request  an  audience  of  the  Presi 
dent  and  Secretary  of  State,  and  to  announce  himself 
furnished  with  full  powers  to  enter  into  negotiation 
on  the  "  Chesapeake  "  affair,  but  forbidden  to  enter 
tain  any  proposition  on  any  other  point. 

"With  respect  to  that  object,  you  will  express  your 
conviction  that  the  instructions  under  which  you  act 

1  Instructions  to  G.  H.  Rose,  Oct.  24,  1807  ;  MSS.  British 
Archives. 


1807.  THE  MISSION  OF  GEORGE  ROSE.  179 

would  enable  you  to  terminate  your  negotiation  amicably 
and  satisfactorily.  But  you  will  state  that  you  are  dis 
tinctly  instructed,  previously  to  entering  into  any  nego 
tiation,  to  require  the  recall  of  the  proclamation  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States,  and  the  discontinuance  of 
the  measures  which  have  been  adopted  under  it." 

After  explaining  that  the  disavowal  and  recall  of 
Admiral  Berkeley  had  taken  away  the  excuse  for 
interdicting  free  communication  with  British  ships, 
and  that  thenceforward  the  interdict  became  an  ag 
gression,  Canning  directed  that  if  the  request  be 
refused,  Rose  should  declare  his  mission  at  an 
end ;  but  supposing  the  demand  to  be  satisfied,  he 
was  to  disavow  at  once  the  forcible  attack  on  the 
"  Chesapeake." 

"  You  will  state  further  that  Admiral  Berkeley  has 
been  recalled  from  his  command  for  having  acted  in  an 
affair  of  such  importance  without  authority.  You  will 
add  that  his  Majesty  is  prepared  to  discharge  those  men 
who  were  taken  by  this  unauthorized  act  out  of  the 
American  frigate  ;  reserving  to  himself  the  right  of  re 
claiming  such  of  them  as  shall  prove  to  have  been  desert 
ers  from  his  Majesty's  service,  or  natural-born  subjects 
of  his  Majesty ;  and  further,  that  in  order  to  repair  as 
far  as  possible  the  consequences  of  an  act  which  his 
Majesty  disavows,  his  Majesty  is  ready  to  secure  to  the 
widows  and  orphans  (if  such  there  be)  of  such  of  the 
men  who  were  unfortunately  killed  on  board  the  4  Chesa 
peake  '  as  shall  be  proved  not  to  have  been  British 
subjects,  a  provision  adequate  to  their  respective  situa 
tion  and  condition  in  life." 


180        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  8. 

This  disavowal,  and  the  removal  of  Berkeley  from 
command,  were  to  be  the  limit  of  concession.  The 
circumstances  of  provocation  under  which  Berkeley 
had  acted,  greatly  extenuated  his  procedure ;  "  and 
his  Majesty  therefore  commands  me  to  instruct  you 
peremptorily  to  reject  any  further  mark  of  his 
Majesty's  displeasure  toward  Admiral  Berkeley." 

The  remainder  of  Canning's  instructions  admits  of 
no  abridgment :  — 

' '  You  will  next  proceed  to  state  that  after  this  volun 
tary  offer  of  reparation  on  his  Majesty's  part,  his  Majesty 
expects  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  will  be 
equally  ready  to  remove  those  causes  of  just  complaint 
which  have  led  to  this  unfortunate  transaction. 

"His  Majesty  requires  this,  not  only  as  a  due  return 
for  the  reparation  which  he  has  thus  voluntarily  tendered, 
but  as  indispensable  to  any  well-founded  expectation  of 
the  restoration  and  continuance  of  that  harmony  and 
good  understanding  between  the  two  governments  which 
it  is  equally  the  interest  of  both  to  cultivate  and 
improve. 

"  However  much  his  Majesty  may  regret  the  summary 
mode  of  redress  which  has  been  resorted  to  in  the  present 
instance,  it  cannot  be  supposed  that  his  Majesty  is  pre 
pared  to  acquiesce  in  an  injury  so  grievous  to  his 
Majesty  as  the  encouragement  of  desertion  from  his 
naval  service. 

"  The  extent  to  which  this  practice  has  been  carried  is 
too  notorious  to  require  illustration ;  but  the  instance  of 
the  4  Chesapeake '  itself  is  sufficient  to  justify  the  demand 
of  adequate  satisfaction. 

"  The  protestation  of   Commodore  Barren  is  contra- 


1807.  THE   MISSION  OF   GEORGE   ROSE.  181 

dieted  in  the  face  of  the  world  by  the  conviction  and 
confession  of  one  of  those  unhappy  men  who  had  been 
seduced  from  his  allegiance  to  his  Majesty,  and  to  whom 
Commodore  Barron  had  promised  his  protection. 

u  His  Majesty,  however,  does  not  require  any  proceed 
ing  of  severity  against  Commodore  Barron  ;  but  he  re 
quires  a  formal  disavowal  of  that  officer's  conduct  in 
encouraging  deserters  from  his  Majesty's  service,  in  re 
taining  them  on  board  his  ship,  and  in  denying  the  fact 
of  their  being  there ;  and  he  requires  that  this  disavowal 
shall  be  such  as  plainly  to  show  that  the  American  gov 
ernment  did  not  countenance  such  proceedings,  and  to 
deter  any  officer  in  their  service  from  similar  misconduct 
in  future. 

"  He  requires  a  disavowal  of  other  flagrant  proceedings, 
—  detailed  in  papers  which  have  been  communicated  to 
you,  — unauthorized,  his  Majesty  has  no  doubt,  but  with 
respect  to  which  it  ought  to  be  known  to  the  world  that 
the  American  government  did  not  authorize  and  does  not 
approve  them. 

"  You  will  state  that  such  disavowals,  solemnly  ex 
pressed,  would  afford  to  his  Majesty  a  satisfactory  pledge 
on  the  part  of  the  American  government  that  the  recur 
rence  of  similar  causes  will  not  on  any  occasion  impose 
on  his  Majesty  the  necessity  of  authorizing  those  means 
of  force  to  which  Admiral  Berkeley  has  resorted  without 
authority,  but  which  the  continued  repetition  of  such 
provocations  as  unfortunately  led  to  the  attack  upon  the 
4  Chesapeake '  might  render  necessary,  as  a  just  reprisal 
on  the  part  of  his  Majesty. 

"  And  you  will  observe,  therefore,  that  if  the  American 
government  is  animated  by  an  equally  sincere  desire  with 
that  which  his  Majesty  entertains  to  preserve  the  rela- 


182        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  8. 

tions  of  peace  between  the  two  countries  from  being 
violated  by  the  repetition  of  such  transactions,  they 
can  have  no  difficulty  in  consenting  to  make  these 
disavowals. 

u  This  consent  is  to  be  the  express  and  indispensable 
condition  of  your  agreeing  to  reduce  into  an  authentic 
and  official  form  the  particulars  of  the  reparation  which 
you  are  instructed  to  offer." 

Rose  came,  not  to  conciliate,  but  to  terrify.  His 
apology  was  a  menace.  So  little  was  the  President 
prepared  for  such  severity,  that  from  the  moment  of 
his  consent  to  treat  the  "  Chesapeake  "  affair  by  itself 
he  rather  regarded  the  mission  and  reparation  as  a 
formality.  So  completely  had  Monroe  been  beguiled 
by  Canning's  courteous  manners,  that  no  suspicion 
of  the  truth  crossed  his  mind  or  crept  into  his 
despatches.  No  prominent  American,  except  Giles, 
ventured  to  hint  that  this  mission  of  peace  and 
friendship  was  intended  only  to  repeat  the  assertion 
of  supremacy  which  had  led  to  the  original  offence. 

George  Henry  Rose  was  chiefly  remembered  as  the 
father  of  Lord  Strathnairn  ;  but  his  merits  were  quite 
different  from  those  of  his  son.  Without  the  rough 
ness  which  sometimes  marked  English  character, 
Rose's  manners  betrayed  a  dignified  and  slightly 
patronizing  courteousness,  —  a  certain  civil  conde 
scension,  —  impressive  to  Americans  of  that  day,  who 
rarely  felt  at  ease  in  the  presence  of  an  Englishman, 
or  were  quite  certain  that  an  American  gentleman 
knew  the  habits  of  European  society.  Benevolent 


1808.  THE  MISSION  OF   GEORGE   ROSE.  183 

superiority  and  quiet  assumption,  so  studied  as  to  be 
natural  and  simple,  were  the  social  weapons  with 
which  George  Rose  was  to  impose  an  unparalleled 
indignity  on  a  government  which,  in  professing  con 
tempt  for  forms,  invited  discourtesies.  No  man  could 
have  been  chosen  with  qualities  better  suited  for 
enforcing  Canning's  will  on  the  yielding  moods  of 
Jefferson. 

Rose's  first  act  after  arriving  in  Hampton  Roads 
was  to  notify  the  President  that  he  could  not  land 
until  assured  that  the  proclamation  of  July  2  would 
not  be  enforced  against  his  ship.  Canning  had  been 
already  officially  informed  that  the  proclamation  ex 
pressly  excepted  vessels  on  a  service  like  that  of  the 
"  Statira,"  as  he  might  have  seen  for  himself  by 
a  moment's  inquiry ;  but  his  instructions  were  writ 
ten  to  suit  the  temper  of  Tory  constituents.  Rose 
was  obliged  to  wait  from  December  26  until  Janu 
ary  9  before  leaving  his  ship,  while  messengers  car 
ried  explanations  and  notes  between  Norfolk  and 
Washington. 

Monroe,  who  sailed  from  England  a  day  later  than 
Rose,  reached  Washington  December  22.  Rose  ar 
rived  only  January  14.  January  16  he  was  received 
by  the  President,  and  made  no  complaint  of  the  mode 
of  reception.  In  the  four  years  that  had  passed  since 
Merry's  arrival,  Jefferson  had  learned  to  be  less  strict 
in  Republican  etiquette  ;  but  although  Rose  suffered 
no  indignity  at  the  White  House,  he  found  much  to 
disapprove  in  the  government.  January  17,  in  a 


184        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  8. 

despatch  to  Canning,  he  mentioned  that  Congress 
contained  one  tailor,  one  weaver,  six  or  seven  tavern- 
keepers,  four  notorious  swindlers,  one  butcher,  one 
grazier,  one  curer  of  hams,  and  several  schoolmasters 
and  Baptist  preachers.1 

The  most  aristocratic  American  of  the  twentieth 
century  will  probably  agree  with  the  most  extreme 
socialist  in  admitting  that  Congress,  in  1808,  might 
with  advantage  have  doubled  its  proportion  of  tailors, 
butchers,  and  swindlers,  if  by  doing  so  it  could  have 
lessened  the  number  of  its  conspirators.  To  the 
latter  class  belonged  Senator  Pickering,  whose  power 
for  mischief  and  whose  appetite  for  intrigue  com 
bined  to  make  him  a  valuable  ally  for  Rose.  Within 
forty-eight  hours  after  Rose's  arrival,  the  senator  from 
Massachusetts  had  fallen  under  the  fascination  of  the 
British  envoy's  manners  and  conversation.  January 
18  he  wrote  to  his  nephew  Timothy  Williams,2  — 

"  I  now  take  up  my  pen  merely  to  mention  an  unex 
pected  interview  with  Mr.  Rose.  I  met  him  last  Satur 
day  [January  16]  at  Georgetown,  at  the  table  of  Mr. 
Peter,  whose  lovely  wife  is  a  granddaughter  of  Mrs. 
Washington.  Mr.  Rose's  face  is  indicative  of  a  placid 
temper,  and  his  conversation  confirms  it.  He  possesses 
good  sense  and  a  disposition  perfectly  conciliatory. 
Such  also  is  the  disposition  of  the  minister,  Canning,  by 
whom  he  was  selected  for  this  mission.  Canning  was  his 
school-fellow  and  intimate  friend.  It  seemed  to  me  a 
sort  of  friendly  compulsion  that  sent  him  hither.  It  was 

1  Rose  to  Canning,  Jan.  17,  1808  ;  MSS.  British  Archives. 

2  Pickering  to  T.  Williams,  Jan.  18,  1808  ;  Pickering  MSS. 


1808.  THE  MISSION  OF   GEORGE  ROSE.  185 

a  sacrifice  for  a  domestic  man  who  left  a  wife  and  seven 
children  behind  him,  and  from  whom  he  had  never  before 
been  separated.  Thus  much  I  gathered  from  his  conver 
sation  with  me,  which  was  marked  with  ease  and  candor ; 
indeed  with  singular  openness,  as  if  I  had  been  an  old 
acquaintance.  He  expressed  his  surprise  that  the  real 
state  of  the  negotiation  with  Mr.  Monroe  had  not  become 
officially  known  to  the  people  by  an  open  communication 
to  Congress.  No  minister  of  Great  Britain,  he  observed, 
would  have  used  such  concealment  as  existed  here.  He 
manifested  a  solicitude  even  to  anxiety  for  a  pacific  ad 
justment  of  all  our  differences.  What  our  Government 
will  demand  as  a  reparation  for  the  attack  on  the  '  Chesa 
peake  '  I  do  not  know,  nor  what  Mr.  Rose  is  authorized 
to  concede ;  but  I  run  no  hazard  in  saying  that  nothing 
in  reality  will  be  denied,  and  that  if  after  all  a  war  with 
England  should  ensue,  the  fault  will  be  our  own." 

In  giving  this  account  of  Rose's  singular  openness 
and  candor,  Senator  Pickering  did  not  repeat  his  own 
remarks  in  the  conversation ;  but  they  could  be  in 
ferred  from  the  rest  of  his  letter. 

u  I  wrote  last  week  to  Mr.  Cabot  that  I  had  the  best 
authority  for  saying  that  our  Government  had  abandoned 
the  ground  taken  in  London, — to  treat  of  the  'Chesa 
peake'  affair  only  in  connection  with  the  old  subjects  of 
dispute.  They  have  now  determined  to  negotiate  on  this 
separately,  and  even  say  that  it  is  an  affair  by  itself  and 
ought  to  be  so  treated.  Perhaps  they  may  demand  that 
Admiral  Berkeley  be  brought  to  a  British  court-martial, 
—  that  at  any  rate  he  be  removed  from  command;  and 
that  the  three  rascals  of  deserters  who  remain  unhung 
should  be  restored. 


186         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  8. 

"  Confidence  now  seems  to  be  in  Mr.  Jefferson's  hands 
as  effectual  in  producing  a  compliance  with  his  recom 
mendations  as  soldiers  in  the  hands  of  Bonaparte  in 
procuring  submission  to  his  commands.  With  the  like 
implicit,  blind  confidence  which  enacted  the  Embargo,  the 
legislatures  of  Virginia  and  Maryland  have  approved  it. 
To  this  day  if  you  ask  any  member  of  Congress  the  cause 
and  the  object  of  the  Embargo,  he  can  give  no  answer 
which  common-sense  does  not  spurn  at.  ,1  have  reason 
to  believe  that  Mr.  Jefferson  expected  to  get  some  credit 
for  it  by  having  it  ready  just  in*  time  to  meet  the  retali 
ating  order  of  England  for  Napoleon's  decree  of  Nov. 
21,  1806.  With  much  solicitude  he,  two  or  three  weeks 
ago,  expressed  his  wonder  that  it  did  not  arrive,  ap 
parently  desiring  it  as  a  material  justification  with  the 
people  for  the  Embargo.  He  will  doubtless  be  utterly 
disappointed." 

That  Jefferson  in  recommending  the  Embargo 
had  the  Orders  in  Council  in  his  mind  was  there 
fore  known  to  Pickering,1  and  was  the  general  talk 
of  Federalists  in  Washington  during  the  month  which 
followed  the  Embargo  Act ;  but  the  orders  themselves 
reached  America  only  the  day  after  this  letter  was 
written,  and  were  published  in  the  "  National  Intelli 
gencer"  of  January  22.  In  full  view  of  the  official 
command  that  American  trade  with  Europe  should 
pass  through  British  ports  and  pay  duty  to  the  Brit- 

1  Cf.  Letters  addressed  to  the  People  of  the  United  States,  by 
Col.  Timothy  Pickering.  London  (reprinted),  1811.  Letter  xiii. 
p.  96.  Review  of  Cunningham  Correspondence,  by  Timothy 
Pickering  (Salem,  1824),  pp.  56-58. 


1808.  THE  MISSION   OF   GEORGE   ROSE.  187 

ish  Treasury,  doubt  as  to  the  wisdom  of  an  Embargo 
seemed  at  an  end.  No  further  dispute  appeared  pos 
sible  except  on  the  question  whether  or  when  the 
Embargo  should  be  raised  in  order  to  declare  war. 
Already,  January  11,  Senator  Adams  offered  a  Reso 
lution  for  appointing  a  committee  to  consider  and  re 
port  when  the  Embargo  could  be  taken  off  and  vessels 
permitted  to  arm  ;  but  the  Senate  silently  rejected 
the  Resolution,  January  21,  by  a  vote  of  seventeen 
to  ten.1  Neither  decision  nor  debate  on  so  serious  a 
point  could  be  profitably  undertaken  before  the  result 
of  Rose's  diplomacy  should  be  revealed. 

(Saturday,  January  16,  before  meeting  Senator  Pick 
ering  at  dinner,  Rose  had  delicately  explained  to  Mad 
ison  that  the  President's  "  Chesapeake  "  proclamation 
was  likely  to  prove  a  stumbling-block.  In  conversa 
tions  which  consumed  another  week  he  urged  its  with 
drawal,  while  Madison  replied  that  the  exclusion  of 
British  ships  was  not  a  punishment  but  a  precau 
tion,  that  the  "  Leopard's  "  attack  was  but  one  of  its 
causes,  and  that  it  was  a  measure  taken  in  the  inter 
ests  of  peace.  Argument  against  Canning's  positive 
instructions  answered  no  purpose.  Rose  could  not 
give  way,  and  when  he  had  been  one  week  in  Wash 
ington,  January  21,  the  negotiation  was  already  at  a 
stand-still.  There  it  would  under  any  other  Admin 
istration  have  been  permitted  to  remain.  Rose  had 
come  to  offer  an  apology  and  to  restore  the  captured 
seamen.  He  had  only  to  do  this  and  go  home. 

1  Diary  of  J.  Q.  Adams,  i.  504. 


188        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.        CH.  8. 

Rose,  after  an  interview  with  the  Secretary  of 
State  about  January  21,  waited  until  January  27 
before  writing  to  Canning.  Then  he  resumed  his 
story : l  — 

"  Within  a  few  hours  after  my  last  conference  with 
Mr.  Madison,  an  indirect  and  confidential  communication 
was  made  to  me  from  one  of  the  members  of  the  Govern 
ment  to  the  following  purport :  that  the  real  difficulty 
as  to  the  recall  of  the  proclamation  was  that  of  finding 
grounds  upon  which  the  President  could  found  his  de 
clared  motives  for  such  a  measure  without  exposing  him 
self  to  the  charge  of  inconsistency  and  disregard  of  the 
national  honor,  and  without  compromising  his  own  perso 
nal  weight  in  the  State  ;  that  it  was  earnestly  wished  that 
I  could  make,  as  it  were,  a  bridge  over  which  he  might 
pass  ;  and  that  I  would  develop  just  so  much  of  the  tenor 
of  my  instructions  as  to  the  conditions  of  reparation  as 
might  justify  him  in  the  course  which  I  required  should 
be  taken  ;  that  should  however  this  be  impossible,  and 
should  the  negotiation  fail,  the  United  States  would  not 
commence  war  with  Great  Britain,  but  would  continue 
their  Embargo,  and  adopting  a  sort  of  Chinese  policy 
would  shut  themselves  up  from  the  rest  of  the  world ; 
that  if  we  attacked  them  they  would  sally  out  just  far 
enough  to  repel  us,  and  would  invade  Canada.  .  .  . 
Communications  of  a  similar  nature  were  repeated  to 
me  on  subsequent  days  ;  and  it  did  not  seem  advisable 
to  address  Mr.  Madison  in  writing  until  the  utmost  point 
to  which  they  would  go  was  ascertained.  At  length  I 
had  a  conversation  with  the  gentleman  in  question.  He 
avowed  to  me  that  what  had  passed  was  with  the  knowl- 

1  Hose  to  Canning,  Jan.  27,  1808;  MSS.  British  Archives, 


1808.  THE  MISSION  OF  GEORGE  ROSE.  189 

edge  of  the  President,  whose  difficulty  arose  from  the 
sacrifice  of  public  opinion  which  he  apprehended  must 
follow  from  the  abandonment  of  the  proclamation.  He 
said  I  must  be  aware  how  dear  to  Mr.  Jefferson  his 
popularity  must  be,  and  especially  at  the  close  of  his 
political  career,  and  that  this  consideration  must  be 
held  particularly  in  view  by  him ;  and  he  pressed  me 
earnestly  to  take  such  steps  as  would  conciliate  the 
President's  wish  to  give  his  Majesty  satisfaction  on  the 
point  in  question  and  yet  to  maintain  the  possession  of 
what  was  pre-eminently  valuable  to  him.  He  expressed 
his  own  personal  anxiety  for  the  accommodation  of  the 
present  difference,  —  an  anxiety  heightened  by  his  knowl 
edge  that  the  United  States  had  forever  lost  all  hope  of 
obtaining  the  Floridas,  the  negotiation  for  them  having 
totally  failed,  and  by  his  intimate  persuasion  that  France 
is  the  dormant  owner  of  them.  He  said,  moreover,  that 
since  America  could  not  obtain  those  provinces,  he  sin 
cerely  wished  to  see  them  in  the  hands  of  Great  Britain, 
whose  possession  of  them  could  never  be  anxious  to  the 
United  States." 

The  supplications  of  this  Cabinet  minister  were  re 
inforced  by  entreaties  from  leading  Federalists,  who 
begged  Rose  not  to  follow  a  course  which  would  aid 
the  President  in  rousing  popular  feeling  against  Eng 
land  ;  but  the  British  envoy  could  yield  only  so  far 
as  not  to  break  the  negotiation  abruptly.  January 
26  he  wrote  to  the  Secretary  a  note,  in  courteous 
language  announcing  himself  authorized  to  express 
the  conviction  —  which  he  certainly  could  not  have 
felt  —  that  if  the  proclamation  were  withdrawn,  he 


190         HISTOKY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  8. 

should  be  able  "  to  terminate  the  negotiation  ami 
cably  and  satisfactorily."  Madison  sent  no"  answer 
to  the  note,  but  kept  the  negotiation  alive  by  private 
interviews.  January  29  Rose  suggested  the  "idea  of 
his  friendly  return  to  England  with  a  representation 
of  the  difficulty.  Madison  reported  this  suggestion 
to  the  President,  \vlio  on  the  following  Monday,  Feb- 
/  ruary  1,  decided  against  the  idea,  preferring  to  yield 
the  point  of  dignity  so  far  as  to  offer  a  recall  of  the 
proclamation,  conditional  upon  an  informal  disclosure 
by  Rose  of  the  terms  in  which  the  atonement  would 
be  made.1 

Throughout  this  tortuous  affair  Rose  stood  impas 
sive.  He  made  no  advance,  offered  no  suggestion  of 
aid,  showed  no  anxiety.  Republicans  and  Federal 
ists  crowded  about  him  with  entreaties  and  advice. 
Rose  listened  in  silence.  Amateur  diplomacy  never 
showed  its  evils  more  plainly  than  in  the  negotia 
tion  with  Rose ;  and  when  Madison  allowed  the 
President  to  take  the  affair  into  his  own  hands, 
employing  another  Cabinet  officer  to  do  what  no  Sec 
retary  of  State  could  permit  himself  to  undertake, 
the  nuisance  became  a  scandal.  In  the  despatch  of 
January  27  Rose  concealed  the  name  of  the'  deputy 
Secretary  of  State ;  but  in  a  despatch  of  February  6 
he  revealed  it :  — 

"  I  should  here  add  that  a  member  of  the  Cabinet  (the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy),  who  informed  me  that  all  his 
communications  with  me  were  with  the  President's  knowl- 
1  Negotiations  with  Mr.  Rose;  Madison's  Works,  ii.  411. 


1808.  THE  MISSION  OF  GEORGE   ROSE.  191 

edge,  assures  me  that  a  rupture  with  France  is  inevitable 
and  at  hand/' 

That  Robert  Smith  acted  in  the  matter  as  negotia 
tor  for  the  President  was  afterward  made  known  by 
Jefferson  himself.* 

Jefferson  clung  with  touching  pathos  to  the  lov^ 
and  respect  of  his  fellow-citizens,  who  repaid  his  de 
votion  with  equal  attachment ;  but  many  an  Ameri 
can  President  who  yearned  no  less  passionately 
for  the  people's  regard  would  have  died  an  outcast 
rather  than  have  trafficked  in  their  dignity  and  his 
own  self-respect  in  order  to  seek  or  save  a  per 
sonal  popularity.  Perhaps  Jefferson  never  knew  pre 
cisely  what  was  said  of  him  by  his  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  —  a  passing  remark  by  such  a  man  as  Robert 
Smith,  repeated  through  such  a  medium  as  George 
Rose,  need  count  for  little ;  but  the  truth  must  be 
admitted  that  in  1808 — for  the  first  and  probably 
for  the  last  time  in  history  —  a  President  of  the 
United  States  begged  for  mercy  from  a  British 
minister. 

In  obedience  to  the  President's  decision,  Madison 
yielded  to  the  British  demand  on  condition  that  the 
Executive  should  not  be  exposed  to  the  appearance 
of  having  yielded.2  He  arranged  with  Rose  the 
"  bridge "  which  Robert  Smith  had  previously  pre 
pared  for  the  President  to  cross.  In  a  "  secret  and 

1  Jefferson  to  W.  Wirt,  May  2,  1811;  Works,  v.  593. 

2  Negotiations  with  Mr.  Rose,  Feb.  4,  1808  ;  Madison's  Works, 
ii.  12. 


192        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.        CH.  8. 

confidential"  despatch  dated  Feb.  6,  1808,  Rose  ex 
plained  to  Canning,  with  evident  uneasiness,  the 
nature  of  the  new  proposal : l  — 

uThe  proposition  made  to  me  by  Mr.  Madison  at  the 
close  of  our  conference  of  yesterday  was  that  he  should 
put  into  my  hands  a  proclamation  recalling  the  original 
proclamation,  sealed  and  signed  by  the  President,  bearing 
date  on  the  day  of  adjustment  of  differences,  and  con 
ceived  in  such  terms  as  I  should  agree  to ;  that  on  this 
being  done  we  should  proceed  to  sign  the  instruments 
adjusting  the  reparation.  I  answered  that  positive  as 
my  instructions  were  to  the  effect  I  had  invariably 
stated  to  him,  such  was  the  knowledge  I  had  of  the 
disposition  of  his  Majesty's  government  to  act  with  the 
utmost  conciliation  toward  this  country  that  I  would 
attempt  the  experiment,  but  premising  distinctly  that  it 
must  be  made  unofficially  through  the  whole  of  it,  and 
with  the  assurance  of  our  mutual  good  faith  to  that 
effect;  and  that  as  it  must  be  completely  and  essen 
tially  informal,  —  for  the  purpose  of  getting  over  diffi 
culties  which  appeared  insuperable  in  any  other  way,  — 
it  must  be  distinctly  understood  that  if  the  attempt  failed, 
the  regular  and  official  communication  must  be  resumed 
on  my  explanatory  note  of  January  26,  and  on  that 
alone." 

In  the  defence  which  Rose  offered  for  thus  disre 
garding  his  instructions,  the  cause  of  his  embarrass 
ment  was  plain.  Duty  required  him  to  act  as  though 
England  had  hitherto  endured  with  magnanimity  the 

1  Rose,  to  Canning,  Feb.  6,  1808  ;  MSS.  British  Archives.  Of. 
Madison's  Writings,  ii.  413. 


1808.  THE   MISSION  OF   GEORGE   ROSE.  193 

wrongs  inflicted  by  America,  but  might  find  herself 
obliged  soon  to  resent  them  This  attitude  could 
have  been  maintained  against  ordinary  forms  of  diplo 
macy,  but  Rose  found  himself  stifled  in  the  embraces 
of  men  whose  hatred  was  necessary  to  warrant  his 
instructions.  He  would  gladly  have  assumed  that 
Madison's  concessions  and  Robert  Smith's  cajoleries 
were  treacherous;  but  his  Federalist  friends,  whose| 
interests  were  actively  English,  assured  him  that  i.E 
America  could  avoid  a  war  with  England,  she  would 
inevitably  drift  into  a  war  with  France.  The  tempta 
tion  to  show  equal  courtesy  to  that  which  was  shown 
to  him,  the  instinctive  shrinking  from  a  harsh  act, 
the  impossibility  of  obeying  instructions  without  put 
ting  himself  in  the  wrong,  and  finally  perhaps  an  in 
capacity  to  understand  the  full  humiliation  implied  in 
his  unrevealed  demands,  —  led  him  to  give  way,  and 
to  let  Madison  partially  into  the  secret  of  Canning's 
instructions. 

On  the  evening  of  February  5  Rose  and  Erskine 
went  to  the  house  of  the  Secretary,  and  a  draft  of 
the  proposed  proclamation  was  there  offered  to  them 
and  accepted.  The  next  day,  at  the  Department,  Rose 
delicately  began  to  reveal  the  further  disavowals  he 
was  instructed  to  demand.  Even  then  he  seemed 
ashamed  to  betray  the  whole,  but  delayed  and  dis 
cussed,  knowing  that  he  had  done  too  much  or  too 
little  for  the  objects  of  his  mission.  Not  until  after 
repeated  interviews  did  he  at  last,  February  14,  men 
tion  "  with  an  apology  for  omitting  it  before,  when  he 

VOL.  IV.  —  13 


194        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  8. 

intended  to  do  it,"  that  a  disavowal  of  Commodore 
Barren  would  be  required.1 

So  cautious  was  Madison  on  his  side  that  he  offered 
I  to  make  a  part  of  the  required  disavowals,  provided 
I  these  should  be  mutual.  Rose  declined  this  offer, 
but  proposed  nothing  more,  and  seemed  rather  to 
invite  a  friendly  failure  of  agreement.  He  ended 
the  conversation  of  February  14  by  addressing  to 
Madison  the  usual  words  of  rupture  :  "  I  will  not 
dissemble  that  I  leave  you  with  the  most  painful 
impressions."2  February  16  Madison  closed"  these 
informal  interviews  with  the  dry  remark  that  the 
United  States  could  not  be  expected  to  "  make  as 
it  were  an  expiatory  sacrifice  to  obtain  redress,  or 
beg  for  reparation."  3 

The  delay  had  strengthened  Rose  by  weakening 
the  President.  The  embargo  was  beginning  to  work. 
That  the  people  should  long  submit  to  it  was  impos 
sible,  reported  Rose ;  even  North  Carolina  was  turn 
ing  against  it.  Monroe's  influence  made  itself  felt;. 

"  I  learn  this  day,"  wrote  the  British  envoy  Feb 
ruary  17,  "  that  Mr.  Monroe  has  been  indefatigable  in 
representing  through  Virginia  the  contrasted  systems  of 
Great  Britain  and  France  in  their  true  lights,  the  cer 
tain  destruction  which  must  result  to  America  from  the 
prevalence  of  the  latter,  and  the  necessity  of  uniting  for 
existence  with  the  former.  He  has  undoubtedly  acquired 

* 

1  Madison's  Writings,  ii.  416. 

2  Kose  to  Canning,  Feb.  16,  1808  ;  MSS.  British  Archives. 
8  Kose  to  Canning,  Feb.  17,  1808  ;  MSS.  British  Archives. 


1808.  THE   MISSION   OF   GEORGE  ROSE.  195 

a  very  strong  party  in  that  State,  — it  is  now  said  a  de 
cided  majority  in  its  legislature,  and  one  entirely  brought 
over  to  the  views  above  enounced." 

February  22,  only  a  few  days  after  the  rupture  of 
negotiation,  the  Milan  Decree  arrived,  and  was  pub 
lished  in  the  "National  Intelligencer."  This  violent 
act  of  Napoleon  did  much  to  divert  popular  indigna 
tion  from  England.  Under  the  influence  of  this  good 
fortune,  Rose  so  little  feared  war  as  a  consequence 
of  his  failure  that  he  speculated  rather  as  to  the 
policy  of  accepting  the  United  States  as  an  ally  : 

"  It  would  certainly  be  highly  desirable,"  he  wrote,1 
"  that  a  rupture  between  France  and  America  should 
take  place ',  but  the  latter  under  its  present  Constitution 
and  Administration  could  take  but  a  very  feeble  part  in 
the  warfare,  and  I  know  not  if  it  is  to  be  wished  that 
it  should  be  roused  to  greater  exertions,  which  must  lead 
to  a  more  efficient  form  of  government,  a  "knowledge  of 
its  strength,  and  the  development  of  extensive  views  of 
ambition." 

Nothing  remained  but  to  revert  to  Rose's  note  of 
January  26,  and  to  close  the  affair  by  a  formal  cor 
respondence.  No  further  attempt  was  made  to  con 
ciliate  the  British  envoy,  or  to  obtain  concessions 
from  him ;  but  February  24  he  was  told  by  Madison 
of  two  steps  to  be  taken  by  the  Government  which 
bore  on  his  negotiation.  The  President  would  rec 
ommend  to  Congress  an  increase  of  the  army  to  ten 
thousand  men,  and  a  levy  of  twenty-four  thousand 

1  Rose  to  Canning,  Feb.  27,  1808  ;  MSS.  British  Archives. 


196        HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  8. 

volunteers.  Madison  added  that  these  were  to  be 
considered  as  "  measures  of  preparation,  but  not 
as  leading  to  war,  or  as  directed  against  any  par 
ticular  nation."  The  Secretary  added  that  an  order 
had  been  issued  to  discharge  all  British  subjects 
from  national  ships, —  "an  act  of  complaisance  in 
its  effects  which  he  observed  Great  Britain  could 
lay  no  claim  to ;  which  was  done  gratuitously, 
but  from  views  of  policy  and  fitness  entertained 
by  this  Government." 

March  5  Madison  at  last  sent  his  reply  to  Rose's 
note  of  January  26.  After  repeating  the  reasons 
which  forbade  a  withdrawal  of  the  President's  pro 
clamation,  the  Secretary  closed  by  informing  Rose 
that  the  President  "  has  authorized  me,  in  the  event 
of  your  disclosing  the  terms  of  reparation  which  you 
believe  will  be  satisfactory,  and  on  its  appearing  that 
they  are  so,  ...  to  proceed  to  concert  with  you  a 
revocation  of  that  act." 1  Rose  waited  till  March 
17,  as  though  hoping  for  some  further  overture, 
but  finally  replied,  "  It  is  with  the  most  painful  sensa 
tions  of  regret  that  I  find  myself  .  .  .  under  the 
necessity  of  declining  to  enter  into  the  terms  of 
negotiation  which  by  direction  of  the  President  you 
therein  offer."  2 

Rose's  professions  of  regret  were  doubtless  sincere. 
Apart  from  the  wish  felt  by  every  young  diplomatist 
to  avoid  the  appearance  of  failure,  Rose  could  not  but 

1  Madison  to  Rose,  March  5,  1808 ;  State  Papers,  iii.  214. 

2  Rose  to  Madison,  March  17,  1808  ;  State  Papers,  iii.  217. 


1808.  THE  MISSION  OF  GEORGE  ROSE.  197 

see  that  his  Government  must  wish  to  be  relieved  of 
the  three  American  seamen  imprisoned  at  Halifax, 
whose  detention,  admitted  to  be  an  act  of  violence, 
must  become  a  festering  sore  in  the  relations  of 
the  two  countries.  That  the  American  government 
meant  to  profit  by  it  was  evident.  By  leaving  the  ^ 
"  Chesapeake  "  affair  unsettled,  Rose  played  into  the 
hands  of  a  national  party.  For  the  first  time  since 
1794  language  began  to  be  used  to  a  British  minis 
ter  in  the  United  States  which  he  could  not  hear 
without  loss  of  dignity  or  sense  of  discredit.  The  ' 
word  "  war "  was  semi-ofncially  pronounced. 

When  on  Monday,  March  21,  Rose  made  his  parting 
visits,  he  found  the  President  silent ;  the  Secretary  of 
State  studiously  avoided  all  political  topics,  while  if 
Rose's  report  was  accurate,  Gallatin  and  Robert  Smith 
talked  frith  intentional  freedom. 

"  Mr.  Gallatin,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  has 
little  influence  in  the  Government,  though  by  far  the 
ablest  and  best  informed  member  of  it ;  and  he  proba 
bly  does  not  interfere  materially  beyond  the  limits  of  his 
own  department ;  but  his  utility  in  that  department,  in 
which  no  adequate  successor  to  him  is  contemplated,  is 
such  that,  as  they  feel  they  cannot  do  without  him, 
they  are  anxious  to  retain  him  at  the  head  of  it,  and 
consequently  are  obliged  to  keep  him  informed  of  their 
proceedings.  ...  Mr.  Gallatin  said  at  once  and  spon 
taneously  that  nothing  of  real  difficulty  remained  between 
the  two  countries  but  his  Majesty's  Orders  in  Council. 
This  he  repeated  twice,  dwelling  upon  the  word  i  nothing ' 
with  particular  emphasis.  He  added  that  if  the  bellige- 


198        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.        Cn.8. 

rent  Powers  persisted  in  enforcing  their  restrictions  on 
the  neutral  commerce,  the  embargo  must  be  continued 
until  the  end  of  the  year,  and  that  then  America  must 
take  part  in  the  war  ;  that  England  had  officially  declared 
that  she  would  revoke  the  restrictions  she  had  imposed  if 
her  enemy  would  do  the  same ;  but  that  though  France 
had  professed  as  much,  she  had  neither  done  it  to  the 
minister  of  the  United  States  at  Paris  nor  directly  to  this 
Government ;  neither  had  she  made  any  communication 
to  it  of  her  restrictive  edicts,  or  relative  to  them  ;  and 
that  this  Government  felt  sensibly  the  difference  of  the 
conduct  held  toward  it  by  those  of  Great  Britain  and 
France  in  those  respects."  l 

Gallatin's  assertion  that  if  the  Orders  in  Council 
were  enforced  America  within  a  year  must  declare 
war,  went  far  beyond  any  threat  ever  made  before  by 
President  Jefferson  or  his  party.  The  Secretary  of 
the  Navy  held  a  somewhat  different  tone :  — 

"  Mr.  Smith  told  me  that  all  would  remain  quiet  if  no 
new  vexations  were  committed  on  their  coast,  and  that 
the  only  measure  which  the  Government  would  carry  into 
effect  would  be  the  levy  of  the  body  of  regulars  to  consist 
nominally  of  six  thousand,  but  really  of  four  thousand 
men." 

Senator  Giles  and  other  Republican  leaders  avowed 
readiness  for  war  with  England.  Before  Rose's  de 
parture,  the  new  policy  had  become  denned.  Its  first 
object  was  to  unite  America  in  resisting  England  and 
France ;  the  second,  to  maintain  the  embargo  till  the 
country  should  be  ready  for  war. 

1  Rose  to  Canning,  March  22,  1808  ;  MSS.  British  Archives. 


1808.  THE  MISSION  OF  GEORGE  ROSE.  199 

With  these  ends  in  view,  the  Administration  threw 
aside  the  "  Chesapeake "  affair  as  a  matter  which 
concerned  England  rather  than  America.  Madison 
notified  Erskine  that  the  subject  had  lost  its  conse 
quence,  and  that  if  England  wished  a  settlement  she 
must  seek  it. 

"  It  will  throw  some  light  upon  the  views  of  this  Gov 
ernment,"  wrote  Rose  in  his  last  despatch,1  "  if  I  state 
that  in  a  recent  conversation  with  Mr.  Erskine,  Mr. 
Madison  observed  that  since  England  has  thus  publicly 
disclaimed  the  right  of  search  of  national  ships  for  de 
serters,  and  Admiral  Berkeley  has  been  recalled  from 
command  of  the  Halifax  squadron,  although  a  more 
formal  mode  of  terminating  the  business  would  have 
been  more  acceptable  to  this  Government,  it  would  con 
sider  itself  as/  satisfied  on  the  restoration  of  the  seamen 
taken  away  by  an  act  of  force  disavowed  by  his  Majesty ; 
but  that  it  would  not  again  ask  for  reparation  upon  this 
matter." 

From  that  moment  all  eyes  turned  toward  the 
embargo.  The  President  had  chosen  his  ground. 
Unless  his  experiment  succeeded,  he  might  yet  be 
forced  into  the  alternative  of  a  second  submission 
or  war. 

1  Rose  to  Canning,  March  22,  1808  ;  MSS.  British  Archives. 
Of.  Madison  to  Pinckney,  April  4,  1808  ;  State  Papers,  iii.  221. 


CHAPTER    IX. 

ALL  winter  Congress  waited  for  the  result  of  Rose's 
negotiation.  The  huge  majority,  without  leadership, 
split  by  divergent  interests,  a  mere  mob  guided  from 
the  White  House,  showed  little  energy  except  for 
debate,  and  no  genius  except  for  obedience. 

The  first  political  effect  of  the  embargo  was  shown 
ip  the  increased  virulence  of  debate.  The  Act  of 
December  22,  passed  on  the  spur  of  the  moment,  was 
powerless  to  prevent  evasions  in  the  seaports,  and 
left  untouched  the  trade  with  Canada  and  Florida.  A 
supplementary  Act  was  necessary ;  but  to  warrant  a 
law  for  stopping  all  commerce  by  sea  and  land,  the 
Government  could  no  longer  profess  a  temporary  pur 
pose  of  protecting  ships,  merchandise,  and  seamen, 
"but  must  admit  the  more  or  less  permanent  nature  of 
the  embargo,  and  the  policy  of  using  it  as  a  means 
of  peaceable  coercion.  The  first  Supplementary  Act 
passed  Congress  as  early  as  Jajmaj^S,  but  applied 
only  to  coasting  and  fishing  vessels,  which  were  put 
under  heavy  bonds  and  threatened  with  excessive  pen 
alties  in  case  of  entering  a  foreign  port  or  trading  in 
foreign  merchandise.  Finding  that  this  measure  was 
not  effective,  and  that  neither  England  nor  France 


1808.  MEASURES  OF  DEFENCE.  201 

showed  a  sign  of  relaxing  the  so-called  system  of 
retaliation,  Government  was  obliged  to  complete  its 
restrictions.  February  11  the  House  instructed  its 
Committee  of  Commerce  to  inquire  what  further  legis 
lation  was  necessary  "  to  prevent  the  exportation  of 
goods,  wares,  and  merchandise  of  foreign  or  domestic 
growth  or  manufacture  to  any  foreign  port  or  place." 
The  committee  instantly  reported  a  bill ;  and  as 
Rose's  negotiation  broke  down,  February  19  the  House 
went  into  committee  to  debate  a  second  supplement 
ary  Embargo  Act,  which  was  to  stop  by  land  and  sea 
all  commerce  with  the  world. 

The  next  day,  February  20,  Barent  Gardenier  of 
New  York,  who  surpassed  Josiah  Quincy  in  hatred  of 
the  Administration,  attacked  the  new  bill  in  a  speech 
which  showed  much  rough  power  and  more  tem 
per.  He  said  with  force  that  between  the  original 
embargo  and  this  Supplementary  Act  no  connection 
existed.  The  one  was  an  embargo,  the  other  was 
non-intercourse ;  and  he  charged  that  the  original 
embargo  was  a  fraud,  intended  to  trick  the  country 
into  a  permanent  system  of  non-intercourse :  — 

"The  more  the  original  measure  develops  itself,  the 
more  I  am  satisfied  that  my  first  view  of  it  was  correct ; 
that  it  was  a  sly,  cunning  measure ;  that  its  real  object 
was  not  merely  to  prevent  our  vessels  from  going  out, 
but  to  effect  a  non-intercourse.  Are  the  nation  prepared 
for  this?  If  you  wish  to  try  whether  they  are,  tell  them 
at  once  what  is  your  object.  Tell  them  what  you  mean. 
Tell  them  you  mean  to  take  part  with  the  Grand  Pacifi- 


202        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  9. 

cator.  Or  else  stop  your  present  course.  Do  not  go  on 
forging  chains  to  fasten  us  to  the  car  of  the  Imperial 
Conqueror." 

Interrupted  by  a  dozen  Republican  members  who 
leaped  to  their  feet  in  anger,  Gardenier  for  a  time 
returned  to  his  argument  and  dropped  the  assertion 
of  subservience  to  Napoleon: — . 

"I  ask  the  intelligent  and  candid  men  of  this  House 
whether  to  prevent  the  farmers  of  Vermont  from  selling 
their  pigs  in  Canada  is  calculated  to  increase  or  diminish 
our  essential  resources ;  whether  the  object  which  the 
President  professed  to  have  in  view  is  counteracted  by  a 
traffic  of  this  kind.  ...  I  could  wish  gentlemen  would, 
instead  of  bolting  at  me  in  the  fulness  of  their  rage, 
endeavor  to  satisfy  my  poor  understanding  by  cool  rea 
soning  that  they  are  right ;  that  they  would  show  me  how 
this  measure  will  prepare  us  for  war  ;  how  the  weakening 
by  distressing  every  part  of  the  country  is  to  increase  its 
strength  and  its  vigor." 

Had  Gardenier  stopped  there,  his  argument  would 
have  admitted  no  answer ;  but  he  had  the  defect  of  a 
Federalist  temper,  and  could  not  control  his  tongue. 

"  Sir,  I  cannot  understand  it.  I  am  astonished,  —  in 
deed  I  am  astonished  and  dismayed.  I  see  effects,  but 
I  can  trace  them  to  no  cause.  Yes,  sir,  I  do  fear  that 
there  is  an  unseen  hand  which  is  guiding  us  to  the  most 
dreadful  destinies,  —  unseen  because  it  cannot  endure 
the  light.  Darkness  and  mystery  overshadow  this  House 
and  this  whole  nation.  We  know  nothing ;  we  are  per 
mitted  to  know  nothing ;  we  sit  here  as  mere  automata ; 
we  legislate  without  knowing  —  nay,  sir,  without  wishing 


1808.  MEASURES  OF  DEFENCE.  203 

to  know  —  why  or  wherefore.  We  are  told  what  we 
are  to  do,  and  the  Council  of  Five  Hundred  do  it.  We 
move,  but  why  or  wherefore  no  man  knows.  We  are 
put  in  motion,  but  how  I  for  one  cannot  tell." 

Gardenier  was  believed  to  be  the  author  of  a  letter 
written  during  the  secret  session,  December  19,  and 
published  in  the  "  New  York  Evening  Post,"  which 
began  the  cry  of  French  influence.1  His  speech  of 
February  20,  insulting  to  the  House,  disorderly  and 
seditious,  resting  on  innuendo  but  carrying  the  weight 
of  a  positive  assertion,  outraged  every  member  of  the 
majority.  Even  John  Randolph  had  never  gone  so 
far  as  to  charge  his  opponents  with  being  the  willing 
and  conscious  tools  of  a  foreign  despot.  The  House 
was  greatly  exasperated,  and  at  the  next  session, 
Monday,  February  22,  three  members  —  Richard  M. 
Johnson  of  Kentucky,  George  W.  Campbell  of  Ten 
nessee,  and  John  Montgomery  of  Maryland  —  rose 
successively  and  declared  that  Gardenier's  expressions 
were  a  slander,  which  if  not  supported  by  proof  made 
their  author  an  object  of  contempt.  Gardenier  chal 
lenged  Campbell,  and  March  2  a  duel  took  place  at 
Bladensburg.  Gardenier  was  severely  wounded,  but 
escaped  with  life,  while  the  bitterness  of  party  feeling 
became  more  violent  than  before. 

Yet  no  member  ventured  fairly  to  avow  and  defend 

the  policy  of  non-intercourse  as  a  policy  of  coercion. 

Campbell,  the  leader  of  the  majority,  admitted  that 

the  embargo  was  intended  to  distress  England  and 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  1807-1808,  p.  1251,  M. 


204        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED   STATES.        CH.  9. 

France,  but  treated  it  mainly  as  a  measure  of  defence. 
No  full  and  fair  discussion  of  the  subject  was  at- 

)  tempted ;  and  the  bill  passed  both  Houses  and  was 
approved  by  the  President  March  12,  without ;-  calling 
from  the  Government  a  hint  in  regard  to  the  scope 
of  its  policy  or  the  length  of  time  during  which 
the  system  of  seclusion  was  to  last.  Even  Jefferson 
kept  silence  upon  what  was  uppermost  in  his  mind, 
and  defended  the  embargo  on  every  ground  except 
that  which  with  him,  if  with  no  one  else,  was  strong 
est.  In  private  he  said  that  the  measure  was  intended 
to  last  until  the  return  of  peace  in  Europe,  or  as  long 
as  the  orders  and  decrees  of  England  and  France 
should  be  maintained  :  — 

"  Till  they  return  to  some  sense  of  moral  duty  we 
keep  within  ourselves.  This  gives  time.  Time  may  pro 
duce  peace  in  Europe ;  peace  in  Europe  removes  all 
causes  of  difference  till  another  European  war;  and  by 
that  time  our  debt  may  be  paid,  our  revenues  clear,  and 
our  strength  increased."  1 

With  such  reasoning  the  opponents  of  the  embargo 
were  far  from  pleased.  Nevertheless,  Jefferson  car 
ried  his  point,  and  could  for  the  moment  afford  to 
disregard  criticism.  His  experiment  of  peaceable 
coercion  was  sure  of  a  trial.  His  control  over  Con 
gress  seemed  absolute.  Only  twenty-two  members 
voted  against  the  Supplementary  Embargo  Act,  and 
in  the  Senate  no  opposition  was  recorded. 

With  such  influence  Jefferson  might  promise  him- 
1  Jefferson  to  John  Taylor,  Jan.  6,  1808;  Works,  v.  226. 


1808. 


MEASURES  OF  DEFENCE. 


205 


self  success  in  any  undertaking ;  and  if  he  had  at 
heart  one  object  more  momentous  than  the  embargo, 
it  was  the  punishment  of  Chief-Justice  Marshall  for 
his  treatment  of  Burr.  As  early  as  Nov.  5,  1807, 
Senator  Tiffin  of  Ohio  began  his  career  in  the  Sen 
ate  by  moving,  as  an  amendment  to  the  Constitu 
tion,  that  all  judges  of  the  United  States  should 
hold  office  for  a  term  of  years,  and  should  be  removed 
by  the  President  on  address  by  two-thirds  of  both 
Houses.  Governor  Tiffin's  motion  was  not  an  isolated 
or  personal  act.  The  State  legislatures  were  invoked. 
Vermont  adopted  the  amendment.  The  House  of 
Delegates  in  Virginia,  both  branches  of  the  Pennsyl 
vania  legislature,  the  popular  branch  in  Tennessee, 
and  various  other  State  governments,  in  whole  or  in 
part,  adopted  the  principle  and  urged  it  upon  Con 
gress.  In  the  House,  George  W.  Campbell  moved  a 
similar  amendment  January  30,  and  from  time  to 
time  other  senators  and  members  made  attempts  to 
bring  the  subject  forward.  In  the  Senate,  Giles  aided 
the  attack  by  bringing  in  a  bill  for  the  punishment 
of  treason.  February  11  he  spoke  in  support  of  his 
proposed  measure,  advancing  doctrines  which  terrified 
Democrats  as  well  as  Federalists.  Joseph  Story  was 
one  of  his  audience,  and  wrote  an  account  of  this 
alarming  speech :  — 

"  Giles  exhibits  in  his  appearance  no  marks  of  great 
ness  ;  he  has  a  dark  complexion  and  retreating  eyes, 
black  hair,  and  robust  form.  His  dress  is  remarkably 
plain  and  in  the  style  of  Virginia  carelessness.  Having 


206        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        Cn.9. 

broken  his  leg  a  year  or  two  since,  he  uses  a  crutch,  and 
perhaps  this  adds  somewhat  to  the  indifference  or  doubt 
with  which  you  contemplate  him.  But  when  he  speaks, 
your  opinion  immediately  changes.  ...  I  heard  him  a 
day  or  two  since  in  support  of  a  bill  to  define  treason, 
reported  by  himself.  Never  did  I  hear  such  all-unhinging 
and  terrible  doctrines.  He  laid  the  axe  at  the  root  of 
judicial  power,  and  every  stroke  might  be  distinctly  felt. 
His  argument  was  very  specious  and  forensic,  sustained 
with  many  plausible  principles  and  adorned  with  various 
political  axioms,  designed  ad  captandum.  One  of  its 
objects  was  to  prove  the  right  of  the  Legislature  to  de 
fine  treason.  My  dear  friend,  look  at  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States  and  see  if  any  such  construction 
can  possibly  be  allowed  !  .  .  .  He  attacked  Chief-Justice 
Marshall  with  insidious  warmth.  Among  other  things 
he  said,  4 1  have  learned  that  judicial  opinions  on  this 
subject  are  like  changeable  silks,  which  vary  their  colors 
as  they  are  held  up  in  political  sunshine.'  "* 

Had  Giles's  proposed  definition  of  treason  become 
law,  it  would  in  another  half-century  have  had  singu 
lar  interest  for  Virginians  of  his  school.  According  to 
this  bill  any  persons,  without  exception,  "  owing  alle 
giance  to  the  United  States  of  America,"  who  should 
assemble  with  intent  forcibly  to  change  the  govern 
ment  of  the  United  States,  or  to  dismember  them  or 
any  one  of  them,  or  to  resist  the  general  execution  of 
any  public  law,  should  suffer  death  as  a  traitor ;  and 
even  though  not  personally  present  at  the  assemblage 
or  at  the  use  of  force,  yet  should  any  person  aid  or 

1  Story's  Life  and  Letters  of  Joseph  Story,  i.  158-159. 


1808.  MEASURES  OF   DEFENCE.  207 

assist  in  doing  any  of  the  acts  proscribed,  such  person 
should  also  suffer  death  as  a  traitor.1  Fortunately 
for  Southern  theories  the  bill,  although  it  passed  the 
Senate  by  means  of  Southern  votes,  was  lost  in  the 
House,  where  John  Randolph  had  introduced  a  bill 
of  his  own  more  moderate  in  character.2 

Although  the  attack  on  the  Supreme  Court  was 
more  persistent  and  was  carried  further  than  ever 
before,  it  met  with  passive  resistance  which  fore 
shadowed  failure,  and  probably  for  this  reason  was 
allowed  to  exhaust  its  strength  in  the  committee- 
rooms  of  Congress.  The  chief-justice  escaped  without 
a  wound.  Under  the  shadow  of  the  embargo  he  could 
watch  in  security  the  slow  exhaustion  of  his  antago 
nist.  Jefferson  had  lost  the  last  chance  of  reforming/ 
the  Supreme  Court.  In  another  six  months  Congress; 
would  follow  the  will  of  some  new  Executive  chief; 
and  if  in  the  full  tide  of  Jefferson's  power  Marshall 
had  repeatedly  thwarted  or  defied  him  with  impunity, 
the  chance  was  small  that  another  President  would 
meet  a  happier  fate. 

The  failure  of  his  attack  on  the  Supreme  Court  was  \ 
not  the  only  evidence  that  Jefferson's  authority  when  / 
put  to  the  test  was  more  apparent  than  real.     If  in 
the  President's  eyes  Marshall  deserved  punishment, 
another  offender  merited  it  still  more.    Senator  Smith 
of  Ohio  was  deeply  implicated  in  Burr's-  conspiracy. 

1  Bill  for  the  Punishment  of  Treason  and  other  crimes;  Annals 
of  Congress,  1807-1808,  p.  108. 

2  Annals  of  Congress,  1807-1808,  p.  1717. 


208        HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.        CH.  9. 

The  dignity   of  the  President   and  of  Congress  de 
manded  inquiry,  and  an  investigation  was  made.    The 
evidence   left   no  reasonable  doubt   that   Smith  had 
been  privy  to  Burr's  scheme ;  but  the  motion  to  expel 
him  from  the  Senate  failed  by  a  vote  of  nineteen  to 
ten,  two  thirds  being  required  for  this  purpose.     In 
the  House,  John  Randolph  brought  charges  against 
-General  Wilkinson  which  could  neither  be  admitted 
nor  met.     The  Administration  was  obliged  to  cover 
I  and  ignore  the  military  scandals  brought  to  light  by 
/  Burr's  trial. 

Even  in  regard  to  more  serious  matters  the  Gov- 
jernment  could  hardly  feel  secure.  In  February,  Sloan 
lof  New  Jersey  offered  a  motion  that  the  seat  of 
[government  should  be  removed  from  Washington  to 
Philadelphia.  The  House,  February  2,  by  a  vote  of 
sixty-eight  to  forty-seven,  agreed  to  consider  the  reso 
lution,  and  a  debate  followed  which  proved  how  far 
from  stable  the  actual  arrangement  was  supposed  to 
be.  Republicans  and  Federalists  alike  assailed  the 
place  in  which  they  were  condemned  to  live.  Fifteen 
million  dollars,  it  was  said,  had  been  spent  upon  it  with 
no  other  result  than  to  prove  that  a  city  could  never 
be  made  to  exist  there.  One  day  they  were  choked 
with  dust ;  the  next  they  were  wallowing  in  mire. 
The  climate  was  one  of  violent  changes  and  piercing 
winds.  Members  sickened  and  died  in  greater  num 
bers  than  ever  before,  but  in  case  of  illness  they  could 
find  no  physician  except  by  sending  to  the  navy  yard 
some  miles  away.  At  the  last  session  the  House  had 


1808.  MEASURES   OF   DEFENCE.  209 

been  driven  from  its  old  hall  by  the  wind  breaking 
its  windows.  The  new  hall,  however  magnificent 
was  unfit  for  its  purpose  ;  to  hear  was  impossible ;  its 
ventilation  was  so  bad  as  to  have  caused  the  illness 
of  Jacob  Crowninshield,  one  of  its  leading  members, 
then  lying  at  the  point  of  death.  The  prices  of  every 
thing  in  Washington  were  excessive.  Butter  was 
fifty  cents  a  pound ;  a  common  turkey  cost  a  dollar 
and  a  half ;  in  Philadelphia  members  would  save  one 
hundred  and  fifty  dollars  a  day  in  hack-hire  alone. 
Even  these  objections  were  trifling  compared  with 
the  inconvenience  of  governing  from  a  wilderness 
where  no  machinery  existed  to  make  administration 
easy.  As  an  example  of  the  absurdities  of  such  a 
system,  members  pointed  to  the  navy  yard,  only  to 
be  reached  by  following  the  windings  of  the  shal 
low  Potomac,  while  the  Navy  Department  was 
obliged  at  extravagant  cost  to  bring  every  article 
of  use  from  the  seaboard,  besides  recruiting  seamen 
at  the  commercial  ports  for  every  ship  fitted  out  at 
Washington. 

Sloan  desisted  from  his  motion  only  after  the  House 
had  shown  itself  strongly  inclined  toward  his  opinion. 
On  another  point  the  divergence  of  ideas  became  more 
marked,  and  Jefferson  found  himself  obliged  to  strain 
his  influence. 

In  the  Republican  party  any  vote  for  a  standing 

army   had   been  hitherto   considered  a  crime.     The 

Federalists  in  1801  had  left  a  force  of  five  thousand 

men ;  Jefferson  reduced  it  to  three  thousand.     The 

VOL.  iv.  — 14 


210        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  9. 

— Republican  party  believed  in  a  militia,  but  neglected 
it.  Throughout  the  Southern  States  the  militia  was 
undisciplined  and  unarmed ;  but  in  Massachusetts, 
as  President  Jefferson  was  beginning  to  notice,  the 
Federalists  took  much  care  of  their  State  soldiery. 
The  United  States  fort  at  Newport  was  garrisoned 
only  by  goats,  and  the  strategic  line  of  Lake  Cham- 
plain  and  the  Hudson  River,  which  divided  New  Eng 
land  from  the  rest  of  the  Union,  lay  open  to  an 
enemy.  In  view  of  war  with  England  such  negli- 

(gence  became  wanton.  Jefferson  saw  that  an  army 
must  be  raised ;  but  many  of  his  truest  followers  held 
that  militia  alone  could  be  trusted,  and  that  the  risk 
of  conquest  from  abroad  was  better  than  the  risk  of 
military  despotism  at  home. 

For  a  people  naturally  brave,  Americans  often 
/showed  themselves  surprisingly  unwilling  to  depend 
fupon  their  own  strength.  To  defy  danger,  to  rush 
into  competition  with  every  foreign  rival,  to  take  risks 
without  number,  and  to  depend  wholly  on  themselves 
were  admitted  characteristics  of  Americans  as  indi 
viduals  ;  but  the  same  man  who,  when  left  to  his  own 
resources,  delighted  in  proving  his  skill  and  courage, 
when  brought  within  the  shadow  of  government  never 
failed  to  clamor  for  protection.  As  a  political  body 
the  American  people  shrank  from  tests  of  its  own 
capacity.  "  American  systems  "  of  politics,  whether 
domestic  or  foreign,  were  systems  for  evading  com 
petition.  The  American  system  in  which  the  old 
Republican  party  believed  was  remarkable  for  avow- 


1808.  MEASURES  OF  DEFENCE.  211 

ing  want  of  self-confidence  as  the  foundation  of 
domestic  as  well  as  of  foreign  policy.  The  Repub 
lican  party  stood  alone  in  refusing,  on  principle,  to 
protect  national  rights  from  foreign  outrage  ;  but  it 
defied  imitation  when  the  sacrifice  of  national  rights 
was  justified  by  the  argument  that  if  American  liber 
ties  were  not  abandoned  to  foreign  nations  they  would 
be  destroyed  by  the  people  themselves.  War,  which 
every  other  nation  in  history  had  looked  upon  as  the 
first  duty  of  a  State,  was  in  America  a  subject  for 
dread,  not  so  much  because  of  possible  defeat  as  of 
probable  success.  No  truer  Republican  could  be  found 
in  Virginia  than  John  W.  Eppes,  one  of  Jefferson's 
sons-in-law;  and  when  the  House  debated  in  Feb 
ruary  a  Senate  bill  for  adding  two  regiments  to  the 
regular  army,  Eppes  declared  the  true  Republican 
doctrine : l  — 

"If  we  have  war,  this  increase  of  the  army  will  be 
useless ;  if  peace,  I  am  opposed  to  it.  I  am  in  favor  of 
putting  arms  into  the  hands  of  our  citizens  and  then  let 
them  defend  themselves.  ...  If  we  depend  on  regular 
troops  alone,  the  liberty  of  the  country  must  finally  be 
destroyed  by  that  army  which  is  raised  to  defend  it.  Is 
there  an  instance  in  which  a  nation  has  lost  its  liberty 
by  its  own  citizens  in  time  of  peace  ?  It  is  by  standing 
armies  and  very  often  by  men  raised  on  an  emergency 
and  professing  virtuous  feelings,  but  who  eventually 
turned  their  arms  against  their  country.  ...  I  never 
yet  have  voted  for  a  regular  army  or  soldier  in  tune 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  Feb.  17,  1808;  Thirteenth  Congress, 
pp.  1627,  1631. 


212         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  9. 

of  peace.  Whenever  an  opportunity  has  offered  I  have 
voted  them  down ;  and  so  help  me  God !  I  will  as  long 
as  I  live." 

One  week  after  Eppes  spoke  these  words,  President 
Jefferson  sent  to  Congress  a  Message  asking  for  an 
immediate  addition  of  six  thousand  men  to  the 
regular  army.1  No  such  blow  had  ever  been  given 
to  the  established  practices  of  Republican  admin 
istration.  Ten  years  before,  every  leader  of  the 
party  had  denounced  the  raising  of  twelve  regiments 
at  a  time  of  actual  hostilities  with  France,  although 
the  law  limited  their  service  to  the  term  of  the  ex 
pected  war.  The  eight  regiments  demanded  by  Jef 
ferson  were  to  be  raised  for  five  years  in  a  time 
of  peace.  The  Southern  Republicans  saw  themselves 
required  to  walk,  publicly  and  avowedly,  in  the  foot 
steps  of  their  monarchical  predecessors ;  while  John 
Randolph  stood  by  and  jeered  at  them. 

The  House  waited  until  Rose  had  fairly  sailed  and 
the  session  drew  near  its  end,  with  embargo  fastened 
upon  the  country,  and  no  alternative  visible  but  war; 
then  slowly  and  unwillingly  began  its  rec^Jitations^ 
April  4  John  Clopton  of  Virginia2  admitted  that  in 
1798  he  had  voted  against  the  army.  His  excuse  for 
changing  his  vote  was  that  in  1798  he  thought  there 
was  no  ground  for  fearing  war,  while  in  1808  he 
sawx  little  ground  for  hoping  peace.  Yet  he  voted 

1  Message  of  Feb.  25,  1808;  Annals  of  Congress,  1.807-1808, 
p.  1691. 

2  Annals  of  Congress,  1807-1808,  p.  1901. 


1808.  MEASURES  OF  DEFENCE.  213 

for  the  new  regiments  only  because  they  were  so 
few  ;  and  even  in  the  event  of  actual  war  "  he  could 
scarcely  imagine  that  he  could  be  induced  to  admit 
the  expediency  of  increasing  the  regular  forces  to  a 
number  much  greater  than  they  would  be"  under 
the  present  bill.  Clopton  was  answered  by  Randolph, 
who  warmly  opposed  the  new  army  for  the  same 
reasons  which  had  led  him  to  oppose  the  old  one. 
Randolph  was  followed  by  George  M.  Troup  of 
Georgia,  —  a  young  man  not  then  so  prominent  as 
he  was  destined  to  become,  who  declared  that  no  one 
had  more  confidence  than  he  felt  in  militia ;  but 
"  it  is  well  known  that  the  present  defective  system 
of  militia  in  our  quarter  of  the  country  at  least  is 
good  for  nothing ; "  and  a  small  standing  army  was 
not  dangerous  but  necessary,  because  it  would  pre 
serve  peace  by  preparing  for  war.1  Smilie  of  Penn 
sylvania  added  another  reason.  He  argued  that  John 
Randolph  had  favored  raising  troops  in  the  year 
1805  to  protect  the  Southern  frontier  "  from  Span 
ish  inroad  and  insult."  Smilie  had  then  opposed  the 
motion  and  the  House  had  rejected  it,  but  to .  Smilie 
the  argument  that  Randolph  had  once  favored  an 
increase  of  the  army,  seemed  decisive. 

A  much  respected  member  from  South  Carolina  — 
David  R.  Williams,  one  of  Randolph's  friends  —  then 
took  the  floor.2  He  could  not  bring  himself  to  vote 
for  the  bill,  because  no  half-way  measure  would  an- 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  1807-1808,  p.  1916. 

2  Annals  of  Congress,  1807-1808,  p.  1922. 


214        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  9. 

swer.  War  would  require  not  six  but  sixty  thousand 
men ;  defensive  armies  were  worse  than  none,  either 
in  war  or  peace.  Williams's  argument  was  so  evi 
dently  weak  that  it  failed  to  convince  even  Macon, 
who  had  voted  against  the  twelve  regiments  in  1798, 
but  meant  to  change  his  ground  and  believed  him 
self  able  to  prove  his  consistency.  In  contradiction 
to  the  bill  itself  he  maintained  that  the  new  army 
was  not  a  peace  establishment ;  that  if  it  were  so  he 
would  not  vote  for  it.  He  condemned  the  maxim 
that  to  preserve  peace  nations  must  be  prepared  for 
war,  and  asserted  that  no  analogy  existed  between 
1798  and  1808,  for  that  in  1808  America  was  at 
tacked  by  foreign  powers,  while  in  1798  she  at 
tacked  them.1 

Discordant  as  these  voices  were,  the  debate  was  the 
next  day  enlivened  by  a  discord  more  entertaining. 
Richard  Stanford  of  North  Carolina,  one  of  the  oldest 
members  of  the  House,  a  close  ally  of  Randolph, 
Macon,  and  Williams,  made  a  speech  which  troubled 
the  whole  body  of  Southern  Republicans.2  Stanford 
voted  for  the  twelve  regiments  in  1798,  but  like  the 
majority  of  Republicans  he  did  so  in  deference  to  a 
party  caucus,  in  order  to  ward  off  the  danger  of  a 
larger  force.  He  said  it  was  the  only  Federalist 
vote  he  ever  gave,  and  he  promised  his  friends  never 
again  to  be  caught  in  the  same  mistake.  With  can 
dor  intended  to  irritate,  he  arrayed  the  occasions  on 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  1807-1808,  p.  1937. 

2  Annals  of  Congress,  1807-1808,  p.  1939. 


1808.  MEASURES   OF   DEFENCE.  215 

which  his  party  had  refused  to  increase  the  military 
establishment :  first,  in  a  state  of  actual  hostilities  in 
1798 ;  again,  when  Spain  defied  and  insulted  the 
government  in  1805 ;  still  again,  on  the  brink  of  a 
Spanish  war  during  Burr's  conspiracy  in  1806.  He 
quoted  Jefferson's  first  Inaugural  Address,  which 
counted  among  the  essential  principles  of  the  gov 
ernment  "  a  well-disciplined  militia,  our  best  reliance 
in  peace  and  for  the  first  moments  of  war  till  regulars 
may  relieve  them ; "  and  the  Annual  Message  of  1806, 
which  said,  "  Were  armies  to  be  raised  whenever  a 
speck  of  war  is  visible  in  our  horizon,  we  never 
should  have  been  without  them  ;  our  resources  would 
have  been  exhausted  on  dangers  which  have  never 
happened,  instead  of  being  reserved  for  what  is 
really  to  take  place."  He  quoted  also  pungent  reso 
lutions  of  1798,  speeches  of  Eppes  and  Wilson  Gary 
Nicholas,  of  Varnum  and  Gallatin ;  he  showed  the 
amount  of  patronage  once  abolished  but  restored 
by  this  bill ;  and  when  at  last  he  sat  down,  the 
Southern  members  were  ruffled  until  even  Macon  lost 
his  temper. 

Soon  John  Randolph  rose  again,  and  if  Stanford's 
speech  was  exasperating  in  its  candor,  Randolph's 
was  stinging  in  its  sarcasm.1  He  treated  the  new 
defensive  system  with  ridicule.  The  Navy  Depart 
ment,  he  said,  had  dwindled  to  a  Gunboat  Depart 
ment.  Congress  built  gunboats  to  protect  shipping 
and  coasts,  and  built  forts  to  protect  gunboats.  The 
1  Annals  of  Congress,  1807-1808,  p.  1959. 


216        HISTORY   OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.        CH.  9. 

army  was  equally  feeble ;  and  both  were  at  odds  with 
the  embargo :  — 

44  When  the  great  American  tortoise  draws  in  his  head 
you  do  not  see  him  trotting  along ;  he  lies  motionless  on 
the  ground ;  it  is  when  the  fire  is  put  on  his  back  that  he 
makes  the  best  of  his  way,  and  not  till  then.  The  system 
of  embargo  is  one  system,  withdrawing  from  every  con 
test,  quitting  the  arena,  flying  the  pit.  The  system  of 
raising  troops  and  fleets  of  whatever  sort  is  another  and 
opposite  to  that  dormant  state.  .  .  .  They  are  at  war 
with  each  other,  and  cannot  go  on  together." 

Even  if  not  inconsistent  with  the  embargo,  the 
army  was  still  useless  :  — 

44  My  worthy  friend  from  Georgia  has  said  that  the 
tigress,  prowling  for  food  for  her  young,  may  steal  upon 
you  in  the  night.  I  would  as  soon  attempt  to  fence  a 
tiger  out  of  my  plantation  with  a  four-railed  fence  as  to 
fence  out  the  British  navy  with  this  force." 

Randolph  ventured  even  to  ridicule  the  State  of 
Virginia  which  was  said  to  demand  an  army :  — 

4 '  My  friend  and  worthy  colleague  tells  us  that  the 
State  of  Virginia,  so  much  opposed  to  armies,  has  now 
got  to  the  war  pitch  so  far  as  to  want  one  regiment 
for  the  defence  of  half  a  million  of  souls  and  seventy 
thousand  square  miles.  .  .  .  Yes,  sir ;  the  legislature  of 
Virginia,  my  parent  State,  of  whom  I  cannot  speak  with 
disrespect,  nor  will  I  suffer  any  man  worth  my  resent 
ment  to  speak  of  her  with  disrespect  in  my  hearing,  has 
been  carried  away  by  the  military  mania,  and  they  want 
one  regiment !  " 


1808.  MEASURES  OF  DEFENCE.  217 

Yet  Randolph  approved  the  embargo  as  little  as  he 
liked  the  army  and  navy. 

"  I  am  not  one  of  those  who  approve  the  embargo," 
he  said  in  another  speech.1  "  It  gives  up  to  Great 
Britain  all  the  seamen  and  all  the  commerce,  —  their  feet 
are  not  now  upon  your  decks,  for  your  vessels  are  all 
riding  safely  moored  along  your  slips  and  wharves ;  and 
this  measure  absolutely  gives  Agriculture  a  blow  which 
she  cannot  recover  till  the  embargo  is  removed.  What 
has  become  of  your  fisheries  ?  Some  gentleman  has  in 
troduced  a  proposition  for  buying  their  fish  to  relieve  the 
fishermen.  Indeed.  I  would  much  sooner  assent  to  buy 
ing  their  fish  than  to  raising  these  troops,  except  indeed 
we  are  raising  the  troops  to  eat  the  fish." 

Randolph  broke  into  shrill  laughter  at  his  own 
joke,  delighted  with  the  idea  of  six  thousand  armed 
men  paid  to  eat  the  fish  that  were  rotting  on  the 
wharves  at  Gloucester  and  Marblehead. 

Keenly  as  Randolph  enjoyed  the  pleasure  of  ridi 
culing  his  colleagues  and  friends,  he  could  expect  to 
gain  no  votes.  George  W.  Campbell  and  the  other 
Administration  speakers  admitted  that  the  embargo 
might  yield  to  war  and  that  an  army  had  become 
necessary.  Even  Eppes  had  the  courage  to  defy  ridi 
cule,  and  in  full  recollection  of  having  vowed  to  God 
February  17  that  as  long  as  he  lived  he  would  vote 
down  a  regular  army,  he  rose  April  7  to  support  the 
bill  for  raising  eight  regiments  :  — 

"I  consider  it  as  part  of  the  system  designed  to 
meet  the  present  crisis  in  our  affairs.  .  .  .  The  period 
1  Annals  of  Congress,  1807-1808,  p.  2037. 


218         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  9. 

must  arrive  when  the  embargo  will  be  a  greater  evil 
than  war.  When  that  period  shall  arrive  it  will  be 
taken  off."  1 

On  the  same  day  the  bill  passed  by  a  vote  of  ninety- 
five  to  sixteen,  and  the  Republican  party  found  itself 
poorer  by  the  loss  of  one  more  traditional  principle. 
Events  were  hurrying  the  Government  toward  dangers 
which  the  party  had  believed  to  be  preventable  under 
the  system  invented  by  Virginia  and  Pennsylvania. 
In  1804  Jefferson  wrote  to  Madison :  "  It  is  impossi 
ble  that  France  and  England  should  combine  to  any 
purpose."2  The  impossible  had  happened,  and  every 
practice  founded  on  the  theory  of  mutual  jealousy 
between  European  Powers  became  once  more  a  sub 
ject  of  dispute.  On  the  day  of  Rose's  departure 
Jefferson,  abandoning  the  secrecy  in  which  until  that 
moment  he  had  wrapped  his  diplomacy,  sent  to  Con 
gress  a  mass  of  diplomatic  correspondence  with  Eng 
land  and  France,  running  back  to  the  year  1804.  A 
few  days  later,  March  30,  he  sent  a  secret  message 
accompanied  by  documents  which  gave  to  Congress, 
with  little  exception,  everything  of  importance  that 
had  passed  between  the  governments.  Only  one  sub 
ject  was  kept  back  :  —  the  tenebrous  negotiation  for 
Florida  remained  secret. 

From  these  documents  Congress  could  see  that  the 

time  for  talking  of  theories  of  peace  and  friendship 

i  or  of  ordinary  commercial  interests  had  passed.     Vio- 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  1807-1808,  p.  2049. 

2  Jefferson  to  Madison,  Aug.  15,  1804;  Works,  iv.  557. 


1808.  MEASURES  OF  DEFENCE.  219 

lence  and  rapine  marked  every  page  of  the  latest 
correspondence.  February  23  Erskine  had  at  last 
notified  the  Government  officially  of  the  existence  and 
purpose  of  the  Orders  in  Council.  His  note  repeated 
the  words  of  Canning's  instructions.1  After  asserting 
that  America  had  submitted  to  the  French  Decrees, 
and  had  thereby  warranted  England  in  forbidding  if 
she  pleased  all  American  commerce  with  France, 
Erskine  pointed  out  that  the  Orders  in  Council,  by 
not  prohibiting  but  limiting  this  commerce,  gave  proof 
of  his  Majesty's  amicable  disposition.  The  Ameri 
cans  might  still  transport  French  and  Spanish  colonial 
produce  to  England,  and  re-export  it  to  the  continent 
of  Europe  under  certain  regulations  :  — 

"The  object  of  these  regulations  will  be  the  estab 
lishment  of  such  a  protecting  duty  as  shall  prevent  the 
enemy  from  obtaining  the  produce  of  his  own  colonies 
at  a  cheaper  rate  than  that  of  the  colonies  of  Great 
Britain.  In  this  duty  it  is  evident  that  America  is 
no  otherwise  concerned  than  as  being  to  make  an 
advance  to  that  amount,  for  which  it  is  in  her  power 
amply  to  indemnify  herself  at  the  expense  of  the  foreign 
consumer." 

Further,  the  orders  licensed  the  importation  through 
England  into  France  of  all  strictly  American  produce, 
except  cotton,  without  paying  duty  in  transit :  — 

"  The  reason  why  his  Majesty  could  not  feel  himself 
at  liberty,  consistent  with  what  was  necessary  for  the 
execution  of  his  purpose  in  any  tolerable  degree,  to 

1  Erskine  to  Madison,  Feb.  23,  1808;  State  Papers,  iii.  209. 


220         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.        CH.  9. 

allow  this  relaxation  to  apply  to  cotton  is  to  be  found 
in  the  great  extent  to  which  France  has  pushed  the 
manufacture  of  that  article,  and  the  consequent  embar 
rassment  upon  her  trade  which  a  heavy  import  upon  cot 
ton  as  it  passes  through  Great  Britain  to  France  must 
necessarily  produce." 

Erskine's  note  claimed  credit  for  England  because 
the  orders  were  not  abruptly  enforced,  but  allowed 
time  for  neutrals  to  understand  and  conform  to  them. 
The  concluding  sentences  were  intended  to  soothe  the 
suffering  merchants :  — 

"  The  right  of  his  Majesty  to  resort  to  retaliation  can 
not  be  questioned.  The  suffering  occasioned  to  neutral 
parties  is  incidental,  and  not  of  his  Majesty's  seeking. 
In  the  exercise  of  this  undoubted  right,  his  Majesty  has 
studiously  endeavored  to  avoid  aggravating  unnecessarily 
the  inconveniences  suffered  by  the  neutral ;  and  I  am 
commanded  by  his  Majesty  especially  to  represent  to 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  the  earnest  desire 
of  his  Majesty  to  see  the  commerce  of  the  world  re 
stored  once  more  to  that  freedom  which  is  necessary 
for  its  prosperity ;  and  his  readiness  to  abandon  the 
system  which  has  been  forced  upon  him  whenever  the 
enemy  shall  retract  the  principles  which  have  rendered  it 
necessary." 

From  this  note  —  a  model  of  smooth-spoken  out 
rage  —  Congress  could  understand  that  until  the 
King  of  England  should  make  other  regulations 
American  commerce  was  to  be  treated  as  subject 
to  the  will  and  interest  of  Great  Britain.  At  the 
same  moment  Congress  was  obliged  to  read  a 


1808.  MEASURES  OF  DEFENCE.  221 

letter  from  Champagny  to  Armstrong,  dated  Jan. 
15,  1808,  in  defence  of  the  Berlin  and  Milan  De 
crees.1  Written  in  words  dictated  by  Napoleon, 
this  letter  asserted  rude  truths  which  irritated 
Americans  the  more  because  they  could  not  be 
denied :  — 

"  The  United  States,  more  than  any  other  Power,  have 
to  complain  of  the  aggressions  of  England.  It  has  not 
been  enough  for  her  to  offend  against  the  independence 
of  their  flag,  —  nay,  against  that  of  their  territory  and  of 
their  inhabitants,  —  by  attacking  them  even  in  their  ports, 
by  forcibly  carrying  away  their  crews  ;  her  decrees  of  the 
llth  November  have  made  a  fresh  attack  on  their  com 
merce  and  on  their  navigation  as  they  have  done  on  those 
of  all  other  Powers. 

"  In  the  situation  in  which  England  has  placed  the 
Continent,  especially  since  her  decrees  of  the  llth  No 
vember,  his  Majesty  has  no  doubt  of  a  declaration  of 
war  against  her  by  the  United  States.  Whatever  tran 
sient  sacrifices  war  may  occasion,  they  will  not  believe  it 
consistent  either  with  their  interest  or  dignity  to  acknowl 
edge  the  monstrous  principle  and  the  anarchy  which  that 
government  wishes  to  establish  on  the  seas.  If  it  be 
useful  and  honorable  for  all  nations  to  cause  the  true 
maritime  law  of  nations  to  be  re-established,  and  to 
avenge  the  insults  committed  by  England  against  every 
flag,  it  is  indispensable  for  the  United  States,  who  from 
the  extent  of  their  commerce  have  oftener  to  complain 
of  those  violations.  War  exists  then  in  fact  between 
England  and  the  United  States ;  and  his  Majesty  con- 

1  Champagny  to  Armstrong,  Jan.  15,  1808;  State  Papers,  iii. 
248. 


222        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.        CH.  9.- 

siders  it  as   declared  from  the  day  on  which  England 
published  her  decrees." 

Two  such  letters  could  hardly  have  been  written  to 
the  chief  of  an  independent  people  and  submitted 
to  a  free  legislature  in  Europe  without  producing  a 
convulsion.  Patient  as  Congress  was,  the  temper  ex 
cited  by  Champagny's  letter  obliged  the  President, 
April  2,  to  withdraw  the  injunction  of  secrecy  after 
the  House  had  twice  rejected  a  motion  to  do  so  with 
out  his  permission ;  but  the  motive  of  the  Federalists 
in  publishing  Champagny's  letter  was  not  so  much  to 
resent  it  as  to  divert  popular  anger  from  England  to 
France.  No  outburst  of  national  self-respect  followed 
the  appearance  of  the  two  letters.  During  the  next 
week  the  House  debated  and  passed  the  bill  for  rais 
ing  the  army  to  ten  thousand  men,  but  on  all  sides 
the  friends  and  opponents  of  the  measure  equally 
deprecated  war.  The  report  of  a  special  committee 
in  the  Senate,  April  16,  expressed  on  that  point  the 
general  feeling  of  Congress : 1  — 

"  With  respect  to  a  resort  to  war  as  a  remedy  for  the 
evils  experienced,  the  committee  will  offer  no  other  reflec 
tion  than  that  it  is  in  itself  so  great  an  evil  that  the 
United  States  have  wisely  considered  peace  and  honest 
neutrality  as  the  best  foundation  of  their  general  policy. 
It  is  not  for  the  committee  to  say  under  what  degree  of 
aggravated  injuries  and  sufferings  a  departure  from  this 
policy  may  become  a  duty,  and  the  most  pacific  nation 
find  itself  compelled  to  exchange  for  the  calamities  of 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  1807-1808,  p.  364. 


1808.  MEASURES  OF  DEFENCE.  223 

war  the  greater  distresses  of  longer  forbearance.  In  the 
present  state  of  things  the  committee  cannot  recommend 
any  departure  from  that  policy  which  withholds  our  com 
mercial  and  agricultural  property  from  the  licensed  depre 
dations  of  the  great  maritime  belligerent  Powers.  They 
hope  that  an  adherence  to  this  policy  will  eventually 
secure  to  us  the  blessings  of  peace  without  any  sacrifice 
of  our  national  rights ;  and  they  have  no  doubt  that  it 
will  be  supported  by  all  the  manly  virtue  which  the  good 
people  of  the  United  States  have  ever  discovered  on 
great  and  patriotic  occasions." 

The  Senate  passed  a  bill  authorizing  the  President 
during  the  recess  to  suspend  the  embargo  in  whole 
or  in  part  if  in  his  judgment  the  conduct  of  the 
belligerent  Powers  should  render  suspension  safe. 
After  a  hot  debate,  chiefly  on  the  constitutionality 
of  the  measure,  it  passed  the  House,  and  April  22 
became  law.  April  25  the  session  ended. 

As  the  result  of  six  months'  labor,  Congress  could 
show  besides  the  usual  routine  legislation  a  number 
of  Acts  which  made  an  epoch  in  the  history  of  the 
Republican  party.  First  came  the  Embargo,  its  two 
Supplements,  and  the  Act  empowering  the  President 
to  suspend  it  at  will.  Next  came  the  series  of  appro 
priation  Acts  which  authorized  the  President  to  spend 
in  all  four  million  dollars  in  excess  of  the  ordinary 
expenditures,  —  for  gunboats,  eight  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  dollars  ;  for  land  fortifications,  one  million  ; 
for  five  new  regiments  of  infantry,  one  of  riflemen, 
one  of  light  artillery,  and  one  of  light  dragoons,  two 


224        HISTORY  OF   THE  UNITED   STATES.        CH.  9. 

million  dollars ;  and  two  hundred  thousand  dollars 
for  arming  the  militia.  Such  progress  toward  energy 
was  more  rapid  than  could  have  been  expected  from 
a  party  like  that  which  Jefferson  had  educated  and 
which  he  still  controlled. 


CHAPTER    X. 

"  THIS  six  months'  session  has  worn  me  down  to  a 
state  of  almost  total  incapacity  for  business,"  wrote 
President  Jefferson  to  his  attorney-general.1  "  Con 
gress  will  certainly  rise  to-morrow  night,  and  I  shall 
leave  this  for  Monticello  on  the  5th  of  May,  to  be 
here  again  on  the  8th  of  June."  More  earnestly  than 
ever  he  longed  for  repose  and  good-will.  "  For  my 
self,"  he  said,2  "  I  have  nothing  further  to  ask  of  the 
world  than  to  preserve  in  retirement  so  much  of  their 
esteem  as  I  may  have  fairly  earned,  and  to  be  permit 
ted  to  pass  in  tranquillity,  in  the  bosom  of  my  family 
and  friends,  the  days  which  yet  remain  to  me."  He 
could  not  reasonably  ask  from  the  world  more  than 
he  had  already  received  from  it ;  but  a  whole  year 
remained,  during  which  he  must  still  meet  whatever, 
demand  the  world  should  make  upon  him.  He  had 
brought  the  country  to  a  situation  where  war  was 
impossible  for  want  of  weapons,  and  peace  was  only 
a  name  for  passive  war.  He  was  bound  to  carry  the 
government  through  the  dangers  he  had  braved ;  and 

1  Jefferson  to  Rodney,  April  24,  1808;  Works,  v.  275. 

2  Jefferson  to  Monroe,  March  10,  1808;  Works,  v.  253. 

VOL.  IV.  —  15 


226         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  10. 

for  the  first  time  in  seven  years  American  democracy, 
struck  with  sudden  fear  of  failure,  looked  to  him  in 
doubt,  and  trembled  for  its  hopes. 

Fortunately  for  Jefferson's  ease,  no  serious  opposi 
tion  was  made  in  the  Republican  party  to  his  choice 
of  a  successor.  Giles  and  Nicholas,  who  managed 
Madison's  canvass  in  Virginia,  caused  a  caucus  to  be 
held,  January  21,  at  Richmond,  where  one  hundred 
and  twenty-three  members  of  the  State  legislature 
joined  in  nominating  electors  for  Madison.  Ran 
dolph's  friends  held  another  caucus,  at  which  fifty- 
seven  members  of  the  same  legislature  joined  in 
nominating  electors  for  Monroe.  To  support  the 
Virginia  movement  for  Madison,  a  simultaneous 
caucus  was  held  at  Washington,  where,  January  20, 
Senator  Bradley  of  Vermont  issued  a  printed  circu 
lar  inviting  the  Republican  members  of  both  Houses 
to  consult,  January  23,  respecting  the  next  Presi 
dential  election.  Bradley's  authority  was  disputed 
by  Monroe's  partisans,  and  only  Madison's  friends, 
or  indifferent  persons,  obeyed  the  call.  Eighty-nine 
senators  and  members  attended  ;  and  on  balloting, 
eighty-three  votes  were  given  for  Madison  as  Presi 
dent,  seventy-nine  for  George  Clinton  as  Vice-Presi- 
dent;  but  the  names  of  the  persons  present  were 
never  published,  and  the  caucus  itself  seemed  afraid 
of  its  own  action.  About  sixty  Republican  members 
or  senators  held  aloof.  John  Randolph  and  sixteen 
of  his  friends  published  a  protest  against  the  caucus 
and  its  candidate  :  — 


1808.  THE   RISE   OF   A  BRITISH  PARTY.  227 

"We  ask  for  energy,  and  we  are  told  of  his  moder 
ation.  We  ask  for  talents,  and  the  reply  is  his  unas 
suming  merit.  We  ask  what  were  his  services  in  the 
cause  of  public  liberty,  and  we  are  directed  to  the 
pages  of  the  '  Federalist,'  written  in  conjunction  with 
Alexander  Hamilton  and  John  Jay,  in  which  the  most 
extravagant  of  their  doctrines  are  maintained  and  prop 
agated.  We  ask  for  consistency  as  a  Republican,  stand 
ing  forth  to  stem  the  torrent  of  oppression  which  once 
threatened  to  overwhelm  the  liberties  of  the  country. 
We  ask  for  that  high  and  honorable  sense  of  duty  which 
would  at  all  times  turn  with  loathing  and  abhorrence 
from  any  compromise  with  fraud  and  speculation.  We 
ask  in  vain." 1 

Jefferson  had  commanded  the  warm  and  undisputed 
regard  of  his  followers ;  Madison  held  no  such  pre 
eminence.  "  Every  able  diplomatist  is  not  fit  to  be- 
President,"  said  Macon.  George  Clinton,  who  had 
yielded  unwillingly  to  Jefferson,  held  Madison  in 
contempt.  While  Monroe  set  up  a  Virginia  candi 
dacy  which  the  Republicans  of  Randolph's  school 
supported,  George  Clinton  set  up  a  candidacy  of 
his  own,  in  New  York,  supported  by  Cheetham's 
"  Watch-To wer,"  and  by  a  portion  of  the  country 
press.  Before  long,  the  public  was  treated  to  a  curi 
ous  spectacle.  The  regular  party  candidate  for  the 
Vice-presidency  became  the  open  rival  of  the  regular 
candidate  for  the  Presidency.  Clinton's  newspapers 
attacked  Madison  without  mercy,  while  Madison's 

1  Address  to  the  People  of  the  United  States,  National  Intel 
ligencer,  March  7,  1808. 


228        HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  10. 

friends   were    electing    Clinton    as    Madison's   Vice- 
president. 

In  this  state  of  things  successful  opposition  to 
Madison  depended  upon  the  union  of  his  enemies 
in  support  of  a  common  candidate.  Not  only  must 
either  Monroe  or  Clinton  retire,  but  one  must  be 
able  to  transfer  his  votes  to  the  other  ;  and  the  whole 
Federalist  party  must  be  induced  to  accept  the  choice 
thus  made.  The  Federalists  were  not  unwilling ;  but 
while  they  waited  for  the  politicians  of  Virginia  and 
New  York  to  arrange  the  plan  of  campaign,  they 
;  busied  themselves  with  recovering  control  of  New 
England,  where  they  had  been  partially  driven  from 
;  power.  The  embargo  offered  them  almost  a  certainty 
iof  success. 

i  From  the  first  moment  of  the  embargo,  even  dur 
ing  the  secret  debate  of  Dec.  19,  1807,  its  opponents 
raised  the  cry  of  French  influence  ;  and  so  positively 
and  persistently  was  Jefferson  charged  with  subservi 
ence  to  Napoleon,  that  while  a  single  Federalist  lived, 
this  doctrine  continued  to  be  an  article  of  his  creed. 
In  truth,  Jefferson  had  never  stood  on  worse  terms 
with  France  than  when  he  imposed  the  embargo.  He 
acted  in  good  faith  when  he  enclosed  Armstrong's 
letter  and  Regnier's  decision  in  his  Embargo  Mes 
sage.  Turreau  was  annoyed  at  his  conduct,  thinking 
it  intended  to  divert  public  anger  from  England  to 
France  in  order  to  make  easier  the  negotiation  with 
Rose.  Instead  of  dictating  Jefferson's  course,  as  the 
Federalists  believed,  Turreau  was  vexed  and  alarmed 


1808.  THE  RISE  OF  A  BRITISH  PARTY.  229 

by  it.  He  complained  of  Armstrong,  Madison,  and 
Jefferson  himself.  The  Embargo  Message,  he  said, 
exposed  the  Administration  in  flank  to  the  Federal 
ists,  and  gave  the  English  envoy  free  play.  "  For  me 
it  was  a  useless  proof  —  one  proof  the  more  —  of  the 
usual  awkwardness  of  the  Washington  Cabinet,  and 
of  its  falsity  {faussete)  in  regard  to  France."  l  His 
contempt  involved  equally  people,  Legislature,  and 
Executive :  — 

"  Faithful  organs  of  the  perverse  intentions  of  the 
American  people,  its  representatives  came  together  be 
fore  their  usual  time,  in  accordance  with  the  President's 
views,  and  in  their  private  conversation  and  in  their  pub 
lic  deliberations  seemed  entirely  to  forget  the  offences  of 
England,  or  rather  to  have  been  never  affected  by  them. 
This  temper,  common  to  the  men  of  all  parties,  proved 
very  evidently  what  was  the  state  of  popular  opinion  in 
regard  to  Great  Britain,  against  whom  no  hostile  project 
will  ever  enter  into  an  American's  thoughts.  The  An 
nual  Message  was  not  calculated  to  inspire  energy  into 
the  honorable  Congress.  All  these  political  documents 
from  the  President's  pen  are  cold  and  colorless."  a 

The  result  of  Rose's  negotiation  confirmed  Tur- 
reau's  disgust:  — 

"  It  can  be  no  longer  doubtful  that  the  United  States, 
whatever  insults  they  may  have  to  endure,  will  never 
make  war  on  Great  Britain  unless  she  attacks  them. 

1  Turreau  to  Champagny,  May  20,  1808  ;  Archives  des  Aff. 
£tr.  MSS. 

2  Turreau  to   Champagny,  May  20,  1808  ;  Archives  des  Aff. 
£tr.  MSS. 


230         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES.      CH.  10. 

Every  day  I  have  been,  and  still  am,  met  with  the  ob 
jection  that  the  decrees  of  the  French  government  have 
changed  the  disposition  of  the  members  of  the  Execu 
tive,  and  especially  of  members  of  Congress.  Both  have 
seized  this  incident  as  a  pretext  to  color  their  coward 
ice  (Idchete) ,  and  extend  it  over  their  system  of  inaction  ; 
since  it  is  evident  that  however  severe  the  measures  of 
the  French  government  may  have  been,  they  weigh  light 
in  the  balance  when  set  in  opposition  to  all  the  excesses, 
all  the  outrages,  that  England  has  permitted  herself  to 
inflict  on  the  United  States."1 

During  the  winter  and  spring  nothing  occurred  to 
soothe  Turreau's  feelings.  On  the  contrary,  his  irri 
tation  was  increased  by  the  President's  communica 
tion  to  Congress  of  Champagny's  letter  of  January 
15,  and  by  the  "  inconceivable  weakness "  which 
made  this  letter  public  :  — 

' '  Although  I  could  hardly  have  calculated  on  this 
new  shock,  which  has  considerably  weakened  our  politi 
cal  credit  in  the  United  States,  I  well  knew  that  we  had 
lost  greatly  in  the  opinion  of  the  Cabinet  at  Washington 
and  of  its  chief.  After  Mr.  Rose's  departure,  —  that  is  to 
say,  about  three  weeks  before  the  end  of  the  session,  — 
I  quitted  the  city  for  reasons  of  health,  which  were  only 
too  well  founded.  I  had  seen  Mr.  Jefferson  only  a  week 
before  I  went  to  take  leave  of  him.  Perhaps  I  should  tell 
your  Excellency  that  I  commonly  see  the  President  once 
a  week,  and  always  in  the  evening,  —  a  time  when  I  am 
sure  of  finding  him  at  home,  and  nearly  always  alone.  I 

1  Turreau  to  Champagny,  May  20,  1808  ;  Archives  des  Aff. 
Etr.  MSS. 


1808.  THE   RISE  OF   A  BRITISH  PARTY.  231 

never  open  upon  the  chapter  of  politics,  because  it  seems 
more  proper  for  me  to  wait  for  him  to  begin  this  subject, 
and  I  never  wait  long.  At  the  interview  before  the  last 
I  found  him  extremely  cool  in  regard  to  the  interests  of 
Europe  and  the  measures  of  the  Powers  coalesced  against 
England.  At  the  last  interview  he  asked  me  if  I  had  re 
cent  news  from  Europe.  I  told  him — what  was  true  — 
that  I  had  nothing  official  since  two  months.  '  You  treat 
us  badly,'  he  replied.  '  The  governments  of  Europe  do  not 
understand  this  government  here.  Even  England,  whose 
institutions  have  most  analogy  with  ours,  does  not  know 
the  character  of  the  American  people  and  the  spirit  of  its 
Administration,'  etc.  I  answered  that  Great  Britain  hav 
ing  violated  the  law  of  nations  in  regard  to  every  people 
in  succession,  the  nature  and  the  difference  of  their  insti 
tutions  mattered  little  to  a  Power  which  had  abjured  all 
principles.  He  interrupted  me  to  say :  '  When  severe 
measures  become  necessary  we  shall  know  how  to  take 
them,  but  we  do  not  want  to  be  dragged  into  them  (y  &tre 
entraines).'  Although  this  was  directly  to  the  address 
of  the  minister  of  France,  I  thought  best  to  avoid  a 
retort,  and  contented  myself  with  observing  that  gener 
ally  France  gave  the  example  of  respect  for  governments 
which  sustained  their  dignity,  and  that  the  object  of  the 
coalition  of  all  the  European  States  against  England  was 
to  constrain  that  Power  to  imitate  her.  The  rest  of  the 
conversation  was  too  vague  and  too  insignificant  to  be 
worth  remembering.  Nevertheless,  Mr.  Jefferson  re 
peated  to  me  what  he  tells  me  at  nearly  every  inter 
view, —  that  he  has  much  love  for  France." 

Turreau  drew  the  inference  "  that  the  federal  gov 
ernment  intends  to-day  more  than  ever  to  hold  an 


. 


232        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  10. 

equal  balance  between  France  and  England."  Ers- 
kine  saw  matters  in  the  same  light.  Neither  the 
Frenchman  nor  the  Englishman,  although  most  di 
rectly  interested  in  the  bias  of  President  Jefferson, 
reported  any  word  or  act  of  his  which  showed  a 
wish  to  serve  Napoleon's  ends. 

The  interests  of  the  Federalists  required  them  to 
assert  the  subservience  of  Jefferson  to  France.  They 
did  so  in  the  most  positive  language,  without  proof, 
and  without  attempting  to  obtain  proof.  Had  this 
been  all,  they  would  have  done  no  worse  than  their 
opponents  had  done  before  them ;  but  they  also  used 
the  pretext  of  Jefferson's  devotion  to  France  in 
order  to  cover  and  justify  their  own  devotion  to 
England. 

After  the  failure  of  Rose,  in  the  month  of  Febru 
ary,  to  obtain  further  concessions  from  Madison,  the 
British  envoy  cultivated  more  closely  the  friendship 
of  Senator  Pickering,  and  even  followed  his  advice. 
As  early  as  March  4  he  wrote  to  his  Government  on 
the  subject,1  — 

"  It  is  apprehended,  should  this  Government  be  desir 
ous  that  hostilities  should  take  place  with  England,  it 
will  not  venture  to  commence  them,  but  will  endeavor  to 
provoke  her  to  strike  the  first  blow.  In  such  a  case  it 
would  no  doubt  adopt  highly  irritating  measures.  On 
this  head  I  beg  leave,  but  with  great  diffidence,  to  submit 
the  views  which  I  have  formed  here,  and  which  I  find 
coincide  completely  with  those  of  the  best  and  most  en- 

1  Rose  to  Canning,  March  4,  1808 ;  MSS.  British  Archives. 


1808.  THE   RISE   OF   A   BRITISH   PARTY.  233 

lightened  men  of  this  country,  and  who  consider  her 
interests  as  completely  identified  with  those  of  Great 
Britain.  I  conceive  it  to  be  of  extreme  importance  in 
the  present  state  of  the  public  mind  in  this  nation,  and 
especially  as  operated  upon  by  the  embargo,  such  as  I 
have  endeavored  to  represent  it  in  preceding  despatches, 
to  avoid  if  possible  actual  warfare,  —  should  it  be  practi 
cable  consistently  with  the  national  honor,  to  do  no  more 
than  retort  upon  America  any  measures  of  insolence  and 
injury  falling  short  of  it  which  she  may  adopt.  Such  a 
line  of  conduct  would,  I  am  persuaded,  render  completely 
null  the  endeavors  exerted  to  impress  upon  the  public 
mind  here  the  persuasion  of  the  inveterate  rancor  with 
which  Great  Britain  seeks  the  destruction  of  America, 
and  would  turn  their  whole  animosity,  —  goaded  on,  as 
they  would  be,  by  the  insults  and  injuries  offered  by 
France,  and  the  self-inflicted  annihilation  of  their  own 
commerce,  —  against  their  own  Government,  and  produce 
an  entire  change  in  the  politics  of  the  country.  A  war 
with  Great  Britain  would,  I  have  no  doubt,  prove  ulti 
mately  fatal  to  this  Government ;  but  it  is  to  be  feared 
that  the  people  would  necessarily  rally  round  it  at  the 
first  moment  and  at  the  instant  of  danger  ;  and  an  exas 
peration  would  be  produced  which  it  might  be  found  im 
possible  to  eradicate  for  a  series  of  years.  Their  sound 
est  statesmen  express  to  me  the  utmost  anxiety  that  their 
fellow-citizens  should  be  allowed  to  bear  the  whole  bur 
den  of  their  own  follies,  and  suffer  by  evils  originating 
with  themselves ;  and  they  are  convinced  that  the  effects 
of  punishment  inflicted  by  their  own  hands  must  ere  long 
bring  them  into  co-operation  with  Great  Britain,  whilst  if 
inflicted  by  hers,  it  must  turn  them  perhaps  irrevocably 
against  her." 


234        HISTORY  OF   ThE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  10. 

"  The  best  and  most  enlightened  men  of  the  coun 
try,"  —  who  "  considered  her  interests  as  completely 
identified  with  those  of  Great  Britain,"  and  who  thus 
concerted  with  Canning  a  policy  intended  to  bring 
themselves  into  power  as  agents  of  Spencer  Perceval 
and  Lord  Castlereagh,  —  were  Senator  Pickering 
and  his  friends.  To  effect  this  coalition  with  the 
British  ministry  Pickering  exerted  himself  to  the 
utmost.  Not  only  by  word  of  mouth,  but  also  by 
letter,  he  plied  the  British  envoy  with  argument  and 
evidence.  Although  Rose,  March  4,  wrote  to  Can 
ning  in  the  very  words  of  the  Massachusetts  senator, 
March  13  the  senator  wrote  to  Rose  repeating  his 
opinion  : :  — 

' '  You  know  my  solicitude  to  have  peace  preserved 
between  the  two  nations,  and  I  have  therefore  taken  the 
liberty  to  express  to  you  my  opinion  of  the  true  point  of 
policy  to  be  observed  by  your  Government  toward  the 
United  States,  in  case  your  mission  prove  unsuccessful ; 
that  is,  to  let  us  alone  ;  to  bear  patiently  the  wrongs  we 
do  ourselves.  In  one  word,  amidst  the  irritations  engen 
dered  by  hatred  and  folly,  to  maintain  a  dignified  com 
posure,  and  to  abstain  from  war,  —  relying  on  this,  that 
whatever  disposition  exists  to  provoke,  there  is  none  to 
commence  a  war  on  the  part  of  the  United  States." 

To  support  his  views  Pickering  enclosed  a  letter 
from  Rufus  King.  "  I  also  know,"  he  continued, 
"  that  in  the  -present  unexampled  state  of  the  world 

1  Pickering  to  Rose,  March  13,  1808;  New  England  Federal 
ism,  p.  366. 


1808.  THE   RISE   OF   A  BRITISH   PARTY.  235 

our  own  best  citizens  consider  the  interests  of  the 
United  States  to  be  interwoven  with  those  of  Great 
Britain,  and  that  our  safety  depends  on  hers.  .  .  . 
Of  the  opinions  and  reasonings  of  such  men  I  wish 
you  to  be  possessed."  He  held  out  a  confident  hope 
that  the  embargo  would  end  in  an  overthrow  of  the 
Administration,  and  that  a  change  in  the  head  of 
the  government  would  alter  its  policy  "  in  a  manner 
propitious  to  the  continuance  of  peace."  A  few  days 
afterward  he  placed  in  Rose's  hands  two  letters  from 
George  Cabot.  Finally,  on  the  eve  of  Rose's  depar 
ture,  March  22,  he  gave  the  British  envoy  a  letter  to 
Samuel  Williams  of  London.  "  Let  him,  if  you  please, 
be  the  medium  of  whatever  epistolary  intercourse  may 
take  place  between  you  and  me."  l 

To  these  advances  Rose  replied  in  his  usual  tone  of 
courteous  superiority :  — 

"  I  avail  myself  thankfully  of  your  permission  to  keep 
that  gentleman's  [Rufus  King's]  letter,  which  I  am  sure 
will  carry  high  authority  where  I  can  use  it  confidentially, 
and  whither  it  is  most  important  that  what  I  conceive  to 
be  right  impressions  should  be  conveyed.  It  is  not  to 
you  that  I  need  protest  that  rancorous  impressions  of 
jealousy  or  ill-will  have  never  existed  there  ;  but  it  is  to 
be  feared  that  at  some  time  or  another  the  extremest 
point  of  human  forbearance  may  be  reached.  Yet  at 
the  present  moment  there  is,  I  think,  a  peculiarity  of 
circumstances  most  strange  indeed,  which  enables  the 
offended  party  to  leave  his  antagonist  to  his  own  sui- 

1  Pickering  to  G.  H.  Rose,  March  22,  1808;  New  England 
Federalism,  p.  368. 


236        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  10. 

cidal  devices,  unless,  in  his  contortions  under  them,  he 
may  strike  some  blow  which  the  other  might  not  be  able 
to  dissemble." l 

No  senator  of  the  United  States  could  submit, 
without  some  overpowering  motive,  to  such  patron 
age.  That  Pickering  should  have  invited  it  was  the 
more  startling  because  he  knew  better  than  any  other 
man  in  America  the  criminality  of  his  act.  Ten 
years  before,  at  a  time  when  Pickering  was  himself 
Secretary  of  State,  the  Pennsylvania  Quaker,  Dr. 
Logan,  attempted,  with  honest  motives,  to  act  as  an 
amateur  negotiator  between  the  United  States  gov 
ernment  and  that  of  France.  In  order  to  prevent 
such  mischievous  follies  for  the  future,  Congress, 
under  the  inspiration  of  Pickering,  passed  a  law 
known  as  "  Lo^^s^Act,''  which  still  stood  on  the 
statute  book  : 2  — 

"  Every  citizen  of  the  United  States,  whether  actually 
resident  or  abiding  within  the  same,  or  in  any  foreign 
country,  who,  without  the  permission  or  authority  of  the 
government,  directly  or  indirectly  commences  or  carries 
on  any  verbal  or  written  correspondence  or  intercourse 
with  any  foreign  government,  or  any  officer  or  agent 
thereof,  with  an  intent  to  influence  the  measures  or  con 
duct  of  any  foreign  government,  or  of  any  officer  or 
agent  thereof,  in  relation  to  any  disputes  or  controver 
sies  with  the  United  States,  or  to  defeat  the  measures  of 

1  G.  H.  Rose  to  Pickering,  March  18,   1808;    New  England 
Federalism,  p.  367. 

2  Rev.  Stat.  sec.  5335.     Cf.  Act  of  Jan.  30,  1799;  Annals  of 
Congress,  1797-1799,  p.  3795. 


1808.  THE   KISE   OF   A  BRITISH   PARTY.  237 

the  government  of  the  United  States ;  and  every  person 
.  .  .  who  counsels,  advises,  or  assists  in  any  such  cor 
respondence,  with  such  intent,  shall  be  punished  by  a 
fine  of  not  more  than  five  thousand  dollars,  and  by  im 
prisonment  during  not  less  than  six  months,  nor  more 
than  three  years." 

When  Pickering  defied  fine  and  imprisonment-— 
under  his  own  law,  in  order  to  make  a  concert  of 
political  action  with  George  Canning  to  keep  the 
British  government  steady  in  aggression,  he  believed 
that  his  end  justified  his  means  ;  and  he  avowed  his 
end  to  be  the  bringing  of  his  friends  into  power 
For  this  purpose  he  offered  himself  to  Canning  as 
the  instrument  for  organizing  what  was  in  fact  a 
British  party  in  New  England,  asking  in  return  only 
the  persistence  of  Great  Britain  in  a  line  of  polic^ 
already  adopted,  which  was  sure  to  work  against  the 
Republican  rule.  Pickering  knew  that  his  conduct 
was  illegal ;  but  he  had  in  his  hands  an  excuse  which 
justified  him,  as  he  chose  to  think,  in  disregarding 
the  law.  He  persuaded  himself  that  Jefferson  was 
secretly  bound  by  an  engagement  with  Napoleon  to 
effect  the  ruin  of  England. 

Then  came  Pickering's  master-stroke.  The  April 
election  —  which  would  decide  the  political  control 
of  Massachusetts  for  the  coming  year,  and  the  choice 
of  a  senator  in  the  place  of  J.  Q.  Adams  —  was  close 
at  hand.  February  16,  the  day  when  Rose's  negotia 
tion  broke  down,  Pickering  sent  to  Governor  Sullivan 
of  Massachusetts  a  letter  intended  for  official  commu- 


238        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  10. 

nication  to  the  State  legislature.1  "'I  may  claim  some 
share  of  attention  and  credit,"  he  began,  — "  that 
share  which  is  due  to  a  man  who  defies  the  world 
to  point,  in  the  whole  course  of  a*  long  and  public  life, 
at  one  instance  of  deception,  at  a  single  departure 
from  Truth."  He  entered  into  speculations  upon  the 
causes  which  had  led  Congress  to  impose  the  embargo. 
Omitting  mention  of  the  Orders  in  Council,  he  showed 
that  the  official  reasons  presented  in  the  President's 
Embargo  Message  were  not  sufficient  to  justify  the 
measure,  and  that  some  secret  motive  must  lie  hid 
den  from  public  view  :  — 

"  Has  the  French  Emperor  declared  that  he  will  have 
no  neutrals?  Has  he  required  that  our  ports,  like  those 
of  his  vassal  States  in  Europe,  be  shut  against  British 
commerce?  Is  the  embargo  a  substitute,  a  milder  form 
of  compliance,  with  that  harsh  demand,  which  if  exhi 
bited  in  its  naked  and  insulting  aspect  the  American 
spirit  might  yet  resent?  Are  we  still  to  be  kept  pro 
foundly  ignorant  of  the  declarations  and  avowed  designs 
of  the  French  Emperor,  although  these  may  strike  at  our 
liberty  and  independence?  And  in  the  mean  time  are 
we,  by  a  thousand  irritations,  by  cherishing  prejudices, 
and  by  exciting  fresh  resentments,  to  be  drawn  gradually 
into  a  war. with  Great  Britain?  Why  amid  the  extreme 
anxiety  of  the  public  mind  is  it  still  kept  on  the  rack  of 
fearful  expectation  by  the  President's  portentous  silence 
respecting  his  French  despatches?  In  this  concealment 
there  is  danger.  In  this  concealment  must  be  wrapt  up 

1  Letter  from  the  Hon.  Timothy  Pickering  to  His  Excellency 
James  Sullivan  (Boston,  1808). 


1808.  THE   RISE  OF   A   BRITISH   PARTY.  239 

the  real  cause  of  the  embargo.     On  any  other  supposition 
it  is  inexplicable." 

Never  was  Jefferson's  sleight-of-hand  more  dexter 
ously  turned  against  him  than  in  this  unscrupulous 
appeal  to  his  own  official  language.  In  all  Picker 
ing's  voluminous  writings  this  letter  stood  out  alone, 
stamped  by  a  touch  of  genius. 

"By  false  policy,"  he  continued,  "  or  by  inordinate 
fears,  our  country  may  be  betrayed  and  subjugated  to 
France  as  surely  as  by  corruption.  I  trust,  sir,  that  no 
one  who  knows  me  will  charge  it  to  vanity  when  I  say 
that  I  have  some  knowledge  of  public  men  and  of  public 
affairs ;  and  on  that  knowledge,  and  with  solemnity,  I 
declare  to  you  that  I  have  no  confidence  in  the  wisdom 
or  correctness  of  our  public  measures ;  that  our  country 
is  in  imminent  danger ;  that  it  is  essential  to  the  public 
safety  that  the  blind  confidence  in  our  rulers  should 
cease ;  that  the  State  legislatures  should  know  the  facts 
and  the  reasons  on  which  important  general  laws  are 
founded ;  and  especially  that  those  States  whose  farms 
are  on  the  ocean  and  whose  harvests  are  gathered  in 
every  sea,  should  immediately  and  seriously  consider  how 
to  preserve  them." 

To  those  Federalists  leaders  who  had  been  ac 
quainted  with  the  plans  of  1804,  the  meaning  of  this 
allusion  to  the  commercial  States  could  not  be  doubtful. 
Least  of  all  could  Pickering's  colleague  in  the  Senate, 
who  had  so  strenuolisly  resisted  the  disunion  scheme, 
fail  to  understand  the  drift  of  Pickering's  leadership. 
John  Quincy  Adams,  at  whose  growing  influence  this 
letter  struck,  had  been  from  his  earliest  recollection, 


240        HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  lu. 

through  his  father's  experience  or  his  own,  closely 
connected  with  political  interests.  During  forty  years 
he  had  been  the  sport  of  public  turbulence,  and  for 
forty  years  he  was  yet  to  undergo  every  vicissitude 
of  political  failure  and  success ;  but  in  the  range  of 
his  chequered  life  he  was  subjected  to  no  other  trial 
so  severe  as  that  which  Pickering  forced  him  to  meet. 
In  the  path  of  duty  he  might  doubtless  face  social  and 
political  ostracism,  even  in  a  town  such  as  Boston 
then  was,  and  defy  it.  Men  as  good  as  he  had  done 
as  much,  in  many  times  and  places ;  but  to  do  this 
in  support  of  a  President  whom  he  disliked  and  dis 
trusted,  for  the  sake  of  a  policy  in  which  he  had  no 
faith,  was  enough  to  shatter  a  character  of  iron. 
Fortunately  for  him,  his  temper  was  not  one  to  seek 
relief  in  half-way  measures.  He  had  made  a  mistake 
in  voting  for  an  embargo  without  limit  of  time ;  but 
since  no  measure  of  resistance  to  Europe  more  vigor 
ous  than  the  embargo  could  gain  support  from  either 
party,  he  accepted  and  defended  it.  He  attended  the 
Republican  caucus  January  23,  and  voted  for  George 
Clinton  as  President ;  and  when  Pickering  flung 
down  his  challenge  in  the  letter  of  February  16, 
Adams  instantly  took  it  up. 

Governor  Sullivan  naturally  declined  to  convey 
Senator  Pickering's  letter  to  the  Legislature ;  but 
a  copy  had  been  sent  to  George  Cabot,  who  caused 
it,  March  9,  to  be  published.  The  effect  was  violent. 
Passion  took  the  place  of  reason,  and  swept  the  Fed 
eralists  into  Pickering's  path.  Governor  Sullivan 


1808.  THE  RISE  OF  A  BRITISH  PARTY.          241 

published  a  vigorous  reply,  but  lost  his  temper  in 
doing  so,  and  became  abusive  where  he  should  have 
been  cool.1  When  Pickering's  letter  was  received 
at  Washington,  Adams  wrote  an  answer,2  which 
reached  Boston  barely  in  time  to  be  read  before  the 
election.  He  went  over  the  history  of  the  embargo  ; 
pointed  out  its  relation  to  the  Orders  in  Council ; 
recapitulated  the  long  list  of  English  outrages ; 
turned  fiercely  upon  the  British  infatuation  of  Pick 
ering's  friends,  and  called  upon  them  to  make  their 
choice  between  embargo  and  war :  — 

' c  If  any  statesman  can  point  out  another  alternative 
I  am  ready  to  hear  him,  and  for  any  practicable  expedi 
ent  to  lend  him  every  possible  assistance.  But  let  not 
that  expedient  be  submission  to  trade  under  British 
licenses  and  British  taxation.  We  are  told  that  even 
under  these  restrictions  we  may  yet  trade  to  the  British 
dominions,  to  Africa  and  China,  and  with  the  colonies 
of  France,  Spain,  and  Holland.  I  ask  not  how  much  of 
this  trade  would  be  left  when  our  intercourse  with  the 
whole  continent  of  Europe  being  cut  off  would  leave  us 
no  means  of  purchase  and  no  market  for  sale.  I-  ask 
not  what  trade  we  could  enjoy  with  the  colonies  of 
nations  with  which  we  should  be  at  war.  I  ask  not 
how  long  Britain  would  leave  open  to  us  avenues  of 
trade  which  even  in  these  very  Orders  of  Council  she 
boasts  of  leaving  open  as  a  special  indulgence.  If  we 
yield  the  principle,  we  abandon  all  pretence  to  national 
sovereignty." 

1  Interesting  Correspondence  (Boston,  1808). 

2  Letter  to  the  Hon.  Harrison  Gray  Otis,  by  John  Quincy 
Adams  (Boston,  1808). 

VOL.  IV. —  16 


242        HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  10. 

Thus  the  issue  between  a  British  and  American 
party  was  sharply  drawn.  Governor  Sullivan  charged 
-Pickering  with  an  attempt  to  excite  sedition  and 
rebellion,  and  to  bring  about  a  dissolution  of  govern 
ment.  Adams  made  no  mention  of  his  colleague's 
name.  In  Massachusetts  the  modern  canvass  was 
unknown ;  newspapers  and  pamphlets  took  the  place 
of  speeches  ;  the  pulpit  and  tavern  bar  were  the  only 
hustings ;  and  the  public  opinions  of  men  in  high 
official  or  social  standing  weighed  heavily.  The  let 
ters  of  Pickering,  Sullivan,  and  Adams  penetrated 
every  part  of  the  State,  and  on  the  issues  raised  by 
them  the  voters  made  their  choice. 

The  result  showed  that  Pickering's  calculation  on 
the  embargo  was  sound.  He  failed  to  overthrow 
Governor  Sullivan,  who  won  his  re-election  by  a 
majority  of  some  twelve  hundred  in  a  total  vote 
of  about  eighty-one  thousand ;  but  the  Federalists 
gained  in  the  new  Legislature  a  decided  majority, 
which  immediately  elected  James  Lloyd  to  succeed 
J.  Q.  Adams  in  the  Senate,  and  adopted  resolutions 
condemning  the  embargo.  Adams  instantly  resigned 
his  seat.  The  Legislature  chose  Lloyd  to  complete 
the  unfinished  term. 

Thus  the  ^great^State  of  Massachusetts  fell  back 
into  Federalism.  All,  and  more  than  all,  that  Jeffer 
son's  painful  labors  had  gained,  his  embargo  in  a  few 
weeks  wasted.  Had  the  evil  stopped  there  no  harm 
need  have  been  feared ;  but  the  reaction  went  far 
beyond  that  point.  The  Federalists  of  1801  were  the 


1808.  THE  RISE  OF  A  BRITISH  PARTY.          243 

national  party  of  America;  the  Federalists  of  1808 
were  a  British  faction  in  secret  league  with  George 
Canning. 

The  British  government  watched  closely  these 
events.  Rose's  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with 
Timothy  Pickering  and  with  the  Washington  repre 
sentatives  of  the  Essex  Junto  was  not  the  only  tie 
between  Westminster  and  Boston.  Of  all  British 
officials,  the  one  most  directly  interested  in  American 
politics  was  Sir  James  Craig,  then  Governor  of  Lower 
Canada,  who  resided  at  Quebec,  and  had  the  strongest 
reason  to  guard  against  attack  from  the  United 
States.  In  February,  1808,  when  the  question  of 
peace  or  war  seemed  hanging  on  the  fate  of  Rose's 
mission,  Sir  James  Craig  was  told  by  his  secretary, 
H.  W.  Ryland,  that  an  Englishman  about  to  visit 
New  England  from  Montreal  would  write  back  let 
ters  as  he  went,  which  might  give  valuable  hints  in 
regard  to  the  probable  conduct  of  the  American 
government  and  people.  The  man's  name  was 
John  Henry  ;  and  in  reporting  his  letters  to  Lord 
Castlcreagh  as  they  arrived,  Sir  James  Craig  spoke 
highly  of  the  writer  :  — 

"  Mr.  Henry  is  a  gentleman  of  considerable  ability, 
and,  I  believe,  well  able  to  form  a  correct  judgment  on 
what  he  sees  passing.  He  resided  for  some  time  in  the 
United  States,  and  is  well  acquainted  with  some  of  the 
leading  people  of  Boston,  to  which  place  he  was  called 
very  suddenly  from  Montreal,  where  he  at  present  lives, 
by  the  intelligence  he  received  that  his  agent  there  was 


244        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  10. 

among  the  sufferers  by  the  recent  measures  of  the  Ameri 
can  government.  He  has  not  the  most  distant  idea  that 
I  should  make  this  use  of  his  correspondence r  which 
therefore  can  certainly  have  no  other  view  than  that 
of  an  unreserved  communication  with  his  friend  who  is 
my  secretary."  1 

Sir  James  Craig  had  something  to  learn  in  regard 
to  volunteer  diplomatists  of  Henry's  type ;  but  being 
in  no  way  responsible  for  the  man,  he  read  the  letters 
which  came  addressed  to  Ryland,  but  which  were 
evidently  meant  for  the  Governor  of  Canada,  and 
proved  to  be  worth  his  reading.  The  first  was  writ 
ten  March  2,  from  S wanton  in  Vermont,  ten  miles 
from  the  Canada  border :  — 

"You  will  have  learned  that  Congress  has  passed  a 
law  prohibiting  the  transport  of  any  American  produce 
to  Canada,  and  the  collector  at  this  frontier  post  expects 
by  this  day's  mail  instructions  to  carry  it  into  rigorous 
execution.  The  sensibility  excited  by  this  measure 
among  the  inhabitants  in  the  northern  part  of  Vermont 
is  inconceivable.  The  roads  are  covered  with  sleighs, 
and  the  whole  country  seems  employed  in  conveying 
their  produce  beyond  the  line  of  separation.  The  clamor 
against  the  Government  —  and  this  measure  particularly 
—  is  such  that  you  may  expect  to  hear  of  an  engagement 
between  the  officers  of  government  and  the  sovereign 
people  on  the  first  effort  to  stop  the  introduction  of  that 
vast  quantity  of  lumber  and  produce  which  is  prepared 
for  the  Montreal  market." 

1  Sir  J.  H.  Craig  to  Lord  Castlereagh,  April  10,  1808  ;  MSS. 
British  Archives. 


1808.  THE   RISE   OF   A  BRITISH   PARTY.  245 

From  Windsor  in  Vermont,  March  6,  Henry  wrote 
again,  announcing  that  the  best-informed  people  be 
lieved  war  to  be  inevitable  between  the  United  States 
and  England.  From  Windsor  Henry  went  on  to 
Boston,  where  he  found  himself  at  home.  Acquainted 
with  the  best  people,  and  admitted  freely  into  soci 
ety,1  he  heard  all  that  was  said.  March  10,  when 
he  had  been  not  more  than  a  day  or  two  in  Boston, 
he  wrote  to  Ryland,  enclosing  a  Boston  newspaper 
of  the  same  morning,  in  which  Senator  Picker 
ing's  letter  to  Governor  Sullivan  appeared  and  the 
approaching  departure  of  Rose  was  announced. 
Already  he  professed  to  be  well-advised  of  what  was 
passing  in  private  Federalist  councils. 

"  The  men  of  talents,  property,  and  influence  in  Boston 
are  resolved  to  adopt  without  delay  every  expedient  to 
avert  the  impending  calamity,  and  to  express  their  deter 
mination  not  to  be  at  war  with  Great  Britain  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  indicate  resistance  to  the  government  in  the 
last  resort.  .  .  .  Very  active,  though  secret,  measures 
are  taken  to  rouse  the  people  from  the  lethargy  which 
if  long  continued  must  end  in  their  subjection  to  the 
modern  Attila." 

March  18  Henry  wrote  again,  announcing  that 
the  fear  of  war  had  vanished,  and  that  Jefferson 
meant  to  depend  upon  his  embargo  and  a  system 
of  irritation :  — 

"It is,  however,  to  be  expected  that  the  evil  will  pro 
duce  its  own  cure,  and  that  in  a  few  months  more  of 

1  Quincy's  Life  of  Josiah  Quincy,  p.  250. 


246         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  10. 

suffering  and  privation  of  all  the  benefits  of  commerce 
the  people  of  the  New  England  States  will  be  ready  to 
withdraw  from  the  confederacy,  establish  a  separate 
government,  and  adopt  a  policy  congenial  with  their 
interests  and  happiness.  For  a  measure  of  this  sort  the 
men  of  talents  and  property  are  now  ready,  and  only 
wait  until  the  continued  distress  of  the  multitude  shall 
make  them  acquainted  with  the  source  of  their  misery, 
and  point  out  an  efficient  remedy." 

These  letters,  immediately  on  their  receipt  at 
Quebec,  were  enclosed  by  Sir  James  Craig  to  Lord 
Castlereagh  in  a  letter  marked  "  Private,"  dated 
April  10,  and  sent  by  the  Halifax  mail,  as  the 
quickest  mode  of  conveyance.1  Meanwhile  Henry 
completed  his  business  in  Boston  and  returned  to 
Montreal,  where  he  arrived  April  11,  and  three  days 
afterward  wrote  again  to  Ryland  at  Quebec :  — 

' '  I  attended  a  private  meeting  of  several  of  the  princi 
pal  characters  in  Boston,  where  the  questions  of  immediate 
and  ultimate  necessity  were  discussed.  In  the  first,  all 
agreed  that  memorials  from  all  the  towns  (beginning  with 
Boston)  should  be  immediately  transmitted  to  the  Admin 
istration,  and  a  firm  determination  expressed  that  they 
will  not  co-operate  in  a  war  against  England.  I  dis 
tributed  several  copies  of  a  memorial  to  that  effect  in 
some  of  the  towns  in  Vermont  on  my  return.  The  mea 
sure  of  ultimate  necessity  which  I  suggested  I  found  in 
Boston  some  unwillingness  to  consider.  It  was  '  that 
in  case  of  a  declaration  of  war  the  State  of  Massachu- 

1  Sir  James  Craig  to  Lord  Castlereagh,  April  10,  1808;  MSS. 
British  Archives,  Lower  Canada,  vol.  cvii. 


1808.  THE  RISE  OF  A  BRITISH  PARTY.  247 

setts  should  treat  separately  for  itself,  and  obtain  from 
Great  Britain  a  guaranty  of  its  integrity.'  Although 
it  was  not  deemed  necessary  to  decide  on  a  measure 
of  this  sort  at  this  moment,  it  was  considered  as  a  very 
probable  step  in  the  last  resort.  In  fine,  every  man 
whose  opinion  I  could  ascertain  was  opposed  to  a  war, 
and  attached  to  the  cause  of  England." 

That  Henry  reported  with  reasonable  truth  the  gen-  I 
eral  character  of  Federalist  conversation  was  proved  I 
by  the  nearly  simultaneous  letters   of   Pickering  to/ 
Rose  ;  but  his  activity  did  not  stop  there.     In  a  final 
letter  of  April  25  he  gave  a  more  precise  account 
of  the  measures  to  be  taken  :  — 

"  In  my  last  I  omitted  to  mention  to  you  that  among 
the  details  of  the  plan  for  averting  from  the  Northern 
States  the  miseries  of  French  alliance  and  friendship, 
individuals  are  selected  in  the  several  towns  on  the  sea 
board  and  throughout  the  country  to  correspond  and  act 
in  concert  with  the  superintending  committee  at  Boston. 
The  benefits  of  any  organized  plan  over  the  distinct  and 
desultory  exertions  of  individuals  are,  I  think,  very 
apparent.  Whether  this  confederacy  of  the  men  of 
talents  and  property  be  regarded  as  a  diversion  of  the 
power  of  the  nation,  as  an  efficient  means  of  resistance 
to  the  general  government  in  the  event  of  a  war,  or  the 
nucleus  of  an  English  party  that  will  soon  be  formidable 
enough  to  negotiate  for  the  friendship  of  Great  Britain, 
it  is  in  all  respects  very  important ;  and  I  have  well- 
founded  reason  to  hope  that  a  few  months  more  of 
suffering  and  the  suspension  of  everything  collateral 
to  commerce  will  reconcile  the  multitude  to  any  men  and 
any  system  which  will  promise  them  relief." 


248         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  10. 

May  5  the  second  part  of  Henry's  correspondence 

was  forwarded  by  Sir  James  Craig  to  Lord  Castle- 

reagh,  who  could  compare  its  statements  with  those 

of   Pickering,  and  with   the   reports   of  Rose.     The 

alliance   between   the  New  England  Federalists   and 

\the  British  Tories  was  made.     Nothing  remained  but 

[to  concentrate  against  Jefferson  the  forces  at  their 

(command. 


CHAPTER  XI. 


THE  embargo  hacKlasted  less  than  four  months, 
when  April  19  the  President  at  Washington  was 
obliged  to  issue  a  proclamation  announcing  that  on 
Lake  Champlain  and  in  the  adjacent  country  persons 
were  combined  for  the  purpose  of  forming  insurrec 
tions  against  the  laws,  and  that  the  military  power 
of  the  government  must  aid  in  quelling  such  insur 
rections.1  Immense  rafts  of  lumber  were  collecting 
near  the  boundary  line ;  and  report  said  that  one 
such  raft,  near  half  a  mile  long,  carried  a  ball-proof/ 
fort,  and  was  manned  by  five  or  six  hundred  armed* 
men  prepared  to  defy  the  custom-house  officers.  This 
raft  was  said  to  contain  the  surplus  produce  of  Ver 
mont  for  a  year  past,  —  wheat,  potash,  pork,  and  beef, 
—  and  to  be  worth  upward  of  three  hundred  thou 
sand  dollars.2  The  governor  of  Vermont  ordered  out 
a  detachment  of  militia  to  stop  this  traffic,  and  the 
governor  of  New  York  ordered  another  detachment 
to  co-operate  with  that  of  Vermont.  May  8  rumors 
of  a  battle  were  afloat,  and  of  forty  men  killed  or 

1  Proclamation  of  April  19,  1808;  Annals  of  Congress,  1808- 
1809,  p.  580. 

2  New  York  Evening  Post,  May,  1808 


250         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  11. 

wounded.1  The  stories  were  untrue,  but  the  rafts 
escaped,  the  customs  officials  not  venturing  to  stop 
'  them. 

Reports  of  this  open  defiance  and  insurrection  on 
the  Canada  frontier  reached  Washington  at  the  same 
time  with  other  reports  which  revealed  endless  an 
noyances  elsewhere.  If  the  embargo  was  to  coerce 
England  or  France,  it  must  stop  supplies  to  the 
West  Indian  colonies,  and  prevent  the  escape  of 
cotton  or  corn  for  the  artisans  of  Europe.  The  em 
bargo  aimed  at  driving  England  to  desperation,  but 
not  at  famishing  America;  yet  the  President  found 
himself  at  a  loss  to  do  the  one  without  doing  the 
other.  Nearly  all  commerce  between  the  States  was 
by  coasting-vessels.  If  the  coasting-trade  should  be 
left  undisturbed,  every  schooner  that  sailed  from  an 
American  port  was  sure  to  allege  that  by  stress  of 
weather  or  by  the  accidents  of  navigation  it  had 
been  obliged  to  stop  at  some  port  of  Nova  Scotia  or 
the  West  Indies,  and  there  to  leave  its  cargo.  Only 
the  absolute  prohibition  of  the  coasting-trade  could 
prevent  these  evasions ;  but  to  prohibit  the  coasting- 
trade  was  to  sever  the  Union.  The  political  tie  might 
remain,  but  no  other  connection  could  survive.  With 
out  the  coasting-trade  New  England  would  be  deprived 
of  bread,  and  her  industries  would  perish ;  Charleston 
and  New  Orleans  would  stagnate  in  unapproachable 
solitude. 

Jefferson  proclaimed  the  existence  of  an  insur- 
1  National  Intelligencer,  May  23,  1808. 


3808.         THE   ENFORCEMENT  OF   EMBARGO.          251 

rection  on  the  Canadian  frontier  shortly  before  the 
adjournment  of  Congress.  Immediately  after  the 
adjournment  he  took  in  hand  the  more  serious  diffi 
culties  of  the  coasting-trade.  The  experiment  of 
peaceable  coercion  was  at  last  to  have  full  trial,  and 
Jefferson  turned  to  the  task  with  energy  that  seemed 
to  his  friends  excessive,  but  expressed  the  vital  inter 
est  he  felt  in  the  success  of  a  theory  on  which  his 
credit  as  a  statesman  depended.  The  crisis  was 
peculiarly  his  own ;  and  he  assumed  the  responsibility 
for  every  detail  of  its  management. 

May  6  the  President  wrote  to  Gallatin  a  letter  con 
taining  general  directions  to  detain  in  port  every 
coasting-vessel  which  could  be  regarded  as  suspicious. 
His  orders  were  sweeping.  The  power  of  the  em 
bargo  as  a  coercive  weapon  was  to  be  learned. 

"  In  the  outset  of  the  business  of  detentions,"  said  the 
President,1  "  I  think  it  impossible  to  form  precise  rules. 
After  a  number  of  cases  shall  have  arisen,  they  may 
probably  be  thrown  into  groups  and  subjected  to  rules. 
The  great  leading  object  of  the  Legislature  was,  and  ours 
in  execution  of  it  ought  to  be,  to  give  complete  effect  to 
the  embargo  laws.  They  have  bidden  agriculture,  com 
merce,  navigation  to  bow  before  that  object,  —  to  be 
nothing  when  in  competition  with  that.  Finding  all 
their  endeavors  at  general  rules  to  be  evaded,  they 
finally  gave  us  the  power  of  detention  as  the  panacea ; 
and  I  am  clear  we  ought  to  use  it  freely,  that  we  may  by 
a  fair  experiment  know  the  power  of  this  great  weapon, 
the  embargo." 

1  Jefferson  to  Gallatin,  May  6,  1808;  Works,  v.  287. 


252         HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  11. 

A  few  days  later  Jefferson  repeated  the  warning  in 
stronger  language :  "  I  place  immense  value  in  the 
experiment  being  fully  made,  how  far  an  embargo 
may  be  an  effectual  weapon  in  future  as  well  as  on 
this  occasion."  1 

"  Where  you  are  doubtful,"  continued  the  instruc 
tions  to  Gallatin,  "  consider  me  as  voting  for  deten 
tion  ; "  and  every  coasting-vessel  was  an  object  of 
doubt.  On  the  same  day  with  the  letter  of  May  6  to 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  the  President  wrote  a 
circular  to  the  governors  of  New  Hampshire,  Massa 
chusetts,  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  and  Orleans, — 
portions  of  the  Union  which  consumed  more  wheat 
than  they  produced,  —  requesting  them  to  issue  cer 
tificates  for  such  quantities  of  flour  as  were  likely 
to  be  needed  beyond  their  local  supply.  The  certifi 
cates,  directed  to  the  collector  of  some  port  usually 
exporting  flour,  were  to  be  issued  to  "  any  merchant 
in  whom  you  have  confidence."2  All  other  ship 
ments  of  produce  were  objects  of  suspicion.  "  I  really 
think,"  wrote  the  President  to  Gallatin,  "  it  would 
be  well  to  recommend  to  every  collector  to  consider 
every  shipment  of  provisions,  lumber,  flaxseed,  tar, 
cotton,  tobacco,  etc.,  —  enumerating  the  articles,  —  as 
sufficiently  suspicious  for  detention  and  reference 
here."  He  framed  new  instructions  to  the  governors 

1  Jefferson  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  May  15,  1808 ; 
Works,  v.  289. 

2  Jefferson  to  the  Governors  of  Orleans,  etc.,  May  6,  1808; 
Works,  v.  285. 


1808.         THE_ENFORCEMENT   OF  EMBARGO.         253 

on  this  idea :  "  We  find  it  necessary  to  consider  every 
vessel  as  suspicious  which  has  on  board  any  articles 
of  domestic  produce  in  demand  at  foreign  markets, 
and  most  especially  provisions."  l 

Gallatin,  having  early  declared  his  want  of  faith  in 
the  embargo  as  a  coercive  measure,  was  the  more 
bound  to  prove  that  his  private  opinion  did  not  pre 
vent  him  from  giving  full  trial  to  the  experiment 
which  Executive  and  Legislature  had  ordered  him  to 
make.  He  set  himself  resolutely  to  the  unpleasant 
task.  Instead  of  following  the  President's  plan  of  in 
discriminate  suspicion  and  detention,  he  preferred  to 
limit  the  suspicious  cargo  in  value,  so  that  no  vessel 
could  carry  provisions  to  the  amount  of  more  than 
one-eighth  of  the  bond ;  but  before  he  could  put  his 
system  in  force,  new  annoyances  arose.  Governor 
Sullivan  of  Massachusetts,  under  the  President's  cir 
cular,  issued  certificates  before  July  15  to  the  amount 
of  fifty  thousand  barrels  of  flour  and  one  hundred 
thousand  bushels  of  corn,  besides  rice  and  rye.  Gal 
latin  complained  to  the  President,2  who  instantly 
wrote  to  the  governor  of  Massachusetts  an  order  to 
stop  importing  provisions  :  — 

"As  these  supplies,  although  called  for  within  the 
space  of  two  months,  will  undoubtedly  furnish  the  con 
sumption  of  your  State  for  a  much  longer  time,  I  have 

1  Jefferson  to   Gallatin,  May  16,   1808;  Gallatin's  Writings, 
i.  389. 

2  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  July  15,  1808;    Gallatin's   Writings, 
i.  394. 


254        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  11. 

thought  advisable  to  ask  the  favor  of  your  Excellency, 
after  the  receipt  of  this  letter,  to  discontinue  issuing 
any  other  certificates,  that  we  may  not  unnecessarily 
administer  facilities  to  the  evasion  of  the  embargo 
laws."  l 

That  Massachusetts  already  on  the  brink  of  re 
bellion  should  tolerate  such  dictation  could  hardly  be 
expected ;  and  it  was  fortunate  for  Jefferson  that 
the  Federalists  had  failed  to  elect  a  governor  of  their 
own  stripe.  Even  Sullivan,  Democrat  as  he  was, 
could  not  obey  the  President's  request,  and  excused 
his  disobedience  in  a  letter  which  was  intended  to 
convince  Jefferson  that  the  people  of  Massachusetts 
were  the  best  judges  of  the  amount  of  food  they 
needed. 

"  The  seaport  towns,"  Sullivan  wrote,2  "  are  supported 
almost  entirely  by  bread  from  the  Southern  and  Middle 
States.  The  interior  of  this  State  live  on  a  mixture  of 
Indian  corn  and  rye  in  common  regimen,  but  their  fine 
bread  and  pastry  depend  on  the  importations  from  the 
southward,  carted  into  the  interior.  The  country  towns 
consume  more  imported  flour  than  is  equivalent  for  all 
the  grain  they  carry  to  market  in  the  seaport  towns. 
Their  hogs  and  poultry  consume  much  Indian  corn.  The 
rice  imported  here  from  the  southward,  since  the  Em 
bargo  Act,  has  been  very  inconsiderable.  The  Indian 
corn  is  in  greater  quantities,  but  that  would  not  find  a 
market  in  the  British  or  French  dominions  if  there  was 
no  embargo.  This  is  an  article  of  great  demand  here, 

1  Jefferson  to  Sullivan,  July  16,  1808;  Works,  v.  317. 

2  Sullivan  to  Jefferson,  July  23,  1808 ;  Jefferson  MSS. 


1808.         THE  ENFORCEMENT  OF  EMBARGO.         255 

not  as  bread,  but  as  sustenance  for  carriage-horses, 
draft-horses,  etc.,  and  the  quantity  consumed  is  really 
astonishing." 

Sullivan  admitted  that  the  habits  of  the  Massachu 
setts  people,  contracted  under  the  royal  government 
and  still  continued,  led  to  the  evasion  of  commercial 
laws ;  but  he  told  the  President  what  would  be  the 
result  of  an  arbitrary  interference  with  their  supplies 
of  food :  — 

"You  may  depend  upon  it  that  three  weeks  after 
these  certificates  shall  be  refused,  an  artificial  and  actual 
scarcity  will  involve  this  State  in  mobs,  riots,  and  con 
vulsions,  pretendedly  on  account  of  the  embargo.  Your 
enemies  will  have  an  additional  triumph,  and  your 
friends  suffer  new  mortifications."1 

Governor  Sullivan  was  a  man  of  ability  and  courage. 
Popular  and  successful,  he  had  broken  the  long  sway 
of  Federalism  in  Massachusetts,  and  within  a  few 
months  had  carried  his  re-election  against  the  ut 
most  exertions  of  the  Essex  Junto ;  but  he  had  seen 
John  Quincy  Adams  fall  a  sacrifice  to  the  embargo, 
and  he  had  no  wish  to  be  himself  the  next  victim 
of  Jefferson's  theories.  His  situation  was  most  diffi 
cult,  and  he  warned  the  President  that  the  embargo 
was  making  it  worse :  — 

"  The  embargo  has  been  popular  with  what  is  denom 
inated  the  Republican  part  of  the  State  ;  but  as  it  does 
not  appear  from  anything  that  has  taken  place  in  the 
European  Powers  that  it  has  had  the  expected  effect 

1  Sullivan  to  Jefferson,  July  21,  1808;  Jefferson  MSS. 


256        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  11. 

there,  it  has  begun  to  lose  its  support  from  the  public 
opinion.  .  .  .  There  are  judicious  men  in  this  State  who 
are  friends  to  the  present  Administration,  and  who  have 
been  in  favor  of  the  embargo  as  a  measure  of  expedience 
which  ought  to  have  been  adopted  by  the  government, 
but  who  how  express  great  doubts  as  to  the  power  of 
enforcing  it  much  longer  under  present  circumstances. 
They  do  not  perceive  any  of  the  effects  from  it  that  the 
nation  expected ;  they  do  not  perceive  foreign  Powers 
influenced  by  it,  as  they  anticipated.  They  are  convinced, 
as  they  say,  that  the  people  of  this  State  must  soon  be 
reduced  to  suffering  and  poverty.  .  .  .  These  men  con 
sider  the  embargo  as  operating  very  forcibly  to  the  sub 
version  of  the  Republican  interest  here.  Should  the 
measure  be  much  longer  continued,  and  then  fail  of  pro 
ducing  any  important  public  good,  I  imagine  it  will  be  a 
decisive  blow  against  the  Republican  interest  now  sup 
ported  in  this  Commonwealth."1 

Jefferson  resented  Sullivan's  conduct.  A  few  days 
afterward  he  wrote  to  General  Dearborn,  the  Secre 
tary  of  War,  who  was  then  in  Maine,  warning  him  to 
be  ready  to  support  the  measure  which  Sullivan  had 
declined  to  adopt. 

"Yours  of  July  27  is  received,"  Jefferson  said.2  "  It 
confirms  the  accounts  we  receive  from  others  that  the  in 
fractions  of  the  embargo  in  Maine  and  Massachusetts  are 
open.  I  have  removed  Pope,  of  New  Bedford,  for  worse 
than  negligence.  The  collector  of  Sullivan  is  on  the 
totter.  The  Tories  of  Boston  openly  threaten  insurrec 
tion  if  their  importation  of  flour  is  stopped.  The  next 

1  Sullivan  to  Jefferson,  July  23,  1808;  Jefferson  MSS. 

2  Jefferson  to  Lincoln,  Aug.  9,  1808;  Works,  v.  334. 


1808.         THE  ENFORCEMENT  OF  EMBARGO.         257 

post  will  stop  it.     I  fear  your  Governor  [Sullivan]  is  not 
up  to  the  tone  of  these  parricides,  and  I  hope  on  the 
first  symptom  of  an  open  opposition  of  the  law  by  force    i 
you  will  fly  to  the  scene,  and   aid  in   suppressing   any 
commotion." 

Blood  was  soon  shed,  but  Jefferson  did  not  shrink. 
The  new  army  was  stationed  along  the  Canada  fron 
tier.  The  gunboats  and  frigates  patrolled  the  coast. 
On  every  side  dangers  and  difficulties  accumulated. 
"  I  did  not  expect  a  crop  of  so  sudden  and  rank 
growth  of  fraud  and  open  opposition  by  force  could 
have  grown  up  in  the  United  States." l  At  New- 
buryport  an  armed  mob  on  the  wharf  prevented  the 
custom-house  officers  from  detaining  a  vessel  about 
to  sail.  The  collectors  and  other  officers  were  ill- 
disposed,  or  were  harassed  by  suits  at  law  for  illegal 
detentions.  Rebellion  and  disunion  stared  Jefferson 
in  the  face,  but  only  caused  him  to  challenge  an  out 
break  and  to  invite  violence. 

"That  the  Federalists  may  attempt  insurrection  is 
possible,"  he  wrote  to  Gallatin,2  "  and  also  that  the 
governor  would  sink  before  it ;  but  the  Republican  part 
of  the  State,  and  that  portion  of  the  Federalists  who 
approve  the  embargo  in  their  judgments,  and  at  any  rate 
would  not  court  mob  law,  would  crush  it  in  embryo.  I 
have  some  time  ago  written  to  General  Dearborn  to  be 
on  the  alert  on  such  an  occasion,  and  to  take  direction 
of  the  public  authority  on  the  spot.  Such  an  incident 
will  rally  the  whole  body  of  Republicans  of  every 

1  Jefferson  to  Gallatin,  Aug.  11,  1808;  Works,  v.  336. 

2  Jefferson  to  Gallatin,  Aug.  19,  1808  ;  Works,  v.  346. 
VOL.  iv.  — 17 


258        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  11. 

shade  to  a  single  point,  —  that  of  supporting  the  public 
authority." 

The  Federalists  knew  when  to  rebel.  Jefferson 
could  teach  them  little  on  that  subject.  They  meant 
first  to  overthrow  Jefferson  himself,  and  were  in  a 
fair  way  to  gratify  their  wish ;  for  the  people  of  New 
England  —  Republican  and  Federalist  alike  —  were 
rapidly  rallying  to  common  hatred  of  the  President. 
As  winter  approached,  the  struggle  between  Jefferson 

f  and  Massachusetts  became  on  both  sides  vindictive. 
He  put  whole  communities  under  his  ban.  He  stopped 
the  voyage  of  every  vessel  "  in  which  any  person  is 
concerned,  either  in  interest  or  in  navigating  her, 
who  has  ever  been  concerned  in  interest  or  in  the 
navigation  of  a  vessel  which  has  at  any  time  before 
entered  a  foreign  port  contrary  to  the  views  of  the 
embargo  laws,  and  under  any  pretended  distress  or 
duress  whatever." 1  When  a  permit  was  asked  for 

\  the  schooner  "  Caroline,"  of  Buckstown  on  the  Penob- 
scot,  Jefferson  replied, — 

u  This  is  the  first  time  that  the  character  of  the  place 
has  been  brought  under  consideration  as  an  objection. 
Yet  a  general  disobedience  to  the  laws  in  any  place  must 
have  weight  toward  refusing  to  give  them  any  facilities 
to  evade.  In  such  a  case  we  may  fairly  require  positive 
proof  that  the  individual  of  a  town  tainted  with  a  general 
spirit  of  disobedience  has  never  said  or  done  anything 
himself  to  countenance  that  spirit."2 

1  Jefferson  to  Gallatin,  Dec.  7,  1808 ;     Works,  v.  396. 

2  Jefferson  to  Gallatin,  Nov.  13,  1808  ;  Works,  v.  386. 


1808.         THE   ENFORCEMENT  OF  EMBARGO.         259 

Jefferson  went  still  further  in  his  reply  to  a  peti 
tion  from  the  island  of  Nantucket  for  food.  "  Our 
opinion  here  is  that  that  place  has  been  so  deeply 
concerned  in  smuggling,  that  if  it  wants  it  is  because 
it  has  illegally  sent  away  what  it  ought  to  have  re 
tained  for  its  own  consumption." 

Of  all  the  old  Republican  arguments  for  a  policy 
of  peace,  the  commonest  was  that  a  standing  army; 
would  be  dangerous,  not  to  foreign  enemies,  but  to 
popular  liberties  ;  yet  the  first  use  of  the  new  army 
and  gunboats  was  against  fellow-citizens.  New  Eng 
land  was  chiefly  controlled  by  the  navy  ;  but  in  New 
York  the  army  was  needed  and  was  employed.  Open 
insurrection  existed  there.  Besides  forcible  resist 
ance  offered  to  the  law,  no  one  was  ignorant  that  the 
collectors  shut  their  eyes  to  smuggling,  and  that 
juries,  in  defiance  of  court  and  President,  refused 
to  indict  rioters.  Governor  Tompkins  announced 
that  Oswego  was  in  active  insurrection,  and  called 
on  the  President  to  issue  a  proclamation  to  that 
effect.2  Jefferson  replied  by  offering  to  take  into 
the  United  States  service  the  militia  required  to 
suppress  the  riots,  and  begged  Governor  Tompkins 
to  lead  his  troops  in  person.  "  I  think  it  so  im 
portant  in  example  to  crush  these  audacious  pro 
ceedings  and  to  make  the  offenders  feel  the  con 
sequences  of  individuals  daring  to  oppose  a  law  by 

1  Jefferson  to  Levi  Lincoln,  Nov.  13,  1808  ;  Works,  v.  387. 

2  Gallatin  to   Jefferson,   July  29,  1808  ;  Gallatin's   Writings, 
i,  396. 


260        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  11. 

force,  that   no  effort  should  be  spared  to   compass 
this  object."1 

When  permission  was  asked  to  establish  a  -packet 
on  Lake  Champlain,  "  I  do  not  think  this  is  a  time," 
replied  Jefferson,  "  for  opening  new  channels  of  inter 
course  with  Canada  and  multiplying  the  means  of 
smuggling."2  The  people  who  lived  on  the  shores 
of  Lake  Champlain  might  object  to  such  interference 
in  their  affairs,  but  could  not  deny  the  force  of 
Jefferson's  reasoning.  Another  application  of  a  dif 
ferent  kind  was  rejected  on  grounds  that  seemed 
to  give  to  the  President  general  supervision  over  the 
diet  of  the  people  :  — 

' '  The  declaration  of  the  bakers  of  New  York  that  their 
citizens  will  be  dissatisfied,  under  the  present  circum 
stances  of  their  country,  to  eat  bread  of  the  flour  of  their 
own  State,  is  equally  a  libel  on  the  produce  and  citizens 
of  the  State.  ...  If  this  prevails,  the  next  application 
will  be  for  vessels  to  go  to  New  York  for  the  pippins  of 
that  State,  because  they  are  higher  flavored  than  the  same 
species  of  apples  growing  in  other  States."  8 

The  same  sumptuary  rule  applied  to  Louisiana. 
"  You  know  I  have  been  averse  to  letting  Atlantic 
flour  go  to  New  Orleans  merely  that  they  may  have 
the  whitest  bread  possible."4 

1  Jefferson  to  Governor  Tompkins,  Aug.  15,   1808  ;  Works, 
v.  343. 

2  Jefferson  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  Sept.  9,  1808  ; 
Works,  v.  363. 

8  Jefferson  to  Gallatin,  July  12,  1808  ;  Works,  v.  307. 
4  Jefferson  to  Gallatin,  Sept.  9,  1808  ;  Works,  v.  363. 


1808.         THE  ENFORCEMENT  OF   EMBARGO.         261 

The  President  seemed  alone  to  feel  this  passionate 
earnestness  on  behalf  of  the  embargo.  His  Cabinet 
looked  on  with  alarm  and  disgust.  Madison  took  no 
share  in  the  task  of  enforcement.  .  Robert  Srv&h 
sent  frigates  and'  gur^soats  hither  and  t^tier,  but 
made  no  concealment  of  his  feelings.  "  Most  fer 
vently,"  he  wrote  to  Gallatin,  "  ought  we  to  pray  to 
be  relieved  from  the  various  embarrassments  of  this 
said  embargo.  Upon  it  there  will  in  some  of  the 
States,  in  the  course  of  the  next  two  months,  as 
suredly  be  engendered  monsters.  Would  that  we 
could  be  placed  on  proper  ground  for  calling  in  this 
mischief-making  busy-body." 1  Smith  talked  freely, 
while  Gallatin,  whose  opinion  was  probably  the  same, 
said  little,  and  labored  to  carry  out  the  law,  but 
seemed  at  times  disposed  to  press  on  the  Presi 
dent's  attention  the  deformities  of  his  favorite 
monster. 

"  I  am  perfectly  satisfied,"  wrote  Gallatin  to  the  Presi 
dent  July  29,2  "that  if  the  embargo  must  be  persisted 
in  any  longer,  two  principles  must  necessarily  be  adopted 
in  order  to  make  it  sufficient :  First,  that  not  a  single 
vessel  shall  be  permitted  to  move  without  the  special 
permission  of  the  Executive  ;  Second,  that  the  collectors 
be  invested  with  the  general  power  of  seizing  property 
anywhere,  and  taking  the  rudders,  or  otherwise  effec 
tually  preventing  the  departure  of  any  vessel  in  harbor, 
though  ostensibly  intended  to  remain  there,  —  and  that 

1  Smith  to  Gallatin,  Aug.  1,  1808;  Adams's  Gallatin,  p.  373. 

2  Gallatin  to    Jefferson,  July  19,  1808  ;  Gallatin's   Writings, 
i.  396. 


262         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  11. 

without  being  liable  to  personal  suits.  I  am  sensible  that 
such  arbitrary  powers  are  equally  dangerous  and  odious  ; 
but  a  restrictive  measure  of  the  nature  of  the  embargo, 
to  a  nation  under  such  circumstances  as  the 

'*V~i\_ 

States^cannot  de  enforced  without  the  assistance 
of  means  as  strong  as  the  measure  itself.  To  that  legal 
authority  to  prevent,  seize,  and  detain,  must  be  added 
a  sufficient  physical  force  to  carry  it  into  effect ;  and 
although  I  believe  that  in  our  seaports  little  difficulty 
would  be  encountered,  we  must  have  a  little  army  along 
the  Lakes  and  British  lines  generally.  .  .  .  That  in  the 
present  situation  of  the  world  every  effort  should  be 
attempted  to  preserve  the  peace  of  this  nation,  cannot 
be  doubted ;  but  if  the  criminal  party-rage  of  Federalists 
and  Tories  shall  have  so  far  succeeded  as  to  defeat  our 
endeavors  to  obtain  that  object  by  the  only  measure  that 
could  possibly  have  effected  it,  we  must  submit  and  pre 
pare  for  war." 

"  I  mean  generally  to  express  an  opinion,"  con 
tinued  the  secretary,  "  founded  on  the  experience  of 
this  summer,  that  Congress  must  either  invest  the 
Executive  with  the  most  arbitrary  powers  and  suffi 
cient  force  to  carry  the  embargo  into  effect,  or  give 
it  up  altogether."  That  Jefferson  should  permit  a 
member  of  his  Cabinet  to  suggest  the  assumption  of 
"  the  most  arbitrary  powers  ;  "  that  he  should  tol 
erate  the  idea  of  using  means  "  equally  dangerous  and 
odious,"  —  seemed  incredible ;  but  his  reply  showed 
no  sign  of  offence.  He  instantly  responded,  — 

"  I  am  satisfied  with  you  that  if  Orders  and  Decrees 
are  not  repealed,  and  a  continuance  of  the  embargo  is 


1808.         THE   ENFORCEMENT  OF   EMBARGO,         263 

preferred  to  war  (which  sentiment  is  universal  here), 
Congress  must  legalize  all  means  which  may  be  necessary 
to  obtain  its  end."  1 

If  repeated  and  menacing  warnings  from  the  peo 
ple,  the  State  authorities,  and  officers  of  the  national 
government  failed  to  produce  an  impression  on  the 
President's  mind,  he  was  little  likely  to  regard  what 
came  from  the  Judiciary  ;  yet  the  sharpest  of  his 
irritations  was  caused  by  a  judge  whom  he  had 
himself,  in  1804,  placed  on  the  Supreme  Bench  to 
counteract  Marshall's  influence.  Some  merchants  of 
Charleston,  with  consent  of  the  collector  and  district- 
attorney,  applied  for  a  mandamus  to  oblige  the  col 
lector  of  that  town  to  clear  certain  ships  for 
Baltimore.  The  collector  admitted  that  he  believed 
the  voyage  to  be  intended  in  good  faith,  and  that 
under  the  Embargo  Law  he  had  no  right  of  deten 
tion  ;  but  he  laid  Secretary  Gallatin's  instructions 
before  the  court.  The  case  was  submitted  without 
argument,  and  Justice  William  Johnson,  of  the  South 
Carolina  circuit,  —  a  native  of  South  Carolina,  and 
a  warm  friend  of  the  President,  —  decided  that  the 
Act  of  Congress  did  not  warrant  detention,  and  that 
without  the  sanction  of  law  the  collector  was  not 
justified  by  instructions  from  the  Executive  in  in 
creasing  the  restraints  upon  commerce.  The  manda 
mus  issued. 

These  proceedings  troubled  but  did  not  check  the 
President.  "I  saw  them  with  great  concern,"  he 
1  Jefferson  to  Gallatin,  Aug.  11,  1808  ;  Works,  v.  336. 


264         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  u. 

wrote  to  the  governor  of  South  Carolina,1  "  because 
of  the  quarter  from  whence  they  came,  and  where 
they  could  not  be  ascribed  to  any  political  wayward 
ness."  Rodney,  the  attorney-general,  undertook  to 
overrule  Justice  Johnson's  law,  and  wrote,  under 
the  President's  instructions,  an  official  opinion  that 
the  court  had  no  power  to  issue  a  mandamus  in 
such  a  case.  This  opinion  was  published  in  the 
newspapers  at  the  end  of  July,  "  an  act  unprece 
dented  in  the  history  of  executive  conduct,"  which 
in  a  manner  forced  Justice  Johnson  into  a  newspaper 
controversy.  The  Judge's  defence  of  his  course  was 
temperate  and  apparently  convincing  to  himself,  al 
though  five  years  afterward  he  delivered  an  opinion2 
of  the  whole  Supreme  Court  in  a  similar  case,  "  un 
questionably  inconsistent "  with  his  embargo  decision, 
which  he  then  placed  on  technical  ground.  He 
never  regained  -Jefferson's  confidence ;  and  so  effec 
tive  was  the  ban  that  in  the  following  month  of 
December  the  Georgia  grand-jury,  in  his  own  circuit, 
made  him  the  object  of  a  presentment  for  "  improper 
interference  with  the  Executive." 

If  the  conduct  of  Justice  Johnson  only  stimulated 
the  President's  exercise  of  power,  the  constitutional 
arguments  of  Federalist  lawyers  and  judges  were 
unlikely  to  have  any  better  effect ;  yet  to  a  Virginia 
Republican  of  1798  no  question  could  have  deeper 

1  Jefferson    to    Governor  Pinckney,  July    18,  1808  ;  Works, 
v.  322. 

2  Mclntyre  v  Wood,  March,  1813;  7  Cranch,  p.  504. 


1808.          THE   ENFORCEMENT   OF   EMBARGO.          265 

interest  than  that  of  the  constitutionality  of  the  em 
bargo.  The  subject  had  already  been  discussed  in 
Congress,  and  had  called  out  a  difference  of  opinion. 
There,  Randolph  argued  against  the  constitutionality 
in  a  speech  never  reported,  which  turned  on  the  dis 
tinction  between  regulating  commerce  and  destroy 
ing  it;  between  a  restriction  limited  in  time  and 
scope,  and  an  interdict  absolute  and  permanent.  The 
opponents  of  the  embargo  system,  both  Federalists 
and  Republicans,  took  the  same  ground.  The  Con 
stitution,  they  said,  empowered  Congress  "  to  regulate 
commerce  with  foreign  nations,  and  among  the  sev 
eral  States,  and  with  the  Indian  tribes ;  "  but  no  one 
ever  supposed  it  to  grant  Congress  the  power  "  to 
prohibit  commerce  with  foreign  nations,  and  among 
the  several  States,  and  with  the  Indian  tribes."  Had 
such  words  been  employed,  the  Constitution  could 
not  have  gained  the  vote  of  a  single  State. 

History  has  nothing  to  do  with  law  except  to  "" 
record  the  development  of  legal  principles.  The 
question  whether  the  embargo  was  or  was  not  Con 
stitutional  depended  for  an  answer  on  the  decision 
of  Congress,  President,  and  Judiciary,  and  the  assent 
of  the  States.  Whatever  unanimous  decision  these  po 
litical  bodies  might  make,  no  matter  how  extravagant, 
was  law  until  it  should  be  reversed.  No  theory  could 
control  the  meaning  of  the  Constitution ;  but  the 
relation  between  facts  and  theories  was  a  political 
matter,  and  between  the  embargo  and  the  old  Vir 
ginia  theory  of  the  Constitution  no  relation  could 


266         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  11. 

be  imagined.  Whatever  else  was  doubtful,  no  one 
could  doubt  that  under  the  doctrine  of  State-rights 
and  the  rules  of  strict  construction  the  embargo 
was  unconstitutional.  Only  by  the  widest  theories 

I  of  liberal  construction  could  its  constitutionality  be 

/  sustained. 

\  The  arguments  in  its  favor  were  arguments  which 
[had  been  once  regarded  as  fatal  to  public  liberty. 
The  first  was  made  by  Richard  M.  Johnson  of  Ken 
tucky  :  "  If  we  have  power  to  lay  an  embargo  for  one 
day,  have  we  not  the  power  to  renew  it  at  the  end 
of  that  day  ?  If  for  sixty  days,  have  we  not  the 
power  to  renew  it  again  ?  Would  it  not  amount  to 
the  same  thing  ?  If  we  pass  a  law  to  expire  within 
a  limited  term,  we  may  renew  it  at  the  end  of  that 
term ;  and  there  is  no  difference  between  a  power 
to  do  this,  and  a  power  to  pass  laws  without  specified 
limit."  1  This  principle,  if  sound,  might  be  applied 
to  the  right  of  habeas  corpus  or  of  free  speech,  to 
'the  protection  of  American  manufactures  or  to  the 
issue  of  paper  money  as  a  legal  tender ;  and  when 
ever  such  application  should  be  made,  the  Union  must 
submit  to  take  its  chance  of  the  consequences  sure 
to  follow  the  removal  of  specified  limits  to  power. 
Another  argument  was  used  by  David  R.  Williams, 
a  representative  South  Carolinian.  "  The  embargo 
is  not  an  annihilation  but  a  suspension  of  commerce," 
he  urged,2  "  to  regain  the  advantages  of  which  it  has 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  1807-1808,  p.  2091. 

2  Annals  of  Congress,  1807-1808,  p.  2130. 


1808.          THE   ENFORCEMENT   OF   EMBARGO.          267 

been  robbed."  If  Congress  had  the  right  to  regulate 
commerce  for  such  a  purpose  in  1808,  South  Carolina 
seemed  to  have  no  excuse  for  questioning,  twenty 
years  later,  the  constitutionality  of  a  protective  sys 
tem.  Still  another  argument  was  used  by  George 
W.  Campbell  of  Tennessee. 

"A  limited  embargo,"  he  said,1  "can  only  mean  an 
embargo  that  is  to  terminate  at  some  given  time  ;  and  the 
length  of  time,  if  a  hundred  years,  will  not  change  the 
character  of  the  embargo,  —  it  is  still  limited.  If  it  be 
constitutional  to  lay  it  for  one  day,  it  must  be  equally 
so  to  lay  it  for  ten  days  or  a  hundred  days  or  as  many 
years,  —  it  would  still  be  a  limited  embargo ;  and  no 
one  will,  I  presume,  deny  that  an  embargo  laid  for 
such  a  length  of  time,  and  one  laid  without  limitation, 
would  in  reality  and  to  all  practical  purposes  be  the 
same." 

This  reasoning  was  supported  by  an  immense  ma 
jority  in  both  Houses  of  Congress ;  was  accepted  as 
sound  by  the  Executive,  and  roused  no  protest  from 
the  legislature  of  any  Southern  State.  So  far  as 
concerned  all  these  high  political  authorities,  the 
principle  was  thus  settled  that  the  Constitution, 
under  the  power  to  regulate  commerce,  conferred 
upon  Congress  the  power  to  suspend  foreign  com4 
merce  forever ;  to  suspend  or  otherwise  regulate) 
domestic  and  inter-state  commerce ;  to  subject  all 
industry  to  governmental  control,  if  such  interfer 
ence  in  the  opinion  of  Congress  was  necessary  or 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  p.  2147. 


268         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  11. 

proper  for  carrying  out  its  purpose ;  and  finally,  to 
vest  in  the  President  discretionary  power  to  execute 
or  to  suspend  the  system,  in  whole  or  in  part. 

The  Judiciary  had  still  to  be  consulted.  In  the 
September  Term,  1808,  an  embargo  case  was  argued 
at  Salem  before  John  Davis,  judge  of  the  District 
Court  for  Massachusetts  ;  and  Samuel  Dexter,  the 
ablest  lawyer  in  New  England,  urged  the  constitu 
tional  objections  to  the  embargo  with  all  the  force 
that  ability  and  conviction  could  give.  No  sounder 
Federalist  than  Judge  Davis  sat  on  the  bench ;  but 
although  the  newspapers  of  his  party  were  declaim 
ing  against  the  constitutionality  of  the  law,  and 
although  Chief -Justice  Parsons,  of  the  Massachusetts 
Supreme  Court,  the  most  eminent  legal  authority 
in  the  State,  lent  his  private  influence  on  the  same 
side,  Judge  Davis  calmly  laid  down  the  old  Fed 
eralist  rule  of  brojrl  -p.nnatvjMiinn.  His  opinion,  elabo 
rately  argued  and  illustrated,  was  printed  in  every 
newspaper. 

"  Stress  has  been  laid  in  argument,"  he  said,  "  on  the 
word  '  regulate/  as  implying  in  itself  a  limitation.  Power 
to  ;  regulate,'  it  is  said,  cannot  be  understood  to  give  a 
power  to  annihilate.  To  this  it  may  be  replied  that  the 
Acts  under  consideration,  though  of  very  ample  extent, 
do  not  operate  as  a  prohibition  of  all  foreign  commerce. 
It  will  be  admitted  that  partial  prohibitions  are  author 
ized  by  the  expression ;  and  how  shall  the  degree  or 
extent  of  the  prohibition  be  adjusted  but  by  the  discre 
tion  of  the  national  government,  to  whom  the  subject 
appears  to  be  committed." 


1808.         THE   ENFORCEMENT  OF  EMBARGO.         269 

In  the  Federalist  spirit  the  Judge  invoked  the 
"necessary  and  proper"  clause,  which  had  been  the 
cloak  for  every  assumption  of  doubtful  powers ;  and 
then  passed  to  the  doctrine  of  "  inherent  sover 
eignty,"  the  radical  line  of  division  between  the 
party  of  President  Washington  and  that  of  Presi 
dent  Jefferson :  - 

"Further,  the  power  to  regulate  commerce  is  not  to 
be  confined  to  the  adoption  of  measures  exclusively  ben 
eficial  to  commerce  itself,  or  tending  to  its  advancement ; 
but  in  our  national  system,  as  in  all  modern  sovereign 
ties,  it  is  also  to  be  considered  as  an  instrument  for 
other  purposes  of  general  policy  and  interest.  The 
mode  of  its  management  is  a  consideration  of  great 
delicacy  and  importance  ;  but  the  national  right  or  power 
to  adapt  regulations  of  commerce  to  other  purposes 
than  the  mere  advancement  of  commerce  appears  to  me 
unquestionable." 

After  drawing  these  conclusions  from  the  power 
to  regulate  commerce,  the  Judge  went  a  step  fur 
ther,  and  summoned  to  his  aid  the  spirits  which 
haunted  the  dreams  of  every  true  Republican,  —  the 
power  of  war,  and  necessity  of  State :  — 

"  Congress  has  power  to  declare  war.  It  of  course 
has  power  to  prepare  for  war;  and  the  time,  the 
manner,  and  the  measure,  in  the  application  of  consti 
tutional  means,  seem  to  be  left  to  its  wisdom  and  dis 
cretion.  Foreign  intercourse  becomes  in  such  times  a 
subject  of  peculiar  interest,  and  its  regulation  forms  an 
obvious  and  essential  branch  of  federal  administration. 
...  It  seems  to  have  been  admitted  in  the  argument 


270        HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  11. 

that  State  necessity  might  justify  a  limited  embargo, 
or  suspension  of  all  foreign  commerce  ;  but  if  Congress 
have  the  power,  for  purposes  of  safety,  of  preparation, 
or  counteraction,  to  suspend  commercial  intercourse  with 
foreign  nations,  where  do  we  find  them  limited  as  to  the 
duration  more  than  as  to  the  manner  and  extent  of  the 
measure  ?  " 

Against  this  remarkable  decision  Dexter  did  not 
venture  to  appeal.  Strong  as  his  own  convictions 
were,  he  knew  the  character  of  Chief-Justice  Mar 
shall's  law  too  well  to  hope  for  success  at  Wash 
ington.  One  of  Marshall's  earliest  constitutional 
decisions  had  deduced  from  the  power  of  Congress 
to  pay  debts  the  right  for  government  to  assume  a 
preference  over  all  other  creditors  in  satisfying  its 
claims  on  the  assets  of  a  bankrupt.1  Constructive 
power  could  hardly  go  further ;  and  the  habit  of 
mind  which  led  to  such  a  conclusion  would  hardly 
shrink  from  sustaining  Judge  Davis's  law. 

Yet  the  embargo,  in  spite  of  Executive,  Legisla 
tive,  Judicial,  and  State  authorities,  rankled  in  the 
side  of  the  Constitution.  Even  Joseph  Story,  though 
in  after  life  a  convert  to  Marshall's  doctrines,  could 
never  wholly  reconcile  himself  to  the  legislation 
of  1808. 

44 1  have  ever,"  he  wrote,  ''considered  the  embargo 
a  measure  which  went  to  the  utmost  limit  of  constructive 
power  under  the  Constitution.  It  stands  upon  the  ex- 

1  United  States  v.  Fisher  and  others,  February  Term,  1805  ; 
Cranch's  Reports,  ii,  358-405. 


1808.         THE  ENFORCEMENT  OF  EMBARGO.         271 

treme  verge  of  the  Constitution,  being  in  its  very  form 
and  terms  an  unlimited  prohibition  or  suspension  of  for 
eign  commerce."  3 

That  President  Jefferson  should  exercise  "  dan 
gerous  and  odious"  powers,  carrying  the  extremest 
principles  of  his  Federalist  predecessors  to  their 
extremest  results ;  that  he  should  in  doing  so  in 
vite  bloodshed,  strain  his  military  resources,  quar 
rel  with  the  State  authorities  of  his  own  party  and 
with  judges  whom  he  had  himself  made  ;  that  he 
should  depend  for  constitutional  law  on  Federalist 
judges  whose  doctrines  he  had  hitherto  believed 
fatal  to  liberty, — these  were  the  first  fruits  of  the 
embargo.  After  such  an  experience,  if  he  or  his 
party  again  raised  the  cry  of  State-rights,  or  of 
strict  construction,  the  public  might,  with  some 
foundation  of  reason,  set  such  complaints  aside  as 
factious  and  frivolous,  and  even,  in  any  other  mouth 
than  that  of  John  Randolph,  as  treasonable. 

1  Story's  Life  of  Story,  i.  185. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

I  THE  embargo  was  an  experiment  in  politics  well 
worth  making.  In  the  scheme  of  President  Jeffer 
son's  statesmanship,  non-intercourse  was  the  substi 
tute  for  war,  —  the  weapon  of  defence  and  coercion 
which  saved  the  cost  and  danger  of  supporting  army 
or  navy,  and  spared  America  the  brutalities  of  the 
Old  World.  Failure  of  the  embargo  meant  in  his 
mind  not  only  a  recurrence  to  the  practice  of  war, 
but  to  every  political  and  social  evil  that  war  had 
always  brought  in  its  train.  In  such  a  case  the 
crimes  and  corruptions  of  Europe,  which  had  been 
the  object  of  his  political  fears,  must,  as  he  believed, 
sooner  or  later  teem  in  the  fat  soil  of  America.  To 
avert  a  disaster  so  vast,  was  a  proper  motive  for 
statesmanship,  and  justified  disregard  for  smaller  in 
terests.  Jefferson  understood  better  than  his  friends 
the  importance  of  his  experiment ;  and  when  in  pur 
suing  his  object  he  trampled  upon  personal  rights 
and  public  principles,  he  did  so,  as  he  avowed  in  the 
Louisiana  purchase,  because  he  believed  that  a  higher 
public  interest  required  the  sacrifice :  — 

"  My  principle  is,  that  the  conveniences  of  our  citi 
zens  shall  yield  reasonably,  and  their  taste  greatly,  to 


1808.  THE   COST  OF   EMBARGO.  273 

the  importance  of  giving  the  present  experiment  so  fair 
a  trial  that  on  future  occasions  our  legislators  may  know 
with  certainty  how  far  they  may  count  on  it-as  an  engine 
for  national  purposes."1 

Hence  came  his  repeated  entreaties  for  severity, 
even  to  the  point  of  violence  and  bloodshed :  — 

44  I  do  consider  the  severe  enforcement  of  the  embargo 
to  be  of  an  importance  not  to  be  measured  by  money, 
for  our  future  government  as  well  as  present  objects."  2 

Everywhere,  on  all  occasions,  he  proclaimed  that 
embargo  was  the  alternative  to  war.  The  question  I 
next  to  be  decided  was  brought  by  this  means  into 
the  prominence  it  deserved.  Of  the  two  systems  of 
statesmanship,  which  was  the  most  costly,  —  which 
the  most  efficient? 

The  dread  of  war,  radical  in  the  Republican  theory, 
sprang  not  so  much  from  the  supposed  waste  of  life 
or  resources  as  from  the  retroactive  effects  which  war 
must  exert  upon  the  form  of  government ;  but  the 
experience  of  a  few  months  showed  that  the  embargo 
as  a  system  was  rapidly  leading  to  the  same  effect^ 
Indeed,   the  I  embargo    and    the    Louisiana   purchase-  > 
taken  together  were  more  destructive  jto  the  theory  I 
and  practice  of  a  Virginia  republic  than  any  foreign  i 
war  was  likely  to  be.     Personal  liberties  and  rights  of   \ 
property  were  more  directly  curtailed  in  the  United     I 
States  by  embargo  than  in  Great  Britain  by  centuries 
of  almost  continuous   foreign  war.     No   one   denied 

1  Jefferson  to  Gallatin,  July  12,  1808  ;  Works,  v.  307. 

2  Jefferson  to  Robert  Smith,  July  16,  1808  ;  Works,  v.  316. 

VOL.  iv.  — 18 


274        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  32. 

that  a  permanent  embargo  strained  the  Constitution 
to  the  uttermost  tension ;  and  even  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  and  the  President  admitted  that  it  re 
quired  the  exercise  of  most  arbitrary,  odious,  and 
dangerous  powers.  From  this  point  of  view  the 
system  was  quickly  seen  to  have  few  advantages. 
If  American  liberties  must  perish,  they  might  as  well  f 
be  destroyed  by  war  as  be  stifled  by  non-intercourse. 

While  the  constitutional  cost  of  the  two  systems 
was  not  altogether  unlike,  the  economical  cost  was  a 
point  not  easily  settled.  No  one  could  say  what  might 
be  the  financial  expense  of  embargo  as  compared  with 
war.  Yet  Jefferson  himself  in  the  end  admitted  that 
the  embargo  had  no  claim  to  respect  as  an  economical 
measure.  The  Boston  Federalists  estimated  that  the 
net  American  loss  of  income,  exclusive  of  that  on 
freights,  could  not  be  less  than  ten  per  cent  for  inter 
est  and  profit  on  the  whole  export  of  the  country,— 
or  ten  million  eight  hundred  thousand  dollars  on  a 
,1  total  export  value  of  one  hundred  and  eight  millions.1 
(This  estimate  was  extravagant,  even  if  the  embargo 
Miad  been  wholly  responsible  for  cutting  off  American 
trade ;  it  represented  in  fact  the  loss  resulting  to 
America  from  Napoleon's  decrees,  the  British  orders, 
and  the  embargo  taken  together.  Yet  at  least  the 
embargo  was  more  destructive  than  war  would  have 
been  to  the  interests  of  foreign  commerce.  Even  in 
the  worst  of  foreign  wars  American  commerce  could 

1  Speech  of  Josiah  Quincy,  Nov.  28,  1808;  Annals  of  Con 
gress,  1808,  1809,  p.  543. 


1808.  THE  COST  OF  EMBARGO.  .275 

not  be  wholly  stopped,  —  some  outlet  for  American 
produce  must  always  remain  open,  some  inward  bound 
ships  would  always  escape  the  watch  of  a  blockading 
squadron.  Even  in  1814,  after  two  years  of  war,  and 
when  the  coast  was  stringently  blockaded,  the  Ameri 
can  Treasury  collected  six  million  dollars  from  im 
ports  ;  but  in  1808,  after  the  embargo  was  in  full  ef 
fect,  the  customs  yielded  only  a  few  thousand  dollars 
on  cargoes  that  happened  to  be  imported  for  some 
special  purpose.  The  difference  was  loss,  to  the  dis 
advantage  of  embargo.  To  this  must  be  added  loss 
of  freight,  decay  of  ships  and  produce,  besides  en-  ^, 
forced  idleness  to  a  corresponding  extent ;  and  finally  I 

the  cost  of  a  war  if  the  embargo  system  should  fail.      J 

In  other  respects  the  system  was  still  costly.  The 
citizen  was  not  killed,  but  he  was  partially  paralyzed. 
Government  did  not  waste  money  or  life,  but  pre 
vented  both  money  and  labor  from  having  their  former 
value.  If  long  continued,  embargo  must  bankrupt  the 
government  almost  as  certainly  as  war ;  if  not  long- 
continued,  the  immediate  shock  to  industry  was  more 
destructive  than  war  would  have  been.  The  expense 
of  war  proved,  five  years  afterward,  to  be  about  thirty 
million  dollars  a  year,  and  of  this  sum  much  the 
larger  portion  was  pure  loss ;  but  in  1808,  owing  to 
the  condition  of  Europe,  the  expense  need  not  have 
exceeded  twenty  millions,  and  the  means  at  hand 
were  greater.  The  effect  of  the^  embargo  was  cer 
tainly  no  greater  than  the  effect  of  war  in  stimu 
lating  domestic  industry.  In  either  case  the  stimulus 


276        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  12. 

was  temporary  and  ineffective ;  but  the  embargo  cut 
off  the  resources  of  credit  arid  capital,  while  war 
gave  bothj  an  artificial  expansion.  The  result  was 
that  while  embargo  saved  perhaps  twenty  millions 
of  dollars  a  year  and  some  thousands  of  lives  which 
war  would  have  consumed,  it  was  still  an  expensive 
system,  and  in  some  respects  more  destructive  than 
war  itself  to  national  wealth. 

The  economical  was  less  serious  than  the  moral 
problem.  The  strongest  objection  to  war  was  not  its 
waste  of  money  or  even  of  life  ;  for  money  and  life 
in  political  economy  were  worth  no  more  than  they 
could  be  made  to  produce.  A  worse  evil  was  the  last 
ing  harm  caused  by  war  to  the  morals  of  mankind, 
which  no  system  of  economy  could  calculate.  The 
reign  of  brute  force  and  brutal  methods  corrupted 
and  debauched  society,  making  it  blind  to  its  own 
vices  and  ambitious  only  for  mischief.  Yet  even  on 
that  ground  the  embargo  had  few  advantages.  The 
peaceable  coercion  which  Jefferson  tried  to  substitute 
for  war  was  less  brutal,  but  hardly  less  mischievous, 
than  the  evil  it  displaced.  The  embargo  opened  the 
sluice-gates  of  social  corruption.  Every  citizen  was 
tempted  to  evade  or  defy  the  laws.  At  every  point 
along  the  coast  and  frontier  the  civil,  military,  and 
naval  services  were  brought  in  contact  with  corrup 
tion  ;  while  every  man  in  private  life  was  placed 
under  strong  motives  to  corrupt.  Every  article  pro 
duced  or  consumed  in  the  country  became  an  object 
of  speculation ;  every  form  of  industry  became  a  form 


UNIVERSITY 

^\     /•»      °F 
1808.  THE  COST  OF  EMBA^iC£>  277 

of  gambling.  The  rich  could  alone  profit  in  the  end  ; 
while  the  poor  must  sacrifice  at  any  loss  the  little 
they  could  produce. 

If  war  made  men  brutal,  at  least  it  made  them 
strong;  it  called  out  the  qualities  best  fitted  to  sur 
vive  in  the  struggle  for  existence.  To  risk  life  for 
one's  country  was  no  mean  act  even  when  done  for 
selfish  motives  ;  and  to  die  that  others  might  more 
happily  live  was  the  highest  act  of  self-sacrifice  to 
be  reached  by  man.  War,  with  all  its  horrors,  could 
purify  as  well  as  debase ;  it  dealt  with  high  motives 
and  vast  interests ;  taught  courage,  discipline,  and 
stern  sense  of  duty.  Jefferson  must  have  asked  him 
self  in  vain  what  lessons  of  heroism  or  duty  were 
taught  by  his  system  of  peaceable  coercion,  which 
turned  every  citizen  into  an  enemy  of  the  laws, — 
preaching  the  fear  of  war  and  of  self-sacrifice,  making 
many  smugglers  and  traitors,  but  not  a  single  hero. 

If  the  cost  of  the  embargo  was  extravagant  in  its 
effects  on  the  Constitution,  the  economy,  and  the 
morals  of  the  nation,  its  political  cost  to  the  party 
in  power  was  ruinous.  War  could  have  worked  no 
more  violent  revolution.  The  trial  was  too  severe 
for  human  nature  to  endure.  At  a  moment's  notice, 
without  avowing  his  true  reasons,  President  Jefferson 
bade  foreign  commerce  to  cease.  As  the  order  was 
carried  along  the  seacoast,  every  artisan  dropped  his 
tools,  every  merchant  closed  his  doors,  every  ship 
was  dismantled.  American  produce  —  wheat,  timber, 
cotton,  tobacco,  rice  —  dropped  in  value  or  became 


278        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  12. 

unsalable ;  every  imported  article  rose  in  price ; 
wages  stopped ;  swarms  of  debtors  became  bank 
rupt  ;  thousands  of  sailors  hung  idle  round  the 
wharves  trying  to  find  employment  on  coasters,  and 
escape  to  the  West  Indies  or  Nova  Scotia.  A  reign 
of  idleness  began  ;  and  the  men  who  were  not 
already  ruined  felt  tha,t  their  ruin  was  only  a  mat 
ter  of  time. 

The  British  traveller,  Lambert,  who  visited  New 
York  in  1808,  described  it  as  resembling  a  fjlace 
ravaged  by  pestilence  : l  — 

"  The  port  indeed  was  full  of  shipping,  but  they  were 
dismantled  and  laid  up  ;  their  decks  were  cleared,  their 
hatches  fastened  down,  and  scarcely  a  sailor  was  to  be 
found  on  board.  Not  a  box,  bale,  cask,  barrel,  or  pack 
age  was  to  be  seen  upon  the  wharves.  Many  of  the 
counting-houses  were  shut  up,  or  advertised  to  be  let ; 
and  the  few  solitary  merchants,  clerks,  porters,  and 
laborers  that  were  to  be  seen  were  walking  about  with 
their  hands  in  their  pockets.  The  coffee-houses  were 
almost  empty ;  the  streets,  near  the  water-side,  were  al 
most  deserted ;  the  grass  had  begun  to  grow  upon  the 
wharves." 

In  New  England,  where  the  struggle  of  existence 
was  keenest,  the  embargo  struck  like  a  thunderbolt, 
and  society  for  a  moment  thought  itself  at  an  end. 
Foreign  commerce  and  shipping  were  the  life  of  the 
people,  —  the  ocean,  as  Pickering  said,  was  their  farm. 
The  outcry  of  suffering  interests  became  every  day 

1  Lambert's  Travels,  ii.  64,  65. 


1808.  THE  COST  OF   EMBARGO.  279 

more  violent,  as  the  public  learned  that  this  paralysis 
was  not  a  matter  of  weeks,  but  of  months  or  years. 
New  Englanders  as  a  class  were  a  law-abiding  people  ; 
but  from  the  earliest  moments  of  their  history  they 
had  largely  qualified  their  obedience  to  the  law  by 
the  violence  with  which  they  abused  and  the  inge-ft 
nuity  with  which  they  evaded  it.  Against  the  em-1 
bargo  and  Jefferson  they  concentrated  the  clamor  and 
passion  of  their  keen  and  earnest  nature.  Rich  and 
poor,  young  and  old,  joined  in  the  chorus ;  and  one 
lad,  barely  in  his  teens,  published  what  he  called 
"  The  Embargo  :  a  Satire,"  —  a  boyish  libel  on  Jeffer 
son,  which  the  famous  poet  and  Democrat  would  after 
ward  have  given  much  to  recall :  — 

"  And  thou,  the  scorn  of  every  patriot  name, 
Thy  country's  ruin,  and  her  councils'  shame.  ., 

Go,  wretch!     Resign  the  Presidential  chair,  ) 

Disclose  thy  secret  measures,  foul  or  fair; 

Go  search  with  curious  eye  for  horned  frogs 

'Mid  the  wild  waste  of  Louisiana  bogs; 

Or  where  Ohio  rolls  his  turbid  stream 

Dig  for  huge  bones,  thy  glory  and  thy  theme." l 

The  belief  that  Jefferson,  sold  to  France,  wished  to 
destroy  American  commerce  and  to  strike  a  deadly 
blow  at  New  and  Old  England  at  once,  maddened 
the  sensitive  temper  of  the  people.  Immense  losses, 
sweeping  away  their  savings  and  spreading  bank 
ruptcy  through  every  village,  gave  ample  cause  for 

1  The  Embargo;  or  Sketches  of  the  Times.  A  Satire.  By 
William  Cullen  Bryant.  1808. 


280         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  12. 

their  complaints.  Yet  in  truth,  New  England  was 
better  able  to  defy  the  embargo  than  she  was  willing 
to  suppose.  She  lost  nothing  except  profits  which 
the  belligerents  had  in  any  case  confiscated ;  her 
timber  would  not  harm  for  keeping,  and  her  fish  were 
safe  in  the  ocean.  The  embargo  gave  her  almost  a 
monopoly  of  the  American  market  for  domestic 
manufactures ;  no  part  of  the  country  was  so  well 
situated  or  so  Avell  equipped  for  smuggling.  Above 
all,  she  could  easily  economize.  The  New  Englander 
knew  better  than  any  other  American  how  to  cut 
down  his  expenses  to  the  uttermost  point  of  parsi 
mony  ;  and  even  when  he  became  bankrupt  he  had 
but  to  begin  anew.  His  energy,  shrewdness,  and  edu 
cation  were  a  capital  which  the  embargo  could  not 
destroy,  but  rather  helped  to  improve. 

The  growers  of  wheat  and  live  stock  in  the  Middle 
States  were  more  hardly  treated.  Their  wheat,  re 
duced  in  value  from  two  dollars  to  seventy-five  cents 
a  bushel,  became  practically  unsalable.  Debarred  a 
market  for  their  produce  at  a  moment  when  every 
article  of  common  use  tended  to  rise  in  cost,  they 
were  reduced  to  the  necessity  of  living  on  the  produce 
of  their  farms  ;  but  the  task  was  not  then  so  difficult 
as  in  later  times,  and  the  cities  still  furnished  local 
markets  not  to  be  despised.  The  manufacturers  of 
Pennsylvania  could  not  but  feel  the  stimulus  of  the 
new  demand ;  so  violent  a  system  of  protection  was 
never  applied  to  them  before  or  since.  Probably  for 
that  reason  the  embargo  was  not  so  unpopular  in 


1808.  THE   COST  OF  EMBARGO.  281 

Pennsylvania  as  elsewhere,  and  Jefferson  had  noth 
ing  to  fear  from  political  revolution  in  this  calm  and 
plodding  community. 

The  true  burden  of  the  embargo  fell  on  the  South 
ern  States,  but  most  severely  upon  the  great  State  of 
Virginia.  Slowly  decaying,  but  still  half  patriar 
chal,  Virginia  society  could  neither  economize  nor 
liquidate.  Tobacco  was  worthless ;  but  four  hun 
dred  thousand  negro  slaves  must  be  clothed  and 
fed,  great  establishments  must  be  kept  up,  the  so-| 
cial  scale  of  living  could  not  be  reduced,  and  even 
bankruptcy  could  not  clear  a  large  landed  estate  with 
out  creating  new  encumbrances  in  a  country  where 
land  and  negroes  were  the  only  forms  of  property  on 
which  money  could  be  raised.  Stay-laws  were  tried, 
but  served  only  to  prolong  the  agony.  With  aston 
ishing  rapidity  Virginia  succumbed  to  ruin,  while  con 
tinuing  to  support  the  system  that  was  draining  her 
strength.  No  episode  in  American  history  was  more 
touching  than  the  generous  devotion  with  which  Vir 
ginia  clung  to  the  embargo,  and  drained  the  poison 
which  her  own  President  held  obstinately  to  her  lips. 
The  cotton  and  rice  States  had  less  to  lose,  and  could 
more  easily  bear  bankruptcy ;  ruin  was  to  them  — 
except  in  Charleston  —  a  word  of  little  meaning ;  but 
the  old  society  of  Virginia  could  never  be  restored. 
Amid  the  harsh  warnings  of  John  Randolph  it  saw 
its  agonies  approach ;  and  its  last  representative, 
heir  to  all  its  honors  and  dignities,  President  Jef 
ferson  himself  woke  from  his  long  dream  of  power 


282         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  12. 

only  to  find  his  own  fortunes  buried  in  the  ruin  he 
had  made. 

Except  in  a  state  of  society  verging  on  primitive 
civilization,  the  stoppage  of  all  foreign  intercourse 
could  not  have  been  attempted  by  peaceable  means. 
The  attempt  to  deprive  the  laborer  of  sugar,  salt, 
tea,  coffee,  molasses,  and  rum  ;  to  treble  the  price  of 
every  yard  of  coarse  cottons  and  woollens ;  to  reduce 
by  one  half  the  wages  of  labor,  and  to  double  its  bur 
dens,  —  this  was  a  trial  more  severe  than  war  ;  and 
even  when  attempted  by  the  whole  continent  of  Eu 
rope,  with  all  the  resources  of  manufactures  and 
wealth  which  the  civilization  of  a  thousand  years  had 
supplied,  the  experiment  required  the  despotic  power 
of  Napoleon  and  the  united  armies  of  France,  Austria, 
and  Russia  to  carry  it  into  effect.  Even  then  it  failed, 
j  Jefferson,  Madison,  and  the  Southern  Republicans 
I  had  no  idea  of  the  economical  difficulties  their  sys 
tem  created,  and  were  surprised  to  find  American 
Society  so  complex  even  in  their  own  Southern 
States  that  the  failure  of  two  successive  crops  to  find 
a  sale  threatened  beggary  to  every  rich  planter  from 
the  Delaware  to  the  Sabine.  During  the  first  few 
months,  while  ships  continued  to  arrive  from  abroad 
and  old  stores  were  consumed  at  home,  the  full 
pressure  of  the  embargo  was  not  felt ;  but  as  the 
summer  of  1808  passed,  the  outcry  became  violent. 
In  the  Southern  States,  almost  by  common  consent 
debts  remained  unpaid,  and  few  men  ventured  to 
oppose  a  political  system  which  was  peculiarly  a 


1808.  THE   COST  OF   EMBARGO.  283 

Southern  invention ;  but  in  the  Northern  States, 
where  the  bankrupt  laws  were  enforced  and  the 
habits  of  business  were  comparatively  strict,  the 
cost  of  the  embargo  was  soon  shown  in  the  form 
of  political  revolution. 

The  relapse  of   Massachusetts  to  Federalism  and 
the  overthrow  of   Senator   Adams  in  the  spring  of  \ 
1808  were  the  first  signs  of  the  political  price  which  \ 
President  Jefferson  must  pay  for  his  passion  of  peace.   ' 
In  New  York  the  prospect  was  little  better.    Governor 
Morgan  Lewis,  elected  in  1804  over  Aaron  Burr  by  a  I 
combination  of  Clintons  and  Livingstons,  was  turned 
out   of    office    in   1807   by    the    Clintons.     Governor 
Daniel  D.  Tompkins,  his  successor,  was  supposed  to 
be  a  representative  of  De  Witt  Clinton  and  Ambrose 
Spencer.     To  De  Witt  Clinton  the  State  of  New  York 
seemed  in  1807  a  mere  appendage, —  a  political  prop 
erty  which  he  could  control  at  will ;  and  of  all  Amer 
ican  politicians  next  to  Aaron  Burr  none  had  shown 
such  indifference  to  party  as  he.   No  one  could  predict 
his  course,  except  that  it  would  be  shaped  according 
to  what  seemed  to  be  the  interests  of  his  ambition. 
He  began  by  declaring  himself  against  the  embargo, 
and  soon  afterward  declared  himself  for  it.     In  truth, 
he  was  for  or  against  it  as  the  majority  might  decide ; 
and  in  New  York  a  majority  could  hardly  fail  to  de-  v 
cide  against  the   embargo.     At  the  spring  election 
of  1808,  which  took  place  about  May  1,  the  Federal 
ists  made  large  gains  in  the  legislature.     The  sum 
mer  greatly  increased  their  strength,  until  Madison's 


284        HISTORY   OF   THE    UNITED   STATES.      CH.  12. 

friends  trembled  for  the  result,  and  their  language 
became  despondent  beyond  reason.  Gallatin,  who 
knew  best  the  difficulties  created  by  the  embargo, 
began  to  despair.  June  29  he  wrote  :  "  From  present 
appearances  the  Federalists  will  turn  us  out  by  4th 
of  March  next."  Ten  days  afterward  he  explained 
the  reason  of  his  fears  :  "  I  think  that  Vermont  is 
lost ;  New  Hampshire  is  in  a  bad  neighborhood ;  and 
Pennsylvania  is  extremely  doubtful."  In  August  he 
thought  the  situation  so  serious  that  he  warned  the 
President :  — 

"There  is  almost  an  equal  chance  that  if  proposi 
tions  from  Great  Britain,  or  other  events,  do  not  put  it  in 
our  power  to  raise  the  embargo  before  the  1st  of  Octo 
ber,  we  will  lose  the  Presidential  election.  I  think  that 
at  this  moment  the  Western  States,  Virginia,  South  Caro 
lina,  and  perhaps  Georgia  are  the  only  sound  States,  and 
that  we  will  have  a  doubtful  contest  in  every  other."1 

Two  causes  saved  Madison.  In  the  first  place,  the 
opposition  failed  to  concentrate  its  strength.  Neither 
George  Clinton  nor  James  Monroe  could  control  the 
whole  body  of  opponents  to  the  embargo.  After  wait 
ing  till  the  middle  of  August  for  some  arrangement 
to  be  made,  leading  Federalists  held  a  conference  at 
New  York,  where  they  found  themselves  obliged,  by 
the  conduct  of  De  Witt  Clinton,  to  give  up  the  hope 
of  a  coalition.  Clinton  decided  not  to  risk  his  for 
tunes  for  the  sake  of  his  uncle  the  Vice-President; 
and  this  decision  obliged  the  Federalists  to  put  a  can- 
1  Adams's  Gallatin,  373,  374. 


1808.  THE   COST   OF   EMBARGO.  285 

didate  of  their  own  in  the  field.  They  named  C.  C. 
Finckney  of  South  Carolina  for  President,  and  Rufus 
King  of  New  York  for  Vice-President,  as  in  1804. 

From   the   moment   his   opponents    divided   them 
selves  among  three  candidates,  Madison  had  nothing 
to  fear;  but  even  without  this  good  fortune  he  pos 
sessed  an  advantage  that   weighed  decisively   in   his 
favor.     The  State  legislatures  had  been  chosen  chiefly 
in  the   spring   or   summer,  when   the   embargo   was 
still   comparatively  popular ;    and  in  most  cases,  but  1 
particularly  in  New  York,  the  legislature  still  chose  I 
Presidential  electors.     The  people  expressed  no  direct 
opinion    on    national    politics,    except    in   regard    to 
Congressmen.     State  after  State  deserted  to  the  Fed 
eralists  without  affecting  the  general  election.     Early 
in  September  Vermont  elected  a  Federalist  governor, 
but    the    swarm   of    rotten    boroughs    in    the    State 
secured  a  Republican  legislature,  which  immediately 
chose  electors  for  Madison.     The  revolution  in  Ver 
mont   surrendered   all   New   England   to  the   Feder 
alists.     New   Hampshire  chose    Presidential   electors 
by  popular  vote ;   Rhode  Island  did  the  same,  —  and  / 
both  States,  by  fair  majorities,  rejected  Madison  and  I 
voted  for  Pinckney.     In  Massachusetts  and  Connec 
ticut  the  legislatures  chose  Federalist  electors.     Thus 
all   New   England  declared  against  the  Administra-  j 
tion ;    and  had  Vermont  been  counted  as  she  voted  r 
in   September,   the   opposition   would   have    received 
forty-five  electoral  votes  from   New  England,   where 
in  1804  it  had   received  only  nine.     In  New  York 


286         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  12. 

the  opponents  of  the  embargo  were  very  strong, 
and  the  nineteen  electoral  votes  of  that  State  might 
in  a  popular  election  have  been  taken  from  Madison. 
In  this  case  Pennsylvania  would  have  decided  the 
result.  Eighty-eight  electoral  votes  wrere  needed 
for  a  choice.  New  England,  New  York,  and  Dela 
ware  represented  sixty-seven.  Maryland  and  North 
Carolina  were  so  doubtful  that  if  Pennsylvania 
had  deserted  Madison,  they  would  probably  have  fol 
lowed  her,  and  would  have  left  the  Republican  party 

wreck. 

The  choice  of  electors  by  the  legislatures  of  Ver 
mont  and  New  York  defeated  all  chance  of  over 
throwing  Madison  ;  but  apart  from  these  accidents 
of  management  the  result  was  already  decided  by  the 
people  of  Pennsylvania.  The  wave  of  Federalist 
success  and  political  revolution  stopped  short  in  New 
York,  and  once  more  the  Democracy  of  Pennsylvania 
steadied  and  saved  the  Administration.  At  the  Octo 
ber  election  of  1808,  —  old  Governor  McKean  having 
at  last  retired,  —  Simon  Snyder  was  chosen  governor 
by  a  majority  of  more  than  twenty  thousand  votes. 
The  new  governor  was  the  candidate  of  Duane  and 
the  extreme  Democrats ;  his  triumph  stopped  the 
current  of  Federalist  success,  and  enabled  Madison's 
friends  to  drive  hesitating  Republicans  back  to  their 
party.  In  Virginia,  Monroe  was  obliged  to  retire 
from  the  contest,  and  his  supporters  dwindled  in 
numbers  until  only  two  or  three  thousand  went  to 
the  polls.  In  New  York,  De  Witt  Clinton  con- 


1808.  THE  COST  OF   EMBARGO.  287 

tented  himself  with  taking  from  Madison  six  of  the 
nineteen  electoral  votes  and  giving  them  to  Vice- 
President  Clinton.  Thus  the  result  showed  compara 
tively  little  sign  of  the  true  Republican  loss  ;  yet  in 
the  electoral  college  where  in  1804  Jefferson  had 
received  the  voices  of  one  hundred  and  sixty-two 
electors,  Madison  in  1808  received  only  one  hundred 
and  twenty-two  votes.  The  Federalist  minority  rose 
from  fourteen  to  forty-seven. 

In  the  elections  to  Congress  the  same  effects  were 
shown.  The  Federalists  doubled  their  number  of 
Congressmen,  but  the  huge  Republican  majority  could 
well  bear  reduction.  The  true  character  of  the 
Eleventh  Congress  could  not  be  foretold  by  the  party 
vote.  Many  Northern  Republicans  chosen  to  Con 
gress  were  as  hostile  to  the  embargo  as  though  they 
had  been  Federalists.  Elected  on  the  issue  of  em 
bargo  or  anti-embargo,  the  Congress  which  was  to 
last  till  March  5, 1811,  was  sure  to  be  factious ;  but 
whether  factious  or  united,  it  could  have  neither 
policy  nor  leader.  The  election  decided  its  own 
issue.  The  true  issue  thenceforward  was  that  of 
war ;  but  on  this  point  the  people  had  not  been 
asked  to  speak,  and  their  representatives  would  not 
dare  without  their  encouragement  to  act. 

The  Republican  party  by  a  supreme  effort  kept 
itself  in  office ;  but  no  one  could  fail  to  see  that  if 
nine  months  of  embargo  had  so  shattered  Jefferson's 
power,  another  such  year  would  shake  the  Union  it 
self.  The  cost  of  this  "  engine  for  national  purposes  " 


288         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  12. 

exceeded  all  calculation.  Financially,  it  emptied  the 
Treasury,  bankrupted  the  mercantile  and  agricultural 
class,  and  ground  the  poor  beyond  endurance.  Con 
stitutionally,  it  overrode  every  specified  limit  on  arbi 
trary  power  and  made  Congress  despotic,  while  it 
left  no  bounds  to  the  authority  which  might  be  vested 
by  Congress,  in  the  President.  Morally,  it  sapped  the 
nation's  vital  force,  lowering  its  courage,  paralyzing 
its  energy,  corrupting  its  principles,  and  arraying  all 
the  active  elements  of  society  in  factious  opposition 
to  government  or  in  secret  paths  of  treason.  Po 
litically,  it  cost  Jefferson  the  fruits  of  eight  years 
painful  labor  for  popularity,  and  brought  the  Union 
to  the  edge  of  a  precipice. 

Finally,  frightful  as  the  cost  of  this  engine  was,  as 
a  means  of  coercion  the  embargo  evidently  failed. 
The  President  complained  of  evasion,  and  declared 
that  if  the  measure  were  faithfully  executed  it  would 
produce  the  desired  effect  ;  but  the  people  knew 
better.  In  truth,  the  law  was  faithfully  executed. 
The  price-lists  of  Liverpool  and  London,  the  pub 
lished  returns  from  Jamaica  and  Havana,  proved 
that  American  produce  was  no  longer  to  be  bought 
abroad.  On  the  continent  of  Europe  commerce  had 
ceased  before  the  embargo  was  laid,  and  its  coercive 
effects  were  far  exceeded  by  Napoleon's  own  restric 
tions  ;  yet  not  a  sign  came  from  Europe  to  show  that 
Napoleon  meant  to  give  way.  From  England  came 
an  answer  to  the  embargo,  but  not  such  as  promised 
its  success.  On  all  sides  evidence  accumulated  that 


1808.  THE  COST  OF  EMBARGO.  289 

the  embargo,  as  an  engine  of  coercion,  needed  a  long 
period  of  time  to  produce  a  decided  effect.  The  law 
of  physics  could  easily  be  applied  to  politics  ;  force 
could  be  converted  only  into  its  equivalent  force.  If 
the  embargo  —  an  exertion  of  force  less  violent  than 
war  —  was  to  do  the  work  of  war,  it  must  extend 
over  a  longer  time  the  development  of  an  equivalent 
energy.  Wars  lasted  for  many  years,  and  the  em 
bargo  must  be  calculated  to  last  much  longer  than 
any  war ;  but  meanwhile  the  morals,  courage,  and 
political  liberties  of  the  American  people  must  be 
perverted  or  destroyed  :  agriculture  and  shipping  must 
perish ;  the  Union  itself  could  not  be  preserved. 

Under  the  shock  of  these  discoveries  Jefferson's 
vast  popularity  vanished,  and  the  labored  fabric  of 
his  reputation  fell  in  sudden  and  general  ruin. 
America  began  slowly  to  struggle,  under  the  con 
sciousness  of  pain,  toward  a  conviction  that  she  must 
bear  the  common  burdens  of  humanity,  and  fight 
with  the  weapons  of  other  races  in  the  same  bloody 
arena ;  that  she  could  not  much  longer  delude  herself 
with  hopes  of  evading  laws  of  Nature  and  instincts 
of  life  ;  and  that  her  new  statesmanship  which  made 
peace  a  passion  could  lead  to  no  better  result  than 
had  been  reached  by  the  barbarous  system  which 
made  war  a  duty. 

VOL.  IV.  —  19 


CHAPTER   XIII. 

WHILE  the  people  of  the  United  States  waited 
to  see  the  effect  of  the  embargo  on  Europe,  Europe 
watched  with  breathless  interest  the  death-throes  of 
Spain. 

The  Emperor  Napoleon,  in  December,  1807,  hur 
ried  in  triumphal  progress  from  one  ancient  city  to 
another,  through  his  Italian  kingdom,  while  his 
armies  steadily  crossed  the  Pyrenees,  and  spread  over 
every  road  between  Bayonne  and  Lisbon.  From 
Madrid,  Godoy  saw  that  the  end  was  near.  Until 
that  moment  he  had  counted  with  certainty  on  the 
devotion  of  the  Spanish  people  to  their  old  King. 
In  the  last  months  of  1807  he  learned  that  even 
Spanish  loyalty  could  not  survive  the  miseries  of  such 
a  reign.  Conspiracy  appeared  in  the  Escorial  itself. 
Ferdinand,  Prince  of  the  Asturias,  only  son  of  Don 
Carlos  IV.,  was  discovered  in  a  plot  for  dethroning 
his  father  by  aid  of  Napoleon.  Ferdinand  was  but 
twenty-three  years  old ;  yet  even  in  the  flower  of 
youth  he  showed  no  social  quality.  Dull,  obstinate, 
sullen,  just  shrewd  enough  to  be  suspicious,  and  with 
just  enough  passion  to  make  him  vindictive,  Ferdi 
nand  was  destined  to  become  the  last  and  worst  of 


1808.  THE   DOS   DE   MAIO.  291 

the  Spanish  Bourbon  kings ;  yet  in  the  year  1807  he 
had  a  strong  bond  of  sympathy  with  the  people,  for 
he  hated  and  feared  his  father  and  mother  and  the 
Prince  of  Peace.  Public  patience,  exhausted  by  end 
less  disaster,  and  outraged  by  the  King's  incompe 
tence,  the  Queen's  supposed  amours,  and  Godoy's 
parade  of  royal  rank  and  power,  vanished  at  the  news 
that  Ferdinand  shared  in  the  popular  disgust;  and 
the  Prince  of  Peace  suddenly  woke  to  find  the  old 
King  already  dethroned  in  his  subjects'  love,  while 
the  Prince  of  the  Asturias,  who  was  fitted  only  for 
confinement  in  an  asylum,  had  become  the  popular 
ideal  of  virtue  and  reform. 

Godoy  stifled  Ferdinand's  intrigue,  and  took  from 
Napoleon  that  pretext  for  interference  ;  but  he  gained 
at  most  only  a  brief  respite  for  King  Charles.  The 
pardon  of  Ferdinand  was  issued  Nov.  5,  1807 ;  De 
cember  23,  Napoleon  sent  from  Milan  to  his  minister 
of  war  orders  1  to  concentrate  armies  for  occupying 
the  whole  peninsula,  and  to  establish  the  magazines 
necessary  for  their  support.  He  was  almost  ready 
to  act ;  and  his  return  to  Paris,  Jan.  3,  1808,  an 
nounced  to  those  who  were  in  the  secret  that  the 
new  drama  would  soon  begin. 

Among  the  most  interested  of  his  audience  was 
General  Armstrong,  who  had  longed,  since  1805,  for 
a  chance  to  meet  the  Emperor  with  his  own  weapons, 
and  who  knew  that  Napoleon's  schemes  required 

b 

1  Napoleon  to  General  Clarke,  Dec.  23,  1807  ;  Correspond - 
ance,  xvi.  212. 


292         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  13. 

control  of  North  and  South  America,  which  would 
warrant  Jefferson  in  imposing  rather  than  in  receiv 
ing  terms  for  Florida.  Whatever  these  terms  might 
be,  Napoleon  must  grant  them,  or  must  yield  the 
Americas  to  England's  naval  supremacy.  The  plan 
as  Armstrong  saw  it  was  both  safe  and  sure.  Napo 
leon  made  no  secret  of  his  wants.  Whatever  finesse 
he  may  have  used  in  the  earlier  stage  of  his  policy 
was  flung  aside  after  his  return  to  Paris,  January  3. 
In  reply  to  Armstrong's  remonstrances  against  the 
Milan  Decree,  the  Emperor  ordered  Champagny  to 
use  the  language  of  command  : l  — 

"  Answer  Mr.  Armstrong,  that  I  am  ashamed  to  discuss 
points  of  which  the  injustice  is  so  evident ;  but  that  in 
the  position  in  which  England  has  put  the  Continent,  I 
do  not  doubt  of  the  United  States  declaring  war  against 
her,  especially  on  account  of  her  decree  of  November  1 1  ; 
that  however  great  may  be  the  evil  resulting  to  America 
from  war,  every  man  of  sense  will  prefer  it  to  a  recogni 
tion  of  the  monstrous  principles  and  of  the  anarchy  which 
that  Government  wants  to  establish  on  the  seas ;  that  in 
my  mind  I  regard  war  as  declared  between  England  and 
America  from  the  day  when  England  published  her  de 
crees  ;  that,  for  the  rest,  I  have  ordered  that  the  Ameri 
can  vessels  should  remain  sequestered,  to  be  disposed  of 
as  shall  be  necessary  according  to  circumstances." 

No  coarser  methods  were  known  to  diplomacy  than 
those  which  Napoleon  commonly  took  whenever  the 
moment  for  action  came.  Not  only  did  he  thus  hold 

1  Napoleon  to  Champagny,  Jan.  12,  1808;  Correspondence, 
xvi.  243. 


1808.  THE   DOS  DE  MAIO.  293 

millions  of  American  property  sequestered  as  a  pledge 
for  the  obedience  of  America,  but  he  also  offered  a 
bribe  to  the  United  States  government.  January  28 
he  gave  orders 1  for  the  occupation  of  Barcelona  and 
the  Spanish  frontier  as  far  as  the  Ebro,  and  for  push 
ing  a  division  from  Burgos  to  Aranda  on  the  direct 
road  to  Madrid.  These  orders  admitted  of  no  dis 
guise  ;  they  announced  the  annexation  of  Spain  to 
France.  A  few  days  afterward,  February  2,  the 
Emperor  began  to  dispose  of  Spanish  territory  as 
already  his  own. 

"  Let  the  American  minister  know  verbally,"  he  wrote 
to  Champagny,2  "that  whenever  war  shall  be  declared 
between  America  and  England,  and  whenever  in  conse 
quence  of  this  war  the  Americans  shall  send  troops  into 
the  Floridas  to  help  the  Spaniards  and  repulse  the  Eng 
lish,  I  shall  much  approve  of  it.  You  will  even  let  him 
perceive  (vous  lui  laisserez  meme  entrevoir)  that  in  case 
America  should  be  disposed  to  enter  into  a  treaty  of  alli 
ance,  and  make  common  cause  with  me,  I  shall  not  be 
unwilling  (eloigne)  to  intervene  with  the  court  of  Spain 
to  obtain  the  cession  of  these  same  Floridas  in  favor  of 
the  Americans." 

The  next  day  Champagny  sent  for  Armstrong  and 
gave  him  a  verbal  message,  which  the  American  min 
ister  understood  as  follows  :  3  — 

1  Napoleon  to  General  Clarke,  Jan.  28,  1808 ;  Correspondance, 
xvi.  281,  282. 

2  Napoleon  to   Champagny,    Feb.  2,  1808;    Correspondance, 
xvi.  301. 

8  Armstrong  to  Madison,  Feb.  15,  1808  ;  MSS.  State  Depart 
ment  Archives. 


294         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  13. 

"General,  I  have  to  communicate  to  you  a  message 
from  the  Emperor.  I  am  instructed  to  say  that  the  mea 
sure  of  taking  the  Floridas,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  -Brit 
ish,  meets  entirely  the  approbation  of  his  Majesty.  I 
understand  that  you  wish  to  purchase  the  Floridas.  If 
such  be  your  wish,  I  am  further  instructed  to  say  that  his 
Majesty  will  interest  himself  with  Spain  in  such  way  as 
to  obtain  for  you  the  Eloridas,  and,  what  is  still  more 
important,  a  convenient  western  boundary  for  Louisiana, 
on  condition  that  the  United  States  will  enter  into  an 
alliance  with  France." 

Weary  of  verbal  and  semi-official  advances,  Arm 
strong  determined  to  put  this  overture  on  record,  and 
in  doing  so,  to  tell  the  Emperor  plainly  the  price 
of  American  friendship.  February  5  he  wrote  to 
Champagny  a  note,  embodying  the  message  as  he 
understood  it,  and  promising  to  convey  it  to  the 
President.1 

"I  should  little  deserve,"  he  added,  "  and  still  less 
reciprocate  the  frankness  of  this  declaration,  were  I  to 
withhold  from  your  Excellency  my  belief  that  the  pre 
sent  conduct  of  France  toward  the  commerce  of  the  United 
States,  so  far  from  promoting  the  views  of  his  Majesty, 
are  directly  calculated  to  contravene  them.  That  the 
United  States  are  at  this  moment  on  the  eve  of  a  war 
with  Great  Britain  on  account  of  certain  outrages  com 
mitted  against  their  rights  as  a  neutral  nation  is  a  fact 
abundantly  and  even  generally  known.  Another  fact, 
scarcely  less  known,  is  that  under  these  circumstances 
France  also  has  proceeded,  in  many  instances  and  by 

1  Armstrong  to  Champagny,  Feb.  5,  1808  ;  MSS.  State  De 
partment  Archives. 


1808.  THE  DOS  DE  MAIO.  295 

various  means,  to  violate  these  very  rights.  In  both 
cases  all  the  injunctions  of  public  law  have  been  equally 
forgotten  ;  but  between  the  two  we  cannot  fail  to  remark 
a  conspicuous  difference.  With  Great  Britain  the  United 
States  could  invoke  no  particular  treaty  providing  rights 
supplementary  to  these  injunctions ;  but  such  was  not 
their  situation  with  France.  With  her  a  treaty  did  exist, 
...  a  treaty  sanctioned  with  the  name  and  guaranteed 
by  the  promise  of  the  Emperor  '  that  all  its  obligations 
should  be  inviolably  preserved.' " 

This  was  hardly  the  reply  which  the  Emperor  ex 
pected  ;  but,  temper  for  temper,  Napoleon  was  not  a 
man  to  be  thus  challenged  by  a  mere  diplomatist. 

"  You  must  write  to  the  American  minister,"  was  his 
order  to  Champagny,1  u  that  France  has  taken  engage 
ments  with  America,  has  made  with  her  a  treaty  founded 
on  tlie  principle  that  the  flag  covers  the  goods,  and  that 
if  this  sacred  principle  had  not  been  solemnly  proclaimed, 
his  Majesty  would  still  proclaim  it ;  that  his  Majesty 
treated  with  America  independent,  and  not  with  America 
enslaved  (asservie)  ;  that  if  she  submits  to  the  King  of 
England's  Decree  of  November  11,  she  renounces  there 
by  the  protection  of  her  flag ;  but  that  if  the  Ameri 
cans,  as  his  Majesty  cannot  doubt  without  wounding 
their  honor,  regard  this  act  as  one  of  hostility,  the  Em 
peror  is  ready  to  do  justice  in  every  respect." 

In  forwarding  these  documents  to  Washington, 
Armstrong  expressed  in  plain  language  his  opinion 
of  Napoleon  and  Champagny.  "  With  one  hand  they 

1  Napoleon  to  Champagny,  Feb.  11,  1808  ;  Correspondance, 
x'vi.  319. 


296         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  13. 

offer  us  the  blessings  of  equal  alliance  against  Great 
Britain ;  with  the  other  they  menace  us  with  war  if 
we  do  not  accept  this  kindness ;  and  with  both  they 
pick  our  pockets  with  all  imaginable  diligence,  dex 
terity,  and  impudence."  Armstrong's  patience  was 
exhausted.  He  besought  the  Government  to  select  its 
enemy,  either  France  or  England  ;  but  "  in  either  case 
do  not  suspend  a  moment  the  seizure  of  the  Flo- 
ridas." l  A  week  afterward  he  wrote  to  Madison 
that  "  in  a  council  of  Administration  held  a  few  days 
past,  when  it  was  proposed  to  modify  the  operation 
of  the  Decrees  of  November,  1806,  and  December, 
1807,  though  the  proposition  was  supported  by  the 
whole  weight  of  the  council,  the  Emperor  became 
highly  indignant,  and  declared  that  these  decrees 
should  suffer  no  change,  and  that  the  Americans 
should  be  compelled  to  take  the  positive  character 
either  of  allies  or  of  enemies."2 

These  letters  from  Armstrong,  enclosing  Cham- 
pagny's  version  of  Napoleon's  blunt  words,  were 
despatched  to  Washington  during  the  month  of 
February;  and,  as  the  story  has  already  shown, 
President  Jefferson  roused  a  storm  against  France 
by  communicating  to  Congress  the  Emperor's  order 
that  the  United  States  government  should  regard  it 
self  as  at  war  with  England.  Turreau  felt  the  pub- 

1  Armstrong  to  Madisoffrab.  15,  1808  ;  MSS.  State  Depart 
ment  Archives. 

2  Armstrong    to    Madison,    Feb.    22,    1808  ;    State    Papers, 
iii.  250. 


1808  THE   DOS  DE  MAIO.  297 

lication  as  a  fatal  blow  to  his  influence ;  but  even 
Turreau,  soldier  as  he  was,  could  never  appreciate 
the  genius  of  his  master's  audacity.  Napoleon  knew 
his  ground.  From  the  moment  England  adopted  the 
Orders  in  Council  the  United  States  were  necessarily 
a  party  in  the  war,  and  no  process  of  evasion  or 
delay  could  more  than  disguise  their  position.  Napo 
leon  told  Jefferson  this  plain  truth,  and  offered 
him  the  Floridas  as  a  bribe  to  declare  himself  on 
the  side  of  France.  These  advances  were  made  be 
fore  the  embargo  system  was  fairly  known  or  fully 
understood  at  Paris ;  and  the  policy  of  peaceable 
coercion,  as  applied  to  England,  had  not  been  consid 
ered  in  the  Emperor's  plans.  Alliance  or  war  seemed 
to  him  the  necessary  alternative,  and  from  that  point 
of  view  America  had  no  reason  or  right  to  com 
plain  because  he  disregarded  treaty  stipulations  which 
had  become  a  dead  letter. 

All  this  while  the  Emperor  held  Spain  in  sus 
pense,  but  February  21  he  gave  orders  for  securing 
the  royal  family.  Murat  was  to  occupy  Madrid ; 
Admiral  Rosily,  who  commanded  a  French  squadron 
at  Cadiz,  was  to  bar  the  way  "  if  the  Spanish  Court, 
owing  to  events  or  a  folly  that  can  hardly  be  ex 
pected,  should  wish  to  renew  the  scene  of  Lisbon."1 
Godoy  saw  the  impending  blow,  and  ordered  the 
Court  to  Cadiz,  intending  4Hfcrry  the  King  even 
to  Mexico  if  no  other  resource  remained.  He  would 


1  Becrfes     to     Rosily,    Feb.     21,     1808  ;     Thiers's    Empire, 
viii.   669. 


298        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  13. 

perhaps  have  saved  the  King,  and  Admiral  Rosily 
himself  would  have  been  the  prisoner,  had  not  the 
people  risen  in  riot  on  hearing  of  the  intended  flight. 
March  17  a  sudden  mob  sacked  Godoy's  house  at 
Aranjuez,  hunting  him  down  like  a  wild  beast,  and. 
barely  failing  to  take  his  life ;  while  by  sheer  terror 
Don  Carlos  IV.  was  made  to  abdicate  the  throne  in 
favor  of  his  son  Ferdinand.  March  19  the  ancient 
Spanish  empire  crumbled  away. 

Owing  to  the  skill  with  which  Napoleon  had  sucked 
every  drop  of  blood  from  the  veins,  and  paralyzed 
every  nerve  in  the  limbs  of  the  Spanish  monarchy, 
the  throne  fell  without  apparent  touch  from  him, 
and  his  army  entered  Madrid  as  though  called  to 
protect  Carlos  IV.  from  violence.  When  the  news 
reached  Paris  the  Emperor,  April  2,  hurried  to 
Bordeaux  and  Bayonne,  where  he  remained  until 
August,  regulating  his  new  empire.  To  Bayonne 
were  brought  all  the  familiar  figures  of  the  old 
Spanish  regime, —  Carlos  IV.,  Queen  Luisa,  Ferdi 
nand,  the  Prince  of  Peace,  Don  Pedro  Cevallos, 
—  the  last  remnants  of  picturesque  Spain ;  and 
Napoleon  passed  them  in  review  with  the  curiosity 
which  he  might  have  shown  in  regarding  a  col 
lection  of  rococo  furniture.  His  victims  always 
interested  him,  except  when,  as  in  the  case  of 
Tousaint  Louverture,  they  were  not  of  noble  birth. 
King  Charles,  he  said,1  looked  a  bon  et  brave 
homme. 

1  Napoleon  to  Talleyrand,  Correspondance,  xvii.  39,  49,  65. 


1808.  THE   DOS   DE   MAIO.  299 

"  I  do  not  know  whether  it  is  due  to  his  position  or 
to  the  circumstances,  but  he  has  the  air  of  a  patriarch, 
frank  and  good.  The  Queen  carries  her  heart  and  his 
tory  on  her  face  ;  you  need  to  know  nothing  more  of 
her.  The  Prince  of  Peace  has  the  air  of  a  bull ;  some 
thing  like  Daru.  He  is  beginning  to  recover  his  senses ; 
he  has  been  treated  with  unexampled  barbarity.  It  is 
well  to  discharge  him  of  every  false  imputation,  but  he 
must  be  le'ft  covered  with  a  slight  tinge  of  contempt." 

This  was  a  compliment  to  Godoy ;  for  Napoleon 
made  it  his  rule  to  throw  contempt  only  upon  per 
sons — like  the  Queen  of  Prussia,  or  Mme.  de  Stael, 
or  Toussaint  —  whose  influence  he  feared.  Of  Fer 
dinand,  Napoleon  could  make  nothing,  and  became 
almost  humorous  in  attempting  to  express  the  anti 
pathy  which  this  last  Spanish  Bourbon  aroused. 

"  The  King  of  Prussia  is  a  hero  in  comparison  with 
the  Prince  of  the  Asturias.  He  has  not  yet  said  a  word 
to  me ;  he  is  indifferent  to  everything ;  very  material ; 
eats  four  times  a  day,  and  has  no  ideas ;  .  .  .  sullen 
and  stupid." 

Madrid  and  Aranjuez,  the  Escorial  and  La  Granja 
were  to  know  King  Charles  and  his  court  no  more. 
After  showing  themselves  for  a  few  days  at  Bayonne, 
these  relics  of  the  eighteenth  century  disappeared  to 
Compi£gne,  to  Valengay,  to  one  refuge  after  another, 
until  in  1814  unhappy  Spain  welcomed  back  the 
sullen  and  stupid  Ferdinand,  only  to  learn  his  true 
character ;  while  old  King  Charles,  beggared  and  for 
gotten,  dragged  out  a  melancholy  existence  in  Italy, 


300         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  13. 

served  to  the  last  by  Godoy  with  a  loyalty  that  half 
excused  his  faults  and  vices.  The  Bourbon  rubbish 
was  swept  from  Madrid ;  Don  Carlos  had  already 
abdicated ;  Ferdinand,  entrapped  and  terrified,  was 
set  aside;  the  old  palaces  were  garnished  for  new 
comers  ;  and  after  Lucien  and  Louis  Bonaparte  had 
refused  the  proffered  throne,  Napoleon  sent  to  Na 
ples  for  Joseph,  who  was  crowned,  June  15,  King 
of  Spain  at  Bayonne. 

Meanwhile  the  Spanish  people  woke  to  conscious 
ness  that  their  ancient  empire  had  become  a  province 
of  France,  and  their  exasperation  broke  into  acts  of 
wild  revenge.  May  2  Madrid  rose  in  an  insurrection 
which  Murat  suppressed  by  force.  Several  hundred 
lives  on  either  side  were  lost ;  and  although  the  affair 
itself  was  one  of  no  great  importance,  it  had  results 
which  made  the  day  an  epoch  in  modern  history. 

The  gradual  breaking  up  of  the  old  European 
system  of  politics  was  marked  by  an  anniversary 
among  each  of  the  Western  nations.  The  English 
race  dated  from  July  4,  1776,  the  beginning  of  a 
new  era ;  the  French  celebrated  July  14,  1789, 
the  capture  of  the  Bastille,  as  decisive  of  their  des 
tinies.  For  a  time,  Bonaparte's  coup  d'etat  of  the 
18th  Brumaire  in  1799  forced  both  France  and 
England  back  on  their  steps;  but  the  dethronement 
of  Charles  IV.  began  the  process  in  a  new  direc 
tion.  The  Second  of  May  —  or  as  the  Spaniards 
called  it,  the  Dos  de  Maio  —  swept  the  vast  Span 
ish  empire  into  the  vortex  of  dissolution.  Each 


1808.  THE   DOS   DE   MAID.  301 

of  the  other  anniversaries  —  that  of  July  4,  1776, 
and  of  July  14,  1789  —  had  been  followed  by  a 
long  and  bloody  convulsion  which  ravaged  large  por 
tions  of  the  world ;  and  the  extent  and  violence 
of  the  convulsion  which  was  to  ravage  the  Spanish 
empire  could  be  measured  only  by  the  vastness  of 
Spanish  dominion.  So  strangely  had  political  forces 
been  entangled  by  Napoleon's  hand,  that  the  explo 
sion  at  Madrid  roused  the  most  incongruous  inter 
ests  into  active  sympathy  and  strange  companionship. 
The  Spaniards  themselves,  the  least  progressive  peo 
ple  in  Europe,  became  by  necessity  democratic ;  not 
only  the  people,  but  even  the  governments  of  Austria 
and  Germany  felt  the  movement,  and  yielded  to  it ; 
the  Tories  of  England  joined  with  the  Whigs  and 
Democrats  in  cheering  a  revolution  which  could  not 
but  shake  the  foundations  of  Tory  principles ;  confu 
sion  became  chaos,  and  while  all  Europe,  except 
France,  joined  hands  in  active  or  passive  support  of 
Spanish  freedom,  America,  the  stronghold  of  free 
government,  drew  back  and  threw  her  weight  on 
the  opposite  side.  The  workings  of  human  develop 
ment  were  never  more  strikingly  shown  than  in  the 
helplessness  with  which  the  strongest  political  and 
social  forces  in  the  world  followed  or  resisted  at 
haphazard  the  necessities  of  a  movement  which  they 
could  not'  control  or  comprehend.  Spain,  France, 
Germany,  England,  were  swept  into  a  vast  and  bloody 
torrent  which  dragged  America,  from  Montreal  to 
Valparaiso,  slowly  into  its  movement ;  while  the 


302        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  13. 

familiar  figures  of  famous  men,  —  Napoleon,  Alex 
ander,  Canning,  Godoy,  Jefi'crson,  Madison,  Talley 
rand  ;  emperors,  generals,  presidents,  conspirators, 
patriots,  tyrants,  and  martyrs  by  the  thousand, — 
were  borne  away  by  the  stream,  struggling,  gesticu 
lating,  praying,  murdering,  robbing ;  each  blind  to 
everything  but  a  selfish  interest,  and  all  helping  more 
or  less  unconsciously  to  reach  the  new  level  which 
society  was  obliged  to  seek.  Half  a  century  of  dis 
order  failed  to  settle  the  problems  raised  by  the 
Dos  de  Maio;  but  from  the  first  even  a  child  could 
see  that  in  the  ruin  of  a  world  like  the  empire  of 
Spain,  the  only  nation  certain  to  find  a  splendid 
and  inexhaustible  booty  was  the  Republic  of  the 
United  States.  To  President  Jefferson  the  Spanish 
revolution  opened  an  endless  vista  of  democratic 
ambition. 

Yet  at  first  the  Dos  de  Maio  seemed  only  to  rivet 
Napoleon's  power,  and  to  strengthen  the  reaction  be 
gun  on  the  18th  Brumaire.  The  Emperor  expected 
local  resistance,  and  was  ready  to  suppress  it.  He 
had  dealt  effectually  with  such  popular  outbreaks 
in  France,  Italy,  and  Germany;  he  had  been  over 
come  in  St.  Domingo  not  by  the  people,  but,  as  he 
believed,  by  the  climate.  If  the  Germans  and  Italians 
could  be  made  obedient -to  his  orders,  the  Spaniards 
could  certainly  offer  no  serious  resistance.  During 
the  two  or  three  months  that  followed  the  dethrone 
ment  of  the  Bourbons,  Napoleon  stood  at  the  summit 
of  his  hopes.  If  the  letters  he  then  wrote  were  not 


1808.  THE  DOS  DE  MATO.  303 

extant  to  prove  the  plans  he  had  in  mind,  common- 
sense  would  refuse  to  believe  that  schemes  so  un 
substantial  could  have  found  lodgment  in  his  brain. 
The  English  navy  and  English  commerce  were  to 
be  driven  from  the  Mediterranean  Sea,  the  Indian 
Ocean,  and  American  waters,  until  the  ruin  of  Eng 
land  should  be  accomplished,  and  the  empire  of  the 
world  should  be  secured.  Order  rapidly  followed 
order  for  reconstructing  the  navies  of  France,  Spain, 
and  Portugal.  Great  expeditions  were  to  occupy 
Ceuta,  Egypt,  Syria,  Buenos  Ayres,  the  Isle  de  France, 
and  the  East  Indies. 

"  The  concurrence  of  these  operations,"  he  wrote  May 
13, l  "  will  throw  London  into  a  panic.  A  single  one 
of  them,  that  of  India,  will  do  horrible  damage  there. 
England  will  then  have  no  means  of  annoying  us  or  of 
disturbing  America.  I  am  resolved  on  this  expedition." 

For  this  purpose  the  Emperor  required  not  only 
the  submission  of  Spain,  but  also  the  support  of 
Spanish  America  and  of  the  United  States.  He 
acted  as  though  he  were  already  master  of  all  these 
countries,  which  were  not  yet  within  his  reach 
Continuing  to  treat  the  United  States  as  a  depend 
ent  government,  he  issued  April  17  a  new  order 
directing  the  seizure  of  all  American  vessels  which 
should  enter  the  ports  of  France,  Italy,  and  the 
Hanse  towns.2  This  measure,  which  became  famous 

1  Napoleon  to  Decres,  May  13,  1808  ;  Correspondance,  xvii. 
112. 

2  Napoleon  to  Gaudin,  April  17, 1808;  Correspondance,  xvii.  16. 


304        HISTORY  OF   THE  UNITED   STATES.      CH.  13. 

as  the  Bayonne  Decree,  surpassed  the  Decrees  of 
Berlin  and  Milan  in  violence,  and  was  gravely  jus 
tified  by  Napoleon  on  the  ground  that,  since  the 
embargo,  no  vessel  of  the  United  States  could  navi 
gate  the  seas  without  violating  the  law  of  its  own 
government,  and  furnishing  a  presumption  that  it 
did  so  with  false  papers,  on  British  account  or  in 
British  connection.  "  This  is  very  ingenious,"  wrote 
Armstrong  in  reporting  the  fact.1  Yet  it  was  hardly 
more  arbitrary  or  unreasonable  than  the  British 
"  Rule  of  1756,"  which  declared  that  a  neutral  should 
practise  no  trade  with  a  belligerent  which  it  had  not 
practised  with  the  same  nation  during  peace. 

While  these  portentous  events  were  passing  rap 
idly  before  the  eyes  of  Europe,  no  undue  haste  marked 
Madison's  movements.  Champagny's  letter  of  Jan. 
15,  1808,  arrived  and  was  sent  to  Congress  toward 
the  end  of  March;  but  although  the  United  States 
quickly  knew  by  heart  Napoleon's  phrase,  "  War  ex 
ists  in  fact  between  England  and  the  United  States, 
and  his  Majesty  considers  it  as  declared  from  the  day 
on  which  England  published  her  decrees;"  although 
Rose  departed  March  22,  and  the  embargo  was 
shaped  into  a  system  of  coercion  long  before  Rose's 
actual  departure,  —  yet  Congress  waited  until  April 
22  before  authorizing  the  President  to  suspend  the 
embargo,  if  he  could  succeed  in  persuading  or  com 
pelling  England  or  France  to  withdraw  the  belli- 

1  Armstrong  to  Madison,  April  25,  1808;  MSS.  State  De 
partment  Archives.  Of.  State  Papers,  iii.  291. 


1808. 


THE  DOS  DE  MAIO.  305 


gerent  decrees;  and  not  until  May  2  —  the  famous 
Dos  de  Maio  —  did  Madison  send  to  Armstrong  in 
structions  which  were  to  guide  that  minister  through 
the  dangers  of  Napoleonic  diplomacy. 

The  Secretary  began  by  noticing  Champagny's  let 
ter  of  January  15,  which  had  assumed  to  declare  war 
for  the  United  States  government. 

"That  [letter],"  said  Madison,1  "  .  .  .  has,  as  you 
will  see  by  the  papers  herewith  sent,  produced  all  the 
sensations  here  which  the  spirit  and  style  of  it  were 
calculated  to  excite  in  minds  alive  to  the  interests  and 
honor  of  the  nation.  To  present  to  the  United  States 
the  alternative  of  bending  to  the  views  of  France  against 
her  enemy,  or  of  incurring  a  confiscation  of  all  the  prop 
erty  of  their  citizens  carried  into  the  French  prize  courts, 
implied  that  they  were  susceptible  of  impressions  by 
which  no  independent  and  honorable  nation  can  be 
guided ;  and  to  prejudge  and  pronounce  for  them  the 
effect  which  the  conduct  of  another  nation  ought  to  have 
on  their  councils  and  course  of  proceeding,  had  the  air 
at  least  of  an  assumed  authority  not  less  irritating  to 
the  public  feeling.  In  these  lights  the  President  makes 
it  your  duty  to  present  to  the  French  government  the 
contents  of  Mr.  Champagny's  letter ;  taking  care,  as 
your  discretion  will  doubtless  suggest,  that  while  you 
make  that  Government  sensible  of  the  offensive  tone 
employed,  you  leave  the  way  open  for  friendly  and 
respectful  explanations,  if  there  be  a  disposition  to  offer 
them,  and  for  a  decision  here  on  any  reply  which  may 
be  of  a  different  character." 

1  Madison  to  Armstrong,  May  2,  1808  ;  State  Papers,  iii.  252. 
VOL.  iv.  —  20 


306        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      Cir.  1.3. 

While  Armstrong  waited  for  Napoleon's  "friendly 
and  respectful  explanations,"  he  was  to  study  the 
Act  of  Congress  which  vested  in  the  President  an 
authority  to  suspend  the  embargo :  — 

"  The  conditions  on  which  the  suspending  authority 
is  to  be  exercised  will  engage  your  particular  attention. 
They  appeal  equally  to  the  justice  and  the  policy  of  the 
two  great  belligerent  Powers  now  emulating  each  other  in 
violations  of  both.  The  President  counts  on  your  best 
endeavors  to  give  to  this  appeal  all  the  effect  possible 
with  the  French  government.  Mr.  Pinkney  will  be  doing 
the  same  with  that  of  Great  Britain." 

The  Florida  affair  remained  to  be  discussed.  The 
President  courteously  acknowledged  the  Emperor's 
wishes  "for  an  accession  of  the  United  States  to 
the  war  against  England,  as  an  inducement  to  which 
his  interposition  would  be  employed  with  Spain  to 
obtain  for  them  the  Floridas."  Armstrong  was  told 
to  say  in  reply  "  that  the  United  States  having 
chosen  as  the  basis  of  their  policy  a  fair  and  sin 
cere  neutrality  among  the  contending  Powers,  they 
are  disposed  to  adhere  to  it  as  long  as  their  essential 
interests  will  permit,  and  are  more  particularly  dis 
inclined  to  become  a  party  to  the  complicated  and 
general  warfare  which  agitates  another  quarter  of 
the  globe,  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  a  separate 
and  particular  object,  however  interesting  to  them ; 
but,"  Madison  added,  "  should  circumstances  demand 
from  the  United  States  a  precautionary  occupation 
against  the  hostile  designs  of  Great  Britain,  it  will 


1808.  THE   DOS   DE   MAIO.  307 

be  recollected  with  satisfaction  that  the  measure  has 
received  his  Majesty's  approbation."  Finally,  Arm 
strong's  advice  to  seize  the  Floridas  without  delay 
was  answered  only  by  the  singular  remark  that  the 
Emperor  had  given  no  reason  to  suppose  he  would 
approve  the  step.  In  private  Jefferson  gave  other 
explanations,  but  perhaps  he  most  nearly  expressed 
his  true  feeling  when  he  added  that  Armstrong  wrote 
"so  much  in  the  buskin  that  he  cannot  give  a  naked 
fact  in  an  intelligible  form."  1 

Turreau,  who  stood  nearer  than  any  other  man  to 
the  secrets  of  American  foreign  politics,  attempted 
to  draw  the  President  from  this  defensive  attitude. 
Turreau's  instructions  were  such  as  to  warrant  him 
in  using  strong  language.  In  a  despatch  dated  Feb 
ruary  15,  Champagny  repeated  to  his  minister  at 
Washington  in  still  plainer  words  the  substance  of 
what  had  been  said  to  Armstrong :  "  Some  Ameri 
can  ships  have  been  seized,  but  the  Emperor  con 
tents  himself  for  the  moment  with  holding  them  in 
sequestration.  His  conduct  toward  the  Americans 
will  depend  on  the  conduct  of  the  United  States 
toward  England."  As  previously  to  Armstrong,  so 
again  to  Turreau,  the  threat  was  supported  by  the 
bribe  :  — 

"  The  Emperor,  wishing  on  this  occasion  to  establish 
a  still  more  intimate  union  of  interests  between  America 
and  France,  has  authorized  me  to  notify  Mr.  Armstrong 

1  Jefferson  to  Madison,  Sept.  13,  1808;  Writings,  v.  367.  Cf. 
Jefferson  to  Armstrong,  March  5,  1809;  Works,  v.  433. 


308        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  13. 

verbally  that  if  England  should  make  any  movement 
against  the  Floridas,  he  would  not  take  it  ill  if  the  United 
States  should  move  troops  there  for  defence.  You  will 
be  cautious  in  making  use  of  this  communication,  which 
is  purely  conditional,  and  can  take  effect  only  in  case  the 
Floridas  are  attacked."  1 

Not  until  late  in  the  month  of  June  did  Turreau 
find  an  opportunity  to  talk  at  his  ease  with  the 
President  and  Secretary  of  State ;  but,  as  usual,  his 
account  of  the  conversation  was  interesting.2  He 
began  with  Madison;  and  after  listening  with  some 
impatience  to  the  Secretary's  long  list  of  complaints, 
he  brought  forward  the  suggestion  of  alliance  :  — 

"  I  watched  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  the  experience 
I  have  in  dealing  with  him  made  me  easily  perceive  that 
my  proposal  embarrassed  him  ;  so  he  replied  in  an  evasive 
manner.  At  last,  finding  himself  too  hard  pressed,  for 
a  third  time  he  said  to  me  l  that  the  intention  of  the 
Federal  government  was  to  observe  the  most. exact  im 
partiality  between  France  and  England.'  '  You  have 
departed  from  it,'  said  I,  '  when  you  place  the  two 
Powers  on  the  same  line  relatively  to  their  conduct 
toward  you.'  .  .  .  '  Well,'  said  he,  '  we  must  wait  the 
decision  of  the  next  Congress  with  regard  to  the  em 
bargo  ;  doubtless  it  will  be  raised  in  favor  of  the  Power 
which  shall  first  recall  the  measures  that  harass  our  com 
merce.'  " 

1  Champagny  to  Turreau,  Feb.  15,  1808;   Archives  des  Aff: 
fitr.  MSS. 

2  Turreau  to  Champagny,  June  28,  1808;  Archives  des  Aff. 
fitr.  MSS. 


J808.  THE   DOS   DE   MAIO.  309 

For  three  hours  Turreau  lectured  the  secretary  on 
the  iniquities  of  England,  while  the  secretary  doggedly 
repeated  his  phrases.  Wearied  but  not  satisfied,  the 
French  minister  abandoned  Madison  and  attacked  the 
President.  Jefferson  entertained  him  with  a  long  list 
of  complaints  against  Spain,  which  Turreau  had  heard 
so  often  as  to  know  them  by  memory.  When  at  last 
the  conversation  had  been  brought  to  the  subject  of 
alliance  against  England,  Jefferson  took  a  new  view 
of  the  situation,  which  hardly  agreed  with  that  taken 
by  the  Secretary  of  State. 

"  You  have  complained,"  replied  the  President,  "  that 
in  consequence  of  our  measures  and  of  the  proceedings  of 
the  last  Congress,  France  has  been  put  on  a  level  with 
England  in  regard  to  the  wrongs  we  allege  against  both 
Powers,  while  there  was  no  kind  of  analogy  either  in  the 
date  or  the  gravity  of  their  wrongs  toward  the  Ameri 
cans.  I  am  going  to  prove  to  you  generally  that  we 
never  intended  to  admit  any  comparison  in  the  conduct 
of  these  two  Powers,  by  recalling  to  you  the  effect  of  the 
very  measures  you  complain  of.  The  embargo,  which 
seems  to  strike  at  France  and  Great  Britain  equally,  is  in 
fact  more  prejudicial  to  the  latter  than  to  the  former,  by 
reason  of  the  greater  number  of  colonies  which  England 
possesses,  and  their  inferiority  in  local  resources." 

After  pursuing  this  line  of  argument  Jefferson  re 
verted  to  his  own  policy,  and  made  an  advance  toward 
•an  understanding. 

"It  is  possible,"  he  said,  "  that  Congress  may  repeal 
the  embargo,  the  continuation  of  which  would  do  us 
more  harm  than  a  state  of  war.  For  us  in  the  pres- 


310         HJSTOKY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      OH.  13. 

ent  situation  all  is  loss  ;  whereas,  however  powerful  the 
English  may  be,  war  would  put  us  in  a  way  of  doing 
them  much  harm,  because  our  people  are  enterprising. 
Yet  as  it  is  probable  that  Congress  will  favor  raising 
the  embargo  if  the  Orders  in  Council  are  withdrawn,  it 
would  be  necessary  for  your  interests,  if  you  are  unwill 
ing  to  withdraw  your  decrees,  that  at  least  you  should 
promise  their  withdrawal  on  condition  that  the  embargo 
be  withdrawn  in  your  favor.  You  will  also  observe  that 
were  the  embargo  withdrawn  in  favor  of  the  English, 
this  will  not  close  our  differences  with  them,  because 
never  —  no,  never  —  will  there  be  an  arrangement  with 
them  if  they  do  not  renounce  the  impressment  of  our 
seamen  on  our  ships." 

With  this  avowal,  which  Turreau  understood  as  a 
sort  of  pledge  that  Jefferson  would  lean  toward  war 
with  England  rather  than  with  France,  the  French 
minister  was  obliged  to  content  himself ;  while  he 
pressed  on  his  Government  the  assurance  that  both 
the  President  and  the  secretary  wished  more  than  all 
else  to  obtain  the  Floridas.  Such  reports  were  little 
calculated  to  change  the  Emperor's  course.  Human 
ingenuity  discovered  but  one  way  to  break  Napoleon's 
will,  and  this  single  method  was  that  of  showing 
power  to  break  his  plans. 

In  due  time  Armstrong  received  his  instructions 
of  May  2,  and  wrote  June  10  to  Champagny  a 
note  declining  the  proposed  alliance,  and  expressing 
the  satisfaction  which  his  Government  felt  at  hearing 
the  Emperor's  approval  of  "  a  cautionary  occupation 
of  the  Floridas."  Napoleon,  who  was  still  at  Bayonne 


1808.  THE  DOS  DE  MA1O.  311 

in  the  flush  of  his  power,  no  sooner  read  this  reply 
than  he  wrote  to  Champagny, a  - 

' '  Answer  the  American  minister  that  you  do  not  know 
what  he  means  about  the  occupation  of  the  Floridas  ;  and 
that  the  Americans,  being  at  peace  with  the  Spaniards, 
cannot  occupy  the  Floridas  without  the  permission  or  the 
request  of  the  King  of  Spain." 

Armstrong,  a  few  days  afterward,  was  astonished 
by  receiving  from  Champagny  a  note  2  denying  posi 
tively  that  any  suggestion  had  ever  been  made  to 
warrant  an  American  occupation  of  the  Floridas 
without  an  express  request  from  the  King  of  Spain : 
"  The  Emperor  has  neither  the  right  nor  the  wish  to 
authorize  an  infraction  of  international  law,  contrary 
to  the  interests  of  an  independent  Power,  his  ally  and 
his  friend."  When  Napoleon  chose  to  deny  a  fact, 
argument  was  thrown  away  ;  yet  Armstrong  could 
not  do  otherwise  than  recall  Champagny's  own  words . 
which  he  did  in  a  formal  note,  and  there  left  the 
matter  at  rest,  writing  to  his  Government  that  the 
change  in  tone  had  "  no  doubt  grown  out  of  the  new 
relations  which  the  Floridas  bear  to  this  government 
since  the  abdication  of  Charles  IV."  3 

For  once  Armstrong  was  too  charitable.  He  might 
safely  have  assumed  that  Napoleon  was  also  con- 

1  Napoleon  to  Champagny,  June  21,  1808 ;   Correspondance, 
xvii.  326. 

2  Champagny  to  Armstrong,  June  22,  1808 ;  MSS.  State  De 
partment  Archives. 

3  Armstrong  to  Madison,  July  8,  1808;    MSS.  State  Depart 
ment  Archives. 


312        HISTORY  OF   THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  13. 

tinning  the  same  coarse  game  he  had  played  since 
April,  1803,  —  snatching  away  the  lure  he  loved  to 
dangle  before  Jefferson's  eyes,  punishing  the  Ameri 
cans  for  refusing  his  offer  of  alliance,  and  making 
them  feel  the  constant  pressure  of  his  will.  They 
were  fortunate  if  he  did  not  at  once  confiscate 
the  property  he  had  sequestered.  Indeed,  not  only 
did  his  seizures  of  American  property  continue  even 
more  rigorously  than  before,1  but  such  French  frig 
ates  as  could  keep  at  sea  actually  burned  and  sunk 
American  ships  that  came  in  their  way.  The  Bay- 
onne  Decree  was  enforced  like  a  declaration  of  war. 
The  Emperor  tolerated  no  remonstrance.  At  Bay- 
onne,  July  6,  he  had  an  interview  with  one  of  the 
Livingstons,  who  was  on  his  way  to  America  as 
bearer  of  despatches. 

"  We  are  obliged  to  embargo  your  ships,"  said  the 
Emperor;2  "they  keep  up  a  trade  with  England;  they 
come  to  Holland  and  elsewhere  with  English  goods  ;  Eng 
land  has  made  them  tributary  to  her.  This  I  will  not 
suffer.  Tell  the  President  from  me  when  you  see  him  in 
America  that  if  he  can  make  a  treaty  with  England,  pre 
serving  his  maritime  rights,  it  will  be  agreeable  to  me ; 
but  that  I  will  make  war  upon  the  universe,  should  it 
support  her  unjust  pretensions.  I  will  not  abate  any 
part  of  my  system." 

Yet  in  one  respect  he  made  a  concession.  He  no 
longer  required  a  declaration  of  war  from  the  United 

1  Napoleon  to  Champagny,  July  11,  1808  ;    Correspondance, 
xvii.  364. 

2  Armstrong  to  Jefferson,  July  28,  1808  ;  Jefferson  MSS, 


1808.  THE   DOS   DP:   MAIO.  313 

States.  The  embargo  seemed  to  him,  as  to  Jefferson, 
an  act  of  hostility  to  England  which  answered  the 
immediate  wants  of  France.  In  the  report  on  foreign 
relations,  dated  Sept.  1,  1808,  Napoleon  expressed 
publicly  his  approval  of  the  embargo :  — 

"  The  Americans,  — this  people  who  placed  their  for-  , 
tune,  their  prosperity,  and  almost  their  existence  in 
commerce,  —  have  given  the  example  of  a  great  and 
courageous  sacrifice.  By  a  general  embargo  they  have 
interdicted  all  commerce,  all  exchange,  rather  than 
shamefully  submit  to  that  tribute  which  the  English 
pretend  to  impose  on  the  shipping  of  all  nations." 

Armstrong,  finding  that  his  advice  was  not  even 
considered  at  home,  withdrew  from  affairs.  After 
obeying  his  instructions  of  May  2,  and  recording 
the  conventional  protest  against  Napoleon's  uncivil 
tone,1  he  secluded  himself,  early  in  August,  at  the 
baths  of  Bourbon  PArchambault,  one  hundred  and 
fifty  miles  from  Paris,  and  nursed  his  rheumatism 
till  autumn.  Thither  followed  him  instructions  from 
Madison,  dated  July  21 ,2  directing  him  to  present 
the  case  of  the  burned  vessels  "  in  terms  which  may 
awaken  the  French  government  to  the  nature  of  the 
injury  and  the  demands  of  justice ; "  but  the  limit  of 
Armstrong's  patience  was  reached,  and  he  flatly  re 
fused  to  obey.  Any  new  experiment  made  at  that 

1  Armstrong  to    Champagny,   July  4,    1808 ;    State    Papers, 
iii.    254. 

2  Madison    to    Armstrong,    July    21,     1808;    State     Papers, 
iii.    254. 


314        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       OH.  13. 

moment,  he  said,  would  certainly  be  useless  and  per 
haps  injurious :  — 

'*  This  opinion,  formed  with  the  utmost  circumspection, 
is  not  only  a  regular  inference  from  the  ill  success  of  my 
past  endeavors,  which  have  hitherto  produced  only  pallia 
tions,  and  which  have  latterly  failed  to  produce  these, 
but  a  direct  consequence  of  the  most  authentic  informa 
tion  that  the  Emperor  does  not,  on  this  subject  and  at 
this  time,  exercise  even  the  small  degree  of  patience 
proper  to  his  character."  * 

Finally  Armstrong  summed  up  the  results  of  Jef 
ferson's  policy  so  far  as  France  was  concerned,  in  a 
letter 2  dated  August  30,  which  carried  candor  to  the 
point  of  severity  :  — 

"  We  have  somewhat  overrated  our  means  of  coercing 
the  two  great  belligerents  to  a  course  of  justice.  The 
embargo  is  a  measure  calculated  above  any  other  to  keep 
us  whole  and  keep  us  in  peace ;  but  beyond  this  you  must 
not  count  upon  it.  Here  it  is  not  felt,  and  in  England 
.  .  .  it  is  forgotten.  I  hope  that  unless  France  shall  do 
us  justice  we  will  raise  the  embargo,  and  make  in  its 
stead  the  experiment  of  an  armed  commerce.  Should 
she  adhere  to  her  wicked  and  foolish  measures,  we  ought 
not  to  content  ourselves  with  doing  this.  There  is  much, 
very  much,  besides  that  we  can  do ;  and  we  ought  not  to 
omit  doing  all  we  can,  because  it  is  believed  here  that  we 
cannot  do  much,  and  even  that  we  will  not  do  what  we 
have  the  power  of  doing." 

1  Armstrong  to  Madison,  Aug.  28,  1808;  MSS.  State  Depart 
ment  Archives. 

2  Armstrong    to    Madison,    Aug.    30,    1808 ;    State    Papers, 
iii.    256. 


1808.  THE   DOS  DE  MAIO.  315 

Fortunately  for  Jefferson,  the  answer  made  by 
Spain,  May  2,  to  Napoleon's  orders  was  not  couched 
in  the  terms  which  the  United  States  government 
used  on  the  same  day.  Joseph  Bonaparte,  entering 
his  new  kingdom,  found  himself  a  king  without  sub 
jects.  Arriving  July  20  at  Madrid,  Joseph  heard 
nothing  but  news  of  rebellion  and  disaster.  On  that 
day  some  twenty  thousand  French  troops  under  Gen 
eral  Dupont,  advancing  on  Seville  and  Cadiz,  were 
surrounded  in  the  Sierra  Morena,  and  laid  down  their 
arms  to  a  patriot  Spanish  force.  A  few  days  after 
ward  the  French  fleet  at  Cadiz  surrendered.  A  pa 
triot  Junta  assumed  the  government  of  Spain.  Quick 
escape  from  Madrid  became  Joseph's  most  pressing- 
necessity  if  he  were  to  save  his  life.  During  one  July 
week  he  reigned  over  his  gloomy  capital,  and  fled, 
July  29,  with  all  the  French  forces  still  uncaptured, 
to  the  provinces  beyond  the  Ebro. 

This  disaster  was  quickly  followed  by  another. 
Junot  and  his  army,  far  beyond  support  at  Lisbon, 
suddenly  learned  that  a  British  force  under  Arthur 
Wellesley  had  landed,  August  1,  about  one  hundred 
miles  to  the  north  of  Lisbon,  and  was  marching  on 
that  city.  Junot  had  no  choice  but  to  fight,  and 
August  21  he  lost  the  battle  of  Yimieiro.  August 
30,  at  Cintra,  he  consented  to  evacuate  Portugal, 
on  condition  that  he  and  his  twenty-two  thousand 
men  should  be  conveyed  by  sea  to  France. 

Never  before  in  Napoleon's  career  had  he  received 
two  simultaneous  shocks  so  violent.  The  whole  of 


316        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  13. 

Spain  and  Portugal,  from  Lisbon  to  Saragossa,  by 
a  spasmodic  effort  freed  itself  from  Bonaparte  or 
Bourbon  ;  but  this  was  nothing,  —  a  single  campaign 
would  recover  the  peninsula.  The  real  blow  was 
in  the  loss  of  Cadiz  and  Lisbon,  of  the  fleets  and 
work-shops  that  were  to  restore  French  power  on 
the  ocean.  Most  fatal  stroke  of  all,  the  Spanish 
colonies  were  thenceforward  beyond  reach,  and  the 
dream  of  universal  empire  was  already  dissolved 
\  into  ocean  mist.  Napoleon  .had  found  the  limits 
I  of  his  range,  and  saw  the  power  of  England  rise, 
more  defiant  than  ever,  over  the  ruin  and  desola 
tion  of  Spain. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

WHEN  Parliament  met  Jan.  21, 1808,  the  paroxysm 
of  excitement  which  followed  the  "  Chesapeake  " 
affair  and  the  attack  on  Copenhagen  had  begun  to 
subside.  War  with  America  was  less  popular  than  it  / 
had  been  six  months  before.  The  "  Morning  Post "  V 
exhorted  the  British  public  to  maintain  "  that  sub-* 
lime  pitch "  from  which  all  opposition  was  to  be 
crushed ;  but  the  Whigs  came  to  Parliament  eager 
for  attack,  while  Perceval  and  Canning  had  exhausted 
their  energies,  and  were  thrown  back  on  a  weari 
some  defensive. 

The  session  —  which   lasted   from  January  21   to  / 
July   4  —  was   remarkable   chiefly   for   an   obstinate  \ 
struggle  over  the  Orders  in  Council.     Against  Perce 
val's  commercial  measures  the  Whigs  bent  the  full 
strength  of  their  party  ;  and  this  strength,  so  far  as 
intelligence  was  concerned,  greatly  outmatched  that 
of  the  Ministry.     New  men, made  reputations  in  the 
conflict.      In    January,    1808,   Alexander    Baring  - 
then  about  thirty-four  years  of  age,  not  yet  in  Parlia 
ment,  but  second  to  no  English  merchant  in  standing 

1  The  Morning  Post,  Jan.  16,  1808. 


318        HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  14. 

-  published  a  pamphlet,  in  reply  to  Stephen's  "  War 
in  Disguise ; "  and  his  superior  knowledge  and  abili 
ties  gave,  for  the  first  time  since  1776,  solid  "ground 
of  support  to  American  influence  in  British  politics. 
Side  by  side  with  Baring,  a  still  -younger  man  thrust 
himself  into  public  notice  by  force  of  qualities  which 
for  half  a  century  were  to  make  him  the  object  of 
mixed  admiration  and  laughter.  The  new  American 
champion,  Henry  Brougham,  a  native  of  Edinburgh, 
thirty  years  of  age,  like  many  other  Scotch  lawyers 
had  come  to  seek  and  find  at  Westminster  the  great 
prize  of  his  profession.  Like  Baring,  Brougham  was 
not  yet  in  Parliament ;  but  this  obstacle  —  which 
would  have  seemed  to  most  men  final  —  could  not 
prevent  him  from  speaking  his  mind,  even  in  presence 
of  the  House. 

Lord  Grenville  began  the  attack,  and  Canning  the 
defence,  on  the  first  day  of  the  session ;  but  not  until 
after  January  27,  when  news  of  the  embargo  arrived, 
and  all  immediate  danger  of  war  vanished,  did  the 
situation  become  clear.  February  5  the  debate  be 
gan.  The  Whigs  found  that  Perceval  met  their  as 
saults  on  the  character  and  policy  of  his  orders  by 
quotations  from  Lord  Howick's  Order,  which  the 
Whigs  only  twelve  months  before  had  issued  and 
defended  as  an  act  of  retaliation.  Narrow  as  this 
personal  rejoinder  might  be,  it  was  fatal  to  the 
Whig  argument.  Baring  and  Brougham  might  criti 
cise  Spencer  Perceval ;  but  Lord  Grenville  and  Lord 
Howick  had  enough  to  do  in  explaining  their  own 


1808.      ENGLAND'S   REPLY  TO   THE  EMBARGO.     319 

words.  The  more  vehement  they  became,  the  more 
obstinately  their  opponents  persevered  in  holding 
them  to  this  single  point. 

Yet  the  issue  the  Whigs  wished  to  make  was  fairly 
met.  Government  %  showed  remarkable  candor  in 
avowing  the  commercial  object  of  the  so-called  retali 
ation.  Admitting  that  even  if  Napoleon  had  issued 
no  decrees  England  might  have  been  obliged  to  en 
force  the  Rule  of  1756,  Spencer  Perceval  declared 
that  after  the  Berlin  Decree  a  much  stronger  measure 
was  necessary  in  order  to  protect  British  commerce. 
Lord  Bathurst,  Lord  Hawkesbury,  and  Lord  Castle- 
reagh  took  the  same  tone.  Their  argument,  carried 
to  its  ultimate  conclusion,  implied  that  Great  Britain 
might  lawfully  forbid  every  other  nation  to  trade 
with  any  country  that  imposed  a  prohibitive  duty 
on  British  manufactures.  Not  even  a  state  of  war 
seemed  essential  to  the  soundness  of  the  principle. 

Already  Lord  Grenville  had  declared  that  "  this 
principle  of  forcing  trade  into  our  markets  would 
have  disgraced  the  darkest  ages  of  monopoly,1' l  when 
March  8  Lord  Erskine  spoke  in  support  of  a  series 
of  resolutions  condemning  the  orders  as  contrary  to 
the  Constitution,  the  laws  of  the  realm,  and  the 
rights  of  nations,  and  a  violation  of  Magna  Charta. 
With  especial  energy  he  declaimed  against  Perceval's 
favorite  doctrine  of  retaliation,  as  applied  to  the 
protection  of  British  commerce.  Lord  Erskine,  like 
Lord  Grenville,  never  spared  epithets. 
1  Cobbett's  Debates,  x.  482,  483. 


320        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  14. 

11  It  is  indeed  quite  astonishing,"  he  said,1  "  to  hear 
the  word  '  retaliation '  twisted  and  perverted  in  a  manner 
equally  repugnant  to  grammar  and  common-sense.  .  .  . 
It  is  a  new  application  of  the  term,  that  if  A  strikes  me, 
I  may  retaliate  by  striking  B.  .  .  .  I  cannot,  my  Lords, 
conceive  anything  more  preposterous  and  senseless  than 
the  idea  of  retaliation  upon  a  neutral  on  whom  the  de 
cree  has  never  been  executed,  because  it  is  only  by  its 
execution  on  him  that  we  can  be  injured." 

Erskine  supported  his  positions  by  a  long  profes 
sional  argument.  Lord  Chancellor  Eldon  replied  by 
developing  international  law  in  a  direction  till  then 
unexplored.2 

"  I  would  beg  the  House  to  consider  what  is  meant  by 
the  law  of  nations,"  he  began.  "  It  is  formed  of  an  ac 
cumulation  of  the  dicta  of  wise  men  in  different  ages, 
and  applying  to  different  circumstances,  but  none  re 
sembling  in  any  respect  such  a  state  of  things  as  at 
present  exists  in  the  face  of  the  world.  Indeed,  none  of 
the  writers  upon  the  subject  of  this  law  appear  to  have 
such  a  state  in  their  contemplation.  But  yet  nothing  is 
to  be  found  in  their  writings  which  does  not  fully  war 
rant  the  right  of  self-defence  and  retaliation.  Upon 
that  right  the  present  ministers  acted  in  advising  those 
Orders  in  Council,  and  upon  the  same  right  their  prede 
cessors  issued  the  order  of  the  7th  of  January." 

The  doctrine  that  because  international  law  wanted 
the  sanction  of  a  well-defined  force  it  was,  strictly 
speaking,  no  law  at  all,  was  naturally  favored  by  the 

1  Cobbett's  Debates,  x.  937,  938. 

2  Cobbett's  Debates,  x.  971. 


1808.      ENGLAND'S   REPLY   TO   THE   EMBARGO.     321 

school  of  common  law  ;  but  Lord  Eldon's  doctrine  went 
further,  for  he  created  a  sanction  of  one-sided  force 
by  which  international  law  might  supersede  its  own 
principles.  His  brother,  Sir  William  Scott,  carried  out 
the  theory  by  contending  in  the  House  of  Commons 
that  "  even  if  the  French  Decree  was  not  acted  upon 
(which,  rested  with  the  other  party  to  prove),  it 
was  nevertheless  an  injury,  because  it  was  an  insult 
to  the  country,"  l  —  a  dictum  which  could  hardly 
find  a  parallel  as  the  foundation  for  an  attack  on  the 
rights  and  property  of  an  innocent  third  party. 

Erskine's  Resolutions  were  of  course  rejected ; 
but  meanwhile  the  merchants  of  the  chief  cities  be 
gan  to  protest.  As  the  bill  for  carrying  the  orders 
into  effect  came  to  its  engrossment,  March  7,  the  re 
sistance  became  hot.  March  11  the  bill  passed  the 
House  by  a  vote  of  168  to  68 ;  but  Brougham  had  yet 
to  be  heard,  and  no  ordinary  power  was  capable  of 
suppressing  Henry  Brougham.  As  counsel  for  the 
American  merchants  of  Liverpool,  Manchester,  and 
London,  he  appeared  March  18  at  the  bar  of  the 
House,  and  for  the  next  fortnight  occupied  most  of 
its  time  in  producing  testimony  to  prove  that  the 
orders  had  ruinously  affected  the  commercial  in 
terest.  April  1  he  summed  up  the  evidence  in  a 
speech  of  three  hours,  which  James  Stephen  thought 
pernicious  and  incendiary.2  Perceval  was  obliged  to 

1  Cobbett's  Debates,  x.  1066. 

2  Brougham  to  Grey,  April  21,  1808;    Brougham's  Memoirs, 
i.  399. 

VOL.  IV.  —  21 


322        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  14. 

produce  witnesses  on  the  other  side ;  and  Stephen, 
who  had  been  brought  into  Parliament  for  the  pur 
pose,  devoted  himself  to  the  task  of  proving  that  the 
orders  had  as  yet  been  allowed  no  chance  to  produce 
any  effect  whatever,  and  that  the  commercial  distress 
was  due  to  the  recent  enforcement  of  the  Berlin  De 
cree.  That  much  distress  existed  no  one  denied ; 
but  its  causes  might  well  be  matter  of  dispute ;  and 
Parliament  left  the  merchants  to  decide  the  point 
as  they  pleased.  Brougham's  inquiry  had  no  other 
effect. 

Pinkney's  dealings  with  Canning  were  equally 
fruitless.  January  26,  when  Pinkney  received  official 
news  of  the  embargo,  he  went  instantly  to  Canning, 
"  who  received  my  explanations  with  great  apparent 
satisfaction,  and  took  occasion  to  express  the  most 
friendly  disposition  toward  our  country."  1  Pinkney 
used  this  opportunity  to  remonstrate  against  the  tax 
imposed  on  American  cotton  by  the  Orders  in  Council. 
A  week  afterward  Canning  sent  for  him,  and  gravely 
suggested  a  friendly  arrangement.  He  wished  to 
know  Pinkney's  private  opinion  whether  the  United 
States  would  prefer  an  absolute  interdict  to  a  pro 
hibitory  duty  on  cotton  intended  for  the  continent.2 
The  sting  of  this  inquiry  rested  not  so  much  in  the 
alternative  thus  presented  as  in  the  seriousness  with 
which  Canning  insisted  that  his  overture  was  a 
concession  to  America.  With  all  his  wit,  as  Lord 

1  Pinkney  to  Madison,  Jan.  26,  1808;  State  Papers,  iii.  206. 

2  Pinkney  to  Madison,  Feb.  2,  1808;  State  Papers,  iii.  207. 


1808.      ENGLAND'S  REPLY   TO   THE  EMBARGO.     323 

Castlereagh  soon  had  reason  to  learn,  Canning  could 
not  quite  acquire  tact  or  understand  the  insults  he 
offered.  Pinkney  tried,  with  much  good  temper,  to 
make  him  aware  that  his  offer  was  in  bad  taste ; 
but  nothing  could  stop  him  in  the  path  of  concili 
ation,  and  February  22  he  addressed  to  Pinkney  a 
note  announcing  that  the  British  government  meant 
to  prohibit  the  export  of  American  cotton  to  the 
continent  of  Europe. 

"  I  flatter  myself,"  he  continued,1  "  that  this  alteration 
in  the  legislative  regulations  by  which  the  Orders  of 
Council  are  intended  to  be  carried  into  execution,  will  be 
considered  by  yon  as  a  satisfactory  evidence  of  the  dis 
position  of  his  Majesty's  government  to  consult  the 
feelings  as  well  as  the  interests  of  the  United  States  in 
any  manner  which  may  not  impair  the  effect  of  that 
measure  of  commercial  restriction  to  which  the  necessity 
of  repelling  the  injustice  of  his  enemies  has  compelled 
his  Majesty  reluctantly  to  have  recourse." 

"  One  object  of  all  this  is  certainly  to  conciliate  us," 
wrote  Pinkney  to  Madison.2  On  the  day  of  Can 
ning's  note  Spencer  Perceval  carried  out  the  promise 
by  moving  the  House  for  leave  to  bring  in  a  bill  pro 
hibiting  the  export  of  cotton,  except  by  license.  At 
the  same  time  he  extended  the  like  prohibition  to 
Jesuit's  bark,  or  quinine.  Impervious  to  indignation 
and  ridicule,  —  caring  as  little  for  the  laughter  of 
Sydney  Smith  as  for  the  wrath  of  Lord  Grenville, — 

1  Canning  to  Pinkney,  Feb   22,  1808;  State  Papers,  iii.  208. 

2  Pinkney  to  Madison,  Feb.  23,  1808;  State  Papers,  iii.  208. 


324        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  14. 

Perceval  pushed  all  his  measures  through  Parliament, 

and  by  the  middle  of  April  succeeded  in  riveting  his 

I  restrictive  system   on   the    statute-book.      No  power 

I  short  of  a  new  political  revolution  could  thencefor- 

Ward  shake  his  grasp  on  American  commerce. 

Yet  Perceval  felt  and  dreaded  the  effects  of  the 
embargo,  which  threatened  to  paralyze  the  healthiest 
industries  of  England.  To  escape  the  effects  of  this 
weapon  Perceval  would  have  made  every  possible 
concession  short  of  abandoning  his  great  scheme  of 
restrictive  statesmanship.  March  26  he  submitted 
to  his  colleagues  a  paper  containing  suggestions  on 
this  point.1  "  It  must  be  admitted,"  he  began,  "  that 
it  is  extremely,  desirable  that  America  should  relax 
her  embargo  at  least  as  far  as  respects  the  inter 
course  with  this  country."  The  Americans  submit 
ted  to  it  with  reluctance,  chiefly  because  they  feared 
the  seizure  of  their  vessels  in  case  England  or  France 
should  declare  war.  To  profit  by  this  situation  Per 
ceval  proposed  a  new  order,  which  should  guaranty 
the  safety  of  every  merchant-vessel,  neutral  or  bellig 
erent,  on  a  voyage  to  or  fyom  a  British  port.  The 
advantages  of  this  step  were  political  as  well  as  com 
mercial.  The  British  ministry  was  disposed  to  meet 
the  wishes  of  the  Boston  Federalists.  Such  an  order, 
Perceval  said,  "  would  have  the  appearance  of  a 
friendly  act  on  the  part  of  this  government  toward 
America,  and  would  increase  the  embarrassment  and 

1  Suggestions  by  S.  P.  for^a  Supplementary  Order  in  Council, 
March  26,  1808;  Perceval  MSS. 


1808.      ENGLAND'S   REPLY   TO   THE   EMBARGO.     325 

difficulties  of  that  government  in  prevailing  upon  their 
subjects  to  submit  to  the  embargo." 

Lord    Bathurst    approved    the    suggestion  ;    Lord  1 
Castlereagh  opposed  it,  for  reasons  best  given  in  his 
own  words  : 1  - 

"  If  the  only  object  to  be  aimed  at  in  conducting  our 
selves  toward  America  was  to  force  the  abrogation  of  the 
embargo,  I  agree  with  Mr.  Perceval  that  the  proposed 
measure  would  make  it  more  difficult  for  the  American 
government  to  sustain  it ;  but  in  yielding  so  far  to  the 
popular  feeling  the  governing  party  would  still  retain 
much  of  their  credit,  and  they  would  continue  to  act  on 
all  the  unsettled  questions  between  the  two  countries  in 
their  past  spirit  of  hostility  to  Great  Britain  and  par 
tiality  to  France.  I  think  it  better  to  leave  them  with 
the  full  measure  of  their  own  difficulties  to  lower  and 
degrade  them  in  the  estimation  of  the  American  people. 
The  continuance  of  the  embargo  for  some  time  is  the 
best  chance  of  their  being  destroyed  as  a  party;  and  I 
should  prefer  exposing  them  to  the  disgrace  of  rescinding 
their  own  measure  at  the  demand  of  their  own  people 
than  furnish  them  with  any  creditable  pretext  for  doing  so. 
I  look  upon  the  embargo  as  operating  at  present  more 
forcibly  in  our  favor  than  any  measure  of  hostility  we ! 
could  call  forth  were  war  actually  declared,  and  doubt  j 
the  policy  of  exhibiting  too  great  an  impatience  on  our/ 
part  of  its  continuance,  which  so  strong  ji  departure  from 
our  us~ual  practice  toward  neutrals  would  indicate." 

Secretary  Canning  wrote  to  his  colleague  in  accord 
with  Castlereagh's  views.2 

1  Opinion  of  Lord  Castlereagh,  March- April,  1808  ;  Perceval 
MSS. 

2  Opinion  of  Mr.  Canning,  March  28,  1808  ;  Perceval  MSS. 


326        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  14. 

"  It  is  so  plain  upon  the  face  of  this  measure,"  began 
Canning,  "that  however  comprehensive  it  may  be  made 
in  words,  it  in  fact  refers  to  America  only ;  and  the  em 
bargo  in  America  seems  to  be  working  so  well  for  us, 
without  our  interference,  that  on  that  ground  alone  I 
confess  I  could  wish  that  no  new  steps  should  be  taken, 
at  least  till  we  have  more  certain  information  of  the  real 
issue  of  the  present  crisis  in  America.  I  have  no  appre 
hension  whatever  of  a  war  with  the  United  States.  .  .  . 
Above  all  things  I  feel  that  to  do  nothing  noiu,  at  this 
precise  moment,  —  absolutely  nothing,  —  is  the  wisest, 
safest,  and  most  manful  policy.  The  battle  about  the 
Orders  in  Council  is  just  fought.  They  are  established 
as  a  system.  We  have  reason  to  hope  that  they  are 
working  much  to  good,  and  very  little  to  mischief. 
Every  day  may  be  expected  to  bring  additional  proofs  of 
this.  But  whether  this  be  true  to  the  extent  that  we 
hope  or  no,  their  effects,  whatever  they  are,  have  been 
produced  in  America.  Nothing  that  we  now  do  can 
alter  those  effects ;  but  an  attempt  to  do  something  will 
perplex  the  view  of  them  which  we  shall  otherwise  have 
to  present  to  the  country  in  so  short  a  time,  and  which 
there  is  so  much  reason  to  believe  will  be  highly 
satisfactory." 

Perceval,  was  less  certain  than  Canning  that  the 
country  would  feel  high  satisfaction  with  the  effect 
of  the  orders ;  and  he  rejoined  by  an  argument  which 
overthrew  opposition  :  - 

"The  reason  which  strongly  urges  me  to  continue  the 
circulation  of  this  paper,  after  having  read  Mr.  Canning's 
paper,  in  addition  to  those  already  stated,  is  the  appre 
hension  I  feel  of  the  want  of  provision  not  only  for 
Sweden,  but  for  the  West  Indies  ;  and  therefore  every 


1808.      ENGLAND'S   REPLY   TO   THE   EMBARGO.     327 

possible  facility  or  encouragement  which  we  could  give 
to  prevail  upon  the  American  people  either  to  evade  the 
embargo  by  running  their  produce  to  the  West  Indian 
Islands,  or  to  compel  their  government  to  relax  it,  would 
in  my  opinion  be  most  wise." 

The  order  was  accordingly  issued.  Dated  April 
11,  1808,1  it  directed  British  naval  commanders  to1 
molest  no  neutral  vessel  on  a  voyage  to  the  West ' 
Indies  or  South  America,  even  though  the  vessel 
should  have  no  regular  clearances  or  papers,  and 
"  notwithstanding  the  present  hostilities,  or  any  future 
hostilities  that  may  take  place."  No  measure  of  the 
British  government  irritated  Madison  more  keenly 
than  this.  "  A  more  extraordinary  experiment,"  he 
wrote  to  Pinkney,2  "  is  perhaps  not  to  be  found  in  the 
annals  of  modern  transactions."  Certainly  govern 
ments  did  not  commonly  invite  citizens  of  friendly 
countries  to  violate  their  own  laws ;  but  one  avowed 
object  of  the  embargo  was  to  distress  the  British 
people  into  resisting  their  government,  and  news 
that  the  negroes  of  Jamaica  and  the  artisans  of  York 
shire  had  broken  into  acts  of  lawless  violence  would 
have  been  grateful  to  the  ears  of  Jefferson.  So  dis 
tinct  was  this  object,  and  so  real  the  danger,  that 
Perceval  asked  Parliament 3  to  restrict  the  consump 
tion  of  grain  in  the  distilleries  in  order  to  counter 
vail  the  loss  of  American  wheat  and  avert  a  famine. 

1  American  State  Papers,  iii.  281. 

2  Madison  to  Pinkney,  July  18,  1808  ;  State  Papers,  iii.  224. 
8  Cobbett's  Debates,  xi.  536. 


328         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  14. 

The  price  of  wheat  had  risen  from  thirty-nine  to 
seventy-two  shillings  a  quarter,  and  every  farmer 
hoped  for  a  rise  above  one  hundred  shillings,  as  in 
1795  and  1800.  Disorders  occurred  ;  lives  were  lost ; 
the  embargo,  as  a  coercive  measure,  pressed  severely 
on  British  society  ;  and  Madison,  with  such  a  weapon 
in  his  hand,  could  not  require  Perceval  to  perceive 
the  impropriety  of  inviting  a  friendly  people  to  violate 
their  own  laws. 

The  exact  cost  of  the  embargo  to  England  could  not 
be  known.  The  total  value  of  British  exports  to 
America  was  supposed  to  be  nearly  fifty  million  dol 
lars  ;  but  the  Americans  regularly  re-exported  to  the 
West  Indies  merchandise  to  the  value  of  ten  or  fif 
teen  millions.  The  embargo  threw  this  part  of  the 
trade  back  into  British  hands.  The  true  consump 
tion  of  the  United  States  hardly  exceeded  thirty- 
five  million  dollars,  and  was  partially  compensated 
to  England  by  the  gain  of  freights,  the  recovery  of 
seamen,  and  by  smuggling  consequent  on  the  em 
bargo.  Napoleon's  decrees  must  in  any  case  have 
greatly  reduced  the  purchasing  power  of  America, 
and  had  in  fact  already  done  so.  Perhaps  twenty -five 
million  dollars  might  be  a  reasonable  estimate  for  the 
value  of  the  remaining  trade  which  the  embargo 
stopped ;  and  if  the  British  manufacturers  made  a 
profit  of  twenty  per  cent  on  this  trade,  their  loss 
in  profits  did  not  exceed  five  million  dollars  for  the 
year,  —  a  sum  not  immediately  vital  to  English 
interests  at  a  time  when  the  annual  expenditure 


1808.      ENGLAND'S   REPLY   TO   THE   EMBARGO.     329 

reached  three  hundred  and  fifty  million  dollars,  and 
when,  as  in  1807,  the  value  of  British  exports  was 
reckoned  at  nearly  two  hundred  million  dollars.  In 
deed,  according  to  the  returns,  the  exports  of  1808  ex 
ceeded  those  of  1807  by  about  two  millions. 

Doubtless  the  embargo  caused  suffering.  The  West 
Indian  negroes  and  the  artisans  of  Staffordshire, 
Lancashire,  and  Yorkshire  were  reduced  to  the  verge 
of  famine ;  but  the  shipowners  rejoiced,  and  the 
country-gentleman  and  farmers  were  enriched.  So 
ill  balanced  had  the  British  people  become  in  the 
excitement  of  their  wars  and  industries  that  not  only 
Cobbett  but  even  a  man  so  intelligent  as  William 
Spence  undertook  to  prove l  that,  foreign  commerce 
was  not  a  source  of  wealth  to  England,  but  that  her 
prosperity  and  power  were  derived  from  her  own 
resources,  and  would  survive  the  annihilation  of  her 
foreign  trade.  James  Mill  replied  2  at  great  length  to 
the  eccentricities  of  Spence  and  Cobbett,  which  the 
common-sense  of  England  would  in  ordinary  times 
have  noticed  only  with  a  laugh. 

The  population  of  England  was  about  ten  millions. 
Perhaps  two  millions  were  engaged  in  manufactures. 
The  embargo  by  raising  the  price  of  grain  affected 
them  all,  but  it  bore  directly  on  about  one  tenth  of 
them.  The  average  sum  expended  on  account  of  the 
poor  was  £4,268,000  in  1803  and  1804;  it  was 

1  Britain  Independent  of  Commerce,  by  William  Spence  (Lon 
don).  1808. 

2  Commerce  Defended,  by  James  Mill  (London),  1808. 


330         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  14. 

£5,923,000  in  1811 ;  and  in  1813,  1814,  and  1815, 
when  the  restrictive  system  had  produced  its  full 
effect,  the  poor-rates  averaged  £6,130,000.  The  in 
crease  was  probably  due  to  the  disturbance  of  trade 
and  was  accompanied  by  a  state  of  society  bordering 
on  chronic  disorder. 

Probably  at  least  five  thousand  families  of  working- 
men  were  reduced  to  pauperism  by  the  embargo  and 
the  decrees  of  Napoleon ;  but  these  sufferers,  who 
possessed  not  a  vote  among  them  and  had  been  in  no 
way  party  to  the  acts  of  either  government,  were  the 
only  real  friends  whom  Jefferson  could  hope  to  find 
among  the  people  ,  of  England  ;  and  his  embargo 
ground  them  in  the  dust  in  order  to  fatten  the  squires 
and  ship-owners  who  had  devised  the  Orders  in  Coun 
cil.  If  the  English  laborers  rioted,  they  were  shot: 
if  the  West  Indian  slaves  could  not  be  fed,  they  died. 
The  embargo  served  only  to  lower  the  wages  and  the 
moral  standard  of  the  laboring  classes  throughout  the 
British  empire,  and' to  prove  their  helplessness. 

Each  government  thus  tried  to  overthrow  the  other ; 
but  that  of  England  was  for  the  moment  the  more 
successful.  The  uneducated  force  of  democracy 
seemed  about  to  break  against  the  strength  of  an 
aristocratic  system.  When  Parliament  rose,  July  4, 
domestic  opposition  was  silenced,  and  nothing  re 
mained  but  to  crush  the  resistance  of  America,  —  a 
task  which  all  advices  from  the  United  States  showed 
to  be  easy ;  while  as  though  to  make  ministers  in 
vulnerable,  Spain  suddenly  opened  her  arms  to  Eng- 


1808.     ENGLAND'S  REPLY   TO   THE   EMBARGO.     331 

land,  offering  new  markets  that  promised  boundless 
wealth.  At  this  unexpected  good  fortune  England 
went  well-nigh  mad;  and  the  Spanish  revolution, 
which  was  in  truth  a  gain  to  democracy,  seemed  to 
strike  Jefferson  a  mortal  blow.  Daring  the  month 
of  July,  1808,  Canning  and  his  colleagues  exulted 
over  Europe  and  America  alike,  looking  down  on 
Jefferson  and  his  embargo  with  the  disgust  and 
horror  which  they  might  have  felt  for  some  monster 
of  iniquity  like  the  famous  butcher  of  the  Marrs, 
who  was  to  rouse  the  shudders  of  England  during 
these  lurid  years.  According  to  Canning,  Napoleon's 
system  was  already  "  broken  up  into  fragments  ut 
terly  harmless  and  contemptible." 1  According  to 
Henry  Brougham,2  hardly  ten  men  could  be  found 
in  London  who  did  not  believe  Bonaparte  utterly 
broken,  or  think  him  worth  paying  one  hundred 
pounds  a  year  to  live  in  retirement  at  Ajaccio  the 
rest  of  his  life.  America  was  still  more  contemptible, 
and  equally  hated.  Early  in  August,  at  a  great  din 
ner  given  at  the  London  Tavern  to  the  Spanish 
patriots.  Sir  Francis  Baring,  of  the  house  of  Baring 
Brothers,  —  a  man  who  for  a  whole  generation  had 
stood  at  the  head  of  British  merchants,  —  proposed 
as  chairman,  among  the  regular  toasts,  the  health  of 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  and  his  voice  was 
instantly  drowned  in  hisses  and  protests.  Jefferson, 

1  Canning  to  Pinkney,  Sept.  23,  1808  ;  State  Papers,  iii.  231. 

2  Brougham  to   Grey,  July  2,   1808  ;   Brougham's   Memoirs, 
i.  405. 


332        HISTORY  OF   THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  u. 

thanks  to  the  slanders  of  Pickering  and  the  Fed 
eralists,  stood  before  England  in  the  attitude  of  a 
foiled  cutthroat,  at  the  moment  when  by  his  order 
the  American  minister  in  London  came  to  the  British 
Foreign  Office  with  a  request  that  the  Orders  in 
Council  should  be  withdrawn. 

"  That  the  Orders  in  Council  did  not  produce  the 
embargo,  that  they  were  not  substantially  known 
in  America  when  the  embargo  took  place," l  was 
the  burden  of  Canning's  and  Castlereagh's  constant 
charge  against  the  United  States  government.  Can 
ning  was  one  of  six  or  eight  men  in  the  world  who 
might  with  truth  have  said  that  they  knew  the  orders 
to  have  produced  the  embargo.  He  alone  could  have 
proved  it  by  publishing  Erskine's  official  evidence  ; 2 
but  he  preferred  to  support  Timothy  Pickering  and 
Barent  Gardenier  in  persuading  the  world  that  Jeffer 
son's  acts  were  dictated  from  Paris,  and  that  their 
only  motive  was  the  assassination  of  England.  "  Nor, 
sir,  do  I  think,"  continued  Canning  before  the  whole 
House  of  Commons,  "  that  the  Orders  in  Council 
themselves  could  have  produced  any  irritation  in 
America.  .  .  .  Since  the  return  of  Mr.  Rose  no  com 
munication  has  been  made  by  the  American  govern 
ment  in  the  form  of  complaint,  or  remonstrance,  or 
irritation,  or  of  any  description  whatever."  With 
infinite  industry  the  assertions  of  Pickering  and  Gar- 

1  Speech  of  Mr.  Canning,  June  24,  1808 ;  Cobbett's  Debates, 
xi.  1050. 

2  See  pp.  175,  176. 


1808.     ENGLAND'S   REPLY   TO   THE  EMBARGO.     338 

denier,  of  John  Randolph  and  of  the  Boston  news 
papers  and  pamphlets,  were  reprinted  and  circulated 
in  London.  "  Your  modesty  would  suffer,"  wrote 
Rose  to  Pickering,1  "  if  you  were  aware  of  the  sen 
sation  produced  in  this  country  by  the  publication 
of  a  letter  from  a  senator  of  Massachusetts  to  his 
constituents." 

Every  American  slander  against  Jefferson  was  wel 
comed  in  England,  until  Pinkney  asked  Madison  in 
disgust,  "  Have  you  prohibited  the  exportation  of  all 
pamphlets  which  uphold  our  rights  and  honor  ? " 2 
The  English  people  could  hardly  be  blamed  if  they 
became  almost  insane  under  the  malice  of  these  false 
hoods,  for  no  whisper  of  lago  was  more  poisonous 
than  Canning's  innuendoes.  Believing  Jefferson  to 
be  in  secret  league  with  Napoleon,  they  insisted 
that  the  United  States  should  be  punished  for  the 
treason  Jefferson  had  planned.  Joseph  Marriatt,  a 
prominent  member  of  Parliament,  in  a  pamphlet 3 
published  in  August,  reminded  President  Jefferson 
of  the  fate  of  the  late  Czar  Paul.  The  feeling  of  so 
ciety  was  so  bitter  that  by  tacit  agreement  America 
ceased  to  be  talked  about ;  no  one  ventured  longer  to 
defend  her. 

In  June  Pinkney  received  instructions,  dated  April 
30,4  authorizing  him  to  offer  a  withdrawal  of  the  em- 

1  Rose  to  Pickering,  May  8,  1808  ;  New  England  Federalism, 
p.  371. 

2  Wheaton's  Life  of  Pinkney,  p.  91. 

8  Hints  to  both  Parties  (London),  1808,  pp.  64,  65. 

4  Madison  to  Pinkney,  April  30,  1808;  State  Papers,  iii.  222. 


334         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  14. 

bargo  on  condition  that  England  should  withdraw 
the  Orders  in  Council.  In  the  situation  of  English 
feeling  such  an  offer  was  almost  an  invitation  to  in 
sult,  and  Pinkney  would  have  gladly  left  it  untouched. 
He  tried  to  evade  the  necessity  of  putting  it  in  writ 
ing  ;  but  Canning  was  inexorable.  From  week  to 
week  Pinkney  postponed  the  unpleasant  task.  Not 
until  August  23  did  he  write  the  note  which  should 
have  been  written  in  June.  No  moment  could  have 
been  more  unfortunate  ;  for  only  two  days  before, 
Arthur  Wellesley  had  defeated  Junot  at  Vimieiro; 
and  August  30  Junot  capitulated  at  Cintra.  The 
delirium  of  England  was  higher  than  ever  before 
or  since. 

September  23  Canning  replied.1  Beginning  with 
a  refusal  to  admit  the  President's  advance,  his  note 
went  on  to  discuss  its  propriety.  "  His  Majesty,"  it- 
said,  "  cannot  consent  to  buy  off  that  hostility  which 
America  ought  not  to  have  extended  to  him,  at  the 
expense  of  a  concession  made,  not  to  America,  but 
to  France."  Canning  was  a  master  of  innuendo ;  and 
every  sentence  of  his  note  hinted  that  he  believed 
Jefferson  to  be  a  tool  of  Napoleon ;  but  in  one  passage 
he  passed  the  bounds  of  official  propriety  :  — 

"The  Government  of  the  United  States  is  not  to  be 
informed  that  the  Berlin  Decree  of  Nov.  21,  1806,  was 
the  practical  commencement  of  an  attempt,  not  merely 
to  check  or  impair  the  prosperity  of  Great  Britain,  but 
utterly  to  annihilate  her  political  existence  through  the 

1  Canning  to  Pinkney,  Sept.  23,  1808;  State  Papers,  iii.  231. 


1808.     ENGLAND'S  REPLY   TO   THE   EMBARGO.     335 

ruin  of  her  commercial  prosperity  ;  that  in  this  attempt 
almost  all  the  Powers  of  the  European  continent  have 
been  compelled  more  or  less  to  co-operate  ;  and  that  the 
American  embargo,  though  most  assuredly  not  intended 
to  that  end,  —  for  America  can  have  no  real  interest  in 
the  subversion  of  the  British  power,  and  her  rulers  are  too 
enlightened  to  act  from  any  impulse  against  the  real  in 
terests  of  their  country,  —  but  by  some  unfortunate  con 
currence  of  circumstances,  without  any  hostile  intention, 
the  American  embargo  did  come  in  aid  of  the  c  blockade 
of  the  European  continent '  precisely  at  the  very  moment 
when  if  that  blockade  could  have  succeeded  at  all,  this 
interposition  of  the  American  government  would  most 
effectually  have  contributed  to  its  success." 

Like  his  colleague  Lord  Castlereagh,  Canning  de 
liberately  tried  to  "lower  and  degrade  "the  Amer 
ican  government  in  the  eyes  of  its  own  people.  His 
defiance  was  even  more  emphatic  than  his  sarcasm. 

u  To  this  universal  combination,"  he  continued,  "  his 
Majesty  has  opposed  a  temperate  but  a  determined  retal 
iation  upon  the  enemy,  —  trusting  that  a  firm  resistance 
would  defeat  this  project,  but  knowing  that  the  smallest 
concession  would  infallibly  encourage  a  perseverance 
in  it. 

' '  The  struggle  has  been  viewed  by  other  Powers  not 
without  an  apprehension  that  it  might  be  fatal  to  this 
country.  The  British  government  has  not  disguised  from 
itself  that  the  trial  of  such  an  experiment  might  be  ardu 
ous  and  long,  though  it  has  never  doubted  of  the  final 
issue.  But  if  that  issue,  such  as  the  British  government 
confidently  anticipated,  has  providentially  arrived  much 
sooner  than  could  even  have  been  hoped  ;  if  '  the  block- 


336        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED   STATES.      CH.  14. 

ade  of  the  Continent,'  as  it  has  been  triumphantly  styled 
by  the  enemy,  is  raised  even  before  it  had  been  well 
established;  and  if  that  system,  of  which  extent  and 
continuity  were  the  vital  principles,  is  broken  up  into 
fragments  utterly  harmless  and  contemptible,  —  it  is, 
nevertheless,  important  in  the  highest  degree  to  the  repu 
tation  of  this  country  (a  reputation  which  constitutes  a 
great  part  of  her  power),  that  this  disappointment  of 
the  hopes  of  her  enemies  should  not  have  been  pur 
chased  by  any  concession  ;  that  not  a  doubt  should  re 
main  to  distant  times  of  her  determination  and  of  her 
ability  to  have  continued  her  resistance ;  and  that  no 
step  which  could  even  mistakenly  be  construed  into  con 
cession  should  be  taken  on  her  part  while  the  smallest 
link  of  the  confederacy  remains  undissolved,  or  while  it 
can  be  a  question  whether  the  plan  devised  for  her  de 
struction  has  or  has  not  either  completely  failed  or  been 
unequivocally  abandoned." 

With  this  sweeping  assertion  of  British  power  Can 
ning  might  well  have  stopped ;  but  although  he  had 
said  more  than  enough,  he  was  not  yet  satisfied.  His 
love  of  sarcasm  dragged  him  on.  He  thought  proper 
to  disavow  the  wish  to  depress  American  prosperity, 
and  his  disavowal  was  couched  in  terms  of  condescen 
sion  as  galling  as  bis  irony  ;  but  in  one  paragraph  he 
concentrated  in  peculiar  force  the  worst  faults  of  his 
character  and  taste  :  — 

"  His  Majesty  would  not  hesitate  to  contribute,  in  any 
manner  in  his  power,  to  restore  to  the  commerce  of  the 
United  States  its  wonted  activity  ;  and  if  it  were  possi 
ble  to  make  any  sacrifice  for  the  repeal  of  the  embargo 


1808.      ENGLAND'S   REPLY   TO  THE  EMBARGO.     337 

without  appearing  to  deprecate  it  as  a  measure  of  hostil 
ity,  he  would  gladly  have  facilitated  its  removal  as  a 
measure  of  inconvenient  restriction  upon  the  American 
people." 

Earl  Grey,  although  he  approved  of  rejecting  the 
American  offer,  wrote  to  Brougham  that  in  this  note 
Canning  had  outdone  himself.1  No  doubt  his  irony  | 
betrayed  too  much  of  the  cleverness  which  had  been 
so  greatly  admired  by  Eton  schoolboys  ;  but  it  served 
the  true  purpose  of  satire,  —  it  stung  to  the  quick,  j 
and  goaded  Americans  into  life-long  hatred  of  Eng-  j 
land.  Pinkney,  whose  British  sympathies  had  offered 
long  resistance  to  maltreatment,  fairly  lost  his  tem 
per  over  this  note.  "  Insulting  and  insidious,"  he 
called  it  in  his  private  correspondence  with  Madi 
son.2  He  was  the  more  annoyed  because  Canning 
wrote  him  an  explanatory  letter  of  the  same  date 
which  gave  a  personal  sting  to  the  public  insult.3 
"  I  feel  that  it  is  not  such  a  letter  as  I  could  have 
persuaded  myself  to  write  in  similar  circumstances," 
he  complained.4 

Pinkney's  abilities  were  great.  Tn  the  skirmish 
of  words  in  which  Canning  delighted,  Pinkney  ex 
celled  ;  and  in  his  later  career  at  the  bar,  of  which 

1  .Grey   to   Brougham,    Jan.  3,    1809;  Brougham's   Memoirs, 
i.  397. 

2  Pinkney  to  Madison,   Oct.   11,    1808;  Wheaton's  Pinkney, 
p.  412. 

8  Canning  to  Pinkney,  Sept.  23,  1808;  State  Papers,  iii.  230. 
4  Pinkney  to  Madison,  Nov.   2,   1808  ;  Wheaton's  Pinkney, 
p.  416. 

VOL.  iv. —  22 


338        HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  14. 

he  was  the  most  brilliant  leader,  and  in  the  Senate, 
where  he  was  heard  with  bated  breath,  he  showed 
more  than  once  a  readiness  to  overbear  opposition 
by  methods  too  nearly  resembling  those  of  Canning ; 
but  as  a  diplomatist  he  contented  himself  with  pre 
serving  the  decorous  courtesy  which  Canning  lacked. 
He  answered  the  explanatory  letter  of  September  23 
with  so  much  skill  and  force  that  Canning  was 
obliged  to  rejoin ;  and  the  rejoinder  hardly  raised 
the  British  secretary's  reputation.1 

With  this  exchange  of  notes,  the  diplomatic  dis 
cussion  ended  for  the  season  ;  and  the  packet  set 
sail  for  America,  bearing  to  Jefferson  the  news  that 
his  scheme  of  peaceable  coercion  had  resulted  in  a 
double  failure,  which  left  no  alternative  but  war  or 
submission. 

1  Pinkney  to  Canning,  Oct.  10,  1808;  State  Papers,  iii.  233. 
Canning  to  Pinkney,  Nov.  22,  1808;  State  Papers,  iii.  237. 


CHAPTER    XY. 

EARLY  in  August,  at  the  time  when  public  feeling' 
against  the  embargo  was  beginning  to  turn  into  per 
sonal  hatred  of  Jefferson,  news  of  the  Spanish  out 
break  reached  America,  and  put  a  new  weapon  into 
Federalist  hands.  The  embargo,  in  its  effects  upon 
Spain  and  her  colonies  was  a  powerful  weapon  to  aid 
Napoleon  in  his  assault  on  Spanish  liberty  and  in  his 
effort  to  gain  mastery  of  the  ocean.  In  an  instant 
England  appeared  as  the  champion  of  human  liberty, 
and  America  as  an  accomplice  of  despotism.  Jeffer 
son,  in  his  pursuit  of  Florida,  lost  what  was  a  thou 
sand  times  more  valuable  to  him  than  territory, — 
the  moral  leadership  which  belonged  to  the  head  of 
democracy.  The  New  England  Federalists  seized 
their  advantage,  and  proclaimed  themselves  the 
friends  of  Spain  and  freedom.  Their  press  rang  with 
denunciations  of  Napoleon,  and  of  Jefferson  his  tool. 
For  the  first  time  in  many  years  the  Essex  Junto  i 
stood  forward  as  champions  of  popular  liberty.  J 

So  deeply  mired  was  Jefferson  in  the  ruts  of  his 
Spanish  policy  and  prejudices  that  he  could  not  at 
once  understand  the  revolution  which  had  taken 
place.  On  hearing  the  earlier  reports  of  Spanish 


340        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  15. 

resistance  his  first  thought  was  selfish.  "  I  am  glad 
to  see  that  Spain  is  likely  to  give  Bonaparte  employ 
ment.  Tant  mieux  pour  nous!"1  To  each  member 
of  his  Cabinet  he  wrote  his  hopes  : 2  — 

"  Should  England  make  up  with  us,  while  Bonaparte 
continues  at  war  with  Spain,  a  moment  may  occur  when 
we  may  without  danger  of  commitment  with  either  France 
or  England  seize  to  our  own  limits  of  Louisiana  as  of 
right,  and  the  residue  of  the  Floridas  as  reprisals  for 
spoliations.  It  is  our  duty  to  have  an  eye  to  this  in 
rendezvousing  and  stationing  our  new  recruits  and  our 
armed  vessels,  so  as  to  be  ready,  if  Congress  authorizes 
it,  to  strike  in  a  moment." 

The  victories  at  Bailen  and  Yimieiro,  the  flight  of 
Joseph  from  Madrid,  the  outburst  of  English  enthu 
siasm  for  Spain,  and  the  loud  echo  from  New  Eng 
land,  in  the  anxieties  of  a  general  election,  brought 
the  President  to  wider  views.  October  22  the  Cabi 
net  debated  the  subject,  arriving  at  a  new  result, 
which  Jefferson  recorded  in  his  memoranda:3  — 

"Unanimously  agreed  in  the  sentiments  which  should 
be  unauthoritatively  expressed  by  our  agents  to  influen 
tial  persons  in  Cuba  and  Mexico  ;  to  wit :  '  If  you  remain 
under  the  dominion  of  the  kingdom  and  family  of  Spain, 
we  are  contented ;  but  we  should  be  extremely  unwilling 
to  see  you  pass  under  the  dominion  or  ascendency  of 

1  Jefferson  to  Robert  Smith,  Aug.  9,  1808;  Writings,  v.  335. 

2  Jefferson   to    Dearborn,  Aug.   12,   1808;    Writings,  v.  338. 
Jefferson  to    Gallatin,   v.   338.     Jefferson  to  R.   Smith,  v.   337. 
Jefferson  to  Madison,  v.  339. 

8  Cabinet  Memoranda;  Jefferson  MSS. 


1808.  FAILURE   OF   EMBARGO.  341 

France  or  England.  In  the  latter  case,  should  you 
choose  to  declare  independence,  we  cannot  now  commit 
ourselves  by  saying  we  would  make  common  cause  with 
you,  but  must  reserve  ourselves  to  act  according  to  the 
then  existing  circumstances ;  but  in  our  proceedings  we 
shall  be  influenced  by  friendship  to  you,  by  a  firm  feel 
ing  that  our  interests  are  intimately  connected,  and  by 
the  strongest  repugnance  to  see  you  under  subordina 
tion  to  either  France  or  England,  either  politically  or 
commercially.'  " 

No  allusion  to  Florida  was  made  in  this  outline  of 
a  new  policy,  and  none  was  needed,  for  Florida  would 
obviously  fall  to  the  United  States.  The  Spanish 
patriots,  —  who  were  as  little  disposed  as  Don  Car 
los  IV.  and  the  Prince  of  Peace  to  see  their  empire 
dismembered,  and  who  knew  as  well  as  Godoy  and 
Cevallos  the  motives  that  controlled  the  United 
States  government,  —  listened  with  only  moderate 
confidence  to  the  protests  which  Jefferson,  through 
various  agents,  made  at  Havana,  Mexico,  and  New 
Orleans. 

"  The  truth  is  that  the  patriots  of  Spain  have  no 
warmer  friends  than  the  Administration  of  the  United 
States,"  began  the  President's  instructions  to  his  agents  ;* 
"  but  it  is  our  duty  to  say  nothing  and  to  do  nothing  for 
or  against  either.  If  they  succeed,  we  shall  be  well 
satisfied  to  see  Cuba  and  Mexico  remain  in  their  present 
dependence,  but  very  unwilling  to  see  them  in  that  of 
France  or  England,  politically  or  commercially.  We  con 
sider  their  interests  and  ours  as  the  same,  and  that  the 

1  Jefferson  to  Claiborne,  Oct.  29,  1808;  Writings,  v.  381. 


342        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  15. 

object  of  both  must  be  to  exclude  all  European  influence 
from  this  hemisphere." 

The  patriotic  junta  at  Cadiz,  which  represented  the 
empire  of  Spain,  could  hardly  believe  in  the  warm 
friendship  which  admitted  its  object  of  excluding  them 
from  influence  over  their  own  colonies.  In  private, 
Jefferson  avowed 1  that  American  interests  rather 
required  the  failure  of  the  Spanish  insurrection. 
"  Bonaparte,  having  Spain  at  his  feet,  will  look  im 
mediately  to  the  Spanish  colonies,  and  think  our 
neutrality  cheaply  purchased  by  a  repeal  of  the  illegal 
parts  of  his  decrees,  with  perhaps  the  Floridas  thrown 
into  the  bargain."  In  truth,  Jefferson  and  the  South 
ern  interest  cared  nothing  for  Spanish  patriotism ; 
and  their  indifference  was  reflected  in  their  press. 
The  independence  of  the  Spanish  colonies  was  the 
chief  object  of  American  policy  ;  and  the  patriots 
of  Spain  had  no  warmer  friends  than  the  Adminis 
tration  of  the  United  States  so  far  as  they  helped 
and  hurried  this  great  catastrophe ;  but  beyond  this 
purpose  Jefferson  did  not  look. 

In  the  Eastern  States  the  Democratic  and  Southern 
indifference  toward  the  terrible  struggle  raging  in 
Spain  helped  to  stimulate  the  anger  against  Jeffer 
son,  which  had  already  swept  many  firm  Republicans 
into  sympathy  with  Federalism.  In  their  minds  in 
difference  to  Spain  meant  submission  to  Napoleon 
and  hatred  of  England  ;  it  proved  the  true  motives 
which  had  induced  the  President  to  suppress  Mon- 
1  Jefferson  to  Monroe,  Jail.  28,  1809;  Writings,  v.  419. 


1808.  FAILURE   OF  EMBARGO.  343 

roe's  treaty  and  to  impose  the  Non-importation  Act 
and  the  embargo;  it  called  for  vehement,  universal, 
decisive  protest.  The  New  England  conscience,  which 
had  never  submitted  to  the  authority  of  Jefferson,  rose 
with  an  outburst  of  fervor  toward  the  Spaniards,  and, 
clung  more  energetically  than  ever  to  the  cause  of 
England,  —  which  seemed  at  last,  beyond  the  possi 
bility  of  doubt,  to  have  the  sanction  of  freedom. 
Every  day  made  Jefferson's  position  less  defensible, 
and  shook  the  confidence  of  his  friends. 

With  the  sanguine  temper  which  had  made  him 
victorious  in  so  many  trials,  the  President  hoped 
for  another  success.  He  still  thought  that  England 
must  yield  under  the  grinding  deprivations  of  the 
embargo,  and  he  was  firm  in  the  intention  to  exact 
his  own  terms  of  repeal.  Pinkney's  earlier  despatches 
offered  a  vague  hope  that  Canning  might  withdraw 
the  orders ;  and  at  this  glimpse  of  sunshine  Jeffer 
son's  spirits  became  buoyant. 

"  If  they  repeal  their  orders,  we  must  repeal  our 
embargo ;  if  they  make  satisfaction  for  the  '  Chesa 
peake.'  we  must  revoke  our  proclamation,  and  generalize 
its  application  by  a  law ;  if  they  keep  up  impressments, 
we  must  adhere  to  non-intercourse,  manufactures,  and 
a  Navigation  Act."  1 

Canning  was  not  altogether  wrong  in  thinking  that 
concession  by  Great  Britain  would  serve  only  to  es 
tablish  on  a  permanent  footing  the  system  of  peace 
able  coercion. 

1  Jefferson  to  Madison,  Sept.  6,  1808;  Writings,  v.  361. 


344        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  15. 

The  first  blow  to  the  President's  confidence  came 
from  France.  Armstrong's  letters  gave  no.  hope 
that  Napoleon  would  withdraw  or  even  modify  his 
decrees. 

"  We  must  therefore  look  to  England  alone,"  wrote 
Madison  September  14, 1  "for  the  chances  of  disem 
barrassment,  —  and  look  with  the  greater  solicitude  as 
it  seems  probable  that  nothing  but  some  striking  proof 
of  the  success  of  the  embargo  can  arrest  the  successful 
perversion  of  it  by  its  enemies,  or  rather  the  enemies 
of  their  country." 

To  England,  accordingly,  the  President  looked  for 
some  sign  of  successful  coercion,  —  some  proof  that 
the  embargo  had  been  felt,  or  at  least  some  encour 
agement  to  hold  that  its  continuance  might  save  him 
from  the  impending  alternative  of  submission  or  war ; 
and  he  had  not  long  to  wait.  The  "  Hope,"  bringing 
Canning's  letters  of  September  23,  made  so  quick 
a  voyage  that  Pinkney's  despatches  came  to  hand 
October  28,  as  the  President  was  preparing  his 
Annual  Message  to  Congress  for  its  special  meeting 
November  7. 

Had  Canning  chosen  the  moment  when  his  defi 
ance  should  have  most  effect,  he  would  certainly  have 
selected  the  instant  when  the  elections  showed  that 
Jefferson's  authority  had  reached  its  limit.  Friends 
and  enemies  alike  united  in  telling  the  President 
that  his  theory  of  statesmanship  had  failed,  and  must 
be  thrown  aside.  The  rapid  decline  of  his  authority 
1  Madison  to  Jefferson,  Sept.  14,  1808;  Jefferson  MSS. 


1808.  FAILURE   OF  EMBARGO.  345 

was  measured  by  the  private  language  of  represen 
tative  men,  speaking  opinions  not  meant  for  popular 
effect.  In  the  whole  Union  no  men  could  be  found 
more  distinctly  representative  than  Wilson  Gary 
Nicholas,  James  Monroe,  John  Marshall,  and  Rufus 
King.  Of  these,  Nicholas  was  distinguished  as  being 
the  President's  warm  and  sympathetic  friend,  whose 
opinions  had  more  weight,  and  whose  relations  with 
him  were  more  confidential,  than  those  of  any  other 
person  not  in  the  Cabinet ;  but  even  Nicholas  thought 
himself  required  to  prepare  the  President's  mind  for 
abandoning  his  favorite  policy. 

"  If  the  embargo  could  be  executed,"  wrote  Nicholas 
October  20, l  "  and  the  people  would  submit  to  it,  I  have 
no  doubt  it  is  our  wisest  course ;  but  if  the  complete 
execution  of  it  and  the  support  of  the  people  cannot  be 
counted  upon,  it  will  neither  answer  our  purpose  nor 
will  it  be  practicable  to  retain  it.  Upon  both  these 
points  I  have  the  strongest  doubts.  .  .  .  What  the  alter 
native  ought  to  be,  I  cannot  satisfy  myself.  I  see  such 
difficulties  at  every  turn  that  I  am  disposed  to  cling  to 
the  embargo  as  long  as  there  is  anything  to  hope  from 
it ;  and  I  am  unwilling  to  form  an  opinion  until  I  have 
the  aid  of  friends  upon  whom  I  rely,  and  who  are  more 
in  the  way  of  information." 

This  admission  of  helplessness  coming  from  the, 
oldest  Virginian  Republicans  betrayed  the  discour-j 
agement  of  all  Jefferson's  truest  friends,  and  ac 
corded  with  the  language  of  Monroe,  who  whatever 

1  \V.  C.  Nicholas  to  Jefferson,  Oct.  20,  1808  ;  Jefferson  MSS. 


346         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  15. 

might  be  his  personal  jealousies  was  still  Republican 
in  spirit.  After  his  return  from  England,  -at  the 
moment  when  his  attitude  toward  the  Administration 
was  most  threatening,  both  Jefferson  and  Madison 
had  made  efforts,  not  without  success,  to  soothe 
Monroe's  irritation ;  and  in  the  month  of  February 
Jefferson  had  even  written  to  him  a  letter  of  friendly 
remonstrance,  to  which  Monroe  replied,  admitting 
that  he  had  been  "  deeply  affected "  by  his  recall, 
and  had  freely  expressed  his  feelings.  The  corre 
spondence,  though  long  and  not  unfriendly,  failed 
to  prevent  Monroe  from  appearing  as  a  rival  candi 
date  for  the  Presidency.  One  of  his  warmest  sup 
porters  was  Joseph  H.  Nicholson,  to  whom  he  wrote, 
September  24,  a  letter  which  in  a  different  tone 
from  that  of  Wilson  Gary  Nicholas  betrayed  the 
same  helplessness  of  counsel : 1  — 

"We  seem  now  to  be  approaching  a  great  crisis. 
Such  is  the  state  of  our  affairs,  and  such  the  compromit- 
ment  of  the  Administration  at  home  and  abroad  by  its 
measures,  that  it  seems  likely  that  it  will  experience 
great  difficulty  in  extricating  itself.  .  .  .  We  are  invited 
with  great  earnestness  to  give  the  incumbents  all  the 
support  we  can,  —  by  which  is  meant  to  give  them  our 
votes  at  the  approaching  election ;  but  it  is  not  certain 
that  we  could  give  effectual  support  to  the  person  in 
whose  favor  it  is  requested,  or  that  it  would  be  advisable 
in  any  view  to  yield  it.  While  we  remain  on  indepen 
dent  ground,  and  give  support  where  we  think  it  is  due, 

1  Monroe  to  Joseph  H.  Nicholson,  Sept.  24,  1808  ;  Nicholson 
MSS. 


1808.  FAILURE  OF  EMBARGO.  347 

we  preserve  a  resource  in  favor  of  free  government  within 
the  limit  of  the  Republican  party.  Compromit  ourselves 
in  the  sense  proposed,  and  that  resource  is  gone.  After 
what  has  passed,  it  has  no  right  to  suppose  that  we  will, 
by  a  voluntary  sacrifice,  consent  to  bury  ourselves  in  the 
same  tomb  with  it." 

If  Wilson  Gary  Nicholas  and  James  Monroe  stood 
in  such  attitudes  toward  the  Administration,  ad 
mitting  or  proclaiming  that  its  policy  had  failed, 
and  that  it  could  command  no  further  confidence, 
what  could  be  expected  from  the  Federalists,  who 
for  eight  years  had  foretold  the  failure  ?  New  Eng 
land  rang  with  cries  for  disunion.  The  Federalist 
leaders  thought  best  to  disavow  treasonable  inten 
tions  ; l  but  they  fell  with  their  old  bitterness  on 
the  personal  character  of  President  Jefferson,  and 
trampled  it  deep  in  the  mire.  Many  of  the  ablest 
and  most  liberal  Federalist  leaders  had  lagged  be 
hind  or  left  the  party,  but  the  zealots  of  Picker 
ing's  class  were  stronger  than  ever.  Pickering 
bent  his  energies  to  the  task  of  proving  that  Jef 
ferson  was  a  tool  of  Napoleon,  and  that  the  em-  ^ 
bargo  was  laid  in  consequence  of  Napoleon's  com 
mand.  The  success  of  this  political  delusion,  both  I 
in  England  and  America,  was  astounding.  Even  a 
mind  so  vigorous  and  a  judgment  so  calm  as  that 
of  Chief-Justice  Marshall  bent  under  this  popular 
imposture. 

1  George   Cabot  to  Pickering,  Oct.  5,  1808  ;   Lodge's   Cabot, 
p.  308. 


348        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  15. 

"  Nothing  can  be  more  completely  demonstrated,"  he 
wrote  to  Pickering,1  "than  the  inemcacy  of  the  em 
bargo  ;  yet  that  demonstration  seems  to  be  of  no  avail. 
I  fear  most  seriously  that  the  same  spirit  which  so  tena 
ciously  maintains  this  measure  will  impel  us  to  a  war 
with  the  only  power  which  protects  any  part  of  the 
civilized  world  from  the  despotism  of  that  tyrant  with 
whom  we  shall  then  be  arranged.  You  have  shown  that 
the  principle  commonly  called  the  Rule  of  1756  is  of 
much  earlier  date,  and  I  fear  have  also  shown  to  what 
influences  the  embargo  is  to  be  traced." 

Chief-Justice  Marshall  had  read  Canning's  insult 
ing  note  of  September  23  more  than  a  month  be 
fore  this  letter  to  Pickering  was  written ;  yet  the 
idea  of  resenting  it  seemed  not  to  enter  his  mind. 
Napoleon  alone  was  the  terror  of  Federalism ;  and 
this  unreasoning  fear  exercised  upon  Marshall's  calm 
judgment  hardly  less  power  than  upon  the  imagina 
tion  of  Fisher  Ames  or  the  austerity  of  Timothy 
Pickering.  Second  only  to  Marshall,  Rufus  King 
was  the  foremost  of  Federalists ;  and  the  same  hor 
ror  of  France  which  blinded  Marshall,  Ames,  and 
Pickering  to  the  conduct  of  England  led  King  to 
hold  the  President  responsible  for  Napoleon's  vio 
lence.  December  1,  1808,  King  wrote  to  Pickering 
a  long  letter  containing  views  which  in  result  dif 
fered  little  from  those  of  Nicholas  and  Monroe.  The 
Berlin  Decree,  he  said,  had  violated  treaty  rights  : 2 

1  Marshall  to  Pickering,  Dec.  19,  1808;  Lodge's  Cabot,  p.  489. 
*  Bufus  King  to  Pickering,  Dec.  1,  1808  ;  Pickering  MSS. 


1808. 


FAILURE  OF   EMBARGO.  349 


"  How  dare  then  our  Government  with  this  document 
before  them,  to  affirm  and  endeavor  to  impose  upon  the 
country  so  gross  a  misstatement  as  they  have  done  in 
reference  to  this  French  Decree?  The  Berlin  Decree, 
being  an  infringement  of  our  rights,  should  have  been 
resisted,  as  a  similar  decree  of  the  Directory  was  resisted 
by  the  Federalists  in  1798.  Had  we  so  done,  there 
would  have  been  no  Orders  in  Council,  no  embargo,  and 
probably  before  this  we  should  have  been  again  in  peace 
with  France.  .  .  .  We  are  now  told  that  the  embargo 
must  be  continued  or  the  country  disgraced.  Admitting 
the  alternative,  how  shameful  is  it  —  how  criminal  rather, 
might  I  say  —  that  the  men  who  have  brought  the  coun 
try  to  this  condition  should  have  the  effrontery  to  make 
this  declaration  !  The  Administration  will  be  disgraced 
by  the  repeal,  and  they  deserve  to  be ;  perhaps  they 
merit  more  than  disgrace.  But  will  the  continuance  of 
the  embargo  save  the  country  from  disgrace  2~  As  to  its 
effect  on  France  and  England,  we  have  sufficient  evidence 
of  its  in  efficacy.  The  longer  it  is  continued,  the  deeper 
our  disgrace  when  it  is  raised.  It  is  earnestly  to  be 
hoped  that  the  Federalists  will  leave  to  the  Administra 
tion  and  its  supporters  all  projects  by  way  of  substitute 
to  the  embargo.  Having  plunged  the  nation  into  its 
present  embarrassment,  let  them  bear  the  whole  respon 
sibility  for  their  measures.  The  embargo  must  be 
repealed.  That  simple,  unqualified  measure  must  be 
adopted.  It  is  high  time  to  discard  visionary  experi 
ments.  For  God's  sake,  let  the  Federalists  abstain 
from  any  share  in  them !  " 

King  was  not  only  the  ablest  of  the  Northern 
Federalists,  he  was  also  the  one  who  knew  En.dand 


350         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  15. 

best ;  and  yet  even  he  condescended  to  the  excuse  or 
palliation  of  England's  conduct,  as  though  Jefferson 
could  have  resisted  the  Berlin  Decree  without  also 
resisting  the  previous  robberies,  impressments,  and 
blockades  of  Great  Britain.  So  deeply  diseased  was 
American  opinion  that  patriotism  vanished,  and  the 
best  men  in  the  Union  took  active  part  with  Lord 
Castlereagh  and  George  Canning  in  lowering  and 
degrading  their  own  government.  Not  even  Rufus 
King  could  see  the  selfishness  of  that  Tory  reaction 
which,  without  regard  to  Napoleon's  decrees,  swept 
Great  Britain  into  collision  with  the  United  States, 
and  from  which  no  act  of  Jefferson  could  have  saved 
American  interests.  Though  King  were  admitted  to 
be  right  in  thinking  that  the  system  of  peaceable 
coercion,  the  "  visionary  experiments  "  of  President 
Jefferson's  statesmanship,  the  fretfulness  of  Madison's 
diplomacy,  had  invited  or  challenged  insult,  yet  after 
these  experiments  had  evidently  failed  and  the  failure 
was  conceded,  a  modest  share  of  patriotism  might 
consent  that  some  policy  for  the  future  should  be 
indicated,  and  that  some  remnant  of  national  dig 
nity  should  be  saved.  No  such  sentimental  weakness 
\  showed  itself  in  the  ranks  of  Federalism.  .Jeffer 
son's  friends  and  enemies  alike  foresaw  that  the 
embargo  must  be  repealed  ;  but  neither  friend  nor 
enemy  could  or  would  suggest  a  remedy  for  national 
disgrace. 

No  record  remains  to  show  in  what  temper  Jeffer 
son  received  the  letters  of  Canning  and  the  warnings 


1808. 


FAILURE   OF   EMBARGO.  351 


of  Wilson  Gary  Nicholas.  Had  he  in  the  course  of 
his  sorely  tried  political  life  ever  given  way  to  unre 
strained  violence  of  temper,  he  might  fairly  have 
flamed  into  passion  on  reading  Canning's  notes ;  but 
he  seemed  rather  to  deprecate  them, — he  made  even 
an  effort  to  persuade  Canning  that  his  innuendoes 
were  unjust.  A  long  memorandum  in  his  own 
handwriting  recorded  an  interview  which  took  place 
November  9  between  him  and  Erskine,  the  British 
minister.4 

44 1  told  him  I  was  going  out  of  the  Administration, 
and  therefore  might  say  to  him  things  which  I  would  not 
do  were  I  to  remain  in.  I  wished  to  correct  an  error 
which  I  at  first  thought  his  Government  above  being- 
led  into  from  newspapers  ;  but  I  apprehended  they  had 
adopted  it.  This  was  the  supposed  partiality  of  the 
Administration,  and  particularly  myself,  in  favor  of 
France  and  against  England.  I  observed  that  when 
I  carne  into  the  Administration  there  was  nothing  I  so 
much  desired  as  to  be  on  a  footing  of  intimate  friend 
ship  with  England ;  that  I  knew  as  long  as  she  was  our 
friend  no  enemy  could  hurt;  that  I  would  have  sacri 
ficed  much  to  have  effected  it,  and  therefore  wished 
Mr.  King  to  have  continued  there  as  a  favorable  instru 
ment  ;  that  if  there  had  been  an  equal  disposition  on 
their  part,  I  thought  it  might  have  been  effected ;  for 
although  the  question  of  impressments  was  difficult  on 
their  side,  and  insuperable  with  us,  yet  had  that  been 
the  sole  question  we  might  have  shoved  along  in  the 
hope  of  some  compromise ;  .  .  .  that  he  might  judge 

1  Cabinet  Memoranda  ;  Jefferson  MSS. 


352        HISTORY   OF   THE    UNITED   STATES.      CH.  15. 

from  the  communications  now  before  Congress  whether 
there  had  been  any  partiality  to  France,  to  whom  he 
would  see  we  had  never  made  the  proposition  to  revoke 
the  embargo  immediately,  which  we  did  to  England ; 
and,  again,  that  we  had  remonstrated  strongly  to  them 
on  the  style  of  M.  Champagny's  letter,  but  had  not  to 
England  on  that  of  Canning,  equally  offensive ;  that 
the  letter  of  Canning  now  reading  to  Congress,  was 
written  in  the  high  ropes,  and  would  be  stinging  to 
every  American  breast.  .  .  .  I  told  him  in  the  course 
of  the  conversation  that  this  country  would  never  re 
turn  to  an  intercourse  with  England  while  those  Orders 
in  Council  were  in  force.  In  some  part  of  it  also  I 
told  him  that  Mr.  Madison  (who,  it  was  now  pretty 
well  understood,  would  be  my  successor,  to  which  he 
assented)  had  entertained  the  same  cordial  wishes  as 
myself  to  be  on  a  friendly  footing  with  England." 

Erskine  reported  this  conversation  to  his  Govern 
ment  ; l  and  his  report  was  worth  comparing  with 
that  of  Jefferson  :  — 

' '  I  collected  from  the  general  turn  of  his  sentiments 
that  he  would  prefer  the  alternative  of  embargo  for  a 
certain  time,  until  the  Congress  should  be  enabled  to 
come  to  some  decided  resolution  as  to  the  steps  to  be 
pursued.  By  this  observation  I  believe  he  meant  that 
he  would  wish  to  wait  until  March  next,  when  the  new- 
Congress  would  be  assembled,  and  the  general  sense 
of  the  people  of  the  United  States  might  be  taken  upon 
the  state  of  their  affairs.  .  .  .  He  took  an  opportunity 
of  observing  in  the  course  of  his  conversation  that  his 
Administration  had  been  most  wrongfully  accused  of 

1  Erskine  to  Canning,  Nov.  10,  1808;  MSS.  British  Archives. 


1808.  FAILURE   OF   EMBARGO.  853 

partiality  toward  France ;  that  for  his  own  part  he  felt 
no  scruple,  as  he  was  about  to  retire,  to  declare  that 
he  had  been  always  highly  desirous  of  an  intimate  con 
nection  with  Great  Britain ;  and  that  if  any  temporary 
arrangement  on  the  subject  of  impressment  could  have 
been  made,  although  he  never  would  have  consented  to 
abandon  the  principle  of  immunity  from  impressment 
for  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  yet  that  the  two 
countries  might  have  shoved  along  (was  his  familiar 
expression)  very  well  until  some  definite  settlement  could 
have  taken  place.  He  remarked  also  that  these  were, 
he  knew,  the  sentiments  of  Mr.  Madison,  who  would 
in  all  probability  succeed  him  in  his  office.  He  hinted 
also  that  both  had  been  long  jealous  of  the  ambitious 
views  and  tyrannical  conduct  of  Bonaparte." 

"  These  declarations,"  continued  Erskine,  "  are  so 
opposite  to  the  general  opinion  of  what  their  real 
sentiments  have  been  that  it  is  very  difficult  to  recon 
cile  them."  In  truth,  the  footing  of  intimate  friend 
ship  Avith  England  so  much  desired  by  Jefferson 
demanded  from  England  more  concessions  than  she 
was  yet  ready  to  yield;  but  nothing  could  be  truer 
or  more  characteristic  than  the  President's  remark 
that  under  his  charge  the  two  countries  might  have 
"  shoved  along  very  well,"  had  peace  depended  only 
upon  him.  In  this  phrase  lay  both  the  defence  and 
the  criticism  of  his  statesmanship. 

In  any  event,  nothing  could  be  more  certain  than 
that  the  time  for  shoving  along  at  all  was  past.  The 
country  had  come  to  a  stand-still  ;  and  some  heroic 
resolution  must  be  taken.  The  question  pressing  for 

VOL.  iv.  —  23 


354        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  15. 

1  an  answer  concerned  Jefferson  more  directly  than  it 
concerned  any  one  else.  What  did  he  mean  to  do  ? 
For  eight  years,  in  regard  to  foreign  relations  his 
will  had  been  law.  Except  when  the  Senate,  in  1806, 
with  disastrous  results,  obliged  him  to  send  William 
Pinkney  to  negotiate  a  treaty  with  England,  Congress 
had  never  crossed  the  President's  foreign  policy  by 
wilful  interference ;  and  when  this  policy  ended  in 
admitted  failure,  his  dignity  and  duty  required  him  to 
stand  by  the  government,  and  to  take  the  responsi 
bility  that  belonged  to  him.  Yet  the  impression 
which  Erskine  drew  from  his  words  was  correct.  He 
had  no  other  plan  than  to  postpone  further  action 
until  after  March  4,  1809,  when  he  should  retire 
from  control.  With  singular  frankness  he  avowed 
this  wish.  After  the  meeting  of  Congress,  November 
7,  when  doubt  and  confusion  required  control,  Jeffer 
son  drew  himself  aside,  repeating  without  a  pause  the 
formula  that  embargo  was  the  alternative  to  war.1 
"  As  yet  the  first  seems  most  to  prevail,"  he  wrote,2 
a  few  days  after  his  interview  with  Erskine ;  and  no 
one  doubted  to  which  side  he  leaned,  though  as  if  it 
were  a  matter  of  course  that  he  should  quit  the 
government  before  his  successor  was  even  elected,  he 
added :  "  On  this  occasion  I  think  it  is  fair  to  leave 
to  those  who  are  to  act  on  them  the  decisions  they 

1  Jefferson  to  Governor  Pinckney,  Nov.  8,  1808;  Writings, 
v.  383. 

2  Jefferson   to   Governor   Lincoln,  Nov.   13,  1808  ;  Writings, 
v.  387. 


1808.  FAILURE  OF  EMBARGO.  355 

prefer,  being  to  be  myself  but  a  spectator.  I  should 
not  feel  justified  in  directing  measures  which  those 
who  are  to  execute  them  would  disapprove.  Our  situ 
ation  is  truly  difficult.  We  have  been  pressed  by  the 
belligerents  to  the  very  wall,  and  all  further  retreat 
is  impracticable." 

Madison  and  Gallatin  did  not  share  Jefferson's 
notion  of  Executive  duties,  and  they  made  an  effort 
to  bring  the  President  back  to  a  juster  sense  of  what 
was  due  to  himself  and  to  the  nation.  November  15 
Gallatin  wrote  a  friendly  letter  to  Jefferson,  urging 
him  to  resume  his  functions. 

"  Both  Mr.  Madison  and  myself,"  wrote  Gallatin,1 
"  concur  in  the  opinion  that  considering  the  temper  of 
the  Legislature  it  would  be  eligible  to  point  out  to  them 
some  precise  and  distinct  course.  As  to  what  that  should 
be  we  may  not  all  perfectly  agree,  and  perhaps  the 
knowledge  of  the  various  feelings  of  the  members,  and 
of  the  apparent  public  opinion,  may  on  consideration  in 
duce  a  revision  of  our  own.  I  feel  myself  nearly  as  un 
determined  between  enforcing  the  embargo  or  war  as  I 
was  at  our  last  meeting.  But  I  think  that  we  must,  or 
rather  you  must,  decide  the  question  absolutely,  so  that 
we  may  point  out  a  decisive  course  either  way  to  our 
friends.  Mr.  Madison,  being  unwell,  proposed  that  I 
should  call  on  you,  and  suggest  our  wish  that  we  might, 
with  the  other  gentlemen,  be  called  by  you  on  that  sub 
ject.  Should  you  think  that  course  proper,  the  sooner 
the  better." 

1  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  Nov.  15,  1808  ;  Gallatin's  Writings, 
i.  420. 

\ 


356         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  15. 

Jefferson's  reply  to  this  request  was  not  recorded, 
but  he  persisted  in  considering  himself  as  no  longer 
responsible  for  the  government.  Although  Madison 
could  not  become  even  President-elect  before  the  first 
Wednesday  in  December,  when  the  electors  were  to 
give  their  votes  ;  and  although  the  official  declaration 
of  this  vote  could  not  take  place  before  the  second 
Wednesday  in  February,  —  Jefferson  insisted  that  his 
functions  were  merely  formal  from  the  moment  when 
the  name  of  his  probable  successor  was  known. 

"  I  have  thought  it  right,"  he  wrote  December  27, * 
"to  take  no  part  myself  in  proposing  measures  the  exe 
cution  of  which  will  devolve  on  my  successor.  I  am 
therefore  chiefly  an  nnmeddling  listener  to  what  others 
say.  On  the  same  ground,  1  shall  make  no  new  appoint 
ments  which  can  be  deferred  till  the  fourth  of  March, 
thinking  it  fair  to  leave  to  my  successor  to  select  the 
agents  for  his  own  Administration.  As  the  moment  of 
my  retirement  approaches  I  become  more  anxious  for  its 
arrival,  and  to  begin  at  length  to  pass  what  yet  remains 
to  me  of  life  and  health  in  the  bosom  of  my  family  and 
neighbors,  and  in  communication  with  my  friends  undis 
turbed  by  political  concerns  or  passions." 

So  freely  did  he  express  this  longing  for  escape 
that  his  enemies  exulted  in  it  as  a  fresh  proof  of  their 
triumph.  Josiah  Quincy,  his  fear  of  the  President 
vanishing  into  contempt,  —  "  a  dish  of  skim-milk 
curdling  at  the  head  of  our  nation,"  -  —writing  to  the 
man  whom  eight  years  before  Jefferson  had  driven 

1  Jefferson  to  Dr.  Logan,  Dec.  27,  1808  ;  Writings,  v.  404. 


1808.  FAILURE   OF   EMBARGO.  357 

from  the  White  House,  gave  an  account  of  the  situa 
tion  differing  only  in  temper  from  Jefferson's  descrip 
tion  of  himself : :  — 

"  Fear  of  responsibility  and  love  of  popularity  are  now 
master-passions,  and  regulate  all  the  movements.  The 
policy  is  to  keep  things  as  they  are,  and  wait  for  Euro 
pean  events.  It  is  hoped  the  chapter  of  accidents  may 
present  something  favorable  within  the  remaining  three 
months ;  and  if  it  does  not,  no  great  convulsion  can 
happen  during  that  period.  The  Presidential  term  will 
have  expired,  and  then  —  away  to  Monticello,  and  let  the 
Devil  take  the  hindmost.  I  do  believe  that  not  a  whit 
deeper  project  than  this  fills  the  august  mind  of  youiv  / 
successor." 

Had  Jefferson  strictly  carried  out  his  doctrine,  and 
abstained  from  interference  of  any  kind  in  the  deci 
sion  of  a  future  policy,  the  confusion  in  Congress 
might  have  been  less  than  it  was,  and  the  chance  of 
agreement  might  have  been  greater;  but  while  ap 
parently  refusing  to  interfere,  in  effect  he  exerted  his 
influence  to  prevent  change  ;  and  to  prevent  a  change 
of  measures  was  to  maintain  the  embargo.  In  insist 
ing  that  the  whole  matter  should  be  left  to  the  next 
Congress  and  President,  Jefferson  resisted  the  popuj 
lar  pressure  for  repeal,  embarrassing  his  successor, 
distracting  the  Legislature,  and  destroying  the  rem 
nants  of  his  own  popularity.  Especially  the  Eastern ' 
Democrats,  who  had  reason  to'  believe  that  in  New 
England  the  Union  depended  on  repeal,  were  exas- 

1  Josiah  Quincy  to  John  Adams,  Dec.  15,  1808  ;  Quincy's  Life 
of  J.  Quiricy,  p.  146. 


358        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  16. 

perated  to  find  Jefferson,  though  declaring  neutrality, 
yet  privately  exerting  his  influence  to  postpone  ac 
tion  until  the  meeting  of  another  Congress.  Among 
the  Eastern  members  was  Joseph  Story,  who  had 
been  elected  to  succeed  Crowninshield,  as  a  Repub 
lican,  to  represent  Salem  and  Marblehead.  Story 
took  his  seat  Dec.  20,  1808,  and  instantly  found 
himself  in  opposition  to  President  Jefferson  and  the 
embargo :  — 

"  I  found  that  as  a  measure  of  retaliation  the  system 
had  not  only  failed,  but  that  Mr.  Jefferson,  from  pride 
of  opinion  as  well  as  from  that  visionary  course  of  specu 
lation  which  often  misled  his  judgment,  was  absolutely 
bent  upon  maintaining  it  at  all  hazards.  He  professed  a 
firm  belief  that  Great  Britain  would  abandon  her  Orders 
in  Council  if  we  persisted  in  the  embargo ;  and  having  no 
other  scheme  to  offer  in  case  of  the  failure  of  this,  he 
maintained  in  private  conversation  the  indispensable  ne 
cessity  of  closing  the  session  of  Congress  without  any 
attempt  to  limit  the  duration  of  the  system."1 

Josiah  Quincy  and  Joseph  Story  were  compara 
tively  friendly  in  their  views  of  Jefferson's  conduct. 
The  extreme  Federalist  opinion,  represented  by 
Timothy  Pickering,  placed  the  President  in  a  light 
far  more  repulsive. 

"It  is  scarcely  conceivable,"  wrote  Pickering  2  to^ 
Christopher  Gore  Jan.  8,  1809,  "  that  Mr.  Jefferson 
should  so  obstinately  persevere  in  the  odious  measure  of 

1  Story's  Life  of  Story,  i.  184. 

3  Pickering  to  C.  Gore,  Jan.  8,  1809  ;  Pickering  MSS. 


1809.  FAILURE   OF   EMBARGO.  359 

the  embargo,  which  he  cannot  but  see  has  impaired  his 
popularity  and  hazards  its  destruction,  if  he  were  not 
under  secret  engagements  to  the  French  Emperor,  —  un 
less  you  can  suppose  that  he  would  run  that  hazard  and 
the  ruin  of  his  country,  rather  than  that  a  measure  which 
he  explicitly  recommended  should  be  pronounced  unwise. 
.  .  .  When  we  advert  to  the  real  character  of  Mr.  Jeffer 
son,  there  is  no  nefarious  act  of  which  we  may  not  sup 
pose  him  capable.  He  would  rather  the  United  States 
should  sink,  than  change  the  present  system  of  measures. 
This  is  not  opinion,  but  history.  I  repeat  it  confiden 
tially  to  you  until  I  obtain  permission  to  vouch  it  on 
evidence  which  I  trust  I  can  obtain." l 

[Pickering's  hatred  of  Jefferson  amounted  to  mania  ; 
but  his  language  showed  the  influence  which,  whether 
intentionally  or  not,  the  President  still  exerted  on  the 
decisions  of  Congress.  All  accounts  agreed  that 
while  refusing  to  act  officially,  the  President  resisted 
every  attempt  to  change,  during  his  time,  the  policy 
he  had  established.  Canning's  defiance  and  Napo 
leon's  discipline  reduced  him  to  silence  and  helpless 
ness  ;  but  even  when  prostrate  and  alone,  he  clung 
to  the  remnant  of  his  system.  Disaster  upon  disaster, 
mortification  upon  mortification,  crowded  fast  upon 
the  man  whose  triumphs  had  been  so  brilliant,  but 
Avhose  last  hope  was  to  escape  a  public  censure  more 
humiliating  than  any  yet  inflicted  on  a  President  of 
the  United  States.  The  interest  attached  to  the  his 
tory  of  his  administration  —  an  interest  at  all  times 

1  Cf.  Pickering  to  S.  P.  Gardner  ;  New  England  Federalism, 
p.  379. 


360         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  15. 

singularly  personal  —  centred  at  last  upon  the  single 
point  of  his  personality,  all  eyes  fixing  themselves 
upon  the  desperate  malice  with  which  his  ancient 
enemies  strove  to  drive  him  from  his  cover,  and  the 
painful  efforts  with  which  he  still  sought  to  escape 
their  fangs. 


CHAPTER   XVI. 

NOVEMBER  8  President  Jefferson  sent  to  Congress 
his  last  Annual  Message,  and  with  it  the  correspond 
ence  of  Pinkney  and  Armstrong.  Intent  as  the  pub 
lic  was  upon  foreign  affairs  alone,  the  Message  had 
no  further  interest  than  as  it  dealt  with  the  question 
of  embargo ;  but  Jefferson  showed  that  he  had  lost 
none  of  his  old  dexterity,  for  he  succeeded  in  giv 
ing  to  his  words  the  appearance  of  conveying  no 
opinion :  — 

"  Under  a  continuance  of  the  belligerent  measures 
which,  in  defiance  of  laws  which  consecrate  the  rights  of 
neutrals,  overspread  the  ocean  with  danger,  it  will  rest 
with  the  wisdom  of  Congress  to  decide  on  the  course  best 
adapted  to  such  a  state  of  things ;  and  bringing  with 
them  as  they  do  from  every  part  of  the  Union  the  senti 
ments  of  our  constituents,  my  confidence  is  strengthened 
that  in  forming  this  decision  they  will,  with  an  unerring 
regard  to  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  nation,  weigh  and 
compare  the  painful  alternatives  out  of  which  a  choice 
is  to  be  made.  Nor  should  I  do  justice  to  the  virtues 
which  on  other  occasions  have  marked  the  character  of 
our  fellow-citizens,  if  I  did  not  cherish  an  equal  confi 
dence  that  the  alternative  chosen,  whatever  it  may  be, 


362        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  16. 

will  be  maintained  with  all  the  fortitude  and  patriotism 
which  the  crisis  ought  to  inspire." 

The  favorite  assumption  that  Congress,  not  the  Ex 
ecutive,  directed  the  national  policy  served  again  to 
veil  Jefferson's  wishes,  but  in  this  instance  with  some 
reason ;  for  no  one  was  ignorant  that  a  strong  party 
in  Congress  meant  if  possible  to  take  the  decision 
out  of  the  President's  hands.  Only  by  the  phrase 
"  painful  alternatives "  did  he  hint  an  opinion,  for 
every  one  knew  that  by  this  phrase  he  aimed  at 
narrowing  the  choice  of  Congress  between  embargo 
and  war.  One  other  paragraph  suggested  that  his 
own  choice  would  favor  continued  commercial  re 
strictions  :  — 

"  The  situation  into  which  we  have  thus  been  forced 
has  impelled  us  to  apply  a  portion  of  our  industry  and 
capital  to  internal  manufactures  and  improvements.  The 
extent  of  this  conversion  is  daily  increasing,  and  little 
doubt  remains  that  the  establishments  formed  and  form 
ing  will  —  under  the  auspices  of  cheaper  material  and 
subsistence,  the  freedom  of  labor  from  taxation  with 
us,  and  of  protecting  duties  and  prohibitions  —  become 
permanent." 

Not  only  the  Message  but  also  the  language,  still 
more  emphatic,  of  private  letters  showed  that  Jef 
ferson  had  become  a  convert  to  manufactures  and 
protected  industries.  "  My  idea  is  that  we  should 
encourage  home  manufactures,"  he  said,1  "  to  the  ex- 

1  Jefferson  to  Colonel  Humphreys,  Jan.  20,  1809  ;  to  Mr. 
Leiper,  Jan.  21,  1809;  Works,  v.  415,  416. 


1808.  PERPLEXITY   AND  CONFUSION.  363 

tent  of  our  own  consumption  of  everything  of  which 
we  raise  the  raw  material."  This  avowal  did  much 
to  increase  the  ill-will  of  New  England,  where  Jeffer 
son's  hostility  to  foreign  commerce  as  a  New  England 
interest  was  believed  to  be  inveterate  and  deadly  ; 
but  the  anger  of  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut  at 
the  wound  thus  threatened  to  their  commerce  and  / 
shipping  could  not  exceed  the  perplexity  of  Southern 
Republicans,  who  remembered  that  Jefferson  in  1801 
promised  them  "  a  wise  and  frugal  government,  which 
shall  restrain  men  from  injuring  one  another ;  which 
shall  leave  them  otherwise  free  to  regulate  their 
own  pursuits  of  industry  and  improvement,  and  shall 
not  take  from  the  mouth  of  labor  the  bread  it  has 
earned."  Not  only  manufactures  but  also  internal 
improvements  were  to  become  a  chief  object  of  gov 
ernmental  regulation  to  an  extent  which  no  Federal 
ist  had  ever  suggested.  The  absolute  prohibition  of 
foreign  manufactures  was  to  go  hand  in  hand  with  a 
magnificent  scheme  of  public  works.  In  the  actual 
state  of  public  affairs,  —  without  revenue  and  on  the 
verge  of  war  with  France  and  England,  —  Jefferson 
exposed  himself  to  ridicule  by  alluding  to  a  surplus  ; 
years  were  to  pass  before  the  employment  of  surplus 
revenue  was  to  become  a  practical  question  in  Ameri 
can  politics,  and  long  before  it  rose  Jefferson  had 
reverted  to  his  old  theories  of  "  a  wise  and  frugal 
government ; "  but  in  1808,  as  President,  he  wel 
comed  any  diversion  which  enabled  him  to  avoid  the 
need  of  facing  the  spectre  of  war. 


364        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  16, 

"  The  probable  accumulation  of  the  surpluses  of  reve 
nue,"  he  said,  "whenever  the  freedom  and  safety  .of  our 
commerce  shall  be  restored,  merits  the  consideration  of 
Congress.  Shall  it  lie  unproductive  in  the  public  vaults? 
Shall  the  revenue  be  reduced?  Or  shall  it  not  rather 
be  appropriated  to  the  improvements  of  roads,  canals, 
rivers,  education,  and  other  great  foundations  of  pros 
perity  and  union,  under  the  powers  which  Congress  may 
already  possess,  or  such  amendments  of  the  Constitution 
as  may  be  approved  by  the  States  ?  " 

The  whole  meaning  of  this  paragraph  was  explained 
by  other  documents.  March  2,  1807,  the  Senate 
adopted  a  Resolution  calling  upon  the  President  for 
a  plan  of  internal  improvements.  April  4,  1808, 
Gallatin  made  an  elaborate  Report,  which  sketched  a 
great  scheme  of  public  works.  Canals  were  to  be  cut 
through  Cape  Cod,  New  Jersey,  Delaware,  and  from 
Norfolk  to  Albemarle  Sound,  —  thus  creating  an  in 
ternal  water-way  nearly  the  whole  length  of  the  coast. 
Four  great  Eastern  rivers  —  the  Susquehanna,  Poto 
mac,  James,  and  Santee,  or  Savannah  —  were  to  be 
opened  to  navigation  from  tide-water  to  the  highest 
practicable  points,  and  thence  to  be  connected  by 
roads  with  four  corresponding  Western  rivers,  —  the 
Alleghany,  Monongahela,  Kanawha,  and  Tennessee,  — 
wherever  permanent  navigation  could  be  depended 
upon.  Other  canals  were  to  connect  Lake  Champlain 
and  Lake  Ontario  with  the  Hudson  River ;  to  pass 
round  Niagara  and  the  falls  of  the  Ohio ;  and  to  con 
nect  other  important  points.  A  turnpike  road  was  to 


1808.  PERPLEXITY   AND  CONFUSION.  365 

be  established  from  Maine  to  Georgia  along  the  coast. 
To  carry  out  these  schemes  Congress  was  to  pledge 
two  million  dollars  of  the  annual  surplus  for  ten  years 
in  advance;  and  the  twenty  millions  thus  spent  might 
be  partly  or  wholly  replaced  by  selling  to  private 
corporations  the  canals  and  turnpikes  as  they  should 
become  productive ;  or  the  public  money  might  at  the 
outset  be  loaned  to  private  corporations  for  purposes 
of  construction. 

A  national  university  was  intended  to  crown  a 
scheme  so  extensive  in  its  scope  that  no  European 
monarch,  except  perhaps  the  Czar,  could  have  equalled 
its  scale.  Jefferson  cherished  it  as  his  legacy  to 
the  nation,  —  the  tangible  result  of  his  "  visionary  " 
statesmanship.  Five  years  afterward  he  still  spoke 
of  it  as  "  the  fondest  wish  of  his  heart,"  and  declared 
that  "so  enviable  a  state  in  prospect  for  our  country 
induced  me  to  temporize  and  to  bear  with  national 
wrongs  which  under  no  other  prospect  ought  ever  to 
have  been  unresented  or  unresisted."  1  Even  in  the 
close  presence  of  bankruptcy  or  war  he  could  not  lay 
aside  his  hopes,  or  abstain  from  pressing  his  plan 
upon  the  attention  of  Congress  at  the  moment  when 
the  last  chance  of  its  success  had  vanished. 

The  contrast  between  the  President's  sanguine 
visions  and  the  reality  was  made  the  more  striking 
by  Gallatin's  Annual  Report,  sent  to  Congress  a  few, 
days  later.  The  President  spoke  for  the  Adminis 
tration  that  was  passing  away,  while  Gallatin  repre* 
1  Jefferson  to  Eppes,  Sept.  11,  1813;  Works,  vi.  194. 


366        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  16. 

sented  the  Administration  to  come.  That  the  sec 
retary  leaned  toward  war  was  notorious,  and  that  he 
was  Madison's  chief  adviser,  perhaps  to  be  the  head 
of  his  Cabinet,  was  known  or  suspected  by  the  men 
who  stood  nearest  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  who 
studied  Gallatin's  Report  as  though  it  were  Madison's 
first  Annual  Message.  The  more  carefully  it  was 
studied,  the  more  distinctly  it  took  the  character  of 
a  War  Budget. 

Receipts  from  customs  had  stopped,  but  the  accrued 
revenue  of  1807  had  brought  nearly  eighteen  million 
dollars  into  the  Treasury ;  and  sixteen  millions  wrould 
remain  to  supply  the  wants  of  Government  at  the 
close  of  the  year  1808.  Of  this  sum  the  ordinary  an 
nual  appropriations  would  consume  thirteen  millions. 
Starting  from  this  point,  Gallatin  discussed  the  finan 
cial  effect  of  the  alternatives  which  lay  before  Con 
gress.  The  first  was  that  of  total  or  partial  submis 
sion  to  the  belligerents ;  "  and  as,  in  pursuing  that 
humble  path,  means  of  defence  will  become  unneces 
sary,  —  as  there  will  be  no  occasion  for  either  an 
army  or  a  navy,  —  it  is  believed  that  there  would  be 
no  difficulty  in  reducing  the  public  expenditures  to 
a  rate  corresponding  with  the  fragments  of  impost 
which  might  still  be  collected."  The  second  choice 
of  measures  was  to  continue  the  embargo  without 
war ;  and  in  this  case  the  government  might  be  sup 
ported  for  two  years  with  no  greater  effort  than  that 
of  borrowing  five  million  dollars.  Finally,  Congress 
might  declare  war  against  one  or  both  of  the  bellige- 


1808.  PERPLEXITY  AND   CONFUSION.  367 

rents,  and  in  that  event  Gallatin  asked  only  leave 
to  contract  loans.  Persons  familiar  with  the  history 
of  the  Republican  party,  and  with  the  career  of  its 
leaders  when  in  opposition,  could  not  hut  wonder  that 
Gallatin  should  ask  leave  to  create  a  new  funded  debt 
for  purposes  of  war.  To  reconcile  the  inconsistency 
Gallatin  once  more  argued  that  experience  proved 
debt  to  be  less  dangerous  than  had  ten  years  before 
been  supposed :- 

uThe  high  price  of  public  stocks  and  indeed  of  all 
species  of  stocks,  the  reduction  of  the  public  debt,  the 
unimpaired  credit  of  the  general  government,  and  the 
large  amount  of  existing  bank-stock  in  the  United  States 
leave  no  doubt  of  the  practicability  of  obtaining  the 
necessary  loans  on  reasonable  terms.  The  geographical 
situation  of  the  United  States,  their  history  since  the 
Revolution,  and  above  all  present  events  remove  every 
apprehension  of  frequent  wars.  It  may  therefore  be 
confidently  expected  that  a  revenue  derived  solely  from 
duties  on  importations,  though  necessarily  impaired  by 
war,  will  always  be  amply  sufficient  during  long  intervals 
of  peace  not  only  to  defray  current  expenses,  but  also 
to  reimburse  the  debt  contracted  during  the  few  periods 
of  war.  No  internal  taxes,  either  direct  or  indirect,  are 
therefore  contemplated,  even  in  the  case  of  hostilities 
carried  on  against  the  two  great  belligerent  Powers." 

Such  language  was  an  invitation  to  war.  Gallatin 
carried  courage  as  far  as  the  President  carried  cau 
tion.  While  Jefferson  talked  of  surpluses  and  depre 
cated  "  painful  alternatives,"  his  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  invited  Congress  to  declare  war  against  the 


368        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  16. 

two  greatest  Powers  in  the  world,  and- promised  to 
support  it  without  imposing  a  single  internal  tax. 

Madison,  upon  whose  decision  even  more  than  on 
that  of  Congress  the  future  policy  of  the  Government 
depended,  would  not  express  an  emphatic  opinion. 
A  glimpse  of  the  chaos  that  prevailed  in  the  Execu 
tive  Department  was  given  in  a  letter  from  Mac  on 
to  Nicholson,1  written  December  4,  after  Macon  had 
offered  Resolutions  in  the  House  looking  to  a  per 
sistence  in  the  system  of  embargo  and  peaceable 
coercion :  — 

"Gallatin  is  most  decidedly  for  war,  and  I  think  that 
the  Vice-President  [Clinton]  and  W.  C.  Nicholas  are  of 
the  same  opinion.  It  is  said  that  the  President  [Jeffer 
son]  gives  no  opinion  as  to  the  measures  that  ought  to 
be  adopted.  It  is  not  known  whether  he  be  for  war  or 
peace.  It  is  reported  that  Mr.  Madison  is  for  the  plan 
which  I  have  submitted,  with  the  addition  of  high  protect 
ing  duties  to  encourage  the  manufacturers  of  the  United 
States.  I  am  as  much  against  war  as  Gallatin  is  in  favor 
of  it.  Thus  I  have  continued  in  Congress  till  there  is 
not  one  of  my  old  fellow-laborers  that  agrees  with  me 
in  opinion." 

Indecision  ruled  everywhere  at  Washington  down 
to  the  close  of  the  year.  Jefferson  would  say  nothing 
at  all ;  Madison  would  say  nothing  decisive  ; 2  and 
Gallatin  struggled  in  vain  to  give  a  show  of  character 

1  Macon  to  Joseph  H.  Nicholson,  Dec.  4,  1808;  Adams's  Gal 
latin,  p.  384. 

2  Madison  to  Pinkney,  Dec.  5,  1808;  Madison's  Writings,  ii. 
427. 


1808.  PERPLEXITY   AND   CONFUSION.  369 

to  the  Government.  December  29  one  of  the  Massa 
chusetts  representatives  wrote  to  a  correspondent  the 
details  of  the  secretary's  plan : l  — 

"  Yesterday  I  spent  an  hour  with  Mr.  Gallatin,  when 
he  unfolded  to  me  his  plan,  —  a  plan  which  he  thinks  will 
finally  prevail.  It  is  this  :  That  we  immediately  pass  a 
non-intercourse  Act  to  take  effect,  say,  June  1  next ;  and 
as  the  bill  now  reads,  that  it  become  null  toward  that 
Power  which  may  relax.  Send  out  the  Act  forthwith  to 
England  and  to  France,  together  with  an  Act  raising 
the  embargo  partially,  say,  at  the  same  time,  and  arming, 
or  granting  letters  of  marque,  etc.  These  being  made 
known  to  Great  Britain  and  France,  it  is  expected  that 
the  obstinate  Emperor  will  not  alter  his  course,  but  it  is 
expected  that  Great  Britain,  when  she  finds  the  stand 
we  deliberately  take,  —  that  we  have  no  rebellion;  that 
Madison  and  a  majority  of  Democrats  are  chosen ;  and 
that  we  shall  be  fighting  a  common  enemy  (France)  with 
her,  —  and  when  she  finds  that  we  intend  living  without 
dishonorable  purchases  of  her  goods,  etc.,  will  study  her 
interest  and  relax." 

The  same  day  Gallatin  wrote  confidentially  to  Nich 
olson,  describing  the  extreme  anxieties  he  felt : 2  — 

u  Never  was  I  so  overwhelmed  with  public  business. 
That  would  be  nothing  if  we  went  right ;  but  a  great  con 
fusion  and  perplexity  reign  in  Congress.  Mr.  Madison 
is,  as  I  always  knew  him,  slow  in  taking  his  ground,  but 
firm  when  the  storm  arises.  ^  What  I  had  foreseen  has 
taken  place.  A  majority  will  not  adhere  to  the  embargo 

1  Orchard  Cook  to  J.  Q.  Adams,  Dec.  29,  1808;  Adams  MSS. 

2  Gallatin  to   Nicholson,  Dec.    29,  1808;   Adams's   Gallatin, 
p.  384. 

VOL.  iv.  —  24 


370        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  16. 

much  longer,  and  if  war  be  not  speedily  determined  on, 
submission  will  soon  ensue." 

Joseph  Story  two  days  afterward  wrote  a  more  ex 
act  account  of  the  distraction  which  prevailed  at  the 
White  House. 

"The  Administration  are  desirous  of  peace,"  wrote 
Story,1  in  confidence,  December  31.  "  They  believe  that 
we  must  suffer  much  from  war ;  they  are  satisfied,  even 
,  now,  that  if  the  embargo  could  be  continued  for  one  year 
our  rights  would  be  acknowledged  were  our  own  citizens 
only  true  to  their  own  interests.  They  deem  this  con 
tinuance  impracticable,  and  therefore  are  of  opinion  that 
after  midsummer  the  plan  must  be  abandoned ;  and  war 
will  then  ensue  unless  the  belligerents  abandon  their 
aggressions." 

The  chaos  prevailing  in  the  White  House  was  order 
compared  with  the  condition  of  Congress ;  and  there 
again  Gallatin  was  forced  to  guide.  After  listening 
November  8  to  the  President's  serene  Message,  the 
House  three  days  later  referred  the  paragraphs  con 
cerning  foreign  Powers  to  a  committee  with  G.  W. 
Campbell  at  its  head.  Campbell  probably  consulted 
Madison,  and  his  instance  doubtless  caused  the  fruit 
less  appeal  of  November  15,  through  Gallatin,  to 
Jefferson.  Failing  to  obtain  guidance  from  the  Presi 
dent,  Gallatin  wrote  a  Report,  which  was  probably 
approved  by  Madison,  and  which  Campbell  presented 
November  22  to  the  House.  For  clearness  and  calm- 

1  Joseph  Story  to  Joseph  White,  Dec.  31,  1808;  Story's  Life  of 
Story,  i.  172. 


1808.  PERPLEXITY'   AND   CONFUSION.  371 

ness  of  statement  this  paper,  famous  in  its  day  as 
"  Campbell's  Report," l  has  never  been  surpassed  in 
the  political  literature  of  the  United  States ;  but  the 
rigorous  logic  of  its  conclusions  terrified  men  who 
could  not  refute  and  would  not  accept  them :  — 

4 '  What  course  ought  the  United  States  to  pursue  ? 
Your  committee  can  perceive  no  other  alternative  but 
abject  and  degrading  submission,  war  with  both  nations, 
or  a  continuance  and  enforcement  of  the  present  suspen 
sion  of  commerce. 

"  The  first  cannot  require  any  discussion  ;  but  the  pres 
sure  of  the  embargo,  so  sensibly  felt,  and  the  calami 
ties  inseparable  from  a  state  of  war,  naturally  create  a 
wish  that  some  middle  course  might  be  discovered  which 
should  avoid  the  evils  of  both  and  not  be  inconsistent 
with  national  honor  and  independence.  That  illusion 
must  be  dissipated  ;  and  it  is  necessary  that  the  people 
of  the  United  States  should  fully  understand  the  situation 
in  which  they  are  placed. 

"There  is  no  other  alternative  but  war  with  both  par 
ties  or  a  continuance  of  the  present  system.  For  war 
with  one  of  the  belligerents  only  would  be  submission  to 
the  edicts  and  will  of  the  other ;  and  a  repeal,  in  whole 
or  in  part,  of  the  embargo  must  necessarily  be  war  or 
submission." 

To  Federalists  these  stern  truths  were  not  wholly 
unwelcome,  since  they  brought  to  an  issue  the  whole 
policy,  domestic  and  foreign,  which  for  eight  years  the 
Federalist  party  had  never  ceased  to  condemn ;  but 
to  Republicans,  who  were  equally  responsible  with 
1  State  Papers,  iii.  259. 


372        HISTORY  OF   THE  UNITED   STATES.      CH.  10. 

the  President  for  the  policy  which  ended  in  Gallatin's 
alternative,  the  harshness  of  the  choice  was  intolera 
ble.  They  felt  that  the  embargo  must  be  abandoned ; 
but  they  felt  still  more  strongly  that  the  double  war 
was  ruin.  In  vain  Gallatin  tried  in  his  Treasury 
Report  to  persuade  them  that  to  fight  the  two  na 
tions  was  a  practicable  task.  Congress  writhed  and 
rebelled.  . 

Campbell's  report  closed  by  recommending  three 
Resolutions  as  common  ground  on  which  all  parties 
could  take  their  stand,  whether  for  war  or  embargo. 
The  first  declared  that  the  United  States  could  not, 
without  a  sacrifice  of  their  rights,  honor,  and  inde 
pendence,  submit  to  the  edicts  of  Great  Britain  and 
France.  The  second  declared  the  expediency  of  ex 
cluding  from  the  United  States  the  ships  and  the 
products  of  all  Powers  which  maintained  these  edicts 
in  force.  The  third  recommended  immediate  prepa 
rations  for  defence. 

The  Federalists  were  eager  for  attack ;  and  when, 
November  28,  Campbell  called  up  the  first  of  his 
Resolutions  for  debate,  Josiah  Quincy  fell  upon  it  with 
violence  not  easily  forgotten,  and  doubtless  meant  to 
strengthen  the  general  belief  that  New  England  would 
control  her  passions  no  longer. 

"  The  course  advocated  in  that  Report  is  in  my  opin 
ion  loathsome,"  he  said ;  "the  spirit  it  breathes  disgrace 
ful  ;  the  temper  it  is  likely  to  inspire  neither  calculated 
to  regain  the  rights  we  have  lost,  nor  to  preserve  those 
which  remain  to  us." 


1808.  PERPLEXITY   AND   COXFUSION.  373 

Assuming  that  the  Report  was  made  in  the  interest 
of  embargo,  and  that  it  foreshadowed  the  permanence 
of  the  anti-commercial  system,  he  met  it  by  threats 
of  insurrection  and  civil  war,  expressed  in  the  same 
breath  with  which  they  were  disavowed:  — 

"Good  Heavens!  Mr.  Chairman,  are  men  mad?  Is 
this  House  touched  with  that  insanity  which  is  the  never- 
failing  precursor  of  the  intention  of  Heaven  to  destroy? 
The  people  of  New  England,  after  eleven  months'  depri 
vation  of  the  ocean,  to  be  commanded  still  longer  to 
abandon  it !  for  an  undefined  period  to  hold  their  nn- 
alienable  rights  at  the  tenure  of  the  will  of  Britain 
or  of  Bonaparte  !  .  .  .  I  am  lost  in  astonishment,  Mr. 
Chairman.  I  have  not  words  to  express  the  matchless 
absurdity  of  this  attempt.  I  have  no  tongue  to  express 
the  swift  and  headlong  destruction  which  a  blind  perse 
verance  in  such  a  system  must  bring  upon  this  nation. 
.  .  .  This  embargo  must  be  repealed.  Yoa  cannot  en 
force  it  for  any  important  period  of  time  longer.  When 
I  speak  of  your  inability  to  enforce  this  law,  let  not 
gentlemen  misunderstand  me.  I  mean  not  to  intimate 
insurrection  or  open  defiance  of  them ;  although  it  is  im 
possible  to  foresee  in  what  acts  that  oppression  will 
finally  terminate  which,  we  are  told,  makes  wise  men 
mad."  Nature  gave  the  ocean  to  New  England,  "  and 
among  a  people  thus  situated,  thus  educated,  thus  numer-/ 
ous,  laws  prohibiting  them  from  the  exercise  of  thei( 
natural  rights  will  have  a  binding  effect  not  one  moment 
longer  than  the  public  sentiment  supports  them." 

Always  assuming  that  the  talk  of  war  covered  the 
plan  of  retaining  the  embargo,  Quincy  allowed  him- 


374        HISTORY   OF   THE    UNITED   STATES.       CH.  16. 

self  to  encourage  warlike  ideas  much  more  recklessly 
than  suited  some  of  his  party  friends.  He  ventured 
to  goad  the  majority  toward  a  decision  which  of  all 
possible  results  was  most  disliked  by  the  Federalists 
of  New  England  :  — 

"  Take  no  counsel  of  fears.  Your  strength  will  in 
crease  with  the  trial,  and  prove  greater  than  you  are  now 
aware.  But  I  shall  be  told  this  may  lead  to  war.  I  ask, 
Are  we  now  at  peace?  Certainly  not,  unless  retiring 
from  insult  be  peace,  unless  shrinking  under  the  lash  be 
peace.  The  surest  way  to  prevent  war  is  not  to  fear  it. 
The  idea  that  nothing  on  earth  is  so  dreadful  as  war  is 
inculcated  too  studiously  among  us.  Disgrace  is  worse. 
Abandonment  of  essential  rights  is  worse." 

/  Whatever  Quincy  might  have  been  willing  to  ac 
cept,  the  party  to  which  he  belonged  wanted  no  war 
except  with  France,  while  the  Republicans  were 
opposed  to  war  in  any  shape.  John  Randolph  did 
indeed  hint  at  the  use  of  force,  but  Randolph's 
opinion  was  never  for  two  days  the  same.  Philip 
Barton  Key  of  Maryland,  as  vehement  a  Federalist 
as  Quincy,  also  advised  a  policy  which  could  lead 
only  to  war :  — 

"  I  would  let  our  vessels  go  out  armed  for  resistance, 
and  if  they  were  interfered  with  I  would  make  the  dernier 
appeal.  We  are  able  and  willing  to  resist ;  and  when  the 
moment  arrives,  there  will  be  but  one  heart  and  one  hand 
throughout  the  Union." 

The  sentiment  was  patriotic ;  but  as  though  ex 
pressly  to  prove  how  little  it  could  be  trusted,  Barent 


1808.  PERPLEXITY  AND   CONFUSION.  375 

Gardenier  rose  to  say,  in  emphatic  and  unqualified 
terms,  that  England  was  wholly  in  the  right,  and  that 
from  the  first  the  American  government  had  aimed 
at  provoking  war.1  Gardenier's  views  were  those  of 
a  majority  of  Federalists,  and  in  the  end  were  adopted 
by  the  party.  Quincy's  blindness  to  the  serious  dan 
ger  of  war  cost  him  the  confidence  of  more  cautious 
conservatives. 

On  the  opposite  side,  the  Republicans  seemed  for 
the  most  part  fairly  cowed  by  the  vigor  with  which 
the  Federalists  defied  the  embargo  and  war  at  once. 
Nothing  in  American  history  offered  a  more  interest 
ing  illustration  of  the  first  stage  of  the  national  char 
acter  than  the  open  avowals  by  Congress  in  1808  of 
motives  closely  akin  to  fear.  America  as  a  nation 
could  run  no  serious  military  peril,  even  though  she 
declared  war  on  England  and  France  at  once.  The 
worst  military  disaster  that  could  happen  would  be 
a  bombardment  or  temporary  occupation  of  some 
seaboard  city  ;  the  most  terrible  punishment  within 
the  range  of  possibility  was  the  burning  of  a  few 
small  wooden  towns  which  could  be  rebuilt  in  three 
months,  and  whose  destruction  implied  no  necessary 
loss  of  life.  Neither  England  nor  France  had  armies 
to  spare  for  permanent  conquest  in  America ;  but 
so  thoroughly  had  the  theory  of  peaceable  coercion 
taken  possession  of  the  national  character  that  men 
of  courage  appealed  to  motives  such  as  in  a  private 
dispute  they  would  have  thought  degrading. 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  1808-1809,  p.  839. 


376        HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  16. 

"  The  gentleman  talked  of  resistance,  and  resistance  on 
sea,"  said  Willis  Alston  of  North  Carolina,  in  reply  to 
Quincy.1  "Did  any  one  believe  that  he  seriously  meant 
meeting  the  powerful  navy  of  Great  Britain  on  the  sea,  — 
of  that  Britain  who  had  been  emphatically  st3Tled  '  the 
mistress  of  the  ocean,'  and  who  was  4  fighting  for  the  lib 
erties  of  the  world  and  of  mankind '  ?  No,  sir  ;  nothing 
of  the  kind  is  meant.  Submission  to  her  orders  would  be 
the  inevitable  consequence  of  the  gentleman's  resistance, 
and  finally  a  loss  of  everything  dear  to  the  American 
character,  —  a  loss  of  our  liberty  and  independence  as 
a  free  people." 

As  though  one  such  admission  were  not  enough, 
Alston  obstinately  recurred  to  it.  "  An  idea  of  that 
sort  of  resistance  is  too  idle  to  merit  serious  consid 
eration."  That  Willis  Alston  was  a  man  of  no  great 
distinction  might  be  true ;  but  such  expressions  were 
not  confined  to  him.  Richard  M.  Johnson  of  Ken 
tucky,  as  brave  a  man  as  lived,  could  not  face  the 
idea  of  war  :  — 

"  At  the  most  alarming  crisis  that  ever  convulsed  the 
political  world,  when  empires  and  kingdoms  have  changed 
with  the  season,  and  America,  buffeted  on  every  side,  has 
maintained  the  ground  of  perfect  neutrality,  this  nation 
should  make  a  pause  on  this  high  eminence  before  they 
plunge  into  the  dread  conflict." 

A  nation   which   had   never  yet  moved  a  muscle 
could  hardly  "  make  a  pause ; "  but  even  if  Colonel 
Johnson's  figures  had  been  more  correct,  the  senti 
ment  was  in  his  mouth  unexpected,  for  in  Kentucky 
1  Annals  of  Congress,  1808-1809,  p.  556. 


1808.  PERPLEXITY  AND  CONFUSION.  377 

gentlemen  "  buffeted  on  every  side  "  were  not  supposed 
to  pause.  Still  more  remarkable  was  the  language  of 
Troup  of  Georgia — "the  hot-headed  Georgian,"  as 
Jefferson  afterward  called  him,  who  twenty  years 
later  challenged  a  civil  war,  but  who  in  1808  was 
even  more  anxious  than  Johnson  to  pause  on  the  high 
eminence  where  he  was  buffeted  on  every  side. 

"Permission  to  arm,"  he  said,1  ;t  is  tantamount  to  a 
declaration  of  war ;  and  the  people  of  this  country  want 
peace  as  long  as  they  can  preserve  it  with  honor.  And 
do  you  think,  sir,  we  are  ready  to  plunge  into  a  ruinous 
war,  naked  and  unarmed,  to  gratify  a  few  bankrupt 
commercial  speculators?  It  is  easy  to  declare  war;  it 
is  more  difficult  under  present  circumstances  to  maintain 
peace  ;  and  it  is  most  difficult  of  all  to  wage  a  successful 
war.  Sir,  beware  !  It  is  the  object  of  the  gentleman 
from  Massachusetts  and  his  friends  to  lead  you  step 
by  step  into  a  war,  and  if  he  can  into  an  unpopular 
war,  which  the  moment  you  cease  to  conduct  with  effect 
you  are  ruined,  and  he  and  his  friends  are  exalted  ;  .  .  . 
and,  sir,  the  moment  this  party  ceases  to  rule,  republi 
canism  is  gone,  and  with  it  the  hopes  of  all  good  men 
forever." 

Apart  from  the  picture  of  American  jealousies, 
Troup's  remarks  offered  an  interesting  example  of 
the  ideas  then  held  in  regard  to  national  honor.  No 
one  made  the  obvious  retort  that  a  nation  which  pre 
served  peace  by  tolerating  insults  like  those  inflicted 
by  Champagny  and  Canning  had  best  say  nothing  of 
its  honor.  The  fiction  of  pride  was  still  kept  up, 
1  Annals  of  Congress,  1808-1809,  p.  606. 


378        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  16. 

though  members  descended  to  appeals  which  seemed 
to  imply  physical  fear.  Madison's  brother-in-law, 
John  G.  Jackson,  admitted  himself  to  be  cowed  by 
Canning's  brutality. 

"  The  fires  lighted  up  in  Copenhagen,"  said  he,1  "  are 
scarcely  extinguished ;  they  are  yet  glowing  before  us  in 
imagination  at  least.  And  we  ought  to  recollect  that  if 
we  do  not  submit,  it  is  war ;  if  we  do  submit,  it  is  trib 
ute  ;  and  if  we  have  war,  our  towns  will  share  the  fate  of 
fortified  Copenhagen,  unless  we  strengthen  and  fortify 
them." 

On  such  reasoning,  submission  and  tribute  alone 
were1  possible,  since  fortifications  which  had  failed  to 
protect  Copenhagen  were  little  likely  to  protect  Nor 
folk  or  New  York.  Macon  joined  in  the  same  cry : 

u  We  have  enough  of  the  necessaries  of  life  to  make  us 
content,  and  there  is  no  nation  in  the  world  at  this  time 
that  enjoys  more  of  the  luxuries  of  Europe  and  of  the 
East  and  West  Indies  than  we  do,  —  in  a  word,  none  that 
enjoys  more  of  the  good  things  of  this  world." 

The  spectacle  of  simple  and  hardy  Speaker  Macon 
in  his  homespun  suit  enjoying  all  the  luxuries  of 
Europe  and  the  farthest  East,  while  Pinkney  and 
Armstrong  paid  for  them  in  the  spoils  of  American 
merchants,  was  quaintly  humorous;  but  no  one  felt 
its  sting  of  satire.  Even  the  typical  South  Caroli 
nian,  David  R.  Williams,  —  a  man  second  to  none  in 
courage  and  independence  of  character,  —  wished  to 
hide  behind  the  embargo  for  fear  of  war :  — 
1  Annals  of  Congress,  1808-1809,  p.  657. 


1808.  PERPLEXITY  AND  CONFUSION.  379 

"I  see  no  other  honorable  course  in  which  peace  can 
be  maintained.  Take  whatever  other  project  has  been 
hinted  at  and  war  inevitably  results.  While  we  can  pro 
crastinate  the  miseries  of  war,  I  am  for  procrastinating. 
We  thereby  gain  the  additional  advantage  of  waiting  the 
events  in  Europe.  The  true  interests  of  this  country  can 
be  found  only  in  peace.  Among  many  other  important 
considerations,  remember  that  the  moment  you  go  to  war 
you  may  bid  adieu  to  every  prospect  of  discharging  the 
national  debt."  l 

The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  had  only  a  month 
before  officially  asserted  the  contrary ;  but  any  excuse 
for  avoiding  war  seemed  to  satisfy  the  House.  From 
the  beginning  to  the  end  of  this  long  and  ardent  de 
bate  not  one  member  from  any  quarter  of  the  Union 
ventured  to  say  —  what  every  man  in  the  United 
States  would  have  said  ten  years  later  —  that  after 
the  formal  and  fixed  decisions  of  France  and  Eng 
land  war  existed  in  fact  and  should  be  declared 
in  form. 

With  all  John  Randolph's  waywardness  and  ex 
travagance,  he  alone  shone  among  this  mass  of  me 
diocrities,  and  like  the  water-snakes  in  Coleridge's 
silent  ocean  his  every  track  was  a  flash  of  golden 
fire.  At  moments  he  struck  passionately  at  his  own 
favorite  companions  —  at  Macon  and  Williams  —  as 
he  struck  at  Jefferson.  The  steady  decline  of  public 
spirit  stung  his  pride.  "  It  was  in  that  fatal  session 
of  1805-1806  that  the  policy  of  yielding  to  anything 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  1808-1809,  p.  797. 


380         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  16. 

that  might  come  in  the  shape  of  insult  and  aggression 
was  commenced.  The  result  was  then  foretold.  It 
has  happened." l  Speaker  after  speaker  revelled  in 
narrating  the  long  list  of  insults  and  outrages  which 
America  had  endured  in  patience. 

"The  House  will  pardon  me,"  said  Randolph,2  "if  I 
forbear  a  minute  recapitulation  of  the  wrongs  which  we 
have  received  not-only  from  the  two  great  belligerents  of 
Europe,  but  from  the  little  belligerents  also.  •  I  cannot, 
like  Shylock,  take  a  pleasure  in  saying,  '  On  such  a  day 
you  called  me  dog ;  on  such  a  day  you  spit  upon  my 
gabardine.'  " 

Yet  Randolph  himself  fell  naturally  into  the  habits 
at  which  he  sneered ;  and  his  wit  alone  raised  him 
above  the  common  level  of  Congressmen.  However 
happily  he  might  ridicule  the  timidity  and  awkward 
ness  of  others,  he  never  advanced  a  positive  opinion 
of  his  own  without  repudiating  it  the  moment  he  was 
taken  at  his  word.  "  I  would  scuffle  for  commerce," 
he  said ; 3  and  the  phrase  was  itself  unworthy  of  a 
proud  people  like  the  Virginians  ;  but  when  Campbell 
tried  to  force  from  him  a  pledge  to  stand  by  the  Gov 
ernment  in  asserting  the  national  rights,  Randolph 
declined  to  gratify  him. 

Of  all  the  speakers,  George  Washington  Campbell 
—  the  reputed  author  of  the  Report  —  alone  took  a 
tone  which  might  almost  be  called  courageous ;  but 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  1808-1809,  p.  685. 

2  Annals  of  Congress,  1808-1809,  p.  595. 

3  Annals  of  Congress,  1808-1809,  pp.  687,  688. 


1808. 


PERPLEXITY   AND  CONlHJjSlON.  881 


even  Campbell  thought  more  of  tactics  than  of  dig 
nity.  He  admitted  that  the  object  of  his  Report  was 
to  unite  the  party  on  common  ground  ;  but  he  dared 
not  say  whether  this  common  ground  was  to  be  em 
bargo  or  war  ;  he  did  not  even  say  —  what  must  have 
been  in  his  mind  —  that  the  Government  had  ex 
hausted  alternatives.  His  chief  effort  seemed  rather 
to  be  directed  toward  making  a  dilemma  for  the 
Federalists  :  — 

u  Are  they  determined  to  vindicate  the  rights  and  inde 
pendence  of  their  country?  If  they  are,  we  wish  to  know 
in  what  manner.  If  they  are  not  willing  to  pursue  the 
measures  of  resistance  we  propose,  of  a  total  interdic 
tion  of  intercourse  with  those  Powers,  will  they  assume 
a  higher  ground?  Will  they  prefer  war?  If  they  do, 
this  is  one  of  the  alternatives  presented  in  the  Report. 
We  wish  to  know  what  measures  they  are  willing  to 
adopt  for  the  safety  of  the  nation.  The  crisis  is  awful. 
The  time  has  come  to  unite  the  people  of  America. 
We  join  issue  with  the  gentlemen  as  to  a  temporizing 
policy.  We  have  not,  —  we  will  not  now  temporize. 
We  say  there  is  no  middle  course.  We  are  in  the  first 
place  for  cutting  off  all  intercourse  with  those  Powers 
who  trample  on  our  rights.  If  that  will  not  prove 
effectual,  we  say  take  the  last  alternative,  war,  with 
all  its  calamities,  rather  than  submission  or  national 
degradation." 

The  most  interesting  part  of  Campbell's  speech  was 
his  awkward  admission  that  peaceable  coercion  had 
failed.  Such  an  admission  was  equivalent  to  avowing 
that  the  Republican  party  had  failed,  but  Campbell 


382        HISTORY   OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.       CH.  16. 

stumbled  as  he  best  could  through  this  mortifying 
confession. 

"We  could  not  foresee,"  he  said,1  "that  the  Govern 
ments  of  those  Powers  would  not  regard  the  distress  and 
sufferings  of  their  own  people  ;  that  France  would  suffer 
her  West  Indian  colonies  to  be  almost  desolated  with 
famine,  and  to  be  compelled  to  apply  to  their  inveterate 
enemy  to  save  them  from  actual  starvation  rather  than 
revoke  her  decrees  ;  nor  could  we  know  that  the  Govern 
ment  of  Great  Britain  would  be  regardless  of  the  com 
plaints  and  representations  of  her  manufacturers  and  a 
respectable  portion  of  her  merchants  ;  that  it  would  lend 
a  deaf  ear  to  the  hungry  cries  of  the  starving  mechanics, 
and  silence  their  just  and  loud  complaints  with  the  thun 
der  of  their  murdering  guns,  and  quench  their  hunger 
with  a  shower  of  balls  instead  of  bread.  We  cannot  be 
culpable  for  not  anticipating  such  events'." 

Yet  for  twenty  years  the  Federalists  had  wearied 
the  country  with  prophecies  of  these  disappointments 
which  Campbell  and  his  Republican  friends  said  they 
could  not  be  expected  to  foresee.  Jefferson  had  per 
sisted  in  acting  on  the  theory  that  he  could  enforce 
national  rights  by  peaceable  means ;  had  staked  his 
reputation,  after  long  and  varied  experience,  on  the 
soundness  of  this  doctrine  which  his  political  oppo 
nents  denied  ;  and  suddenly,  on  its  failure,  his  follow 
ers  pleaded  that  they  could  not  be  held  culpable  for 
failing  to  anticipate  what  their  political  opponents  had 
steadily  foretold.  The  confession  of  such  an  over- 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  1808-1809,  p.  747. 


1808.  PEKPLEXITY  AND   CONFUSION.  383 

sight  was  more  fatal  than  all  the  sneers  of  Randolph 
and  the  taunts  of  Quincy. 

There  Congress  for  the  moment  stopped.  The 
debate  —  which  began  November  28  and  lasted  till 
December  17  —  ended  in  the  adoption  of  Campbell's 
first  Resolution  by  a  vote  of  one  hundred  and  eighteen 
to  two ;  of  the  second  by  eighty -four  to  thirty ;  and 
of  the  third  without  opposition.  Nothing  was  de 
cided  ;  and  the  year  closed  leaving  Congress,  as  Gal- 
latin  told  his  friend  Nicholson,  in  "  great  confusion 
and  perplexity." 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

BEHIND  the  scenes  diplomacy  was  at  work,  actively 
seeking  to  disentangle  or  to  embroil  the  plot  of  the 
culminating  drama.  Erskine,  the  British  minister, 
sympathizing  with  his  father  Lord  Erskine,  in  good 
will  to  America,  hurried  from  one  to  another  of  the 
officials  at  Washington,  trying  to  penetrate  their 
thoughts,  —  an  easy  task,  —  and  to  find  a  bond  of 
union  between  them  and  George  Canning,  —  a  prob 
lem  as  difficult  as  any  that  ever  diplomacy  solved. 
Besides  his  interview  with  Jefferson,  he  reported 
conversations  with  the  Cabinet. 

"  I  have  had  several  interviews  with  Mr.  Madison 
since  the  arrival  of  the  '  Hope,'  "  he  wrote  November  5,1 
"  and  have  often  turned  the  conversation  upon  the  points 
above  mentioned,  which  he  did  not  seem  willing  to  dis 
cuss  ;  but  I  could  collect  from  what  he  did  say  that  it 
was  his  own  opinion  that  all  intercourse  ought  to  be 
broken  off  with  the  belligerents,  and  that  some  steps 
further  —  to  use  his  expression  —  ought  to  be  taken.  .  .  . 
I  will  just  communicate  to  you  the  hints  which  were 
thrown  out  by  Mr.  Smith,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  in  a 
conversation  which  I  had  with  him,  —  of  an  unofficial 

1  Erskine  to  Canning,  Nov.  5,  1808;  MSS.  British  Archives. 


1808.  DIPLOMACY  AND  CONSPIRACY.  385 

kind,  indeed,  but  in  which  he  expressed  his  sentiments 
unequivocally, — that  in  addition  to  the  steps  alluded  to 
by  Mr.  Madison,  he  would  wish  that  their  ministers 
should  be  recalled  from  England  and  France,  and  that 
preparations  should  be  immediately  made  for  a  state  of 
hostility.  Mr.  Gallatin,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
would  have  preferred  taking  a  decided  part  against  one 
or  other  of  those  Powers  before  the  embargo  was  first 
laid,  but  thinks  that  no  other  course  can  now  be  adopted. 
The  Vice-President,  Mr.  Clinton,  was  and  is  strongly 
averse  to  the  embargo  system ;  and  though  he  does  not 
openly  declare  himself,  it  is  well  known  that  he  is  entirely 
opposed  to  the  present  Administration.  .  .  .  Indeed,  in 
conversation  with  me  yesterday  he  inveighed  with  great 
force  against  the  conduct  of  Bonaparte  toward  Spain, 
and  expressed  his  astonishment  that  any  American  should 
have  hesitated  to  express  such  sentiments.  He  alluded 
to  the  conduct  of  this  Government  in  not  only  with 
holding  any  approbation  of  the  noble  efforts  of  the  Span 
iards  to  resist  that  usurper's  tyranny  over  them,  but  to 
the  language  held  by  their  newspapers,  and  in  private  by 
themselves,  of  regret  at  these  events  as  being  likely  to 
conduce  to  the  interest  and  success  of  England.  A  dif 
ferent  tone  is  now  assumed  upon  that  important  subject ; 
and  the  President  said  to  me  a  few  days  ago  that  how 
ever  he  might  doubt  the  eventual  success  of  the  Spanish 
cause,  the  feelings  of  a  tiger  could  alone  lead  to  an  at 
tempt  to  subjugate  them  through  such  torrents  of  blood 
and  such  devastation  as  must  ensue  if  followed  by 
success." 

Erskine's  report  was   nearly  exact.     In  regard  to 
Robert  Smith,  it  was  coniirmed  by  a  letter  written  at 

VOL.  iv.  —  25 


386        HISTORY  OF   THE  UNITED   STATES.      CH.  17. 

the  same  moment  by  Smith  to  the  President ; l  and 
so  far  as  concerned  Madison,  Gallatin,  and  -George 
Clinton,  it  was  not  far  wrong.  A  month  then 
passed  while  Congress  drifted  toward  a  decision.  At. 
last,  about  December  1,  Erskine  roused  himself  to  an 
effort.  Doubtless  Madison  and  Gallatin  knew  his 
purpose,  —  perhaps  they  inspired  it;  but  in  any 
case,  Erskine  acted  rather  in  their  interests  than  in 
the  spirit  or  policy  of  Canning. 

December  3  the  British  minister  wrote  to  his  Gov 
ernment  the  first  of  a  series  of  despatches  calculated 
to  bring  Canning  to  his  senses. 

"  The  Government  and  party  in  power,"  said  he,2 
"unequivocally  express  their  resolution  not  to  remove 
the  embargo,  except  by  substituting  war  measures  against 
both  belligerents,  unless  either  or  both  should  relax  their 
restrictions  upon  neutral  commerce." 

To  reinforce  this  assertion  Erskine  reported  an 
interview  with  Secretary  Madison,  who  after  review 
ing  the  facts  had  ended  by  explicitly  threatening  a 
declaration  of  war.  He  said  in  substance  — 

"  That  as  the  world  must  be  convinced  that  America 
had  in  vain  taken  all  the  means  in  her  power  to  obtain 
from  Great  Britain  and  France  a  just  attention  to  their 
rights  as  a  neutral  Power  by  representations  and  remon 
strances,  that  she  would  be  fully  justified  in  having  re 
course  to  hostilities  with  either  belligerent,  and  that  she 

1  R.  Smith  to  Jefferson,  Nov.  1,  1808;  Jefferson  MSS. 

2  Erskine  to  Canning,  Dec.  3,  1808;  Cobbett's  Debates,  xvii., 
Appendix  cxxxiv. 


1808.  DIPLOMACY   AND   CONSPIRACY.  387 

only  hesitated  to  do  so  from  the  difficulty  of  contending 
with  both  ;  but  that  she  must  be  driven  even  to  endeavor 
to  maintain  her  rights  against  the  two  greatest  Powers 
in  the  world,  unless  either  of  them  should  relax  their 
restrictions  upon  neutral  commerce, --in  which  case  the 
United  States  would  side  with  that  Power  against  the 
other  which  might  continue  the  aggression.  Mr.  Madison 
observed  to  me  that  it  must  be  evident  that  the  United 
States  would  enter  upon  measures  of  hostility  with  great 
reluctance,  as  he  acknowledged  that  they  are  not  at  all 
prepared  for  war,  much  less  with  a  Power  so  irresistibly 
strong  as  Great  Britain ;  and  that  nothing  would  be 
thought  to  be  too  great  a  sacrifice  to  the  preservation  of 
peace,  except  their  independence  and  their  honor.  He 
said  that  he  did  not  believe  that  any  Americans  would  be 
found  willing  to  submit  to  (what  he  termed)  the  encroach 
ments  upon  the  liberty  and  the  rights  of  the  United 
States  by  the  belligerents  ;  and  therefore  the  alternatives 
were,  Embargo  or  War.  He  confessed  that  the  people 
of  this  country  were  beginning  to  think  the  former  alter 
native  too  passive,  and  would  perhaps  soon  prefer  the 
latter,  as  even  less  injurious  to  the  interests,  and  more 
congenial  with  the  spirit,  of  a  free  people." 

In  support  of  Madison's  views  Erskine  reported 
December  4  J  a  long  conversation  with  Gallatin,  which 
connected  the  action  of  Congress  with  the  action  of 
diplomacy.  Gallatin  and  Robert  Smith,  according 
to  the  British  minister,  had  not  approved  the  em 
bargo  as  a  measure  of  defence,  "  and  had  thought 
that  it  had  been  better  to  have  resorted  to  measures 

1  Erskine  to  Canning,  Dec.  4,  1808;  Cobbett's  Debates,  xvii., 
Appendix  cxxxvii. 


388        HISTORY  OF   THE    UNITED   STATES.       CH  17. 

of  a  more  decided  nature  at  first ;  but  that  now  they 
had  no  other  means  left  but  to  continue  it  for  a  short 
time  longer,  and  then  in  the  event  of  no  change 
taking  place  in  the  conduct  of  the  belligerents  to 
ward  the  United  States,  to  endeavor  to  assert  their 
rights  against  both  Powers."  Gallatin —  acting  as 
Madison's  Secretary  of  State  —  sketched  an  ingen 
ious  and  plausible  project  which  Erskine  was  to 
suggest  for  Canning's  use.  His  leading  idea  was 
simple.  The  total  non-intercourse  with  both  bellig 
erents  —  the  measure  recommended  by  Campbell's 
Report,  and  about  to  become  law  —  must  remove 
two  causes  of  dispute  with  England ;  for  this  non- 
intercourse  superseded  the  President's  "  Chesapeake  " 
proclamation  and  the  Non-importation  Act  of  April, 
1806,  against  British  manufactures.  Henceforward 
England  could  not  complain  of  American  partiality 
to  France,  seeing  that  America  impartially  prohibited 
every  kind  of  intercourse  with  both  countries.  This 
mode  of  conciliation  was  but  a  fair  return  for  Can 
ning's  conciliatory  prohibition  of  American  cotton, 
and  if  carried  one  step  further  must  end  on  both 
sides  in  a  declaration  of  war  in  order  to  prove  their 
wish  for  peace ;  but  Canning  could  hardly  object  to 
his  own  style  of  reasoning.  After  thus  evading  two 
English  grievances,  Gallatin  arrived  at  his  third  point, 
—  that  Congress  meant  to  interdict  the  employment 
of  foreign  seamen  on  American  vessels,  and  thus 
put  an  end  to  all  occasion  for  impressment.  Finally, 
Erskine  represented  Gallatin  as  saying  that  the 


1808.  DIPLOMACY   AND   CONSPIRACY.  389 

United  States  were  ready  to  concede  the  Rule  of 
1756,  and  not  to  claim  in  time  of  war  a  trade  pro 
hibited  in  time  of  peace. 

In  the  ease  of  private  and  friendly  conversation 
the  most  cautious  of  men,  even  more  than  the  most 
reckless,  stood  at  the  mercy  of  reporters.  Gallatin 
was  by  temperament  excessively  cautious,  and  was 
evidently  on  his  guard  in  talking  with  Erskine ;  but 
he  could  not  prevent  Erskine  from  misunderstand 
ing  his  words,  and  still  less  from  misconstruing  his 
reserve.  The  British  minister  afterward  officially 
explained  that  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  had 
offered  no  such  concession  as  was  implied  by  the 
Rule  of  1756  ;  he  proposed  only  to  yield  the  Ameri 
can  claim,  never  yet  seriously  pressed,  to  the  direct 
trade  between  the  colonies  of  France  and  their 
mother  country ; 1  but  although  Erskine's  mistake  on 
this  point  proved  troublesome,  it  was  not  so  embar 
rassing  to  Gallatin  as  the  inference  which  the  British 
minister  drew  from  his  reserve  on  a  point  of  merely 
personal  interest. 

"  I  have  no  doubt,"  continued  Erskine,  "  but  these 
communications  were  made  with  a  sincere  desire  that 
they  might  produce  the  effect  of  conciliation ;  because  it 
is  well  known  that  Mr.  Gallatin  has  long  thought  that 
the  restrictive  and  jealous  system  of  non-import  laws, 
extra  duties,  and  other  modes  of  checking  a  free  trade 
with  Great  Britain  has  been  erroneous  and  highly  in 
jurious  to  the  interests  of  America.  He  informed  me 

1  Erskine  to  Gallatin,  Aug.  15,  1809;  State  Papers,  iii.  307. 


390         HISTORY  OF   THE  UNITED   STATES.      CH.  17. 

distinctly  that  he  had  always  entertained  that  opinion, 
and  that  he  had  uniformly  endeavored  to  persuade  the 
President  to  place  the  conduct  of  Great  Britain  and 
France  in  a  fair  light  before  the  public.  He  seemed  to 
check  himself  at  the  moment  he  was  speaking  upon  that 
subject,  and  I  could  not  get  him  to  express  himself  more 
distinctly ;  but  I  could  clearly  collect  from  his  manner, 
and  from  some  slight  insinuations,  that  he  thought  the 
President  had  acted  with  partiality  toward  France ;  for 
he  turned  the  conversation  immediately  upon  the  charac 
ter  of  Mr.  Madison,  and  said  that  he  could  not  be  ac 
cused  of  having  such  a  bias  toward  France,  and  re 
marked  that  Mr.  Madison  was  known  to  be  an  admirer 
of  the  British  Constitution,  to  be  generally  well  disposed 
toward  the  nation,  and  to  be  entirely  free  from  any 
enmity  to  its  general  prosperity.  He  appealed  to  me 
whether  I  had  not  observed  that  he  frequently  spoke  with 
approbation  of  its  institutions,  its  energy,  and  spirit, 
and  that  he  was  thoroughly  well  versed  in  its  history, 
literature,  and  arts.  These  observations  he  made  at  that 
time  for  the  purpose  of  contrasting  the  sentiments  of  Mr. 
Madison  with  those  of  the  President,  as  he  knew  that  I 
must  have  observed  that  Mr.  Jefferson  never  spoke  with 
approbation  of  anything  that  was  British,  and  always 
took  up  French  topics  in  his  conversation,  and  always 
praised  the  people  and  country  of  France,  and  never 
lost  an  opportunity  of  showing  his  dislike  to  Great 
Britain." 

When  in  course  of  time  this  despatch  was  printed, 
Gallatin  felt  himself  obliged  to  make  a  public  dis 
avowal  of  Erskine's  statements.  That  he  had  at 
first  preferred  measures  more  decided  than  the  em- 


1808.  DIPLOMACY  AND  CONSPIRACY.  391 

bargo  was,  he  said,  a  mistake ;  and  the  inferences 
drawn  in  regard  to  President  Jefferson  were  wholly 
erroneous :  — 

**  Eight  years  of  the  most  intimate  intercourse,  during 
which  not  an  act,  nor  hardly  a  thought,  respecting  the 
foreign  relations  of  America  was  concealed,  enable  me 
confidently  to  say  that  Mr.  Jefferson  never  had  in  that 
respect  any  other  object  in  view  but  the  protection  of 
the  rights  of  the  United  States  against  every  foreign  ag 
gression  or  injury,  from  whatever  nation  it  proceeded, 
and  has  in  every  instance  observed  toward  all  the  bellig 
erents  the  most  strict  justice  and  the  most  scrupulous 
impartiality."  1 

This  denial  was  hardly  necessary.  The  despatches 
themselves  plainly  showed  that  Erskine,  having  set 
his  heart  on  effecting  a  treaty,  used  every  argument 
that  could  have  weight  with  Englishmen,  and  dwelt 
particularly  upon  the  point  —  which  he  well  knew  to 
be  a  dogma  of  British  politics  —  that  President  Jeffer 
son  had  French  sympathies,  whereas  Madison's  sym 
pathies  were  English.  If  Erskine  had  been  a  Tory, 
he  would  have  known  better  than  to  suppose  that 
Perceval's  acts  were  in  any  way  due  to  Jefferson  or 
his  prejudices ;  but  the  British  minister  wished  to 
employ  all  the  arguments  that  could  aid  his  purpose ; 
and  to  do  him  justice,  he  used  without  stint  that 
argument  which  his  British  instincts  told  him  would 
be  most  convincing,  —  the  single  word,  War. 

1  Gallatin  to  the  National  Intelligencer,  April  21,  1810;  Gal- 
latin's  Writings,  i.  475. 


392        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  17. 

"  I  ascertained  from  Mr.  Madison,"  he  wrote  Novem 
ber  26, *  "  that  .  .  .  the  Report  of  the  Committee  seemed 
distinctly  to  announce  that  the  ULTIMATE  and  only  effec 
tual  mode  of  resisting  the  aggressions  of  the  belligerents 
would  be  by  a  war." 

If  Canning  could  be  panic-struck  by  italics  and 
capital  letters,  Erskinc  meant  to  excite  his  worst 
alarms.  Perhaps  Madison  was  a  little  the  accom 
plice  of  these  tactics ;  for  at  the  moment  when  he 
threatened  war  in  language  the  most  menacing,  the 
future  President  was  trembling  lest  Congress  should 
abjectly  submit  to  British  orders.  Erskine's  de 
spatches  early  in  December  echoed  the  official  words 
of  Madison,  Gallatin,  and  Robert  Smith,  but  gave 
little  idea  of  their  difficulties.  The  same  tactics 
marked  his  next  letters.  Jan.  1,  1809,  he  wrote  to 
Canning 2  that  the  bill  which  was  to  carry  into  effect 
the  Resolutions  of  Campbell's  Report  had  been  laid 
before  the  House  :  — 

"  You  will  observe,  sir,  that  the  provisions  of  this  bill 
are  exactly  such  as  this  Government  informed  me  would 
be  adopted,  and  which  I  detailed  to  you  in  my  despatches 
by  the  last  month's  packet.  On  these  measures,  and  a 
strict  enforcement  of  the  embargo,  the  Government  and 
Congress  have  determined  to  rely  for  a  short  time,  in  the 
hope  that  some  events  in  Europe  may  take  place  to 
enable  them  to  extricate  themselves  from  their  present 
highly  embarrassing  situation.  It  is  now  universally 

1  Erskine  to  Canning,  Nov.  26,  1808;  MSS.  British  Archives. 

2  Erskine  to  Canning,  Jan.  1,  1809  (No.  1);   MSS.  British 
Archives. 


1808.  DIPLOMACY   AND  CONSPIRACY.  393 

acknowledged  that  the  Embargo  Act  must  be  raised  by 
next  summer ;  and  nearly  all  the  members  of  the  ruling 
party  declare  that  unless  the  belligerent  Powers  should 
remove  their  restrictions  upon  neutral  commerce  before 
that  time,  it  will  be  incumbent  upon  the  United  States 
to  adopt  measures  of  hostility  toward  such  of  those 
Powers  as  may  continue  their  aggressions." 

War  was  the  incessant  burden  of  Erskine's  reports  ; 
and  he  spared  no  pains  to  convince  his  Government 
that  Madison  had  both  the  power  and  the  will  to 
fight.  The  next  House,  he  reported,  would  contain 
ninety-five  Republicans  to  forty-seven  Federalists : 
"  This  great  majority  (which  may  vary  a  few  votes) 
would  of  course  be  strong  enough  to  carry  any  rneas-' 
ures  they  wished ;  and  all  their  declarations  and 
their  whole  conduct  indicate  a  determination  to  adopt 
the  line  of  conduct  which  I  have  before  pointed  out." 
Only  three  days  earlier  Gallatin  had  privately  written 
to  Nicholson  that  great  confusion  and  perplexity 
reigned  in  Congress,  that  Madison  was  slow  in  tak 
ing  his  ground,  and  that  if  war  were  not  speedily 
determined  submission  would  soon  ensue;  but  Ers- 
kine  reported  little  of  this  pacific  temper,  while  he 
sent  cry  after  cry  of  alarm  to  London.  Toward  the 
end  of  December  Congress  took  up  a  measure  for 
raising  fifty  thousand  troops.  Erskine  asked  the 
Secretary  of  State  for  what  purpose  so  large  a  force 
was  needed ;  and  Madison  replied  that  the  force  was 
no  greater  than  the  state  of  relations  with  foreign 
Powers  required. 


394        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  17. 

"  He  added  (to  my  great  surprise)  that  if  the  United 
States  thought  proper,  they  might  act  as  if  war  had  been 
declared  by  any  or  all  of  them,  and  at  any  rate  by  Great 
Britain  and  France.  When  I  pressed  him  for  a  further 
explanation  of  his  meaning,  he  said  that  such  had  been 
the  conduct  of  both  those  Powers  toward  the  United 
States  that  they  would  be  justified  in  proceeding  to  imme 
diate  hostilities.  From  his  manner  as  well  as  from  his 
conversation,  I  could  perceive  that  he  was  greatly  in 
censed  ;  and  it  appeared  to  me  that  he  wished  that  Great 
Britain  might  take  offence  at  the  conduct  of  the  United 
States  and  commence  hostilities  upon  them,  so  as  to  give 
this  Government  a  strong  ground  of  appeal  to  the  people 
of  this  country  to  support  them  in  a  war,  —  unless  in 
deed  they  could  be  extricated  from  their  difficulties  by 
Great  Britain  giving  way  and  withdrawing  her  Orders 
in  Council."  l 

Following  one  letter  by  another,  in  these  varied 
tones  of  menace,  Erskine  ended  by  sending,  Jan.  3, 
1809,  a  Message  from  the  President-elect  which 
wanted  nothing  except  a  vote  of  Congress  to  make 
it  a  formal  announcement  of  war : 2  — 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that  I  had  an  inter 
view  with  Mr.  Madison  yesterday,  in  which  he  declared 
that  he  had  no  hesitation  in  assuring  me  that  in  the  event 
of  the  belligerent  nations  continuing  their  restrictions 
upon  neutral  commerce,  it  was  intended  by  this  Govern 
ment  to  recommend  to  Congress  to  pass  a  law  to  allow 
merchant- ships  to  arm,  and  also  to  issue  letters  of 

1  Erskine  to  Canning,  Jan.  1,  1809  (No.  2);  MSS.  British 
Archives. 

2  Erskine  to  Canning,  Jan.  3,  1809;  MSS.  British  Archives. 


1808.  DIPLOMACY   AND   CONSPIRACY.  395 

marque  and  reprisal.  The  exact  time  when  this  course 
would  be  adopted,  he  said,  might  depend  upon  circum 
stances  such  as  could  not  precisely  be  described ;  but  he 
said  that  he  was  confident  that  if  it  was  not  taken  be 
fore  the  expiration  of  the  present  Congress,  in  March,  it 
would  be  one  of  the  first  measures  of  the  new  Congress, 
which  will  be  held  early  in  May  next." 

Erskine  added  that  the  Federalists  also  thought 
Great  Britain  wrong  in  refusing  the  American  offers, 
and  that  they  too  declared  war  to  be  necessary  if 
these  offers  should  still  be  rejected.  He  wrote  to  Sir 
James  Craig  to  be  on  guard  against  sudden  attack 
from  the  United  States.  These  measures  taken,  the 
British  minister  at  Washington  waited  the  echo  of  his 
alarm-cries,  and  Madison  left  the  matter  in  his  hands. 
No  instructions  were  sent  to  Pinkney,  no  impulse 
was  given  to  the  press;  and  the  public  obstinately 
refused  to  believe  in  war.  Perhaps  Erskine  received 
some  assurance  that  no  decisive  step  would  be  taken 
before  he  should  have  obtained  from  London  a  reply 
to  his  despatches  of  December ;  but  whether  or  not  he 
had  any  tacit  understanding  with  Madison,  his  ambi 
tion  to  reunite  the  two  countries  and  to  effect  the 
diplomatic  triumph  of  a  treaty  certainly  led  him  to 
exaggerate  the  warlike  ardor  of  America,  and  to  cross 
by  a  virtuous  intrigue  what  he  thought  the  ruinous 
career  of  his  own  Government. 

On  the  other  hand,  General  Turrean  flattered  him 
self  that  the  diplomatic  triumph  would  fall  not  to 
Erskine,  but  to  himself ;  and  the  hope  of  war  upon 


396        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  17. 

England  almost  overcame  for  a  sanguine  moment  his 
contempt  for  American  character  and  courage.  Tur- 
reau  acquiesced  in  the  embargo,  since  such  was  the 
Emperor's  will,  —  but  only  as  a  choice  of  evils ;  for 
he  knew  better  than  Napoleon  how  deep  a  wound 
the  embargo  inflicted  on  Martinique  and  Guadeloupe. 
He  consoled  himself  only  by  the  hope  that  it  injured 
Great  Britain  still  more.  "  I  have  always  considered," 
he  said,1  "  that  the  embargo,  rigorously  executed,  hurt 
us  less  than  it  hurt  England,  because  our  colonial 
interests  are  of  small  account  in  the  balance  against 
the  colonial  interests  of  the  enemy."  In  his  eyes  a 
declaration  of  war  against  France  was  better  suited 
than  the  embargo  to  French  interests,  provided  it 
/  were  joined  with  a  like  declaration  against  England ; 
and  he  prepared  his  Government  in  advance  for 
treating  such  a  war  as  though  it  were  an  alliance. 

"  I  believe  that  France  ought  not  to  take  this  declara 
tion  in  its  literal  sense,  because  its  apparent  object  would 
be  only  nominal,  and  not  in  the  intention  of  the  legisla 
tors.  I  know  that  such  is  now  their  disposition  ;  and 
although  it  is  conceded  that  the  number  of  Federalists 
will  be  greater  in  the  next  Congress  than  in  this,  yet  the 
Administration  will  always  have  a  great  majority  in  the 
House,  and  a  still  greater  in  the  Senate.  I  am  in  such 
close  relations  with  the  greater  number  of  senators  as  not 
to  be  deceived  in  regard  to  their  intentions.  But  in  this 
case,  too,  it  would  be  necessary  that  France  should  not 
answer  the  challenge  of  war,  and  should  wait  until  the 

1  Tiirreau  to  Champagny,  Jan.  15,  1809;  Archives  des  Aff. 
£tr.  MSS. 


1808.  DIPLOMACY  AND   CONSPIRACY.  397 

first  hostilities  had  taken  place  between  England  and 
the  United  States.  Then  I  shall  hope  that  the  declara 
tion  against  France  will  be  immediately  withdrawn.  I 
have  reason  to  believe  that  a  declaration  of  war  against 
France  as  well  as  against  England  will  take  place  only 
with  the  intention  of  reaching  this  last  Power  without  too 
much  shocking  public  opinion,  and  in  order  to  avoid  the 
reproach  of  too  much  partiality  toward  the  first,  Your 
Excellency  can,  from  this,  form  an  idea  of  the  weak 
ness  of  Congress,  and  of  the  disposition  of  the  Amer 
ican  people."1 

This  despatch,  written  in  the  middle  of  January, 
completed  the  diplomatic  mano3uvres  by  which  Madi 
son  hoped  to  unite  his  foreign  with  his  domestic 
policy.  The  scheme  was  ingenious.  Even  if  it 
should  fail  to  wring  concessions  from  Canning,  hos 
tilities  would  result  only  in  a  cheap  warfare  on  the 
ocean,  less  wearisome  than  the  embargo,  —  a  war 
which,  so  far  as  concerned  the  continent  of  Europe, 
would  rather  benefit  than  injure  commerce  ;  but  a 
policy  like  this,  at  once  bold  and  delicate,  required 
the  steady  support  of  a  vigorous  Congress.  Neither 
Erskine  nor  Turreau  told  the  full  strength  of  the 
difficulties  with  which  Madison  and  Gallatin  strug 
gled  within  their  own  party ;  or  that  while  the  new 
Administration  was  laboring  to  build  up  a  new  policy, 
the  Federalists  had  already  laid  their  hands  on  the 
material  that  the  new  policy  needed  for  its  use. 

Whatever  might  be  their  differences  in  other  re- 

1  Turreau  to  Champagny,  Jan.  15,  1809;  Archives  des  Aff. 

Etr.  MSS. 


398         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  17. 

spects,  Jefferson,  Madison,  and  Gallatin  agreed  on 
one  common  point.  They  held  that  until  some  deci 
sion  should  be  reached  in  regard  to  peace  or  war,  the 
embargo  must  be  maintained  and  enforced.  Neither 
the  dignity  nor  the  interests  of  the  country  permitted 
a  sudden  break  with  the  policy  which  had  been  stead 
ily  followed  during  the  eight  years  of  their  power. 
Abandonment  of  embargo  without  war  was  an  act  of 
submission  to  England  and  France  which  would  cer 
tainly  destroy  whatever  national  self-respect  might 
have  survived  the  mortifications  of  the  last  three 
years ;  but  if  the  embargo  was  to  be  maintained,  it 
must  be  enforced,  and  without  new  legislation  strict 
enforcement  was  impossible.  This  new  legislation 
was  demanded  by  Gallatin,  in  a  letter  of  Nov.  24, 
1808,  addressed  to  Senator  Giles  of  the  Senate  com 
mittee.  December  8,  Giles  introduced  a  Bill  confer 
ring  on  Gallatin  the  "  arbitrary  "  and  "  dangerous  " 
powers  he  asked.  The  new  measure  answered  Galla- 
tin's  description.  Henceforward  coasting-vessels  were 
to  give  impossible  bonds,  to  the  amount  of  six  times 
the  value  of  vessel  and  cargo,  before  any  cargo  could 
even  be  put  on  board ;  collectors  might  refuse  per 
mission  to  load,  even  when  such  bonds  were  offered, 
"  whenever  in  their  opinion  there  is  an  intention  to 
violate  the  embargo ; "  in  suits  on  the  bond,  the  de 
fence  was  to  be  denied  the  right  to  plead  capture, 
distress,  or  accident,  except  under  conditions  so  strin 
gent  as  to  be  practically  useless  ;  no  ship-owner  could 
sell  a  vessel  without  giving  bond,  to  the  amount  of 


1808.  DIPLOMACY  AND   CONSPIRACY.  399 

three  hundred  dollars  for  each  ton,  that  such  ship 
should  .not  contravene  any  of  the  Embargo  Acts ; 
and  by  Section  9,  the  whole  country  was  placed  under 
the  arbitrary  will  of  government  officials :  "  The  col 
lectors  of  all  the  districts  of  the  United  States  shall 
.  .  .  take  into  their  custody  specie  or  other  articles 
of  domestic  growth,  produce,  or  manufacture  .  .  . 
when  in  vessels,  carts,  wagons,  sleighs,  or  any  other 
carriage,  or  in  any  manner  apparently  on  their  way 
toward  the  territory  of  a  foreign  nation  or  the 'vicin 
ity  thereof,  or  toward  a  place  whence  such  articles 
are  intended  to  be  exported ; "  and  after  seizure  the 
property  could  be  recovered  by  the  owner  only  on 
giving  bonds  for  its  transfer  to  some  place  "  whence, 
in  the  opinion  of  the  collector,  there  shall  not  be  any 
danger  of  such  articles  being  exported."  The  col 
lectors  not  only  received  authority  to  seize  at  discre 
tion  all  merchandise  anywhere  in  transit,  but  were 
also  declared  to  be  not  liable  at  law  for  their  seizures, 
and  were  to  be  supported  at  need  by  the  army,  navy, 
and  militia. 

In  vain  did  Giles  l  and  the  other  stanch  followers  of 
Jefferson  affirm  that  this  bill  contained  no  new  prin 
ciples  of  legislation ;  that  it  was  but  an  extension  of 
ordinary  customs  laws  ;  and  that  its  provisions  were 
"  necessary  and  proper  "  for  carrying  into  effect  the 
great  constitutional  object, — the  embargo.  Giles  held 
so  many  opinions  in  the  course  of  his  public  life  that 
no  Federalist  cared  to  ask  what  might  be  his  momen- 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  1808-1809,  p.  259. 


400        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  17. 

tary  theory  of  the  Constitution ;  but  whether  as  a 
matter  of  law  he  was  right  or  wrong,  he  could  hardly 
dispute  what  Gallatin  in  private  admitted,  that  the 
powers  conferred  by  his  Enforcement  Act  were  "  most 
arbitrary,"  "  equally  dangerous  and  odious."  The 
Senate  knew  well  the  nature  of  the  work  required 
to  be  done,  but  twenty  senators  voted  for  the  passage 
of  the  bill,  December  21,  while  only  seven  voted  in 
the  negative. 

In  pressing  this  measure  at  a  moment  so  critical, 
Gallatin  may  have  been  bold,  but  was  certainly  not 
discreet.  If  he  meant  to  break  down  the  embargo, 
he  chose  the  best  means  ;  if  he  meant  to  enforce 
it,  he  chose  the  worst.  The  Eastern  congressmen 
made  no  secret  that  they  hoped  to  resist  the  law 
by  force. 

"  This  strong  tone  was  held  by  many  of  the  Eastern 
members  in  a  large  company  where  I  was  present,"  wrote 
the  British  minister  to  Canning  Jan.  1,  1809;  "and  the 
gentlemen  who  so  expressed  themselves  declared  that 
they  had  no  hesitation  in  avowing  such  opinions,  and 
said  that  they  would  maintain  them  in  their  places  in 
Congress." 

They  were  as  good  as  their  word,  and  when  the  bill 
came  before  the  House  arguments  and  threats  were 
closely  intermingled  ;  but  the  majority  listened  to 
neither,  and  January  5,  in  a  night  session,  forced  the 
bill  to  its  passage  by  a  vote  of  seventy-one  to  thirty- 
two.  January  9  the  Enforcement  Act  received  the 
signature  of  President  Jefferson. 


1808  DIPLOMACY  AND  CONSPIRACY.  401 

Senator  Pickering,  of  Massachusetts,  alone  profited 
by  this  audacious  act  of  power ;  and  his  overwhelm 
ing  triumph  became  every  day  more  imminent,  as  the 
conservative  forces  of  New  England  arrayed  them 
selves  under  his  lead.  Since  the  departure  of  Rose, 
in  March,  he  had  basked  in  the  sunshine  of  sue-/ 
cess  and  flattery.  Single-handed  he  had  driven  JohnKx 
Quincy  Adams  from  public  life,  and  had  won  the 
State  of  Massachusetts,  for  the  first  time,  to  the  pu 
principles  of  the  Essex  Junto.  That  he  felt,  in  his 
austere  way,  the  full  delight  of  repaying  to  the  son 
the  debt  which  for  eight  years  he  had  owed  to  the 
father  was  not  to  be  doubted ;  but  a  keener  pleasure 
came  to  him  from  beyond  the  ocean.  If  the  Ameri 
can  of  that  day,  and  especially  the  New  England 
Federalist,  conceived  of  any  applause  as  deciding^7 
the  success  of  his  career,  he  thought  first  of  London 
and  the  society  of  England ;  although  the  imagination 
could  scarcely  invent  a  means  by  which  an  Ameri 
can  could  win  the  favor  of  a  British  public.  This 
impossibility  Pickering  accomplished.  His  name  and 
that  of  John  Randolph  were  as  familiar  in  London 
as  in  Philadelphia  ;  and  Rose  maintained  with  him 
a  correspondence  calculated  to  make  him  think  his 
success  even  greater  than  it  was. 

"  In  Professor  Adams's  downfall,  at  which  I  cannot  but 
be  amused,"  wrote  Rose  from  London,1  "I  see  but  the 
forerunner  of  catastrophes  of  greater  mark.  This  prac- 

1  Rose  to  Pickering,  Aug.  4,  1808;  New  England  Federalism, 
p.  372. 

VOL.  iv.  —  26 


402        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  17. 

tical  answer  of  your  common  constituents  to  his  reply  to 
you  was  the  best  possible.  By  his  retreat  he  admits  his 
conviction  that  you  were  the  fitter  representative  of  the 
State  legislature.  In  the  conversion  of  Massachusetts, 
I  see  the  augury  of  all  that  is  of  good  promise  with  you. 
Let  me  thank  you  cordially  for  your  answer  to  Governor 
.Sullivan.  It  was  an  unintentional  kindness  on  his  part 
v  thus  to  compel  you  to  bring  to  the  public  eye  the  narra 
tive  of  a  life  so  interesting,  so  virtuous,  and  honorable. 
Receive  the  assurance  of  how  anxiously  I  hope  that 
though  gratitude  is  not  the  virtue  of  republics,  the  re 
maining  years  of  that  life  may  receive  from  yours  the 
tribute  of  honor  and  confidence  it  has  so  many  claims  to. 
In  so  wishing,  I  wish  the  prosperity  of  your  country." 

Flattery  like  this  was  rare  in  Pickering's  toilsome 
career  ;  and  man,  almost  in  the  full  degree  of  his  an 
tipathy  to  demagogy,  yearns  for  the  popular  regard 
he  will  not  seek.  Pickering's  ambition  to  be  Presi 
dent  was  as  evident  to  George  Rose  as  it  had  been  to 
John  Adams.  "  Under  the  simple  appearance  of  a 
bald  head  and  straight  hair,"  wrote  the  ex-President,1 
"  and  under  professions  of  profound  republicanism, 
he  conceals  an  ardent  ambition,  envious  of  every  su 
perior,  and  impatient  of  obscurity."  That  Timothy 
Pickering  could  become  President  over  a  Union 
which  embraced  Pennsylvania  and  Virginia  was  an 
idea  so  extravagant  as  to  be  unsuited  even  to  coarsely 
flavored  flattery  ;  but  that  he  should  be  the  chief 
of  a  New  England  Confederation  was  not  an  ex- 
\;  travagant  thought,  and  toward  a  New  England  Con- 
1  Cunningham  Letters,  p.  56. 


1808.  DIPLOMACY  AND  CONSPIRACY.  403 

federation  events  were  tending  fast.  The  idea  of  vX 
combining  the  Eastern  States  against  the  embargo, — 
which  if  carried  out  put  an  end  to  the  Union  under 
the  actual  Constitution, — belonged  peculiarly  to  Pick 
ering  ;  and  since  he  first  suggested  it  in  his  famous 
embargo  letter,  it  had  won  its  way  until  New  England 
was  ripe  for  the  scheme. 

One  by  one,  the  Federalist  leaders  gave  their  adhe 
sion  to  the  plan.  Of  all  these  gentlemen,  the  most 
cautious  —  or,  as  his  associates  thought,  the  most 
timid — was  Harrison  Gray  Otis,  President  of  the 
Massachusetts  Senate.  Never  in  the  full  confidence 
of  the  Essex  Junto,  he  was  always  a  favorite  orator 
in  Boston  town-meeting,  and  a  leader  in  Boston  soci 
ety  ;  but  he  followed  impulses  stronger  than  his  own 
will,  and  when  he  adopted  an  opinion  his  party 
might  feel  secure  of  popular  sympathy.  Dec.  15, 
1808,  Otis  wrote  from  Boston  to  Josiah  Quincy  at 
Washington  a  letter  which  enrolled  him  under  Pick 
ering's  command.1 

"  It  would  be  a  great  misfortune  for  us  to  justify  the 
obloquy  of  wishing  to  promote  a  separation  of  the  States, 
and  of  being  solitary  in  that  pursuit.  .  .  .  On  the  other 
hand,  to  do  nothing  will  seem  to  be  a  flash  in  the  pan, 
and  our  apostate  representatives  will  be  justified  in  the 
opinions  which  they  have  doubtless  inculcated  of  our 
want  of  union  and  of  nerve.  What  then  shall  we  do? 
In  other  words,  what  can  Connecticut  do?  For  we  can 

1  H.  G.  Otis  to  Quincy,  Dec.  15,  1808;  Quincy's  Life  of 
Quincy,  p.  164. 


404        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  17. 

and  will  come  up  to  her  tone.  Is  she  ready  to  declare 
the  embargo  and  its  supplementary  chains  unconstitu 
tional  ;  to  propose  to  their  State  the  appointment  of 
delegates  to  meet  those  from  the  other  commercial  States, 
/  in  convention  at  Hartford  or  elsewhere,  for  the  purpose 
of  providing  some  mode  of  relief  that  may  not  be  incon 
sistent  with  the  Union  of  these  States,  to  which  we  should 
adhere  as  long  as  possible  ?  Shall  New  York  be  invited 
to  join ;  and  what  shall  be  the  proposed  objects  of  such 
a  convention?" 

In  thus  adopting  the  project  of  Timothy  Pickering 
/for  a  New  England  convention,  Otis  was  not  less 
careful  than  Pickering  himself  to  suggest  that  the 
new  Union  should  be  consistent  with  the  old  one. 
American  constitutional  lawyers  never  wholly  suc 
ceeded  in  devising  any  form  of  secession  which  might 
not  coexist  with  some  conceivable  form  of  Union, 
such  as  was  recognized  by  the  Declaration  of  July 
4,  1776 ;  but  no  form  of  secession  ever  yet  devised 
could  coexist  with  the  Union  as  it  was  settled  by  the 
Constitution  of  1789 ;  and  the  project  of  a  New  Eng 
land  convention,  if  carried  out,  dissolved  that  Union 
as  effectually  as  though  it  had  no  other  object.  "  No 
State  shall,  without  the  consent  of  Congress,  .  .  . 
enter  into  an  agreement  or  compact  with  another 
State."  :  Such  was  the  emphatic  interdict  of  the 
Constitution,  and  its  violation  must  either  destroy 
the  Union  or  give  it  new  shape.  Doubtless  the  Union 
had  existed  before  the  Constitution,  and  might  sur- 

1  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  Art.  I.  sect.  10. 


1808.  DIPLOMACY   AND   CONSPIRACY.  405 

vive  it ;  but  a  convention  of  the  New  England  States 
could  not  exist  under  the  Union  of  1789. 

Another  Boston  Federalist,  second  to  none  in 
standing,  who  unlike  Otis  was  implicitly  trusted  by 
the  Essex  Junto,  wrote  a  letter  to  Senator  Pickering, 
dated  five  days  later :  - 

"  Our  Legislature  will  convene  on  January  24,"  began 
Christopher  Gore,1  "-and  what  will  be  proper  for  us  to 
do  under  the  circumstances  of  our  times  is  doubtful.  To 
ascertain  the  most  useful  course  to  be  pursued  on  this 
occasion  fills  our  minds  with  deep  and  anxious  solicitude. 
...  By  conversing  with  our  frieuds  from  the  other  New 
England  States  you  might  be  able  to  know  in  what  mea 
sures  and  to  what  extent  they  would  be  willing  to  co 
operate  with  Massachusetts.  The  opposition,  to  be 
effectual  of  any  change  in  our  rulers,  should  comprehend 
all  New  England.  These  men,  I  fear,  are  too  inflated 
with  their  own  popularity  to  attend  to  any  call  short 
of  this." 

The  action  of  Massachusetts  was  to  be  concerted 
with  Connecticut  ;  and  the  leading  senator  from 
Connecticut  was  Pickering's  very  intimate  friend, 
James  Hillhouse,  whose  amendments  to  the  Constitu 
tion,  proposed  to  the  Senate  in  an  elaborate  speech 
April  12,  1808,  were  supposed  by  his  enemies  to  be 
meant  as  the  framework  for  a  new  confederacy,  since 
they  were  obviously  inconsistent  with  the  actual 
Union.  Hillhouse  and  Pickering  stood  in  the  most 

1  Gore  to  Pickering,  Dec.  20,  1808  ;  New  England  Federalism, 
p.  375. 


406         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  17. 

confidential  relations.  From  their  common  chamber 
in  the  "  Six  Buildings "  they  carried  on  their  joint 
campaign  against  the  embargo ; 1  and  with  this  ad 
vantage,  Pickering  in  due  time  wrote  his  reply  to 
Christopher  Gore  for  the  guidance  of  the  Massachu 
setts  General  Court :  — 

"  New  England  must  be  united  in  whatever  great  mea 
sure  shall  be  adopted.  During  the  approaching  session 
of  our  Legislature  there  may  be  such  further  advances  in 
mischief  as  may  distinctly  point  out  the  course  proper  to 
be  adopted.  •  A  convention  of  delegates  from  those 
States,  including  Vermont,  seems  obviously  proper  and 
necessary.  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut  can  appoint 
their  delegates  with  regular  authority.  In  the  other 
States  they  must  be  appointed  by  county  conventions. 
A  strong  and  solemn  address,  stating  as  concisely  as 
will  consist  with  perspicuity  the  evil  conduct  of  our 
Administration  as  manifested  in  their  measures,  ought  to 
be  prepared  to  be  laid  before  our  Legislature  when  they 
meet,  to  be  sent  forth  by  their  authority,  to  the  people. 
But  the  fast,  which  I  have  repeatedly  heard  mentioned 
here,  I  hope  will  be  postponed  till  the  very  crisis  of  our 
affairs,  if  such  a  crisis  should  be  suffered  to  arise.  To 
proclaim  a  fast  sooner  would,  I  fear,  have  more  the  ap 
pearance  of  management  than  of  religion."  2 

Such  action  was  not  to  be  easily  reconciled  with 
the  spirit  of  the  Constitution,  but  Pickering  attempted 

1  Pickering  to  Billhouse,  Dec.  16,  1814  ;  New  England  Fed- 
eralism,  p.  414. 

2  Pickering  to  C.  Gore,  Jan.  8,  1809;  New  England  Federal 
ism,  p.  376, 


1808.  DIPLOMACY   AND   CONSPIRACY.  407 

to  show  its  accord  ;  and  in  doing  so  he  completed  the 
revolution  which  for  eight  years  had  been  in  progress 
between  the  two  political  parties.  He  placed  himself 
on  the  precise  ground  taken  by  Jefferson  in  the 
Kentucky  Resolutions  of  1798  :  — 

"  Pray  look  into  the  Constitution,  and  particularly  to 
the  tenth  article  of  the  Amendments.  How  are  the 
powers  reserved  to  the  States  respectively,  or  to  the 
people,  to  be  maintained,  but  by  the  respective  States 
judging  for  themselves,  and  putting  their  negative  on 
the  usurpations  of  the  general  government." 

That  the  States  of  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut 
meant  to  take  the  first  step  toward  a  change  in  the 
Federal  compact  was  an  open  secret  at  Washington 
before  the  close  of  the  year.  As  early  as  December 
29  Gallatin  wrote  to  his  friend  Nicholson  a  letter  of 
alarm,1  which  showed  that  the  plan  was  already 
known  by  the  Administration  :  — 

"  I  actually  want  time  to  give  you  more  details,  but  I 
will  only  state  that  it  is  intended  by  the  Essex  Junto  to 
prevail  on  the  Massachusetts  legislature,  who  meet  in  two 
or  three  weeks,  to  call  a  convention  of  the  five  New 
England  States,  to  which  they  will  try  to  add  New  York  ; 
and  that  something  must  be  done  to  anticipate  and  de 
feat  that  nefarious  plan." 

1  Adams's  Gallatin,  p.  384. 


CHAPTER    XVIII. 

AMONG  the  Federalists  were  still  a  few  moderate 
men  who  hoped  that  Jefferson  might  not  be  wholly 
sold  to  France,  and  who  were  inclined  to  ask  for 
some  new  policy  of  peace  or  war  before  throwing 
aside  the  old  one.  Pickering's  contempt  for  such 
allies  echoed  the  old  feuds  of  New  England,  and  re 
vived  the  root-and-branch  politics  of  the  Puritans: 

"  Some  cautious  men  here  of  the  Federal  party  dis 
covered  an  inclination  to  wait  patiently  till  the  first  of 
June  the  promised  repeal  of  the  embargo.  God  forbid 
that  such  timid  counsels  should  reach  the  Massachusetts 
legislature,  or  a  single  member  of  it !  A  million  of  such 
men  would  not  save  the  nation.  Defeat  the  accursed 
measure  now,  and  you  not  only  restore  commerce,  agri 
culture,  and  all  sorts  of  business  to  activity,  but  you 
save  the  country  from  a  British  war.  The  power  of  the 
present  miserable  rulers  —  I  mean  their  power  to  do  ma 
terial  mischief  —  will  then  be  annihilated."  1 

Pickering's  instructions  were  exactly  followed  ;  his 
temper  infused  itself  through  every  New  England 
town.  Once  more,  a  popular  delusion  approaching 

1  Pickering  to  S.  P.  Gardner ;  New  England  Federalism, 
p.  379. 


1808.  GENERAL   FACTIOUSNESS.  409 


frenzy,  — j^a  temporary  insanity  like  the  witchcraft 
and  Quaker  mania,  —  took  possession  of  the  mind  of 
Massachusetts,  and  broke  into  acute  expression. 
Not  for  a  full  century  had  the  old  Puritan  prejudice 
shown  itself  in  a  form  so  unreasoning  and  unreason 
able  ;  but  although  nearly  one  half  the  people  held 
aloof  and  wondered  at  the  madness  of  their  own 
society,  the  whole  history  of  Massachusetts,  a  succes 
sion  of  half-forgotten  disputes  and  rebellions,  seemed 
to  concentrate  itself  for  the  last  time  in  a  burst 
of  expiring  passions,  mingled  with  hatred  of  Vir-  \s 
ginia  and  loathing  for  Jefferson,  until  the  rest  of 
America,  perplexed  at  paroxysms  so  eccentric,  won 
dered  whether  the  spirit  of  Massachusetts  liberty 
could  ever  have  been  sane.  For  the  moment  Timothy 
Pickering  was  its  genius. 

The  decision  reached  by  the  Federalists  at  Wash 
ington,  on  or  about  December  21,  when  the  Enforce 
ment  Bill  passed  the  Senate,  was  quickly  known  in 
Massachusetts,  and  without  further  delay  the  crisis 
was  begun.  Hitherto  the  tone  of  remonstrance  had 
been  respectful ;  under  cover  of  the  Enforcement  Act 
it  rapidly  became  revolutionary.  Dec.  27,  1808,  a 
town-meeting  at  Bath,  in  the  district  of  Maine,  set  / 
the  movement  on  foot  by  adopting  Resolutions l  which 
called  on  the  general  court,  at  its  meeting  January 
25,  to  take  "  immediate  steps  for  relieving  the  people, 
either  by  themselves  alone,  or  in  concert  with  other 
commercial  States ; "  while  at  the  same  time  the 

1  New  England  Palladium,  Jan.  3,  1809. 


410         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  18. 

town  voted  "  that  a  committee  of  safety  and  corres 
pondence  be  appointed,  to  correspond  with  com 
mittees  of  other  towns,  .  .  .  and  to  watch  over  the 
safety  of  the  people  of  this  town,  and  to  give  imme 
diate  alarm  so  that  a  regular  meeting  may  be  called 
whenever  any  infringement  of  their  rights  shall  be 
committed  by  any  person  or  persons  under  color  and 
pretence  of  authority  derived  from  any  officer  of  the 
United  States."  This  extravagant  measure,  evidently 
intended  to  recall  the  memory  of  1776,  was  quickly 
imitated  by  the  town  of  Gloucester,  which,  January 
12,1  formally  approved  the  Resolutions  passed  at 
Bath,  voted  an  address  to  the  general  court,  and 
appointed  a  committee  of  public  safety.  These  first 
steps  went  so  far  that  other  towns  could  not  easily 
k^p  pace  with  them,  and  were  obliged  to  fall  behind. 
The  scheme  of  appointing  everywhere  town-com 
mittees  of  public  safety  to  organize  combined  resis 
tance  to  the  national  government,  was  laid  aside,  or 
fell  to  the  ground ;  but  the  town-meetings  went  on. 
In  the  county  of  Hampshire,  a  public  meeting  of 
citizens,  January  12,2  announced  "  that  causes  are 
continually  occurring  which  tend  to  produce  a  most 
calamitous  event,  —  a  dissolution  of  the  Union  ;  " 
and  January  20,  a  meeting  at  Newburyport,  in  Sena 
tor  Pickering's  County  of  Essex,  voted  — 

"  That  we  will  not  aid  or  assist  in  the  execution  of  the 
several  embargo  laws,  especially  the  last,  and  that  we 

1  New  England  Palladium,  Jan.  17,  1809. 

2  New  England  Palladium,  Jan.  20,  1809. 


1809.  GENERAL   FACTIOUSNESS.  411 

consider  all  those  who  do  as  violators  of  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States  and  of  this  Commonwealth ;  and 
that  they  be  considered  as  unworthy  of  the  confidence 
and  esteem  of  their  fellow-citizens." 

On  the  eve  of  the  day  fixed  for  the  General  Court 
to  assemble,  in  the  midst  of  town-meetings  far  and 
near,  Boston  called  a  meeting  at  Faneuil  Hall.  The 
town  had  grown  to  a  population  of  more  than  thirty 
thousand,  but  old  citizens  could  remember  the  Stamp 
Act  and  the  Boston  Port  Bill ;  they  had  seen  Samuel 
Adams  and  John  Hancock  defy,  in  Faneuil  Hall,  the 
power  of  Parliament ;  and  the  same  town-meeting 
which  had  stood  firm  against  King  George,  even  to 
the  point  of  armed  rebellion,  still  existed  unchanged, 
ready  to  resist  the  tyranny  of  a  Virginia  President. 
January  23  four  thousand  citizens  swarmed  to  the 
hall  famous  for  its  Revolutionary  associations;  and 
in  the  minds  of  all,  either  as  a  hope  or  a  terror, 
revolution  was  the  absorbing  thought. 

Socially,  nothing  could  be  more  respectable  than 
the  assembly.  The  names  of  the  committee  appointed 
to  draft  a  petition  to  the  general  court  included  the 
best  people  of  Boston.  The  list  began  with  Thomas 
Handasyd  Perkins,  and  included  Samuel  Dexter, 
John  Warren,  William  Sullivan,  Jonathan  Mason,  and 
Theodore  Lyman,  —  members  of  a  city  aristocracy 
which  still  existed  in  vigor  as  robust  as  in  the  days 
when  aristocracy  was  sustained  by  English  example 
and  patronage.  Chief-Justice  Parsons,  who  freely 
expressed  his  opinion  that  the  embargo  was  unconsti- 


. 


412         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  18. 

tutional,  had  no  part  in  the  proceedings ;  but  on  his 
privately  given  advice  the  meeting  was  to  take  its 
stand.  The  Essex  Junto,  willing  to  escape  its  own 
unpopularity,  surrendered  the  apparent  lead  to  a  man 
who  shared  in  few  of  the  extreme  opinions  of  Picker 
ing,  Parsons,  and  George  Cabot,  —  a  man  who  stood 
second  to  no  Federalist  in  ability,  but  who  had  never 
sympathized  with  Alexander  Hamilton's  feuds,  or 
with  factious  hostility  either  to  Federalist  or  to  Re 
publican  Presidents.  Samuel  Dexter,  Secretary  of 
War  in  1800,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  in  1801,  a 
lawyer  of  the  highest  standing,  had  been  employed 
to  argue  against  the  constitutionality  of  the  Embargo 
Act  before  Judge  Davis  in  September,  and  although 
he  lost  his  cause,  he  stoutly  maintained  the  soundness 
of  his  argument.  In  truth,  the  question  was  still 
open ;  and  since  the  trial  at  Salem,  the  Enforcement 
Act  had  greatly  strengthened  constitutional  objec 
tions  already  strong.  Dexter  believed  that  his  duty 
required  him  to  join  in  protesting  against  such  legis 
lation,  and  accordingly  he  took  an  active  part  in 
drafting  and  defending  the  Resolutions  and  memorial 
reported  by  his  committee,  which  appealed  to  the 
general  court  "  for  their  interposition  to  save  the 
people  of  this  Commonwealth  from  the  destructive 
consequences  which  they  apprehend  to  their  liberties 
and  property  from  the  continuance  of  the  present 
system." 

No  measure  reported  by  Samuel  Dexter  was  likely 
to  satisfy  the  hot  temper  of  a  town-meeting.     The 


1809.  GENERAL   FACTIOUSNESS.  413 

regular  Resolutions  were  duly  adopted,  with  little 
vigorous  opposition,  and  the  meeting  adjourned  till 
the  next  day  ;  but  when  the  citizens  re-assembled, 
January  24,  they  passed  another  resolve,  offered  by 
Daniel  Sargent,  which  startled  the  law-abiding  public 
of  Massachusetts  by  formally  declaring  that  "  we  will 
not  voluntarily  aid  or  assist  in  the  execution  "  of  the 
Enforcement  Act ;  and  that  "  all  those  who  shall  so 
assist  in  enforcing  upon  others  the  arbitrary  and  un 
constitutional  provisions  of  this  Act,  ought  to  be 
considered  as  enemies  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  and  of  this  State,  and  hostile  to  the 
liberties  of  this  people." 

Alarming  as  was  the  tone  of  Boston,  Samuel 
Dexter  and  his  associates  avoided  taking  open  partv 
with  the  British  government  against  their  own.  Else 
where  no  such  reticence  was  shown.  Not  only  in 
private,  in  all  places,  at  every  table,  did  the  bitterness 
of  New  England  temper  and  the  intensity  of  local 
prejudice  allow  themselves  the  freest  expression,  but 
the  numerous  town-meetings  also  showed  a  spirit  •* 
rather  British  than  American.  Among  many  ex 
amples  a  few  are  worth  recalling,  to  show  the 
absence  of  national  feeling,  and  the  difficulties  and 
dangers  which  stood  in  the  nation's  way. 

January  24  the  town  of  Beverly,  in  Essex  County,  \/ 
voted  l  that  — 

"  They  have  witnessed  with  regret  too  strong  a  pro 
pensity  to  palliate  and  overlook  the  unjust  aggressions  of 

1  New  England  Palladium,  Jan.  31,  1809. 


414        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  18. 

one  foreign  nation,  and  to  exaggerate  and  misrepresent 
the  conduct  of  another ;  that  the  measures  pursued  are 
calculated  and  designed  to  force  us  into  a  war  with 
Great  Britain,  —  a  war  which  would  be  extremely  detri 
mental  to  our  agriculture,  fatal  to  our  commerce,  and 
which  would  probably  deprive  us  forever  of  the  Bank 
fishery,  —  and  to  unite  us  in  alliance  with  France,  whose 
embrace  is  death." 

/      January  26  the  town  of  Plymouth  voted l  — 

"  That  by  the  partial  and  insidious  management  of 
our  external  relations,  by  a  servile  compliance  with  the 
views  of  one  belligerent  whose  restless  ambition  is  grasp 
ing  at  the  subjugation  of  the  civilized  world,  and  by  the 
unnecessary  provocations  offered  to  another,  magnani 
mously  contending  for  its  own  existence  and  the  emanci 
pation  of  the  oppressed,  our  national  peace  is  endangered, 
and  our  national  dignity  and  good  faith  sacrificed  on  the 
altar  of  duplicity." 

%  /      January  23  the  town  of  Wells,  in  the   district  of 
Maine,  voted2  — 

u  That  we  deprecate  that  cringing  sycophancy  which 
has  marked  the  conduct  of  our  national  government 
toward  the  tyrant  of  Europe,  while  we  view  with  indig 
nation  and  alarm  its  hostility  toward  Great  Britain." 

v       On  the  same  day  Gloucester  spoke  in  language  still 
more  insulting  to  the  national  government : 3  — 

"  We  see  not  only  the  purse-strings  of  our  nation  in 
the  hands  of  a  Frenchified  Genevan,  but  all  our  naval 

1  New  England  Palladium,  Jan.  31,  1809. 

2  New  England  Palladium,  Feb.  3,  1809. 

8  New  England  Palladium,  Feb.  24,  1809. 


1809.  GENERAL  FACTIOUSNESS.  415 

forces  and  all  our  militia  placed  under  the  control  of  this 
same  foreigner,  whom  we  cannot  but  think  a  satellite  of 
Bonaparte.  ...  In  our  opinion  the  national  Cabinet 
has  given  to  this  country  and  the  world  the  most  indubi 
table  evidence  of  their  insincerity  ;  that  their  great  study 
has  been  to  involve  this  country  in  a  war  with  Great 
Britain,  and  of  course  to  form  a  coalition  with  France, 
regardless  of  consequences.  Their  pledges  to  France  of 
their  willingness  to  submit  to  the  wishes  or  mandates  of 
the  Corsican  have  been  satisfactory.  .  .  .  We  should 
deprecate  a  separation  of  the  States,  and  would  resort  to 
every  honorable  means  of  redress  before  we  wrould  seek 
relief  in  a  dissolution  of  the  Union.  .  .  .  Our  Adminis 
tration  can  dissemble  their  real  motives  no  longer ;  our 
dreadful  forebodings  prove  realities ;  the  expected  blow 
has  reached  us,  and  by  it  has  fled  our  liberty." 

In  quaint  and  pathetic  phrases,  the  little  town  of 
Alfred,  in  Maine,  sent  to  the  general  court  a  peti 
tion1  which  charged  the  national  government  with 
endeavoring  "  to  provoke  a  ruinous  and  destructive 
war  with  England,  to  gratify  the  ambition  and  ca 
price,  and  augment  the  power,  of  the  tyrant  of 
France." 

"  We  are  the  poor  inhabitants  of  a  small  town,"  con 
tinued  the  Alfred  petition,  "  rendered  poorer  by  the  way 
ward,  inconsistent  policy  of  the  general  government ; 
but  life  and  liberty  are  as  dear  to  us  as  to  our  opulent 
brethren  of  the  South,  and  we  flatter  ourselves  that  we 
have  as  much  love  of  liberty  and  abhorrence  of  slavery 
as  those  who  oppress  us  in  the  name  of  Republicanism. 

1  New  England  Palladium,  Feb.  17,  1809. 


416        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  18. 

We  love  liberty  in  principle  but  better  in  practice.  We 
cling  to  a  union  of  the  States  as  the  rock  of  our  salva 
tion  ;  and  nothing  but  a  fearful  looking  for  of  despotism 
would  induce  us  to  wish  for  a  severance  of  the  band  that 
unites  us.  But  oppression  did  sever  us  from  the  British 
empire ;  and  what  a  long  and  continued  repetition  of 
similar  acts  of  the  government  of  the  United  States 
\  j  would  effect,  God  only  knows  !  " 

f\  These  extracts  showed  the  temper  in  which  the 
Massachusetts  legislature  met.  The  Federalist  lead 
ers  had  more  difficulty  to  restrain  than  to  excite  the 
people,  and  felt  themselves  strong  enough  to  assume 
the  air  of  cautious  and  conservative  men.  After  an 
exchange  of  opinions  between  the  Legislature  and 
Levi  Lincoln,  who  had  become  governor  on  the  death 
of  Sullivan  shortly  before,  both  Houses  turned  their 
attention  to  national  affairs.  The  numerous  petitions 
on  the  subject  of  the  embargo  were  referred  to  com 
mittees.  Without  loss  of  time  the  Senate  commit 
tee,  February  1,  made  a  Report  recommending  an 
Act  to  secure  the  people  of  the  State  from  u  unrea 
sonable,  arbitrary,  and  unconstitutional  searches  in 
their  dwelling-houses  ; "  to  which  was  added  a  series 
of  four  Resolutions,  closing  with  a  formal  adoption  of 
the  step  so  long  desired  by  Senator  Pickering. 

V  "  Resolved,  That  the  Legislature  of  this  Commonwealth 
will  zealously  co-operate  with  any  of  the  other  States  in 
all  legal  and  constitutional  measures  for  procuring  such 
amendments  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  as 
shall  be  judged  necessary  to  obtain  protection  and  de- 


1809.  GENERAL   FACTIOUSNESS.  417 

fence  for  commerce,  and  to  give  to  the  commercial  States 
their  fair  and  just  consideration  in  the  government  of  the 
Union  ;  and  for  affording  permanent  security,  as  well  as 
present  relief,  from  the  oppressive  measures  under  which 
they  now  suffer. 

"  Resolved,  That  the  Honorable  the  President  of  the 
Senate,  and  the  Honorable  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,  be  requested  to  transmit  a  copy  of  this 
Report,  and  the  Resolutions  thereon,  to  the  legislatures 
of  such  of  our  sister  States  as  manifest  a  disposition  to 
concur  with  us  in  measures  to  rescue  our  common  coun 
try  from  impending  ruin,  and  to  preserve  inviolate  the 
union  of  the  States." 

These  Resolutions  proclaimed  that  a  union  of  the 
Eastern  States  against  the  national  government  was 
the  earnest  wish  of  Massachusetts ;  and  the  advance  f 
thus  made  was  instantly  met  by  Connecticut,  where 
Jonathan  Trumbull,  a  Federalist  of  pure  stock,  who 
had  for  ten  years  filled  the  chair  of  governor,  called 
a  special  meeting  of  the  Legislature  in  pursuance  of 
the  arrangement  concerted  at  Washington.  The 
temper  of  Governor  Trumbull  could  be  judged  from  a 
letter  written  by  him,  February  4,  to  Secretary  Dear 
born,  who  had  requested  him  to  select  militia  officers 
on  whom  the  collectors  might  call  for  military  aid  in 
enforcing  the  embargo. 

"  Conceiving  as  I  do,"  replied  Governor  Trumbull, 
"  and  believing  it  to  be  the  opinion  of  the  great  mass  of 
citizens  of  this  State,  that  the  late  law  of  Congress  for  a 
more  rigorous  enforcement  of  the  embargo  is  unconstitu 
tional  in  many  of  its  provisions,  interfering  with  the 
VOL.  iv.  —  27 


418        HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  18. 

,  State  sovereignties,  and  subversive  of  the  rights,  privi- 
v  leges,  and  immunities  of  the  citizens  of  the"  United 
States,  .  .  .  my  mind  has  been  led  to  a  serious  and 
decided  determination  to  decline  a  compliance  with  your 
request,  and  to  have  no  agency  in  the  appointments 
which  the  President  has  been  pleased  to  refer  to  me." 

In  calling  together  the  legislature  of  Connecticut, 
Governor  Trumbull's  concert  with  Massachusetts  was 
evident,  and  his  object  of  resisting  the  embargo  was 
avowed.  So  bluntly  did  the  Federalists  proclaim 
their  purpose,  that  when  the  Connecticut  legislature 
met,  February  23,  the  governor  in  his  opening  speech 
explained  his  action  as  though  it  were  a  matter  of 
J  course  that  he  should  call  upon  the  State  to  nullify 
an  Act  of  Congress. 

"  Whenever  our  national  legislature,"  he  said,  "  is  led 
to  overleap  the  prescribed  bounds  of  their  constitutional 
powers,  on  the  State  legislatures  in  great  emergencies 
devolves  the  arduous  task,  —  it  is  their  right,  it  becomes 
their  duty,  —  to  interpose  their  protecting  shield  between 
the  rights  and  liberties  of  the  people  and  the  assumed 
power  of  the  general  government." 

If  Madison  was  not  by  that  time  weary  of  his  own 
words,  —  if  the  Resolutions  of  1798  and  the  fatal 
"  interpose "  of  Virginia  had  not  become  hateful  to 
his  ears,  —  he  might  have  found  some  amusement 
in  the  irony  with  which  Trumbull  flung  the  familiar 
phrases  of  Virginia  back  into  her  face ;  but  serious 
as  such  conduct  was,  the  mere  defiance  carried  less 
alarm  than  was  warranted  by  the  signs  of  secret 


1809.  GENERAL  FACTIOUSNESS.  419 

concert  with  England  which  the  Federalists  willingly 
betrayed.  Trumbull  and  Hillhouse,  Pickering  and 
Otis,  were  not  necessarily  masters  of  the  situation, 
even  when  at  the  head  of  all  New  England ;  but 
when  they  pointed  significantly  at  the  fleets  and 
armies  of  Great  Britain  behind  them,  they  carried 
terror  to  the  heart  of  the  Union.  So  little  did  they 
hide  their  attitude  toward  the  British  government 
that  their  organ,  the  "  New  England  Palladium," 
published,  January  6,  Canning's  personal  letter  of 
Sept.  23,  1808,  to  Pinkney,  which  Madison  had  sup 
pressed.  How  it  had  been  obtained,  no  one  knew. 
The  British  Foreign  Office  seemed  to  stand  in  di 
rect  communication  with  Boston,  while  the  Boston 
Federalists  exulted  in  a  chance  to  swell  what  they 
thought  the  triumph  of  George  Canning  over  their 
own  Federalist  friend,  William  Pinkney. 

Tactics  like  these,  unscrupulous  though  they  might 
be,  were  effective.  Jefferson  and  Madison  had  the 
best  reason  to  know  the  force  of  such  factiousness.  ' 
for  only  ten  years  before,  on  less  provocation,  they  I 
had  themselves  led  in  Virginia  and  Kentucky  a  move 
ment  with  a  similar  purpose ;  but  although  their 
history  as  leaders  of  an  opposition  implied  agreement 
in  principle  with  the  doings  of  Massachusetts  and 
Connecticut,  their  dignity  and  interest  as  Presidents 
of  the  United  States  required  them  to  carry  out  the 
laws  they  had  advised  and  approved.  Whatever 
might  be  the  personal  wishes  of  a  few  men  like  Pick 
ering,  the  great  mass  of  Federalists  wished  at  heart 


420        HISTOKY  OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  18. 

,  no  more  harm  to  the  country  than  to  overthrow  and 
humiliate  Jefferson,  and  to  cripple  Madison  from  the 
start ;  while  the  Administration,  on  its  side,  in  strug 
gling  to  escape  a  personal  humiliation,  was  obliged  to 
adopt  any  course  that  offered  the  best  hope  of  success 
even  though  it  should  sacrifice  the  national  character 

^  As  the  last  weeks  of  President  Jefferson's  Adminis 
tration  approached,  this  personal  conflict  —  the  bitter 
ness  of  sixteen  years -— concentrated  its  virulence 

/  upon  a  single  point,  but  that  point  vital  to  Jefferson's 
fame  and  popularity,  —  the  embargo. 

Rarely  in  American  history  has  been  seen  a  struggle 
more  furious  or  less  ennobling  than  that  which  took 
place  at  Washington  in  the  months  of  January  and 
February,  1809.  With  a  bold  face,  but  with  small 
confidence,  Madison  and  Gallatin  pressed  their  meas 
ures.  After  passing  the  Enforcement  Act  on  the 
morning  of  January  6,  Congress  turned  at  once  to 
a  matter  even  more  serious.  January  7  a  Resolution 
was  offered  in  the  House  providing  for  an  early 
meeting  of  the  next  Congress,  and  in  the  short  de 
bate  that  followed,  a  distinct  line  began  for  the  first 
time  to  divide  the  advocates  of  war  from  the  partisans 
of  peace.  The  extra  session  was  avowedly  to  be 
called  for  the  purpose  of  declaring  war.  Simultane 
ously  a  bill  was  introduced  to  raise,  arm,  and  equip 
fifty  thousand  volunteers  to  serve  for  the  term  of 
two  years ;  while  the  Senate  sent  down  another 
bill  ordering  all  the  frigates  and  gunboats  to  be 
u  fitted  out,  officered,  manned,  and  employed  as  soon 


1809.  GENERAL  FACTIOUSNESS. 

as  may  be."  The  fourth  Monday  in  May  was  the 
date  proposed  for  the  extra  session,  and  Congress 
at  last  found  itself  face  to  face  with  the  naked 
issue  of  war. 

The  effect  of  the  crisis  upon  Congress  was  imme 
diate.  Doubt,  defiance,  dismay,  and  disgust  took 
possession  of  the  Legislature,  which  swayed  backward 
and  forward  from  day  to  day,  as  courage  or  fear  pre 
vailed.  The  old  Republicans,  who  could  not  yield 
their  faith  in  the  embargo,  begged  almost  piteously 
for  delay. 

"  A  large  portion  of  the  people,  the  South  almost 
unanimously,"  urged  David  R.  Williams  of  South  Caro 
lina,  "  have  expressed  a  wish  that  the  Government  should 
adhere  to  the  embargo  till  it  produces  an  effect,  or  the 
capacity  to  produce  the  effect  be  disproved.  You  are 
like  to  be  driven  out  of  the  embargo  by  war?  Why,  sir, 
look  at  the  sensation  in  New  England  and  New  York, 
and  talk  about  going  to  war  when  you  cannot  maintain 
an  embargo !  ...  If  you  do  not  adopt  war  before  the 
fourth  Monday  in  May,  will  the  nation  be  ruined  if  you 
postpone  it  still  further?"1 

Macon  declared  that  the  embargo  was  still  the 
people's  choice :  — 

"  As  to  the  people  being  tired  of  the  embargo,  when 
ever  they  want  war  in  preference  to  it  they  will  send 
their  petitions  here  to  that  effect.  .  .  .  Let  each  man  put 
the  question  to  his  neighbor  whether  he  will  have  war  or 
embargo,  and  there  is  no  doubt  but  he  will  answer  in 
favor  of  the  latter." 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  1808-1809,  p.  1100. 


422        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  18. 

Such  reasoning,  honest  and  true  as  it  was  in  the 
mouths  of  men  like  Macon  and  Williams,  gave  a  tone 
of  weakness  and  irresolution  to  the  debate,  while  it 
acted  on  the  Federalists  with  the  force  of  defiance, 
and  drew  from  Josiah  Quincy  "a  speech  which  long 
remained  famous,  and  which  no  Republican  ever  for 
got  or  forgave. 

That  this  strong,  self-asserting  Boston  gentleman, 

y  gifted,  ambitious,  the  embodiment  of  Massachusetts 
traditions  and  British  prejudices,  should  feel  deep 
contempt  for  the  moral  courage  and  the  understanding 
of  men  whose  motives  were  beyond  the  range  of  his 
sympathies  and  experience,  was  natural ;  for  Josiah 
Quincy  belonged  to  a  class  of  Americans  who  cared 

/    so  intensely  for  their  own  convictions  that  they  could 
.not  care  for  a  nation  which  did  not  represent  them ; 

\/and  in  his  eyes  Jefferson  was  a  transparent  fraud,  his 
followers  were  dupes  or  ruffians,  and  the  nation  was 
hastening  to  a  fatal  crisis.  Yet  with  all  this  to  excuse 
him,  his  language  still  passed  the  bounds  of  license. 
He  began  by  reaffirming  that  deception  had  been 
practised  on  the  House  when  the  President  induced 
it  to  adopt  the  embargo  without  alluding  to  its  co 
ercive  purpose :  — 

"  I  do  not  think  I  state  my  position  too  strongly  when 
I  say  that  not  a  man  in  this  House  deemed  the  embargo 
intended  chiefly  as  a  measure  of  coercion  on  Great  Bri 
tain  ;  that  it  was  to  be  made  permanent  at  all  hazards 
until  it  had  effected  that  object,  and  that  nothing  else 
effectual  was  to  be  done  for  the  support  of  our  mari- 


1809.  GENERAL   FACTIOUSNESS.  423 

time  rights.  If  any  individual  was  influenced  by  such 
motives,  certainly  they  were  not  those  of  a  majority  of 
this  House.  Now,  sir,  on  my  conscience,  I  do  believe 
that  these  were  the  motives  and  intentions  of  the  Admin 
istration  when  they  recommended  the  embargo  to  the 
adoption  of  this  House." 

So  far  as  concerned  President  Jefferson  this  charge 
was  true ;  but  every  one  knew  that  Jefferson  habitu 
ally  threw  responsibility  on  Congress,  and  after  the 
scandal  made  by  John  Randolph  in  the  Spanish 
affair  of  1805,  the  House  alone  was  to  blame  if  it  in 
curred  consequences  which  were  evident  on  the  face 
of  its  measures.  Quincy  next  asserted  a  worse  and 
more  mischievous  charge  :  — 

"Not  only  that  embargo  was  resorted  to  as  a  means 
of  coercion,  but  from  the  first  it  was  never  intended  by 
the  Administration  to  do  anything  else  effectual  for  the 
support  of  our  maritime  rights.  Sir,  I  am  sick —  sick  to 
loathing  —  of  this  eternal  clamor  of  '  war,  war,  war ! ' 
which  has  been  kept  up  almost  incessantly  on  this  floor, 
now  for  more  than  two  years.  Sir,  if  I  can  help  it,  the 
old  women  of  this  country  shall  not  be  frightened  in  this 
way  any  longer.  I  have  been  a  long  time  a  close  ob 
server  of  what  has  been  done  and  said  by  the  majority 
of  this  House,  and  for  one  I  am  satisfied  that  no  in 
sult,  however  gross,  offered  to  us  by  either  France  or 
Great  Britain,  could  force  this  majority  into  the  decla 
ration  of  war.  To  use  a  strong  but  common  expres 
sion,  it  could  not  be  kicked  into  such  a  declaration  by 
either  nation."1 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  1808-1809,  p.  1112. 


424         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  18. 

Insults  are  pointless  unless  they  have  a  foundation 
of  truth  or  probability.  The  Parliament  of'  Great 
Britain  would  have  laughed  at  such  a  taunt;  Napo 
leon  would  not  have  understood  what  it  meant;  but 
Congress  drew  a  deep  breath  of  dismay,  for  every 
member  knew  that  openly  and  secretly,  in  public 
and  in  private,  the  single  decisive  argument  against 
war  had  been  and  still  was  —  fear.  After  four  years 
of  outrage  such  as  would  have  made  the  blood  of  an 
Englishman  or  a  Frenchman  turn  to  fire  in  his  veins, 
not  an  American  could  be  found,  between  Canada 
and  Texas,  who  avowed  the  wish  to  fight.  Quincy's 
speech  produced  a  momentary  outbreak  of  passion ; 
hot  retorts  were  made ;  the  chamber  rang  with  epi 
thets  of  abuse ;  but  still  no  one  professed  to  want 
war.  The  House  twisted  and  turned  like  a  martyr 
on  his  bed  of  steel,  but  its  torture  was  of  painful 
doubt,  not  of  passion. 

So  far  as  mere  words  affected  the  public  mind, 
Josiah  Quincy's  taunt,  not  less  than  the  sarcasms 
of  Canning  and  the  arrogance  of  Napoleon,  stung 
Americans  beyond  endurance.  In  one  sense  Quincy 
did  good  service  to  his  country ;  his  statesmanship, 
if  not  refined,  was  effective? ;  his  argument,  if  some 
what  brutal,  was  strong ;  and  within  four-and-twenty 
hours  the  House  met  it  in  the  only  way  that  could 
preserve  the  dignity  of  Congress  and  the  Adminis 
tration,  by  passing  the  bill  for  an  extra  session  with 
eighty  votes  against  twenty-six.  This  result  was 
reached  January  20,  and  seemed  to  prove  that  the 


1809.  GENERAL   FACTIOUSNESS.  425 

Government  had  overcome  its  difficulties  and  mas 
tered  the  situation ;  but  nothing  was  further  from 
the  truth.  Quincy  knew  what  was  passing  behind 
the  scenes.  The  Administration,  so  far  from  gaining 
strength,  barely  showed  steadiness.  At  the  moment 
when  New  England  flung  herself,  with  every  sign  of 
desperate  rage,  across  the  path  of  Government,  fac 
tion  within  the  Republican  party  struck  Madison  a 
severe  blow  before  he  had  time  for  defence. 

The  first  sign  of  Republican  revolt  appeared  in 
unexpected  favors  lavished  on  the  maltreated  navy. 
Sixteen  Republican  senators  combined  with  the  Fed 
eralists  to  pass  through  the  Senate  a  bill  which  or 
dered  every  armed  vessel  of  the  government,  including 
gunboats,  to  be  employed  at  once  in  active  service. 
Gallatin  saw  in  this  measure  only  an  intrigue  of 
the  Smiths  and  an  attack  upon  the  Treasury  which 
would  cost  six  million  dollars  without  possible  ad 
vantage  to  the  public;  but  in  fact  the  bill  proved 
something  more  than  an  intrigue,  for  it  showed  the 
violence  of  New  England  reaction  against  the  long 
starvation  of  the  navy.  Futile  as  was  the  scheme 
of  manning  gunboats  in  order  to  waste  money  which 
should  have  been  spent  on  construction  or  magazines, 
New  England  was  ready  to  join  the  Smiths  or  any 
other  faction  in  any  vote,  however  unreasonable, 
which  promised  employment  for  the  seamen.  Jef 
ferson's  system  had  shown  its  character  most  clearly 
in  distrust  and  discouragement  of  the  navy;  and  no 
one  could  wonder  if  the  first  sign  of  waning  in  his 


426         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  18. 

authority  appeared  in  that  department,  or  if  Madison's 
first  difficulties  occurred  in  the  weakest  part  of  the 
old  statesmanship. 

Gallatin  was  taken  by  surprise,  for  the  bill  passed 
the  Senate  without  serious  opposition ;  but  when  it 
reached  the  House,  January  10,  the  Treasury,  through 
George  W.  Campbell,  tried  to  strike  out  the  clause 
which  obliged  the  government  to  fit  out  and  man 
all  the  vessels  in  the  service  without  regard  to  the 
purpose  of  their  employment.  A  number  of  Repub 
lican  members,  largely  from  New  England,  combining 
with  the  Federalists,  defeated  Campbell  by  a  close 
vote  of  sixty-four  to  fifty-nine.  In  alarm  at  a  meas 
ure  which,  before  war  was  decided,  threatened  to 
take  from  the  Treasury  and  throw  into  the  ocean 
all  the  money  reserved  to  support  the  first  year  of 
hostilities,  Gallatin  exerted  himself  to  stop  it.  Jan 
uary  11,  David  R.  Williams  and  the  old  Republicans 
came  to  his  rescue  with  a  motion  to  recommit,  but 
they  were  again  beaten  by  fifty-nine  to  fifty-eight. 
The  next  day  John  Montgomery  of  Maryland 
changed  sides.  By  a  vote  of  sixty-nine  to  fifty- 
three  the  bill  was  recommitted ;  January  13  the 
House  in  committee  struck  out  the  mandatory  clause 
by  fifty-three  votes  against  forty-two;  and  January 
16  the  House  accepted  the  amendment  by  sixty-eight 
votes  against  fifty-five.  These  divisions  showed  a 
considerable  number  of  Republicans  still  acting  with 
the  Federalists ;  and  in  this  respect  the  Senate  was 
even  less  manageable  than  the  Hon*e.  Only  after 


1809.  GENERAL   FACTIOUSNESS.  427 

an  obstinate  struggle  did  the  Senate  give  way  so 
far  that  at  last  Congress  agreed  upon  ordering  four 
frigates  to  be  fitted  out,  and  as  many  gunboats  as 
the  public  service  might  in  the  President's  judgment 
require. 

The  reasons  given  by  the  Senate  for  persisting  in 
its  plan  were  proof  that  something  remained  un 
told ;  for  they  showed  the  hand  and  influence  of  the 
Smiths,  rather  than  the  interests  of  Madison's  coming 
Administration.  David  R.  Williams,  who  was  a  mem 
ber  of  the  Conference  Committee,  reported  to  the 
House  that  the  managers  for  the  Senate  gave  three 
reasons  for  insisting  on  their  bill :  — 

' '  The  first  of  them  was  that  thviy  wanted  a  pledge 
from  this  House  that  it  was  willing  to  come  forward  and 
defend  the  nation ;  another  was  that  these  [frigates] 
were  necessary  to  defend  the  gunboats  in  their  opera 
tions  ;  and  a  third,  that  men  could  not  be  got  to  enlist 
for  the  service  of  the  gunboats,  and  that  to  remedy  this 
evil  they  might  be  enlisted  to  man  the  frigates,  and  after 
wards  transferred."1 

A  Navy  Department  which  used  its  frigates  to 
defend  gunboats  and  decoy  seamen  was  hardly  fit 
to  be  trusted  with  unlimited  credit  on  the  Treasury. 
Gallatin  lost  his  temper  at  finding  his  authority 
threatened  with  overthrow  by  an  influence  which  he 
knew  to  be  incompetent,  and  believed  to  be  selfish 
and  corrupt.  Irritated  by  the  vote  of  January  10, 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  studied  the  division- 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  1808-1809,  p.  1185. 


428        HISTORY   OF   THE  UNITED  STATES.      CH.  18. 

list  to  learn  whence  came  the  hostile  influence  which 
formed  what  he  called !  "  the  navy  coalition  of  1809, 
by  whom  were  sacrificed  forty  Republican  members, 
nine  Republican  States,  the  Republican  cause  itself, 
and  the  people  of  the  United  States,  to  a  system 
of  favoritism,  extravagance,  parade,  and  folly."  He 
found  the  central  point  in  the  "  Smith  faction,  or 
ruling  party,"  of  which  he  declared  Wilson  Gary 
Nicholas  to  be  file-leader  in  the  House,  with  six 
votes.  With  these  acted  six  New  York  followers  of 
Yice-President  Clinton,  and  five  "scared  Yankees." 
The  others  were  merely  misled  Republicans  or 
Federalists. 

"  The  Smith  faction,  or  ruling  party,"  of  which 
Wilson  Gary  Nicholas  was  file-leader  in  the  House, 
and  which  never  failed  to  make  its  influence  felt 
in  moments  of  trouble,  had  gained  in  the  Senate  an 
ally  whose  selfishness  was  equal  to  that  of  General 
Smith,  and  whose  nature  was  far  more  malignant. 
Of  all  the  enemies  with  whom  Madison  had  to  deal, 
only  one  in  his  own  party  was  venomous.  Old 
George  Clinton,  though  openly  hostile,  possessed  strong 
qualities,  and  in  any  event  was  too  old  for  serious 
effort.  Samuel  Smith  played  the  game  of  politics 
somewhat  too  much  like  a  game  of  whist,  in  which 
he  allowed  his  trumps  to  fall  indifferently  on  his 
partners  or  on  his  opponents,  whenever  he  saw  the 
chance  to  insure  a  trick  to  his  own  hand ;  but  Smith 
was  still  a  man  from  whom  in  the  last  resort  cour- 
1  Adams's  Gallatin,  p.  387. 


1809.  GENERAL   FACTIOUSNESS.  429 

age  and  energy  might  be  expected,  and  in  whom,  sel 
fishness  apart,  confidence  could  be  placed.  No  such 
redeeming  quality  could  be  truthfully  attributed  to 
William  Branch  Giles,  the  senator  from  Virginia, 
the  third  member  of  the  senatorial  cabal  who  was 
about  to  place  himself  in  the  path  of  the  Admin 
istration,  and  to  apply  his  abilities  and  persistence 
to  the  deliberate  task  of  blocking  the  wheels  of 
government. 

Giles  had  served  his  party  long  and  well,  and 
thought  himself  entitled  to  higher  recognition  than 
he  had  as  yet  received.  In  later  times  a  safe  seat 
in  the  Senate  became  almost  the  highest  prize  of 
politics,  —  men  sometimes  preferred  it  to  a  candi 
dacy  for  the  Presidential  office  itself;  but  in  1809 
the  Cabinet  stood  above  the  Senate,  and  Giles  looked 
upon  himself  as  entitled  to  the  Department  of  State, 
and  in  due  time  to  the  Presidency.  Madison,  with 
a  different  view  of  the  public  good  and  of  his  own 
comfort,  betrayed  the  intention  of  appointing  Gallatin 
his  Secretary  of  State ;  and  Gallatin's  fitness  for  the 
post  was  so  evident  as  to  make  his  appointment  the 
best  that  could  be  suggested ;  but  at  the  first  rumor 
of  the  intention,  Giles  united  with  Smith  in  threaten 
ing  to  procure  the  rejection  of  Gallatin  by  the  Senate. 
To  deny  the  President  the  selection  of  his  own  Sec 
retary  of  State  was  an  act  of  factiousness  which 
remained  without  a  parallel ;  but  Giles  and  Smith 
had  both  the  will  and  the  power  to  carry  their  point. 
Even  Wilson  Gary  Nicholas  remonstrated  in  vain. 


430         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  18. 

"  From  the  first,"  was  the  story  told  by  Nicholas,1 
"  Mr.  Giles  declared  his  determination  to  vote  against 
Gallatin.  I  repeatedly  urged  and  entreated  him  not  to 
do  it ;  for  several  days  it  was  an  object  of  discussion 
between  us ;  there  was  no  way  which  our  long  and  inti 
mate  friendship  would  justify,  consistent  with  my  re 
spect  for  him,  in  which  I  did  not  assail  him.  To  all 
my  arguments  he  replied  that  his  duty  to  his  country 
was  to  him  paramount  to  every  other  consideration,  and 
that  he  could  not  justify  to  himself  permitting  Gallatin 
to  be  Secretary  of  State,  if  his  vote  would  prevent  it." 

\j  Thus  Gallatin's  foreign  birth — the  only  objection 
alleged  against  him  —  became  the  pretext  for  Giles 
to  declare  war  against  the  coming  Administration  of 
President  Madison.  With  the  aid  of  Vice-President 
Clinton,  Senator  Samuel  Smith,  and  the  Federalists, 
Giles  could  control  the  Senate  ;  and  every  factious 
interest  which  wished  to  force  on  Madison  an  object 
of  its  own  was  sure  to  ally  itself  with  these  intriguers 
until  its  object  should  be  conceded.  The  Senate  was 
already  a  hot-bed  of  intrigue,  where  William  B.  Giles, 
Timothy  Pickering,  George  Clinton,  and  Samuel 
Smith  held  control ;  and  unless  Madison  by  some 
great  effort  of  force  or  skill  could  crush  Giles,  in 
time  not  only  the  new  Administration,  but  also  the 
Union  itself,  might  find  a  deadly  danger  in  the  venom 
of  his  selfishness. 

At  the  close  of  January,  affairs  at  Washington 
were  trembling  on  a  poise.  The  laws  required  for 

1  Adams's  Gallatin  p.  388. 


1809.  GENERAL   FACTIOUSNESS.  431 

Madison's  purpose  were  all  passed  save  one ;  but  the 
party  was  rent  in  pieces  by  faction.  Discipline  was 
at  an  end ;  the  States  of  Massachusetts  and  Connec 
ticut  were  openly  adopting  treasonable  measures ;  and 
the  great  trial  of  strength  —  the  decision  of  Congress 
on  immediate  repeal  of  the  embargo  —  had  not  yet 
been  reached. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

EARLY  in  January  the  intended  policy  of  Madison 
became  known.  As  the  story  has  already  told,  Madi 
son  and  Gallatin  decided  to  retain  the  embargo  until 
June,  but  to  call  the  new  Congress  together  May  22, 
and  then  to  declare  war,  unless  Erskine  could  make 
concessions.  President  Jefferson  was  chiefly  inter 
ested  in  maintaining  the  embargo  until  after  March  4, 
and  the  despotism  he  had  so  long  maintained  over 
Congress  seemed  still  to  exasperate  his  enemies. 
By  common  consent,  attack  upon  the  embargo  was 
regarded  as  attack  upon  the  President :  and  the 
Northern  Democrats  had  so  far  lost  respect  for  their 
old  leader  as  to  betray  almost  a  passion  for  telling 
him  unpleasant  truths. 

Joseph  Story,  who  took  the  lead  in  this  party  rebel 
lion,  came  to  Congress  determined  to  overthrow  the 
embargo,  and  found  Ezekiel  Bacon  —  another  Massa 
chusetts  member  —  equally  determined  with  himself. 
In  after  years  Justice  Story  told  the  tale  as  he 
remembered  it : l  — 

"  The  whole  influence  of  the  Administration  was  di 
rectly  brought  to  bear  upon  Mr.  Ezekiel  Bacon  and 
1  Story's  Life  of  Story,  i.  187. 


1809.  REPEAL  OF  EMBARGO.  433 

myself  to  seduce  us  from  what  we  considered  a  great 
duty  to  our  country,  and  especially  to  New  England. 
We  were  scolded,  privately  consulted,  and  argued  with 
by  the  Administration  and  its  friends  on  that  occasion. 
I  knew  at  the  time  that  Mr.  Jefferson  had  no  ulterior 
measure  in  view,  and  was  determined  on  protracting  the 
embargo  for  an  indefinite  period,  even  for  years.  I  was 
well  satisfied  that  such  a  course  would  not  and  could  not 
be  borne  by  New  England,  and  would  bring  on  a  direct 
rebellion.  It  would  be  ruin  to  the  whole  country.  Yet 
Mr.  Jefferson,  with  his  usual  visionary  obstinacy,  was 
determined  to  maintain  it ;  and  the  New  England  Repub 
licans  were  to  be  made  the  instruments.  Mr.  Bacon  and 
myself  resisted ;  and  measures  were  concerted  by  us, 
with  the  aid  of  Pennsylvania,  to  compel  him  to  abandon 
his  mad  scheme.  For  this  he  never  forgave  me." 

Joseph  Story,  with  very  high  and  amiable  qualities, 
was  quick  in  temper ;  and  in  regard  to  Jefferson  he 
let  his  temper  master  his  memory. 

"  One  thing  I  did  learn  while  I  was  a  member  of  Con 
gress,"  he  continued,  "  and  that  was  that  New  England 
was  expected,  so  far  as  the  Republicans  were  concerned, 
to  do  everything  and  to  have  nothing.  They  were  to 
obey,  but  not  to  be  trusted.  This,  in  my  humble  judg 
ment,  was  the  steady  policy  of  Mr.  Jefferson  at  all  times. 
We  were  to  be  kept  divided,  and  thus  used  to  neutralize 
each  other." 

In  this  spirit  toward  his  own  President  Story  came 
to  Washington,  and  joined  hands  with  Timothy  Pick 
ering,  John  Randolph,  and  George  Canning  in  the 
attempt  "  to  lower  and  degrade "  Jefferson  in  the 

VOL.  iv.— 28 


434        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  19. 

eyes  of  his  own  people.  Jefferson  asked  only  to  be 
spared  the  indignity  of  signing  with  his  own  hand 
the  unconditional  repeal  of  the  embargo ;  while  the 
single  point  on  which  Story,  Bacon,  Pickering,  and 

j  Canning  were  agreed  was  that  the  repeal  should  be 
the  act  of  the  man  who  made  the  law.  On  one  side 

/  Jefferson,  Madison,  Gallatin,  and  their  friends  en 
treated  Congress  to  stand  firm ;  to  maintain  the 
ground  already  solemnly  taken  ;  to  leave  the  embargo 
until  June,  and  then  to  declare  war  if  they  pleased. 
On  the  other  hand,  Pickering,  Bacon,  Story,  the 
Clintons,  and  the  Pennsylvanians  demanded  imme- 

/  diate  repeal,  —  partly  to  pacify  New  England,  but 
quite  as  much  for  the  reason,  which  Pickering  urged, 
that  immediate  repeal  would  prevent  war.  That  it 
would  in  fact  prevent  war  was  obvious.  Repeal  was 
submission. 

Story  took  no  part  in  the  public  struggle,  for  he 
left  Washington  about  January  20,  and  the  great 
debate  began  ten  days  afterward  ;  but  although  he 
held  his  peace  in  public,  and  his  friends  made  no 
open  display  of  their  anger,  the  temper  in  which 
they  acted  was  notorious,  and  the  breach  between 
them  and  Jefferson  was  never  healed.  They  could 
not  forgive  him :  that  Jefferson  should  ever  forget 
the  wound  they  inflicted,  required  magnanimity  be 
yond  that  of  any  philosopher  known  in  politics. 

As  soon  as  the  naval  and  military  bills  and  the 
extra  session  for  May  22  were  at  last  fairly  deter 
mined  and  every  detail  decided,  Wilson  Gary  Nicho- 


1809.  REPEAL  OF   EMBARGO.  435 

las  took  the  lead  of  the  House,  and  January  30  called 
up  a  Resolution  intended  to  settle  the  policy  of  em 
bargo  and  war.  The  words  of  this  Resolve  were  too 
serious  not  to  have  received  very  careful  attention : 

"  Resolved,  As  the  opinion  of   this  House,   that  the 

United  States  ought  not  to  delay  beyond  the day 

of to  resume,  maintain,  and  defend  the  navigation 

of  the  high  seas ;  and  that  provision  ought  to  be  made 
by  law  for  repealing  on  the day  of the  sev 
eral  embargo  laws,  and  for  authorizing  at  the  same  time 
letters  of  marque  and  reprisal  against  Great  Britain  and 
France,  provided  on  that  day  their  Orders  or  Edicts  vio 
lating  the  lawful  commerce  and  neutral  rights  of  the 
United  States  shall  be  in  force  ;  or  against  either  of  those 
nations  having  in  force  such  Orders  or  Edicts." 

Nicholas  agreed  to  divide  the  Resolution  so  that  a 
test  vote  might  first  be  taken  on  the  repeal  of  the 
embargo ;  and  he  then  moved  to  fill  the  blank  with 
the  words,  "  the  first  day  of  June."  The  House 
was  thus  asked  to  pledge  itself  that  on  June  1  the 
embargo  should  cease.  On  this  question  the  debate 
began. 

David  R.  Williams  was  a  typical  Carolinian.  With 
something  of  the  overbearing  temper  which  marked 
his  class,  he  had  also  the  independence  and  the  hon 
esty  which  went  far  to  redeem  their  failings.  He 
had  stood  for  years,  with  his  friend  Macon,  proof 
against  the  influence  of  patronage  and  power ;  he 
supported  the  embargo,  and  was  not  ashamed  to 
avow  his  dread  of  war ;  but  since  his  favorite  mea- 


436        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  19. 

sure  was  to  be  thrown  aside,  he  stood  by  his  char 
acter,  and  made  an  appeal  to  the  House,  giving  at 
once  to  the  debate  an  air  of  dignity  which  it  never 
wholly  lost :  — 

"  Will  you  drive  us  to  a  repeal  of  the  embargo,  and 
make  no  resistance  ?  Are  you  ready  to  lie  down  quietly 
under  the  impositions  laid  upon  you  ?  You  have  driven 
us  from  the  embargo.  The  excitements  in  the  East  ren 
der  it  necessary  that  we  should  enforce  the  embargo  with 
the  bayonet  or  repeal  it.  I  will  repeal  it,  —  and  I  could 
weep  over  it  more  than  over  a  lost  child.  If  you  do 
not  resist,  you  are  no  longer  a  nation  ;  you  dare  not 
call  yourself  so ;  you  are  the  merest  vassals  conceiva 
ble.  ...  I  appeal  to  the  minority,  who  hold  the  desti 
nies  of  the  nation  in  their  grasp,  —  for  they  can  enforce 
embargo  without  the  bayonet,  —  I  beg  them,  if  they  will 
not  declare  war,  that  they  will  do  the  best  they  can  for 
their  country." 

No  one  then  wondered  to  see  South  Carolina  almost 
on  her  knees  before  Massachusetts,  beseeching  her, 
on  her  own  terms,  for  her  own  honor,  to  do  the  best 
she  could  for  the  common  country ;  but  Massachu 
setts  had  no  voice  to  respond.  Dryly,  in  the  caustic 
tone  of  Connecticut  austerity,  Samuel  Dana  replied 
that  the  days  of  ancient  chivalry  had  not  yet  re 
turned.  When  Massachusetts  at  last  found  a  spokes 
man,  she  gave  her  answer  through  the  mouth  of 
Ezekiel  Bacon,  —  a  man  second  to  none  in  respecta 
bility,  but  'not  one  whom,  in  a  moment  of  supreme 
crisis,  the  State  would  naturally  have  chosen  among 


1809.  REPEAL   OF   EMBARGO.  437 

all  her  citizens  to  pronounce  her  will.  Bacon  had 
carefully  collected  advice  from  the  men  in  his  State 
who  were  most  competent  to  give  counsel ; l  but  in 
Massachusetts  affairs  at  Washington  were  little  un 
derstood.  Bent  only  on  saving  the  Union  by  forcing 
a  repeal  of  the  embargo,  and  hampered  by  alliance 
with  Federalists  and  Pennsylvanians,  Bacon  could  not 
afford  to  show  a  sense  of  national  self-respect. 

He  began  by  admitting  that  the  discontents  in  New 
England  made  immediate  repeal  necessary  :  — 

"It  surely  could  not  be  sound  policy,  by  adhering  to 
this  system  beyond  the  measure  of  absolute  necessity, 
to  risk  in  the  hands  of  any  faction  which  might  be  dis 
posed  to  wield  it  an  instrument  by  which  they  may  en 
danger  the  union  of  our  country,  and  raise  themselves  to 
power  on  the  ruins  of  liberty  and  the  Constitution." 

Such  a  beginning,  offering  a  reward  for  threats  of 
disunion,  and  conceding  to  traitors  what  would  have 
been  refused  to  good  citizens,  was  an  evil  augury ; 
and  the  rest  of  Bacon's  speech  carried  out  the  prom 
ise.  As  he  refused  to  prolong  the  embargo,  so  he 
refused  to  vote  for  war.  "  In  every  point  of  view,  the 
policy  of  declaring  offensive  war  against  any  nation 
four  months  in  advance  is  to  me  wholly  objection 
able."  The  conclusion  was  as  feeble  as  was  required 
by  the  premises  ;  but  only  some  demon  of  bad  taste 
could  have  inspired  an  orator  at  such  a  moment  to 
use  the  language  of  Falstaff ;  — 

1  Cf.  J.  Q.  Adams  to  Ezekiel  Bacon,  Nov.  17  and  Dec.  21, 
1808 ;  New  England  Federalism,  pp,  127,  131. 


438        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  19. 

"  We  choose  not  to  take  measures  any  more  than  to 
give  reasons  '  upon  compulsion,'  and  we  will  not  so  take 
them.  We  will,  however,  I  trust,  defend  ourselves 
against  the  depredations  of  both  [belligerents]  ;  and  if 
they  both  or  either  choose  to  persevere  in  the  execution 
of  their  lawless  aggressions,  we  shall,  it  is  hoped,  be 
come  more  united  in  our  determination  and  our  efforts  to 
vindicate  our  rights,  if  they  shall  continue  to  be  assailed. 
At  any  rate,  I  am  for  leaving  it  to  the  wisdom  of  the  en 
suing  Congress,  which  is  to  meet  at  an  early  day,  to 
determine  upon  that  position  which  the  nation  shall  take 
in  relation  to  such  a  state  of  things  as  may  grow  out  of 
the  course  which  I  propose." 

Between  the  Federalists  and  the  Republicans  of 
Massachusetts  Congress  was  left  under  no  illusions. 
Bacon  expressed  in  these  vacillating  phrases  the  true 
sense  of  the  country.  On  the  evening  of  February  2, 
after  four  days  of  debate,  the  committee,  by  seventy- 
three  votes  against  forty,  rejected  Wilson  Gary  Nicho 
las's  motion  to  fix  June  1  as  the  date  for  removing 
the  embargo  ;  and  the  next  day,  by  an  affirmative 
J  vote  of  seventy,  with  no  negatives,  March  4  was  fixed 
as  the  term. 

Immediately  after  this  decisive  division  John 
Randolph  took  the  floor.  Discord  had  become  his 
single  object  in  public  life.  The  Federalists  at  least 
had  a  purpose  in  their  seditiousness,  and  were  hon 
est  in  preferring  the  British  government  to  their 
own ;  the  Republicans  of  all  shades,  however  weak  in 
will  or  poor  in  motive,  were  earnest  in  their  love 
of  country  ;  but  Randolph  was  neither  honest  nor 


1809.  REPEAL  OF   EMBARGO.  439 

earnest,  neither  American  nor  English  nor  truly 
Virginian.  Disappointed  ambition  had  turned  him 
into  a  mere  egoist ;  his  habits  had  already  become 
intemperate,  and  his  health  was  broken ;  but  he  could 
still  charge  upon  Jefferson  all  the  disasters  of  the 
country,  and  could  delight  in  the  overwhelming  ruin 
which  had  fallen  upon  his  former  chief.  Randolph's 
speech  of  February  3  was  stale  and  tedious.  Except 
on  the  single  point  of  raising  the  embargo  he  was 
spiritless ;  and  his  only  positive  idea,  borrowed  from 
the  Federalists,  consisted  in  a  motion  that,  instead 
of  issuing  letters  of  marque,  Government  should  au 
thorize  me  reliant- vessels  to  arm  and  defend  them 
selves  from  seizure.  If  the  scheme  had  a  meaning, 
it  meant  submission  to  the  British  Orders,  and  was 
suggested  by  the  Federalists  for  no  other  object ;  but 
in  Randolph's  mind  such  a  plan  carried  no  definite 
consequence. 

On  Randolph's  motion  the  debate  continued  until 
February  7.  The  Republicans,  disconcerted  and  dis 
heartened  by  the  conduct  of  their  friends  from  New 
England  and  New  York,  made  little  show  of  energy, 
and  left  to  David  R.  Williams  the  task  of  expressing 
the  whole  ignominy  of  their  defeat.  Williams  strug 
gled  manfully.  Randolph's  fears  for  the  Constitu 
tion  were  answered  by  the  South  Carolinian  in  a  few 
words,  which  condensed  into  a  single  paragraph  the 
results  of  his  party  theories :  — 

"If  the  Constitution  is  made  of  such  brittle  stuff  as 
not  to  stand  a  single  war ;  if  it  is  only  to  be  preserved  by 


440        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  19. 

submission  to  foreign  taxation,  —  I  shall  very  soon  lose 
all  solicitude  for  its  preservation."  , 

With  more  than  Federalist  bitterness  he  taunted 
the  hesitation  of  the  Democrats,  —  "  contemptible 
cowardice,"  he  called  it.  "  It  is  time  we  should  as 
sume,  if  it  is  not  in  our  natures,  nerve  enough  to 
decide  whether  we  will  go  to  war  or  submit."  The 
House  replied  by  striking  out  the  recommendation  of 
reprisals,  by  a  vote  of  fifty-seven  to  thirty-nine. 

These  two  votes  rendered  the  Administration  for 
the  moment  powerless  to  make  head  against  the 
sweeping  Federalist  victory.  Josiah  Quincy,  who 
watched  every  symptom  of  democratic  disaster,  wrote 
as  early  as  February  2,  before  the  first  defeat  of  the 
Administration  : l  "  There  is  dreadful  distraction  in 
the  enemy's  camp  on  the  subject  of  removing  the 
embargo.  Jefferson  and  his  friends  are  obstinate. 
Bacon  and  the  Northern  Democrats  are  equally  de 
termined  that  it  shall  be  raised  in  March."  The 
next  day  Quincy  added  :  "  Jefferson  is  a  host ;  and  if 
the  wand  of  that  magician  is  not  broken,  he  will  yet 
defeat  the  attempt." 

The  contest  had  become  personal ;  to  break  the 
"  wand  of  the  magician  "  was  as  much  the  object  of 
Democrats  as  of  Federalists,  and  neither  Madison 
nor  Gallatin  could  restore  discipline.  February  4 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  wrote : 2  "As  far  as 
my  information  goes,  everything  grows  more  quiet  in 

1  Quincy 's  Life  of  Quincy,  p.  185. 

2  Adams's  Gallatin,  p.  386. 


1809.  REPEAL   OF   EMBARGO.  441 

Massachusetts  and  Maine.     All  would  be  well  if  our 
friends  remained  firm  here." 

The  attempt  to  hold  the  friends  of  the  Administra 
tion  firm  brought  only  greater  disaster.  The  vote  in 
committee  refusing  to  recommend  reprisals  took  place 
February  7  ;  and  the  next  day  Quincy  wrote  again  : 
"  Great  caucusing  is  the  order  of  the  day  and  the 
night  here.  The  Administration  is  determined  to 
rally  its  friends,  and  postpone  the  removal  of  the 
embargo  till  May.  But  I  think  they  cannot  succeed. 
Bacon,  I  am  told,  stands  firm  and  obstinate  against 
all  their  solicitations  and  even  almost  denunciations. 
However,  they  had  another  caucus  last  night.  The 
event  is  unknown.  Jefferson  has  prevailed." 

February  9  the  result  of  the  caucus  was  shown  by 
a  vote  of  the  House  discharging  the  Committee  of  the 
Whole,  and  referring  the  subject  to  the  Committee  of 
Foreign  Relations,  whose  chairman  was  G.  W.  Camp 
bell, —  which  amounted  to  a  public  admission  that 
Madison's  plan  had  failed,  and  that  some  new  expe 
dient  for  uniting  the  party  must  be  invented.  Ezekiel 
Bacon  refused  to  obey  the  caucus,  and  voted  with  the 
Federalists  against  the  reference. 

President  Jefferson,  though  his  name  was  still  a 
terror  to  his  enemies,  accepted  whatever  decision  his 
Cabinet  advised.  Till  the  day  of  his  death  he  never 
forgot  the  violence  of  these  last  weeks  of  his  admin 
istration,  or  the  outcry  of  the  New  England  towns.  V 
"  How  powerfully  did  we  feel  the  energy  of  this  or 
ganization  in  the  case  of  the  embargo,"  he  wrote  long 


442        HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  19. 

afterward.1  "  I  felt  the  foundations  of  the  govern- 
yment  shaken  under  my  feet  by  the  New  England 
townships."  lie  showed  the  same  lack  of  interest 
in  February  which  had  marked  his  conduct  in  No 
vember  ;  not  even  the  certainty  of  his  own  over 
throw  called  out  the  familiar  phrases  of  vexation. 
February  7  he  wrote  to  his  son-in-law,  Thomas  Mann 
Randolph,2  — 

"  I  thought  Congress  had  taken  their  ground  firmly  for 
continuing  their  embargo  till  June,  and  then  war.  But 
a  sudden  and  unaccountable  revolution  of  opinion  took 
place  the  last  week,  chiefly  among  the  New  England  and 
VNew  York  members,  and  in  a  kind  of  panic  they  voted 
the  4th  of  March  for  removing  the  embargo,  and  by 
such  a  majority  as  gave  all  reason  to  believe  they  would 
not  agree  either  to  war  or  non-intercourse.  This,  too, 
was  after  we  had  become  satisfied  that  the  Essex  Junto 
had  found  their  expectation  desperate,  of  inducing  the 
people  there  either  to  separation  or  forcible  opposition. 
The  majority  of  Congress,  however,  has  now  rallied  to 
the  removing  the  embargo  on  the  4th  March,  non- 
intercourse  with  France  and  Great  Britain,  trade  every 
where  else,  and  continuing  war  preparations.  The 
further  details  are  not  yet  settled,  but  I  believe  it  is 
perfectly  certain  that  the  embargo  will  be  taken  off  the 
4th  of  March." 

As  the  President  became  more  subdued,  Senator 
Pickering  became  more  vehement ;  his  hatred  for 
Jefferson  resembled  the  hatred  of  Cotton  Mather  for 

1  Jefferson  to  J.  C.  Cabell,  Feb.  2,  1816  ;  Works,  vi.  540. 

2  Works,  v.  424. 


1809.  REPEAL  OF   EMBARGO.  443 

a  witch.      February  4  he  wrote   to  his   nephew  in 
Boston : l  — 

UI  entertain  no  doubt  that  Jefferson  stands  pledged 
to  Bonaparte  to  maintain  the  embargo  until  a  non- 
intercourse  or  war  shall  succeed ;  and  he  dreads  the 
explosion  justly  to  be  apprehended  by  him  from  the 
disappointment  and  passion  of  Bonaparte,  should  the 
embargo  be  removed  without  a  substitute  as  well  or 
better  comporting  with  his  views.  Upon  this  aspect 
of  things  it  behooves  our  State  legislature  to  advance 
with  a  firm  step  in  defence  of  the  rights  of  our  citizens 
and  of  the  Constitution.  The  palatines  tremble  at  their 
posts.  The  least  relaxation  or  wavering  in  the  councils 
of  New  England  would  give  them  fresh  courage,  and 
hazard  the  most  disastrous  consequences." 

Another  observer  wrote  comments,  serious  in  a 
different  sense.  Erskine  watched  with  extreme  in 
terest  every  detail  of  this  complicated  struggle,  and 
reported  to  Canning  both  facts  and  speculations 
which  could  not  fail  to  affect  the  British  government. 
Aware  that  Canning  had  won  a  brilliant  success, 
Erskine  labored  to  profit  by  his  triumph,  and  to  turn 
it  in  the  interests  of  peace.  A  vast  majority  of 
Americans,  he  said,2  wanted  only  some  plausible  ex 
cuse  to  justify  them  in  resenting  Napoleon's  conduct : 
but  "  they  naturally  wish  to  be  saved  the  complete 
humiliation  of  being  obliged  avowedly  to  recant  all 
their  violent  declarations  of  their  determination  never 

1  Pickering  to  T.  Williams,  Feb.  4,  1809;  Pickering  MSS. 

2  Erskine  to  Canning,  Feb.  9,  1809;  MSS.  British  Archives. 


444         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  19. 

to  submit  to  the  Orders  in  Council  of  Great  Britain." 
He  speculated  "  how  far  it  might  be  possible  still 
further  to  bend  the  spirit  of  that  part  of  the  people 
of  the  United  States  until  they  should  be  forced  to 
single  out  France  to  be  resisted  as  the  original 
aggressors  while  his  Majesty's  Orders  in  Council 
continued  to  be  enforced."  After  the  repeal  of  the 
embargo  and  the  refusal  to  make  war,  but  one  rem 
nant  of  American  protest  against  British  aggressions 
remained.  The  Republican  caucus,  February  7,  de 
cided  in  favor  of  returning  to  Jefferson's  pacific 
non-intercourse,  —  the  system  which  had  been,  by 
common  consent,  thrown  aside  as  insufficient  even 
before  the  embargo.  February  10  Erskine  gave  an 
account  of  the  new  measure,  and  of  its  probable 
effect  on  American  politics  :  — 

"  It  is  true  that  a  non-intercourse  law  may  be  consid 
ered  by  the  Eastern  States  very  objectionable  ;  but  as  it 
would  be  rather  a  nominal  prohibition  than  a  rigorous 
enforcement,  a  resistance  to  it  would  be  less  likely  to  be 
made,  and  of  less  importance  if  it  should  take  place. 
The  ultimate  consequences  of  such  differences  and  jeal 
ousies  arising  between  the  Southern  and  Eastern  States 
would  inevitably  tend  to  a  dissolution  of  the  Union, 
which  has  been  for  some  time  talked  of,  and  has  of  late, 
as  I  have  heard,  been  seriously  contemplated  by  many  of 
the  leading  people  in  the  Eastern  division." 

The  Non-intercourse  Bill,  which  Erskine  described 
February  10  as  likely  to  be  no  more  than  a  nominal 
prohibition  of  commerce,  was  reported  February  11  to 


1809.  REPEAL  OF  EMBARGO.  445 

the  House  from  the  Committee  of  Foreign  Relations 
The  bill  excluded  all  public  and  private  vessels  of 
France  and  England  from  American  waters ;  forbade 
under  severe  penalties  the  importation  of  British  or 
French  goods ;  repealed  the  embargo  laws,  "  except 
so  far  as  they  relate  to  Great  Britain  or  France 
or  their  colonies  or  dependencies,  or  places  in  the 
actual  possession  of  either ; "  and  gave  the  President 
authority  to  reopen  by  proclamation  the  trade  with 
France  or  England  in  case  either  of  these  countries 
should  cease  to  violate  neutral  rights.  That  the  pro 
posed  non-intercourse  was  in  truth  submission  to  the 
Orders  in  Council,  no  one  denied. 

"  I  conceive  that  great  advantages  may  be  reaped 
from  it  by  England,"  wrote  Erskine,1  "  as  she  has  the 
command  of  the  seas,  and  can  procure  through  neu 
trals  any  of  the  produce  of  this  country,  besides  the 
immense  quantity  which  will  be  brought  direct  to  Great 
Britain  under  various  pretences ;  whereas  France  will 
obtain  but  little,  at  a  great  expense  and  risk." 

Such  a  non-intercourse  merely  sanctioned  smug 
gling,  and  was  intended  for  no  other  purpose.  Galla- 
tin  in  his  disgust  flung  open  the  doors  to  illicit 
commerce.  When  Erskine  went  to  him  to  ask  what 
was  meant  by  "  France,  England,  and  their  depen 
dencies,"  Gallatin  replied  that  only  places  in  actual 
possession  of  England  and  France  were  intended ; 
that  it  was  impossible  to  say  what  nations  had  de 
crees  in  force  infringing  neutral  rights,  but  that 

1  Erskine  to  Canning,  Feb.  10,  1809;  MSS.  British  Archives. 


446        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  19. 

even  Holland  would   be   considered  an  independent 
country.1 

"The  intention  of  this  indefinite  description,"  con 
tinued  Erskine,  4'  is  undoubtedly  to  leave  open  as  many 
places  for  their  commerce  as  they  can,  consistently  with 
keeping  up  an  appearance  of  resistance  to  the  belligerent 
restrictions ;  but  it  is  thoroughly  understood  that  the 
whole  measure  is  a  mere  subterfuge  to  extricate  them 
selves  from  the  embarrassments  of  the  embargo  system, 
and  is  never  intended  to  be  enforced." 

When  this  bill  came  before  the  House,  another 
long  debate  arose.  Hardly  a  trace  of  national  pride 
remained.  No  one  approved  the  bill,  but  no  one 
struggled  longer  against  submission.  Josiah  Quincy 
and  many  of  the  Federalists  held  that  the  surrender 
was  not  yet  complete  enough,  and  that  total  submis 
sion  to  Great  Britain  must  precede  the  return  of  Mas 
sachusetts  to  harmony  with  the  Union,  or  to  a  share 
in  measures  of  government.  His  words  were  worth 
noting :  — 

\J  "He  wished  peace  if  possible  ;  if  war,  union  in  that 
war.  For  this  reason  he  wished  a  negotiation  to  be 
opened,  unshackled  with  those  impediments  to  it  which 
now  existed.  As  long  as  they  remained,  the  people  in 
the  portion  of  country  whence  he  came  would  not  deem 
an  unsuccessful  attempt  at  negotiation  to  be  cause  for 
war.  If  they  were  removed,  and  an  earnest  attempt  at 
negotiation  was  made,  unimpeded  with  these  restrictions, 
and  should  not  meet  with  success,  they  would  join  heart 
ily  in  a  war." 

1  Erskine  to  Canning,  Feb.  13,  1809;  MSS.  British  Archives. 


1809.  REPEAL  OF  EMBARGO.  447 

Doubtless  Quincy  believed  the  truth  of  what  he 
said ;  but  as  though  to  prove  him  mistaken  in  claim 
ing  even  the  modest  amount  of  patriotism  which  he 
asserted  for  his  party,  Barent  Gardenier  immediately 
followed  with  a  declaration  that  Great  Britain  was 
wholly  in  the  right,  and  that  America  should  not  only 
submit  to  the  Orders  in  Council,  but  should  take 
pride  in  submission  :  — 

"  I  do  not  say  that  the  orders  were  lawful,  or  that 
they  were  not  infringements  of  our  rights  as  a  neutral 
nation,  —  as  it  might  offend  the  prejudices  of  the  House. 
But  I  may  be  permitted  to  say  that  if  they  were  unlawful, 
I  have  proved  that  they  are  not  hurtful ;  that  the  British 
Orders  in  Council  only  supplied  to  that  which  our  sense 
of  honor  would  lead  us  to  do,  their  sanction."1 

Gardenier's  views  roused  no  longer  much  outward 
irritation.  The  war  Republicans  liked  honest  avowals 
better  than  sham  patriotism ;  but  John  Randolph,  un 
willing  to  be  embarrassed  with  allies  so  candid,  rated 
Gardenier  sharply :  - 

"  I  looked  at  the  gentleman  from  New  York  at  that 
moment  with  the  sort  of  sensation  which  we  feel  in  be 
holding  a  sprightly  child  meddling  with  edged  tools,  — 
every  moment  expecting,  what  actually  happened,  that 
he  will  cut  his  fingers.  .  .  .  The  gentleman's  friends,  if 
any  he  have,  —  and  I  have  no  right  to  presume  that  he 
has  none,  but  the  contrary,  — will  do  well  to  keep  such 
dangerous  implements  out  of  his  way  for  the  future." 

Randolph  himself  persisted  in  the  scheme  of  with 
drawing  all  restrictions  on  commerce,  and   allowing 
1  Annals  of  Congress,  1808-1809,  p.  1460. 


448        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  19. 

merchant-vessels  to  arm,  —  a  measure  which  had  the 
advantage  of  being  warlike  or  pacific,  according  as  he 
should  prefer  in  the  future  to  represent  it.  David  R. 
Williams  hit  upon  an  idea  more  sensible,  and  likely 
to  prove  more  effective.  "  If  the  embargo  is  to  be 
taken  off,  and  war  not  to  be  substituted,  —  if  the 
nation  is  to  submit,  —  I  wish  to  do  it  profitably."  He 
proposed  to  shut  out  the  shipping  of  England  and 
France,  but  to  admit  their  manufactures,  under  a 
duty  of  fifty  per  cent  when  imported  in  American 
vessels.  A  number  of  Southern  Republicans  approved 
this  plan. 

Much  the  strongest  speech  against  the  bill  was 
that  of  George  W.  Campbell,  who  made  no  attempt 
to  hide  his  mortification  at  seeing  the  House  desert 
him,  its  leader,  and  turn  its  back  upon  the  pledge  it 
had  solemnly  given  in  accepting  his  Report  only  two 
months  before  :  — 

"  At  the  very  time  when  your  own  people  are  rallying 
round  the  standard  of  their  government ;  when  they  are 
about  to  shake  off  that  timidity,  that  alarm,  that  restless 
disposition,  which  the  first  pressure  occasioned  by  the 
suspension  of  commerce  naturally  produced ;  when  they 
are,  in  almost  every  quarter  of  the  Union,  declaring  their 
determination  and  solemnly  pledging  themselves  to  sup 
port  your  measures,  to  maintain  the  embargo,  or  go  to 
war  if  necessary,  —  to  do  anything  but  submit :  at  that 
very  moment,  instead  of  being  invited  by  a  similar  pa 
triotic  enthusiasm  to  throw  yourselves  in  front,  and  to 
lead  them  on  to  the  honorable  contest,  you  abandon  the 
ground  you  have  already  occupied,  you  check  their  gen- 


1809.  ttEPEAL   OF   EMBARGO.  449 

erous  enthusiasm,  and  leave  them  the  mortification  of 
seeing  their  country  disgraced  by  a  timid,  temporizing 
policy  that  must,  if  persevered  in,  ruin  the  nation." 

Although  events  had  already  proved  that  no  ap 
peal  to  self-respect  called  out  a  response  from  this 
Congress,  Campbell  might  reasonably  suppose  that 
arguments  of  self-interest  would  be  heard ;  and  he 
pressed  one  objection  to  the  bill  which,  in  theory, 
should  have  been  decisive  :  — 

"The  non-intercourse  would  press  most  severely  on 
the  Southern  and  Western  States,  who  depend  chiefly  on 
the  immediate  exchange  of  their  productions  for  foreign 
goods,  and  would  throw  almost  the  whole  commerce  of 
the  nation  into  the  hands  of  the  Eastern  States,  without 
competition,  and  also  add  a  premium  on  their  manu 
factures  at  the  expense  of  the  agricultural  interest  to  the 
South  and  West.  Foreign  goods  being  excluded,  the 
manufacturing  States  would  furnish  the  rest  of  the  Union 
with  their  manufactured  goods  at  their  own  prices." 

A  moment's  reflection  must  have  satisfied  the 
Republicans  that  this  argument  against  the  bill  was 
fatal.  Non-intercourse  must  ruin  the  South,  in  order 
to  offer  an  immense  bribe  to  the  shipping  and  manu 
factures  of  New  England  as  an  inducement  for  New 
England  to  remain  in  the  Union.  The  manufacturing 
interests  never  ventured  to  ask  such  extravagant 
protection  as  was  thrust  upon  them  in  1809  by  the 
fears  of  the  agricultural  States  ;  the  greed  of  corpo 
rate  capital  never  suggested  the  monopoly  created 
for  Eastern  ships  and  factories  by  a  measure  which 

VOL.  iv.  —  29 


450         HISTORY  OF   THE  UNITED   STATES       CH.  19. 

shut  from  America  all  ships  and  manufactures  but 
theirs.  Even  if  but  partially  enforced,  such  legisla 
tion  was  ruinous  to  agriculture. 

Entreaty  and  argument  were  thrown  away.  The 
House  lost  discipline,  self-respect,  and  party  char 
acter.  No  one  felt  responsible  for  any  result,  no 
majority  approved  any  suggestion.  As  the  last  days 
of  the  session  drew  near,  the  machinery  of  legisla 
tion  broke  down,  and  Congress  became  helpless.  So 
strange  and  humiliating  a  spectacle  had  not  before 
been  seen.  The  nation  seemed  sinking  into  the 
weakness  of  dissolution. 

The  paralysis  came  in  a  form  that  could  not  be 
disguised.  While  the  House  disputed  over  one  Non- 
intercourse  Bill,  the  Senate  passed  another ;  and  Feb 
ruary  22  the  House  laid  aside  its  own  measure  in 
order  to  take  up  that  of  the  Senate,  which  contained 
the  disputed  clause  authorizing  letters  of  marque  and 
reprisal  against  nations  that  should  continue  their 
unlawful  edicts  after  repeal  of  the  embargo.  In  pur 
suance  of  its  vote  of  February  7,  the  House  in  com 
mittee  promptly  struck  out  the  reprisal  clause.  Next 
it  rejected  David  R.  Williams's  motion  for  discrimi 
nating  duties.  Ezekiel  Bacon,  perhaps  somewhat 
scandalized  at  the  legislation  he  had  chiefly  caused, 
suggested  the  Federalist  plan  of  authorizing  merchant- 
vessels  to  resist  seizure ;  and  February  25  a  struggle 
occurred  on  the  question  of  permitting  forcible  re 
sistance  by  merchant-vessels.  The  minority  was 
deeply  agitated  as  the  act  of  complete  submission 


1809.  REPEAL  OF  EMBARGO.  451 

became  imminent.  David  R.  Williams  cried  that 
if  the  House  could  so  abandon  national  rights,  they 
deserved  to  be  scoffed  by  all  the  world ;  John  W. 
Eppes  declared  himself  compelled  to  believe  Josiah 
Quincy's  assertion  that  the  majority  could  not  be 
kicked  into  a  war ;  even  the  peaceable  Macon  moved 
a  warlike  amendment.  Vote  after  vote  was  taken ; 
again  and  again  the  ayes  and  noes  were  called  on 
dilatory  motions  of  adjournment;  but  every  motion 
looking  toward  war  was  steadily  voted  down,  and 
in  the  end,  February  27,  the  Non-intercourse  Bill  in 
its  most  unresisting  shape  received  the  approval  of 
the  House.  Not  a  speaker  defended  it ;  at  the  last 
moment  the  charge  was  freely  made  that  the  bill  had 
not  a  single  friend.  The  members  who  voted  for  it 
declared  in  doing  so  that  the  measure  was  a  weak 
and  wretched  expedient,  that  they  detested  it,  and 
took  it  merely  as  a  choice  of  evils ;  but  eighty-one 
members  voted  in  its  favor,  and  only  forty  in  the 
negative.  More  extraordinary  still,  this  non-inter 
course,  which  bound  the  South  to  the  feet  of  New 
England,  was  supported  by  forty-one  Southern  mem 
bers,  while  but  twelve  New  England  representatives 
recorded  their  names  in  its  favor. 

Three  months  afterward,  at  a  moment  when  the 
danger  of  war  seemed  to  have  vanished,  John  Ran 
dolph  recalled  the  memory  of  this  confused  struggle, 
and  claimed  for  President  Jefferson  and  himself  the 
credit  for  having  prevented  a  declaration  of  war.  He 
had  voted  against  the  non-intercourse,  he  said,  be- 


452        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  19. 

cause  he  had  believed  that  he  could  get  rid  of  the  em 
bargo  on  still  better  terms ;  others  had  voted  against 
it  because  they  thought  it  absolute  disgrace : l  — 

"  The  fact  is  that  oobody  would  advocate  it;  that 
though  it  was  carried  by  a  majority  of  two  to  one,  those 
who  finally  voted  for  it  condemned  it,  and  all  parties 
seemed  ashamed  of  it ;  and  that  ...  all  the  high-toned 
men  and  high-toned  presses  in  this  country  denounced 
the  majority  of  this  House  for  passing  that  law,  as 
having  utterly  disgraced  themselves.  ...  If  the  great 
leaders  could  have  been  gratified,  according  to  their  own 
showing  they  would  have  dragged  this  country  into  a 
war  with  Great  Britain.  .  .  .  NOWT  to  be  sure,  sir,  those 
persons  who  undertook  to  stop  their  wild  career  were 
composed  of  heterogeneous  materials ;  .  .  .  there  were 
minority  men,  caucus  men,  protesters,  —  in  fact,  sir,  all 
parties,  Catholics,  Protestants,  Seceders,  —  and  all  were 
united  in  the  effort  to  prevent  the  leaders  of  both  Houses 
from  plunging  the  nation  into  a  war  with  one  Power  and 
knuckling  to  the  other ;  from  riveting  the  chains  of 
French  influence,  perhaps  of  French  alliance  upon  us. 
Thank  God  that  their  designs  were  proclaimed  to  the 
nation,  that  the  President  did  not  give  his  consent,  which 
would  have  made  us  kick  the  beam.  Yes,  sir!  Feder 
alists,  minority  men,  protesters,  and  all  would  have 
kicked  the  beam  if  it  had  ever  emanated  from  the  Cabinet 
that  the  President  was  for  war." 

If  Randolph  was  right,  the  "  wand  of  the  magi 
cian  "  had  not  been  broken  ;  and  other  observers  be 
sides  Randolph'  held  the  same  opinion.  "  Jefferson 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  1809-1810  ;  part  i.  149,  150. 


1809. 


REPEAL  OF   EMBARGO.  453 


has  triumphed,"  wrote  Josiah  Quincy,  February  27, 
immediately  after  the  repeal ;  "  his  intrigues  have 
prevailed."  l 

In  a  spirit  widely  different  from  that  of  Randolph 
and  Quincy,  Nathaniel  Macon,  February  28,  wrote 
to  his  friend  Nicholson, — 

"  Otis,  the  Secretary  of  the  Senate,  has  this  moment 
informed  the  House  of  Representatives  that  the  Senate 
have  agreed  to  the  amendments  made  by  the  House  to 
the  Bill  to  repeal  the  embargo. 

"  The  Lord,  the  mighty  Lord,  must  come  to  our  assist 
ance,  or  I  fear  we  are  undone  as  a  nation !  " 2 

1  Quincy 's  Life  of  Quincy,  p.  185. 

2  Macon  to  Nicholson,  Feb.  28,  1809;  Nicholson  MSS. 


CHAPTER   XX. 

THE  repeal  of  the  embargo,  which  received  the 
President's  signature  March  1,  closed  the  long  reign 
of  President  Jefferson ;  and  with  but  one  exception 
the  remark  of  John  Randolph  was  destined  to  remain 
true,  that  "  never  has  there  been  any  Administration 
which  went  out  of  office  and  left  the  nation  in  a  state 
so  deplorable  and  calamitous."  That  the  blame  for 
this  failure  rested  wholly  upon  Jefferson  might  be 
doubted  ;  but  no  one  felt  more  keenly  than  he  the 
disappointment  under  which  his  old  hopes  and  am 
bitions  were  crushed. 

Loss  of  popularity  was  his  bitterest  trial.  He  who 
longed  like  a  sensitive  child  for  sympathy  and  love 
left  office  as  strongly  and  almost  as  generally  dis 
liked  as  the  least  popular  President  who  preceded 
or  followed  him.  He  had  undertaken  to  create  a 
government  which  should  interfere  in  no  way  with 
private  action,  and  he  had  created  one  which  inter 
fered  directly  in  the  concerns  of  every  private  citizen 
in  the  land.  He  had  come  into  power  as  the  cham 
pion  of  State-rights,  and  had  driven  States  to  the 
verge  of  armed  resistance.  He  had  begun  by  claim 
ing  credit  for  stern  economy,  and  ended  by  exceeding 


1809.  JEFFERSON'S   RETIREMENT.  455 

the  expenditure  of  his  predecessors  He  had  invented 
a  policy  of  peace,  and  his  invention  resulted  in  the 
necessity  of  lighting  at  once  the  two  greatest  Powers 
in  the  world. 

The  feelings  of  the  New  England  Democrats  have 
been  described  in  their  own  words.  Angry  as  Ezekiel 
Bacon  and  Joseph  Story  were,  their  bitterness  against 
Jefferson  was  hardly  so  great  as  that  of  the  Clintoni- 
ans  in  New  York  ;  but  the  same  irritation  extended 
even  into  the  compact  democracy  of  Pennsylvania. 
In  the  preceding  summer,  before  the  Presidential 
election,  A.  J.  Dallas  said  to  Gallatin  : l  "  I  verily  be 
lieve  one  year  more  of  writing,  speaking,  and  appoint 
ing  would  render  Mr.  Jefferson  a  more  odious  Presi 
dent,  even  to  the  Democrats,  than  John  Adams."  So 
far  as  could  be  judged  from  the  conduct  of  the  party, 
the  prophecy  became  truth.  The  Southern  Republi 
cans,  always  loyal  to  a  Southern  President,  would  not 
openly  turn  against  their  old  leader,  but  the  Northern 
Democrats  made  no  disguise  of  their  aversion. 

Not  even  in  .1798  had  factiousness  been  so  violent  as 
in  the  last  month  of  President  Jefferson's  power ;  in 
1800  the  country  in  comparison  had  been  contented. 
Feb.  23, 1809,  nearly  three  weeks  after  the  disastrous 
overthrow  of  the  embargo  in  Congress,  the  Connecti 
cut  legislature  met  in  special  session  to  "  interpose  " 
between  the  people  and  the  national  government.  In 
a  Report  echoing  the  words  of  Governor  Trumbull's 
speech,  the  House  instantly  approved  his  refusal  to  aid 

1  Dallas  to  Gallatin,  July  30,  1808;  Adams's  Gallatin,  p.  372. 


456        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  20. 

in  carrying  out  the  "  unconstitutional  and  despotic " 
Enforcement  Act,  and  pledged  itself  to  join  the  legis 
lature  of  Massachusetts  in  the  measures  proposed  "to 
give  to  the  commercial  States  their  fair  and  just 
consideration  in  the  Union." l  The  spirit  in  which 
Massachusetts  meant  to  act  was  shown  in  a  formal 
Address  to  the  People  issued  by  her  Legislature 
March  1,  bearing  the  official  signatures  of  Harrison 
Gray  Otis,  President  of  the  Senate,  and  Timothy 
Bigelow,  Speaker  of  the  House. 

"  Protesting  in  the  sight  of  God  the  sincerity  of 
their  attachment  to  the  Union  of  the  States,  and  their 
determination  to  cherish  and  preserve  it  at  every 
hazard  until  it  shall  fail  to  secure  to  them  those 
blessings  which  alone  give  value  to  any  form  of  gov 
ernment,"  the  Massachusetts  legislature  laid  before 
the  people  of  the  State  certain  Reports  and  measures 
adopted  for  the  purpose  of  impeding  the  embargo 
laws,  and  apologized  for  having  done  no  more,  on 
the  ground  that  more  could  not  have  been  done 
"  without  authorizing  a  forcible  resistance  to  Acts  of 
Congress,  —  an  ultimate  resource  so  deeply  to  be  de 
precated  that  the  cases  which  might  justify  it  should 
not  be  trusted  even  to  the  imagination  until  they 
actually  happen."  Less  than  forty  years  before,  Mas 
sachusetts  had  used  much  the  same  language  in  re 
gard  to  Acts  of  Parliament,  and  the  world  knew  what 
then  followed ;  but  even  in  the  bitterest  controversies 

1  Report  and  Resolutions,  National  Intelligencer,  March  10, 
1809. 


1809.  JEFFERSON'S   RETIREMENT. 


over  Stamp  Act  or  Port  Bill,  the  General  Court  of 
Massachusetts  had  never  insulted  King  George  as 
they  insulted  President  Jefferson.  The  Address  at 
great  length  asserted  that  his  Government  was  labor 
ing  under  "  an  habitual  and  impolitic  predilection  for 
France ; "  and  even  in  making  this  assertion  it  apolo 
gized  for  England  in  terms  which  echoed  the  words 
of  Canning  and  Castlereagh  :  — 

"Without  pretending  to  compare  and  adjust  the  re 
spective  injuries  sustained  from  the  two  nations,  it  can 
not  be  disguised  that  in  some  instances  our  nation  has 
received  from  Great  Britain  compensation ;  in  others 
offers  of  atonement,  and  in  all  the  language  of  concilia 
tion  and  respect." 

On  the  other  hand,  war  with  England  must  lead 
to  alliance  with  France ;  and  that  a  connection  with 
France  "  must  be  forever  fatal  to  the  liberty  and  inde 
pendence  of  the  nation  is  obvious  to  all  who  are  not 
blinded  by  partiality  and  passion." 

Such  reasoning  had  the  merits  of  its  emphasis. 
The  case  of  forcible  resistance  which  could  not  be 
trusted  to  the  imagination  until  it  happened  pointed 
designedly  to  a  war  with  England,  which,  being  equiv 
alent  to  a  connection  with  France,  must  be  forever 
fatal  to  the  liberty  and  independence  of  the  United 
States.  The  dogma  that  a  British  war  must  dissolve 
the  Union  had  become  more  than  ever  an  article  of 
Federalist  faith.  Even  Rufus  King,  writing  to  Pick 
ering,  January  31,  said:1  "The  embargo,  as  we  are 
1  King  to  Pickering,  Jan.  31,  1809;  Pickering  MSS. 


458         HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  20. 

now  told,  is  to  give  way  to  war.  If  the  project  be  to 
unite  with  France  against  England,  the  Union  cannot 
be  preserved."  To  prevent  war  with  England  was  to 
prevent  a  dissolution  of  the  Union ;  and  the  legisla 
ture  of  Massachusetts,  acting  on  that  idea,  closed  what 
it  called  its  "  Patriotick  Proceedings,"  by  declaring 
to  the  people  of  the  Commonwealth  the  measures  by 
which  alone  the  Union  could  be  saved :  — 

"  As  the  malady  is  deep,  you  will  still  be  deceived  by 
trusting  to  any  temporary  relief.  You  must  realize  and 
comprehend  the  nature  of  your  peculiar  interests,  and  by 
steady,  persevering,  and  well-concerted  efforts  rise  into 
an  attitude  to  promote  and  preserve  them.  The  farmer 
must  remember  that  his  prosperity  is  inseparable  from 
that  of  the  merchant ;  and  that  there  is  little  affinity 
between  his  condition  and  habits  and  those  of  a  South 
ern  planter.  The  interests  of  New  England  must  be 
defined,  understood,  and  firmly  represented.  A  perfect 
intelligence  must  be  cultivated  among  those  States,  and 
a  united  effort  must  be  made  and  continued  to  acquire 
their  just  influence  in  the  national  government.  For  this 
purpose  the  Constitution  should  be  amended,  and  the  pro 
vision  which  gives  to  holders  of  slaves  a  representation 
equal  to  that  of  six  hundred  thousand  free  citizens  should 
be  abolished.  Experience  proves  the  injustice,  and  time 
will  increase  the  inequality,  of  this  principle,  the  original 
reason  for  which  has  entirely  failed.  Other  amendments 
to  secure  commerce  and  navigation  from  a  repetition  of 
destructive  and  insidious  theories  are  indispensable." 

Such  were  the  conditions  on  which  Massachusetts 
must  insist :  — > 


1809.  JEFFERSON'S   RETIREMENT.  459 

"  The  Legislature  are  aware  that  their  measures  and 
sentiments  will  encourage  their  opponents  in  propagating 
the  foul  imputation  of  a  design  to  dismember  the  Union. 
But  when  did  party  malice  want  a  theme  to  excite  popu 
lar  prejudice?  When  did  it  have  recourse  to  one  more 
absurd  and  unfounded?" 

The  object  of  the  Federalist  majority  was  to 
strengthen  the  Union,  —  so  they  protested  and  so  they 
doubtless  believed  ;  but  in  truth  they  insisted  upon 
creating  a  new  Union  as  a  condition  of  their  remain 
ing  in  the  old.  The  fatal  word  "  must "  ran  through 
all  their  demands  :  — 

"  If  the  Southern  States  are  disposed  to  avail  them 
selves  of  the  advantages  resulting  from  our  strength  and 
resources  for  common  defence,  they  must  be  willing  to 
patronize  the  interests  of  navigation  and  commerce  with 
out  which  our  strength  will  be  weakness.  If  they  wish 
to  appropriate  a  portion  of  the  public  revenue  toward 
roads,  canals,  or  for  the  purchase  of  arms  and  the  im 
provement  of  their  militia,  they  must  consent  that  you 
who  purchase  your  own  arms,  and  have  already  roads, 
canals,  and  militia  in  most  excellent  order,  shall  have 
another  portion  of  it  devoted  to  naval  protection.  If 
they  in  the  spirit  of  chivalry  are  ready  to  rush  into  an 
unnecessary  and  ruinous  war  with  one  nation,  they  must 
suffer  you  to  pause  before  you  bid  an  eternal  adieu  to 
your  independence  by  an  alliance  with  another." 

Union  of  New  England  against  the  national  Union 

—  an  idea  hitherto  confined  to  the  brain  of  Timothy 

Pickering  —  had   become  the    avowed   object   of  the 

Massachusetts  and  Connecticut  legislatures.     "Noth- 


460         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  20. 

ing  less  than  a  perfect  union  and  intelligence  among 
the  Eastern  States "  could  answer  the  objects  of 
Pickering;  but  side  by  side  with  the  perfect  union 
of  the  Eastern  States  went  a  perfect  intelligence  be- 

\/  tween  those  States  and  the  British  government.  On 
one  side,  Pickering  maintained  relations  with  Rose ; 

^on  the  other,  Sir  James  Craig  kept  a  secret  agent  at 
Boston.  January  26,  at  the  moment  when  the  crisis 
of  war  or  peace  was  about  to  be  decided  at  Washing 
ton,  Mr.  Ryland  at  Quebec,  on  behalf  of  the  Governor- 
General  of  Canada,  sent  for  John  Henry  to  undertake 
another  winter  journey  through  New  England.1  His 
instructions,  dated  February  6  and  signed  by  Sir 
James  Craig  himself,  enjoined  the  utmost  secrecy,  and 
restricted  Henry  to  the  task  of  ascertaining  how  far, 
in  case  of  war,  the  Federalists  of  the  Eastern  States 
would  look  to  England  for  assistance,  or  be  disposed 
to  enter  into  a  connection  with  the  British  govern 
ment.2  Only  in  case  the  Federalist  leaders  should 
express  a  wish  to  that  effect  was  Henry  cautiously  to 
avow  his  official  character,  and  to  receive  any  commu 
nication  for  transmitted,  February  10  Henry  started 
on  this  errand,  but  before  he  reached  Boston  the 
news  that  Congress  had  decided  to  repeal  the  em 
bargo  without  declaring  war  left  him  little  to  do. 
He  remained  quietly  in  Boston,  in  familiar  relations 

1  Ryland    to    John    Henry,  Jan.   26,    1809;    State    Papers, 
iii.  546. 

2  Sir  James  Craig  to  John  Henry,  Feb.  6,  1809 ;  State  Papers, 
iii.  546, 


1809.  JEFFERSON'S   RETIREMENT.  461 

with  the  Federalist  leaders,1  without  betraying  his 
errand ;  and  the  substance  of  his  reports  to  the 
governor-general  amounted  only  to  a  decided  opinion 
that  the  Federalists  were  not  yet  ready  to  act :  "  I 
can  assure  you  that  at  this  moment  they  do  not 
freely  entertain  the  project  of  withdrawing  the  East 
ern  States  from  the  Union,  rinding  it  a  very  unpopu 
lar  topic."  2  Until  midsummer,  when  the  last  fear  of 
war  vanished,  this  accredited  agent  of  the  governor- 
general  waited  at  Boston  for  events.  "  His  manners 
being  gentlemanly  and  his  letters  of  introduction 
good,"  said  Josiah  Quincy,  "  he  was  admitted  freely 
into  society  and  heard  the  conversation  at  private 
tables." 

Had  Jefferson  known  that  a  British  emissary  was 
secretly  waiting  at  Boston  to  profit  by  the  result  of 
eight  years'  Republican  policy,  he  could  not  but  have 
felt  deep  personal  mortification  mingled  with  his 
sense  of  wrong.  Of  all  Jefferson's  hopes,  perhaps  the 
warmest  had  been  that  of  overthrowing  the  power 
of  his  New  England  enemies,  —  those  whom  he  had 
once  called  the  monarchical  Federalists, — the  clergy  V" 
and  the  Essex  Junto.  Instead  of  overthrowing  them 
he  had  given  them,  for  the  first  time  in  their  lives,  ; 
unlimited  power  for  mischief ;  he  had  overthrown 
only  the  moderate  Federalists,  who  when  forced  to 
choose  between  treason  and  embargo  submitted  to 
the  embargo  and  hated  its  author.  The  Essex 

1  Quincy's  Life  of  Quincy,  p.  250. 

2  Henry  to  Sir  J.  Craig,  March  7,  1809;  State  Papers,  iii.  549. 


462        HISTORY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES.      CH.  20. 

Junto  became  supreme  in  New  England ;  and  be 
hind  it  stood  the  power  of  Great  Britain,  ready  to 
interpose,  if  necessary,  for  its  defence. 

Jefferson  submitted  in  silence,  and  even  with  an 
air  of  approval,  to  the  abrupt  abandonment  of  his 
favorite  measure.  He  admitted  that  the  embargo 
had  failed  ;  he  even  exaggerated  its  evils,  and  de 
scribed  it  as  more  costly  than  war.  His  language 
implied  that  the  failure  of  peaceable  coercion  was  no 
longer  a  matter  of  doubt  in  his  mind. 

u  The  belligerent  edicts,"  he  wrote  to  Armstrong,1 
"  rendered  our  embargo  necessary  to  call  home  our  ships, 
oar  seamen,  and  property.  We  expected  some  effect, 
too,  from  the  coercion  of  interest.  Some  it  has  had,  but 
much  less  on  account  of  evasions  and  domestic  opposition 
to  it.  After  fifteen  months'  continuance,  it  is  now  dis 
continued  because,  losing  fifty  million  dollars  of  exports 
annually  by  it,  it  costs  more  than  war,  which  might  be 
carried  on  for  a  third  of  that,  besides  what  might  be  got 
by  reprisal." 

To  Dupont  de  Nemours  Jefferson  wrote  in  the  same 
strain.2  He  signed  without  the  betrayal  of  a  protest 
the  bill  repealing  the  embargo,  and  talked  of  war  as 
a  necessary  evil.  Not  until  more  than  a  year  after 
ward  did  he  admit  the  bitterness  of  his  disappoint 
ment  and  mortification  ;  but  July  16,  1810,  he  wrote 
to  his  old  Secretary  of  War  a  letter  which  expressed, 

1  Jefferson  to  Armstrong,  March  5,  1809 ;  Works,  v.  433. 

2  Jefferson  to  Dupont  de  Nemours,  March  2,  1809  ;  Works, 
v.  432. 


1809.  JEFFERSON'S  RETIREMENT.  463 

in   his   familiar  note  of  irritability,  the  feelings  he 
had  pent  up:1  — 

"  The  Federalists  during  their  short-lived  ascendency 
have  nevertheless,  by  forcing  us  from  the  embargo,  in 
flicted  a  wound  on  our  interests  which  can  never  be 
cured,  and  on  our  affections  which  will  require  time  to 
cicatrize.  I  ascribe  all  this  to  one  pseudo-Republican,  — 
Story.  He  came  on  in  place  of  Crowninshield,  I  believe,1^ 
and  stayed  only  a  few  days,  —  long  enough,  however,  to 
get  complete  hold  of  Bacon,  who,  giving  in  to  his  repre 
sentations,  became  panic-struck,  and  communicated  the 
panic  to  his  colleagues,  and  they  to  a  majority  of  the 
sound  members  of  Congress.  They  believed  in  the  alter 
native  of  repeal  or  civil  war,  and  produced  the  fatal 
measure  of  repeal.  ...  I  have  ever  been  anxious  to 
avoid  a  war  with  England  unless  forced  by  a  situation 
more  losing  than  war  itself ;  but  I  did  believe  we  could 
coerce  her  to  justice  by  peaceable  means;  and  the  em 
bargo,  evaded  as  it  was,  proved  it  would  have  coerced 
her  had  it  been  honestly  executed.  The  proof  she  ex 
hibited  on  that  occasion  that  she  can  exercise  such  an 
influence  in  this  country  as  to  control  the  will  of  its  gov 
ernment  and  three  fourths  of  its  people  is  to  me  the 
most  mortifying  circumstance  which  has  occurred  since 
the  establishment  of  our  government." 

In  truth,  the  disaster  was  appalling  ;  and  Jefferson 
described  it  in  moderate  terms  by  admitting  that  the 
policy  of  peaceable  coercion  brought  upon  him  morti 
fication  such  as  no  other  President  ever  suffered.  So 
complete  was  his  overthrow  that  his  popular  influence 

1  Jefferson  to  Dearborn,  July  15,  1810;  Works,  v.  529. 


464        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  20. 

declined  even  in  the  South.  Twenty  years  elapsed 
before  his  political  authority  recovered  power  over 
the  Northern  people ;  for  not  until  the  embargo  and 
its  memories  faded  from  men's  minds  did  the  mighty 
shadow  of  Jefferson's  Revolutionary  name  efface  the 
ruin  of  his  Presidency.  Yet  he  clung  with  more  and 
more  tenacity  to  the  faith  that  his  theory  of  peace 
able  coercion  was  sound ;  and  when  within  a  few 
months  of  his  death  he  alluded  for  the  last  time  to 
the  embargo,  he  spoke  of  it  as  "  a  measure  which, 
persevered  in  a  little  longer,  we  had  subsequent  and 
satisfactory  assurance  would  have  effected  its  object 
completely."  l 

A.  discomfiture  so  conspicuous  could  not  fail  to 
bring  in  its  train  a  swarm  of  petty  humiliations  which 
for  the  moment  were  more  painful  than  the  great 
misfortune.  Jefferson  had  hoped  to  make  his  country 
forever  pure  and  free ;  to  abolish  war,  with  its  train 
of  debt,  extravagance,  corruption,  and  tyranny ;  to 
build  up  a  government  devoted  only  to  useful  and 
moral  objects ;  to  bring  upon  earth  a  new  era  of  peace 
and  good-will  among  men.  Throughout  the  twistings 
and  windings  of  his  course  as  President  he  clung  to 
this  main  idea ;  or  if  he  seemed  for  a  moment  to 
forget  it,  he  never  failed  to  return  and  to  persist  with 
almost  heroic  obstinacy  in  enforcing  its  lessons.  By 
repealing  the  embargo,  Congress  avowedly  and  even 
maliciously  rejected  and  trampled  upon  the  only  part 
of  Jefferson's  statesmanship  which  claimed  originality, 
1  Jefferson  to  W.  B.  Giles,  Dec.  25,  1825;  Works,  vii.  424. 


1809.  JEFFERSON'S   RETIREMENT.  465 

or  which  in  his  own  opinion  entitled  him  to  rank  as  a 
philosophic  legislator.  The  mortification  he  felt  was 
natural  and  extreme,  but  such  as  every  great  states 
man  might  expect,  and  such  as  most  of  them  expe 
rienced.  The  supreme  bitterness  of  the  moment  lay 
rather  in  the  sudden  loss  of  respect  and  consideration 
which  at  all  times  marked  the  decline  of  power,  but 
became  most  painful  when  the  surrender  of  office 
followed  a  political  defeat  at  the  hands  of  supposed 
friends. 

The  last  days  of  his  authority  were  embittered  by 
a  personal  slight  which  wounded  him  deeply.  After 
the  peace  of  Tilsit  the  Emperor  Alexander  of  Russia 
expressed  a  wish  to  exchange  ministers  with  the 
United  States  government.  In  every  point  of  view 
America  must  gain  by  winning  the  friendship  of 
Russia;  and  much  as  Jefferson  disliked  multiplying 
diplomatic  offices,  he  could  not  but  feel  that  at  a 
time  when  his  ministers  were  likely  at  any  moment 
to  be  driven  from  France  and  England,  nothing  could 
be  more  useful  than  to  secure  a  foothold  at  St.  Peters 
burg.  Without  loss  of  time  he  created  the  mission, 
and  appointed  his  old  personal  friend  William  Short 
to  the  new  post.  In  August,  1808,  during  the  recess 
of  Congress,  he  sent  Short  to  Europe,  with  orders  to 
stop  at  Paris  until  the  Senate  should  confirm  his 
appointment.  For  political  reasons  Jefferson  waited 
till  the  close  of  the  session,  and  then,  February  24, 
made  this  appointment  the  subject  of  his  last  Mes 
sage  to  the  Senate,  explaining  the  motives  which  had 

VOL.  IV.  — 30 


466         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  20. 

induced  him  to  create  a  diplomatic  agency  at  St. 
Petersburg,  and  announcing  that  Short  had  received 
his  commission  and  had  gone  to  Europe  six  months 
before  on  this  errand. 

No  sooner  had  the  Senate,  on  receiving  this  Mes 
sage,  gone  into  executive  session  than  Senator  Bradley 
of  Vermont  offered  a  Resolution  that  any  intercourse 
with  Russia,  such  as  the  President  suggested,  might 
"  be  carried  on  with  equal  facility  and  effect  by  other 
public  agents  of  the  United  States  without  the  ex 
pense  of  a  permanent  minister  plenipotentiary ; "  or 
in  case  of  sudden  negotiations  for  peace  in  Europe, 
"  the  permanent  minister  at  any  of  the  Courts  thereof 
may  be  instructed  to  attend  on  the  same ; "  and  that 
for  these  reasons  the  proposed  appointment  was  at 
present  inexpedient  and  unnecessary.  After  much 
secret  debate,  Senator  Bradley,  February  27,  with 
drew  his  motion,  and  the  Senate  then  abruptly  and 
unanimously  rejected  Short's  nomination. 

The  discourtesy  was  flagrant.  As  a  matter  of 
policy  the  new  mission  might  fairly  be  subject  for 
argument ;  and  the  Senate  had  a  right,  if  it  chose, 
to  follow  its  own  opinions  on  such  a  subject.  Un 
reasonable  as  was  the  idea  of  sending  hither  and 
thither  the  American  ministers  "  at  any  of  the  Courts 
of  Europe,"  when  every  senator  knew  that  on  the 
continent  of  Europe  America  had  but  one  minister, 
and  even  he  was  on  the  verge  of  dismissal  or  recall ; 
ill-judged  as  was  the  assertion  that  a  consular  agent 
could  carry  on  "  with  equal  facility  and  effect "  at  a 


1809.  JEFFERSON'S  RETIREMENT.  467 

Court  like  that  of  St.  Petersburg  a  diplomatic  inter 
course  which  would  need  every  resource  of  public  and 
private  influence ;  narrow  as  was  the  policy  of  refus 
ing  "  the  expense  of  a  permanent  minister  plenipoten 
tiary  "  to  the  only  nation  in  the  world  which  offered 
her  friendship  at  a  moment  when  England  and  France 
were  doing  their  utmost  to  spare  America  the  ex 
pense  of  legations  at  London  and  Paris,  —  yet  these 
objections  to  Jefferson's  wish  were  such  as  the  Senate 
might  naturally  make,  for  they  were  the  established 
creed  of  the  Republican  party,  and  no  one  had  done 
more  than  Jefferson  himself  to  erect  them  into  a 
party  dogma.  Dislike  of  diplomacy  was  a  relic  of 
the  old  colonial  status  when  America  had  been  de 
pendent  on  Europe,  —  a  prejudice  rising  chiefly  from 
an  uneasy  sense  of  social  disadvantage.  Whenever 
America  should  become  strong  and  self-confident, 
these  petty  jealousies  were  sure  to  disappear,  and 
her  relations  with  other  Powers  would  be  controlled 
solely  by  her  wants ;  but  meanwhile  the  Senate  in 
every  emergency  might  be  expected  to  embarrass  the 
relations  of  the  Executive  with  foreign  governments, 
and  to  give  untenable  reasons  for  its  conduct.  That 
the  Senate  should  object,  could  have  been  no  surprise 
to  Jefferson ;  but  that  it  should  without  even  a  pri 
vate  explanation  reject  abruptly  and  unanimously  the 
last  personal  favor  asked  by  a  President  for  whom 
every  Republican  senator  professed  friendship,  and 
from  whom  most  had  received  innumerable  favors, 
seemed  an  unpardonable  insult.  So  Jefferson  felt 


468         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  20. 

it.     He   wrote   to   Short   in   accents   of   undisguised 
mortification :  — 

"  It  is  with  much  concern  I  inform  you  that  the  Senate 
has  negatived  your  appointment.  We  thought  it  best  to 
keep  back  the  nomination  to  the  close  of  the  session, 
that  the  mission  might  remain  secret  as  long  as  possible, 
which  you  know  was  our  purpose  from  the  beginning. 
It  was  then  sent  in  with  an  explanation  of  its  object 
and  motives.  We  took  for  granted,  if  any  hesitation 
should  arise,  that  the  Senate  would  take  time,  and  that 
our  friends  in  that  body  would  make  inquiries  of  us  and 
give  us  the  opportunity  of  explaining  and  removing  ob 
jections  ;  but  to  our  great  surprise  and  with  an  unexam 
pled  precipitancy  they  rejected  it  at  once.  This  reception 
of  the  last  of  my  official  communications  to  them  could 
not  be  unfelt."1 

Senators  attempted  explanations :  Short  had  been 
too  long  in  the  diplomatic  service  or  resident  abroad  ; 
the  diplomatic  connections  of  the  United  States  with 
Europe  were  already  too  extensive,  and  rather  than 
send  more  ministers  those  actually  abroad  should 
be  recalled  ;  "  riveted  to  the  system  of  unentangle- 
ment  with  Europe,"  the  Senate,  though  sensible  of 
"  the  great  virtues,  the  high  character,  the  powerful 
influence,  and  valuable  friendship  of  the  Emperor," 
declined  the  honor  of  relations  with  him.  Yet  these 
reasons  showed  only  that  the  Senate  felt  as  little  re 
gard  for  Jefferson's  opinions  and  feelings  as  for  those 
of  the  Czar.  The  manner  of  the  rejection,  even  more 

1  Jefferson  to  W.  Short,  March  8,  1809;  Works,  v.  435. 


1809.  JEFFERSON'S  RETIREMENT.  469 

than  the  rejection  itself,  proved  the  willingness  of  the 
President's  oldest  friends  to  inflict  what  they  knew 
to  be  a  painful  wound  on  the  self-respect  of  a  fallen 
leader. 

These  mortifications,  which  rapidly  followed  each 
other  in  the  last  days  of  February,  were  endured  by 
Jefferson  with  dignity  and  in  silence.  Perhaps  sena 
tors  would  have  better  understood  and  might  have 
more  respected  a  vigorous  burst  of  anger,  even  at 
some  cost  of  dignity,  than  they  did  the  self-restraint 
of  the  sensitive  gentleman  who  had  no  longer  a  wish 
but  to  escape  from  Washington  and  seek  peace  in 
the  calm  of  Monticello.  He  could  with  only  a  pang 
of  mortified  pride  write  his  excuses  to  the  Emperor 
Alexander  and  to  William  Short,  and  dismiss  the 
matter  forever  from  his  mind.  Public  annoyances 
were  for  him  nearly  at  an  end,  and  could  never  re 
cur  ;  but  unfortunately  these  public  trials  came  upon 
him  at  a  moment  when  his  private  anxieties  were 
extreme. 

In  his  style  of  life  as  President,  Jefferson  had  in 
dulged  in  such  easy  and  liberal  expenses  as  suited 
the  place  he  held.  Far  from  showing  extravagance, 
the  White  House  and  its  surroundings  had  in  his 
time  the  outward  look  of  a  Virginia  plantation.  The 
President  was  required  to  pay  the  expenses  of  the 
house  and  grounds.  In  consequence,  the  grounds 
were  uncared  for,  the  palings  broken  or  wanting,  the 
paths  undefined,  and  the  place  a  waste,  running  im 
perceptibly  into  the  barren  fields  about  it.  Within, 


470        HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  20. 

the  house  was  as  simple  as  without,  after  the  usual 
style  of  Virginia  houses,  where  the  scale  was  often 
extravagant  but  the  details  plain.  Only  in  his  table 
did  Jefferson  spend  an  unusual  amount  of  money 
with  excellent  results  for  his  political  influence,  for 
no  President  ever  understood  better  than  Jefferson 
the  art  of  entertaining ;  yet  his  table  cost  him  no  ex 
cessive  sums.  For  the  best  champagne  he  paid  less 
than  a  dollar  a  bottle ;  for  the  best  Bordeaux  he  paid 
a  dollar ;  and  the  Madeira  which  was  drunk  in  pipes 
at  the  White  House  cost  between  fifty  and  sixty  cents 
a  bottle.  His  French  cook  and  cook's  assistant  were 
paid  about  four  hundred  dollars  a  year.  On  such  a 
scale  his  salary  of  twenty-five  thousand  dollars  was 
equivalent  to  fully  sixty  thousand  dollars  of  modern 
money ;  and  his  accounts  showed  that  for  the  first 
and  probably  the  most  expensive  year  of  his  Presi 
dency  he  spent  only  116,800  which  could  properly  be 
charged  to  his  public  and  official  character.1  A  mode 
of  life  so  simple  and  so  easily  controlled  should  in 
a  village  like  Washington  have  left  no  opening  for 
arrears  of  debt ;  but  when  Jefferson,  about  to  quit  the 
White  House  forever,  attempted  to  settle  his  accounts, 
he  discovered  that  he  had  exceeded  his  income.  Not 
his  expenses  as  President,  but  his  expenses  as  planter 
dragged  him  down.  At  first  he  thought  that  his 
debts  would  reach  seven  or  eight  thousand  dollars, 
which  must  be  discharged  from  a  private  estate  hardly 

1  Jefferson's   Financial   Diary.      Harper's   Magazine,    March, 
1885,  pp.  534-542. 


1809.  JEFFERSON'S   RETIREMENT.  471 

exceeding  two  hundred  thousand  dollars  in  value  at 
the  best  of  times,  and  rendered  almost  worthless  by 
neglect  and  by  the  embargo.  The  sudden  demand 
for  this  sum  of  money,  coming  at  the  moment  of  his 
political  mortifications,  wrung  from  him  cries  of  genu 
ine  distress  such  as  no  public  disaster  had  called  out. 
He  wrote  to  his  commission-merchant  entreating  him 
to  borrow  the  money  :  — 

"  Since  I  have  become  sensible  of  this  deficit  I  have 
been  under  an  agony  of  mortification,  and  therefore  must 
solicit  as  much  urgency  in  the  negotiation  as  the  case 
will  admit.  My  intervening  nights  will  be  almost  sleep 
less,  as  nothing  could  be  more  distressing  to  me  than  to 
leave  debts  here  unpaid,  if  indeed  I  should  be  permitted 
to  depart  with  them  unpaid,  of  which  I  am  by  no  means 
certain."  1 

Large  as  it  was,  this  estimate  of  the  debt  fell  far 
short  of  the  reality.  The  arrears  amounted  in  truth 
to  twenty  thousand  dollars.2  Nothing  but  immediate 
and  rigid  economy  could  restore  the  loss,  and  even 
with  every  advantage  Jefferson  could  never  hope  to 
live  again  upon  his  old  scale  without  incurring  bank 
ruptcy  ;  he  must  cease  to  be  a  grand  seigneur,  or  drag 
his  family  into  the  ruin  which  seemed  to  be  the  fate 
of  every  Virginian. 

Under  the  weight  of  these  troubles,  public  and  pri 
vate,  Jefferson's  longing  to  escape  became  intense ; 
and  his  letters  repeated,  in  accents  more  and  more 
earnest,  the  single  wish  that  filled  his  mind. 

1  Domestic  Life  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  p.  400. 

2  Randall's  Jefferson,  iii.  326. 


472        HISTORY  OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.       CH.  20. 

"  I  shall  within  a  few  days,"  he  wrote  February  25, 1 
44  divest  myself  of  the  anxieties  and  the  label's  with 
which  I  have  been  oppressed,  and  retire  with  inexpres 
sible  delight  to  my  family,  my  friends,  my  farms,  and 
books.  There  I  may  indulge  at  length  in  that  tranquil 
lity  and  those  pursuits  from  which  I  have  been  divorced 
by  the  character  of  the  times  in  which  I  have  lived, 
and  which  have  forced  me  into  the  line  of  political  life 
under  a  sense  of  duty  and  against  a  great  and  constant 
aversion  to  it." 

March  2  he  wrote  to  Dnpont  de  Nemours,2  in 
stronger  terms  of  weariness  and  disgust :  "  Never 
did  a  prisoner  released  from  his  chains  feel  such  re 
lief  as  I  shall  on  shaking  off  the  shackles  of  power. 
Nature  intended  me  for  the  tranquil  pursuits  of  sci 
ence  by  rendering  them  my  supreme  delight."  March 
4  he  rode  once  more  on  horseback  to  the  Capitol,  and 
stood  by  the  side  of  Madison  while  John  Marshall 
administered  the  oath  of  office.  The  weight  of  ad 
ministration  was  at  last  removed,  but  the  longing  for 
home  became  only  the  greater.  March  5  he  wrote 
to  Armstrong : 3  "  Within  two  or  three  days  I  retire 
from  scenes  of  difficulty,  anxiety,  and  of  contending 
passions,  to  the  elysium  of  domestic  affections  and 
the  irresponsible  direction  of  my  own  affairs."  A 
week  afterward  Jefferson  quitted  Washington  forever. 
On  horseback,  over  roads  impassable  to  wheels, 

1  Jefferson  to  Warden,  Feb.  25,  1809;  Jefferson  MSS. 

2  Jefferson  to  Dnpont  de  Nemours,  March  2,  1809  ;  Works, 
v.  432. 

8  Jefferson  to  Armstrong,  March  5,  1809;  Works,  v.  434. 


1809.  JEFFERSON'S  RETIREMENT.  473 

through  snow  and  storm,  he  hurried  back  to  Monti- 
cello  to  recover  in  the  quiet  of  home  the  peace  of 
mind  he  had  lost  in  the  disappointments  of  his 
statesmanship.  He  arrived  at  Monticello  March  15, 
and  never  again  passed  beyond-  the  bounds  of  a  few 
adjacent  counties. 

With  a  sigh  of  relief  which  seemed  as  sincere  and 
deep  as  his  own,  the  Northern  people  saw  him  turn 
his  back  on  the  White  House  and  disappear  from  the 
arena  in  which  he  had  for  sixteen  years  challenged 
every  comer.  In  the  Northern  States  few  regrets 
were  wasted  upon  his  departure,  for  every  mind  was 
intent  on  profiting  by  the  overthrow  of  his  system ; 
but  Virginia  was  still  loyal  to  him,  and  the  citizens 
of  his  own  county  of  Albemarle  welcomed  with  an 
affectionate  address  his  final  return.  His  reply,  dig 
nified  and  full  of  grateful  feeling,  seemed  intended  as 
an  answer  to  the  attacks  of  partisan  grossness  and 
a  challenge  to  the  judgment  of  mankind  :  — 

.  "  The  anxieties  you  express  to  administer  to  my  happi 
ness  do  of  themselves  confer  that  happiness ;  and  the 
measure  will  be  complete  if  my  endeavors  to  fulfil  my 
duties  in  the  several  public  stations  to  which  I  have 
been  called  have  obtained  for  me  the  approbation  of  my 
country.  The  part  which  I  have  acted  on  the  theatre  of 
public  life  has  been  before  them,  and  to  their  sentence  I 
submit  it ;  but  the  testimony  of  my  native  county,  of  the 
individuals  who  have  known  me  in  private  life,  to  my 
conduct  in  its  various  duties  and  relations  is  the  more 
grateful  as  proceeding  from  eye-witnesses  and  observers, 
from  triers  of  the  vicinage.  Of  yon,  then,  my  neighbors, 


474         HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES.      CH.  20. 

I  may  ask  in  the  face  of  the  world,  '  Whose  ox  have  I 
taken,  or  whom  have  I  defrauded?  Whom  have  I  op 
pressed,  or  of  whose  hand  have  I  received  a  bribe  to 
blind  mine  eyes  therewith  ? '  On  your  verdict  I  rest  with 
conscious  security." 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  II. 


ABBOT,  CHARLES,  ii.  97. 

Acts  of  Congress :  of  Jan.  30,  1799, 
called  Logan's  Act,  ii.  236;  of 
March  3,  1805,  regulating  trade 
with  St.  Domingo,  i.  88;  of  Feb. 
13,  1806,  called  the  Two  Million 
Act,  138,  139,  147,  170;  of  Feb.  28, 

1806,  prohibiting  trade  with   St. 
Domingo,   140,   141;   of  April  18, 
1808,   prohibiting  the  importation 
of  certain  goods  from  Great  Britain, 
175;  of  March  29,  1806,  for  laying 
out  the  Cumberland  Road,  181 ;  of 
April  21,  1806,  for  continuing  the 
Mediterranean  Fund,  183;  of  Dec. 
19,  1806,  for  suspending  the  Non 
importation  Act  of  April  18,  1806, 
349;    of  March  3,  1807,  repealing 
the   salt-tax   and   continuing   the 
Mediterranean  Fund,  349,  367,  369; 
of  Feb.    10,   1807,   establishing  a 
coast   survey,    355;    of   March   2, 

1807,  prohibiting  the  importation 
of  slaves,  356-365  ;  of  Dec.  18, 1807, 
providing  for  the  building  of  one 
hundred  and  eighty-eight  gunboats, 
ii.  161 ;  of  Dec.  22,  1807,  for  lay 
ing  an  embargo,  168-176;  of  Jan. 
9,  1808,  supplementary  to  the  em 
bargo,  200 ;  of  March  12,  1808,  sup 
plementary  to  the  embargo,  201- 
204;  of  April  12,  1808,  to  raise  eiprht 
new  regiments,  212-218;   of  April 
22,  1808,  authorizing  the  President 


under  certain  conditions  to  suspend 
the  embargo,  223,  306:  of  Jan.  9, 
1809,  to  enforce  the  embargo,  398- 
400;  of  Jan.  30,  1809,  calling  an 
extra  session  on  the  fourth  Mon 
day  in  May,  424;  of  March  1, 1809, 
to  interdict  commercial  intercourse 
between  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain  and  France,  444-453. 

Adair,  John,  senator  from  Kentucky, 
i.  127,  139;  in  Wilkinson's  confi 
dence,  220,  223,  241,  255,  274;  re 
fuses  to  testify,  282;  accompanies 
Burr  to  Nashville,  287  ;  his  re 
marks  on  Andrew  Jackson,  288; 
starts  for  New  Orleans  by  land, 
291;  Burr's  despatches  to,  295; 
arrives  in  New  Orleans,  and  is  ar 
rested,  324;  discharged  from  cus 
tody,  340. 

Adams,  John,  ii.  455;  his  description 
of  Pickering,  402. 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  senator  from 
Massachusetts,  his  interviews  with 
Jefferson,  i.  129,  430,  431;  his  part 
in  the  Non-importation  Resolu 
tions,  151;  his  remarks  on  Yrujo, 
188  ;  attends  "  Chesapeake  " 
meetings  in  Boston,  ii.  29;  pledged 
to  support  opposition  to  England, 
146;  chairman  of  the  committee 
on  the  embargo,  171;  urges  the 
passage  of  the  Embargo  Act,  173; 
offers  a  resolution  for  removing 


476 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  A^D  II. 


the  embargo,  187;  votes  for  Clin 
ton  and  replies  to  Pickering's  let 
ter,  240  et  seq. ;  resigns  his  seat  in 
the  Senate,  242,  255,  283,  401. 

Alexander,  Czar  of  Russia,  i.  425; 
signs  treaty  of  Tilsit,  ii.  62;  wishes 
diplomatic  relations  with  Jefferson, 
465. 

Alfred,  Maine,  the  town  of,  protests 
against  the  embargo,  ii.  415. 

Allston,  Joseph,  Burr's  son-in-law,  i. 
220, 240  ;  guarantees  Blennerhassett 
from  loss,  260;  with  Burr  in  Ken 
tucky,  260,  268;  to  go  with  re 
cruits  from  Charleston,  265,  266; 
his  part  in  Burr's  trial,  463  et 
seq. 

Allston,  Mrs.  (Theodosia  Burr),  ac 
companies  Burr  on  his  expedition, 
i.  255;  at  Blennerhassett's  island, 
257 ;  to  be  queen  of  Mexico,  259 ; 
infatuation  of  Luther  Martin  for, 
444. 

Alston,  Willis,  member  of  Congress 
from  North  Carolina,  i.  354;  on 
war  with  England,  ii.  376. 

Ames,  Fisher,  ii.  348. 

Anderson,  Patton,  i.  287. 

Anderson,  Joseph,  senator  from  Ten 
nessee,  i.  139. 

"Aristides,"  i.  209. 

Armstrong,  John,  minister  to  France, 
notifies  Monroe  of  Napoleon's  de 
cision  on  Spanish  claims  and  boun 
daries,  i.  31,  32;  recommends  a 
course  toward  Texas  and  Florida, 
39;  to  be  employed  in  the  Florida 
negotiation,  78;  receives  Talley- 
'rand's  conditions  for  an  arrange 
ment  with  Spain,  104;  attacked 
in  the  Senate,  153;  opposition  to 
his  appointment  with  Bowdoin  to 
conduct  the  Florida  negotiation, 
153,  172;  watching  Napoleon  in 
Paris,  370;  offers  to  execute  Tal 
leyrand's  plan,  376;  approaches 
Napoleon  through  Duroc,  386: 


asks  Decres  for  an  explanation  of 
the  Berlin  Decree,  390;  refused 
passports  for  Napoleon's  head 
quarters,  ii.  105;  protests  against 
the  "Horizon"  judgment,  110; 
reports  Napoleon's  order  relating 
to  the  Berlin  Decree,  112;  well 
informed  with  regard  to  Napo 
leon's  projects,  113;  remonstrates 
against  the  Milan  Decree,  292 ;  re 
ceives  from  Champagny  an  offer 
of  the  Floridas  as  the  price  of  an 
alliance  with  France,  294;  replies 
to  Champagny,  294;  refuses  to 
present  the  case  of  the  burned 
vessels  to  the  French  government, 

01  o 
did. 

Auckland,  Lord,  i.  407. 
"Aurora,"  the,  119. 
Austerlitz,  battle  of,  i.  163,  370. 


BACON,  EZEKIEL,  determined  to 
overthrow  the  embargo,  ii.  432, 
436,  441,  450,  455,  463. 

Bailen,  capitulation  at,  ii.  315,  341. 

Baldwin,  Abraham,  senator  from 
Georgia,  i.  126. 

Barclay,  John,  i.  231. 

Baring,  Alexander,  i.  52 ;  ii.  69 ;  his 
reply  to  "  War  in  Disguise," 
317. 

Baring,  Sir  Francis,  at  the  dinner  to 
the  Spanish  patriots,  ii.  331. 

Barron,  Captain  James,  appointed 
Commodore  of  the  Mediterranean 
squadron,  ii.  5;  replies  to  Captain 
Humphrey's  note,  13;  oi'ders  his 
flag  to  be  struck,  19;  blamed  by 
his  brother  officers,  20;  trial  of, 
21;  result  of  the  trial,  22. 

Bastrop  grant,  the,  Burr's  proposal 
to  Blennerhassett  to  buy,  i.  256; 
bought  by  Burr,  260,  274. 

Bath,  town-meeting  in  December, 
1808,  ii.  409. 

Bathurst,    Lord,   President    of    the 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  II. 


477 


Board  of  Trade,  disapproves  of 
Perceval's  general  order,  ii.  93  et 
seq.,  100,  325. 

Bayard,  James  A.,  senator  from  Del 
aware,  i.  339,  461;  ii.  146. 

Bayonne  Decree  of  April  17,  3808, 
fi.  304.  312. 

Bellechasse,  M.,  of  New  Orleans,  i. 
300,  305  et  seq. 

Berkeley,  Admiral  George  Cranfield, 
issues  orders  to  search  the  "  Chesa 
peake"  for  deserters,  ii.  3;  ap 
proves  the  attack  on  the  "Chesa 
peake,"  25;  recalled  and  his  attack 
on  the  "  Chesapeake  "  disavowed, 
51. 

Berlin  Decree  of  Nov.  21,  1806,  i. 
389,  412,  416,  427;  enforced  in 
August,  1807,  ii.  82,  109;  Napo 
leon's  defence  of,  221,  295;  his 
persistence  in,  295. 

Beverly,  town-meeting  in  January, 
1809^  ii.  413. 

Bidwell,  Barnabas,  i.  127;  supports 
Jefferson's  Spanish  message  in 
committee,  132,  137 ;  urged  by  Jef 
ferson  to  take  the  leadership  of  the 
Democrats  in  Congress,  207;  in 
slave-trade  debate,  360,  363. 

Bigelow,  Timothy,  speaker  of  Mas 
sachusetts  legislature,  ii.  456. 

Bissell,  Captain,  of  the  First  Infantry, 
i.  284,  2DO;  welcomes  Burr  at  Fort 
Massac,  291  ;  receives  a  letter  from 
Andrew  Jackson  warning  him  to 
stop  expedition,  291. 

Blennerhassett.  Harman,  i.  220,  233; 
duped  by  Burr,  247,  256  et  seq.  ; 
his  indiscreet  talk,  259,  275,  281 : 
returns  to  his  home,  276;  driven 
from  his  island,  286;  rejoins  Burr, 
291;  indicted,  457;  keeps  a  record 
of  Burr's  trial,  462  et  seq. ;  Allston 
tries  to  conciliate,  464  ;  Duane 
visits,  464. 

Blennerhassett,  Mrs.,  i.  220;  sends 
a  warning  letter  to  Burr,  275. 


Blockade,  of  New  York,  i.  91  et  seq. ; 
ii.  144;  preferred  by  Bathurst  to 
commercial  restrictions,  95  ;  Fox's, 
of  the  French  and  German  coast, 
398. 

Bollman,  Eric,  to  be  sent  to  London 
by  Burr,  i.  248,  251;  starts  for 
New  Orleans,  255;  arrives,  296, 
306;  reports  to  Burr,  309;  sees 
Wilkinson,  318;  arrested,  319,  338; 
discharged  from  custody,  340. 

Bonaparte,  Joseph,  crowned  King  of 
Spain,  ii.  300. 

Bonaparte,  Lucien,  offered  the  crown 
of  Spain,  ii.  113;  his  story  of  the 
offer,  124. 

Bore,  M.,  of  New  Orleans,  i.  300. 

Boston  town-meeting  in  January, 
1809,  ii.  411. 

Botts,  Benjamin,  Burr's  counsel,  i. 
444. 

Bowdoin,  James,  appointed  minister 
to  Madrid,  i.  57;  Jefferson's  letter 
announcing  appointment,  57;  sug 
gestions  of  plans  for  his  negotia 
tions,  59-61,  71;  reveals  Talley 
rand's  plan  for  a  settlement  with 
Spain,  378;  letter  to,  436. 

Bradley,  Captain,  of  the  "Cam 
brian,"  recall  and  promotion,  i.  48. 

Bradley,  Stephen  R.,  senator  from 
Vermont,  i.  126,  139;  offers  a  reso 
lution  opposing  the  appointment  of 
a  minister  to  Russia,  ii.  466. 

Breckenridge,  John,  of  Kentucky, 
appointed  attorney-general,  i.  11, 
127;  his  death,  444. 

Brougham,  Henry,  his  speculations 
on  the  cause  of  Erglish  prejudice 
against  America,  ii.  73;  his  hos 
tility  to  Perceval's  orders,  318;  at 
the  bar  of  the  House  opposing  the 
Orders  in  Council,  321. 

Brown,  James,  secretaiy  of  the  Loui 
siana  Territory,  i.  219,  280. 

Bruff,  James,  Major  of  Artillery, 
sounded  by  General  Wilkinson, 


478 


INDEX   TO   VOLS.  I.  AND   II. 


i.   222,   241;    his    charge    against 
Wilkinson,  454. 

Bruin,  Judge,  i.  325. 

Bryant,  William  Cullen,  his  poem, 
"  The  Embargo,"  ii.  279. 

Bullus,   Dr.,  on  the  "Chesapeake," 
ii.  11,  .13,  21. 

Burling,  Colonel,  i.  313. 

Burr,  Aaron,  Vice-President,  gives 
the  casting  vote  against  Dr.  Lo 
gan's  amendment,  i.  88;  jealous 
of  Miranda,  189,  218;  his  scheme 
and  connections.  219;  on  his  way 
to  New  Orleans,  220  ;  his  plans 
notorious  in  New  Orleans,  224  et 
seq. ;  returns  and  visits  Andrew 
Jackson  and  Wilkinson,  227;  his 
expectations  of  aid  from  Eng 
land  disappointed,  229;  his  report 
to  Merry,  231 ;  received  at  the 
White  House,  233;  his  advances 
to  Yrujo  and  the  Spanish  gov 
ernment,  234  ;  his  plot  to  seize 
the  heads  of  government  and  the' 
public  money,  239;  his  conteir.pt 
for  Jefferson,  244;  his  communica 
tions  with  Yrujo,  247  ;  rebuffed  by 
Fox,  250;  his  imposture,  251;  his 
cipher  despatch  to  Wilkinson,  253; 
starts  for  New  Orleans  with  Mrs. 
Allston  and  De  Pestre,  255;  se 
cures  Blennerhassett's  fortune,  256; 
arouses  opposition  irf  Kentucky, 
268; 'orders  the  purchase  of  sup 
plies,  274;  denies  intention  to  sepa 
rate  the  Eastern  from  the  AVestern 
States,  276;  attacked  in  court  by 
District-Attorney  Daveiss,  277;  a 
second  time  accused,  282 ;  acquitted, 
282;  repeats  h'is  disavowal  to  An 
drew  Jackson,  287;  escapes  from 
Nashville,  289;  received  at  Fort 
Massac,  291 ;  his1  relations  in  New 
Orleans,  296 ;  his  visit  to  New  Or 
leans  in  1805,  302;  denounced  by 
Wilkinson,  surrenders  to  Governor 
Meade,  325  et  seq. ;  deserts  his 


friends,  327;  arrested  and  sent  to 
Richmond,  Va.,  327;  brought  to 
trial  before  Chief-Justice  Marshall, 
441;  committed  for  misdemeanor 
only,  446;  indicted,  459;  his  de 
meanor  under  trial,  464;  acquitted, 
469. 


CABINET,  new  arrangement  of,  in 
March,  1805,  i.  10-12;  approves 
embargo,  ii.  170 ;  Madison's  in 
tended,  429. 

Cabot,  George,  i.  95,  144;  ii.  29;  let 
ters  from,  given  to  Rose  by  Picker 
ing,  ii.  235,  412. 

"Cambrian,"  British  frigate,  i.  48. 

Campbell,  George  Washington,  mem 
ber  of  Congress  from  Tennessee, 
chairman  of  Ways  and  Means 
Committee,  ii.  153;  challenged  by 
Gardenier,  203,  217;  his  argument 
for  the  embargo,  267;  his  report 
to  Congress,  370;  defends  his  re 
port,  380;  his  Resolution  adopted, 
383;  opposes  fitting  out  the  navy, 
426,  441;  speech  of,  on  the  Non- 
intercourse  Act,  448 

Campbell,  John,  member  of  Con 
gress  from  Maryland,  i.  356. 

Canals  proposed  by  Gallatin,  ii.  364. 

Canning,  George,  becomes  Foreign 
Secretary,  ii.  56;  his  character,  57, 
73;  his  opinion  of  democrats,  59; 
his  wit,  60;  his  eloquence,  61;  his 
negotiation  with  Monroe  respecting 
the  "  Chesapeake  "  affair,  40  et  seq. ; 
his  reasons  for  disavowing  Berke 
ley's  act,  76  et  seq. ;  his  opinion  on 
Spencer  Perceval's  proposed  Or 
der  in  Council,  92,  97;  instructs  Er- 
skine  with  regard  to  the  Orders  in 
Council,  99;  instructions  to  Rose, 
178  et  seq.;  opposes  interference 
with  the  effect  of  the  embargo,  326; 
his  confidence  in  Napoleon's  over 
throw  in  1808,  331;  on  the  causes 


INDEX   TO   VOLS.  I.  AND  II. 


479 


of  the  embargo,  332;  replies  to 
Pinkney's  conditional  proposition 
to*  withdraw  the  embargo,  334  et 
seq. ;  letter  of,  to  Pinkney  published 
in  the  "  New  England  Palladium," 
419. 

Cantrelle,  MM  i.  300. 

Capitol  at  Washington,  the  south 
wing  completed,  ii.  152,  209. 

Casa  Calvo,  Marquis  of,  i.  71,  73.  74, 
79. 

Cast lereagh,  Lord,  on  Howick's  Order 
in  Council,  ii.  80,  81;  becomes  War 
Secretary,  81;  urges  retaliation  on 
France,  83,  90,  325,  421. 

Cazeneau,  Mr.,  i.  379. 

Cevallos,  Don  Pedro,  Spanish  Min 
ister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  his  ne 
gotiation  with  Monroe,  i.  24-36  ; 
refuses  to  countenance  Burr's  de 
signs,  249. 

Champagny,  Jean  Baptiste  de,  suc 
ceeds  Talleyrand  as  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  ii.  107;  his  letter 
of  Jan.  15,  1808,  declaring  war  to 
exist  between  England  and  the 
United  States,  221. 

Charles  IV.  of  Spain,  abdication  of, 
ii.  117,  298. 

Cheetham,  James,  i.  272,  273. 

"Chesapeake,"  frigate,  the  desertion 
of  British  seamen  to,  ii.  2;  delay  in 
getting  her  ready  for  sea,  5;  starts 
for  sea,  9;  fired  on  by  the  "Leop 
ard,"  16;  strikes  her  flag,  19;  re 
turns  to  Norfolk,  20. 

'•  Chesapeake  Affair,"  measures 
taken  by  the  Cabinet  after  the,  ii. 
31,  163;  Madison's  instructions  on, 
39,  45;  its  effect  on  English  so 
ciety,  44  ;  attack  disavowed  by 
the 'British  Ministry,  51,  149;  Can 
ning's  instructions  on,  178-182; 
Rose's  negotiation  on,  ii.  187-197; 
laid  aside,  199 ;  Gallatin's  plan  for 
settling,  388. 

Chic-kasaw  Bluff,  i.  284,  290,  325. 


Claiborne,  W.  C.  C.,  governor  of 
Orleans  Territory,  character  of, 
i.  297  ct  se</.;  his  anxieties,  304; 
his  ignorance  of  Burr's  conspiracy, 
308;  warned  by  Wilkinson  and 
Andrew  Jackson,  316  et  seq. 

Claims  against  Spain,  i.  23-26,  28- 
30,  32,  35,  107. 

Clark,  Daniel,  of  New  Orleans,  i. 
222;  in  sympathy  with  Burr  and 
the  Mexican  Association,  223,  236 ; 
his  letter  to  Wilkinson  complaining 
of  Burr's  indiscretion,  224;  Burr's 
drafts  to  be  drawn  in  his  favor,  2ol ; 
a  correspondent  of  Burr  in  New 
Orleans,  296,  322;  his  hatred  for 
Claiborne,  300;  delegate  to  Con 
gress,  302,  303;  secures  affidavits 
in  evidence  of  his  innocence,  306 
et  seq. ;  in  Washington,  307;  pre 
serves  silence  respecting  the  con 
spiracy,  308;  Wilkinson's  letters 
to,  321,  322;  turns  against  Wilkin 
son,  454. 

Clark,  William,  explores  Louisiana 
Territory  with  Captain  Lewis,  i.  12, 
215. 

Clay,  Henry,  Burr's  counsel,  i.  278, 
282. 

"Clermont,"  Fulton's  steamboat, 
makes  her  first  voyage  August  17, 
1807,  ii.  135. 

Clinton,  George,  Vice-President,  i. 
126;  by  his  casting  vote  confirms 
Armstrong,  153,  172;  renominated 
for  Vice-President  in  1808,  ii.  226, 
287;  his  hostility  to  Madison,  227; 
supported  by  Cheatham  for  the 
Presidency,  227,  284;  his  opinions 
reported  by  Erskine,  385;  his  op 
position  to  Madison,  428,  430. 

Clinton,  DeWitt,  presides  over  a 
"Chesapeake"  meeting  in  New 
York,  ii.  28;  his  attitude  towards 
the  embargo,  283;  takes  electoral 
votes  from  Madison,  287. 

Clopton,  John,  ii.  212. 


480 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  H. 


Coast  survey,  appropriation  for  by 
Congress,  i.  355. 

Coasting  trade  under  the  embargo,  ii. 
251  et  seq. 

Cobbett,  William,  on  the  "Chesa 
peake  "  affair,  ii.  44,  73,  329. 

Colonial  trade,  rule  of,  established 
by  case  of  "Essex,"  i.  45;  distress 
of,  49;  arrangement  of.  in  Monroe's 
treaty,  409,  412;  parliamentary  re 
port  on,  ii.  67;  the  only  object  of 
Perceval's  Orders  in  Council,  95. 

Congress,  Session  of  1804-1805,  i.  9; 
problems  before,  December,  1805, 
91;  meeting  of  the  Ninth,  Dec.  2, 
1805,  126;  close  of  first  session, 
196;  opening  of  second  session, 
Dec.  1,  1806,  328;  close  of,  369; 
Tenth,  character  of,  ii.  146;  meet 
ing  of,  Oct.  26,  1807,  152;  close  of 
the  first  session,  223;  meeting  of 
second  session,  Nov.  7,  1808,  354, 
361 ;  close  of,  453,  454. 

Connecticut  legislature,  action  of,  in 
February,  1809,  ii.  418,  455. 

"Constitution,"  the,  ii.  5. 

Cook,  Orchard,  member  of  Congress 
from  Massachusetts,  his  letter  de 
scribing  Gallatin's  plan,  ii.  369. 

Copenhagen,  the  British  expedition 
against,  ii.  63;  bombardment  of, 
65. 

Cordero,  Governor,  i.  311. 

Cotton,  export  to  France  prohibited 
by  England,  ii.  101,  219,  322,  323. 

Craig,  Sir  James,  governor-general 
of  Canada,  calls  on  the  Indians  for 
assistance  in  case  of  war  with  the 
United  States,  ii.  137;  governor  of 
Lower  Canada,  243;  warned  by 
Erskine  to  be  on  his  guard  against 
attacks  from  the  United  States,  395; 
his  instructions  to  John  Henn*,  460. 

Creoles  in '  Louisiana,  Claiborne's 
treatment  of,  i.  298. 

Crowninshield,  Jacob,  member  of 
Congress  from  Massachusetts,  — 


declines  Navy  Department,  ap 
pointed  Secretary,  refuses  office, 
remains  on  records  as  Secretary  of 
Navy,  i.  10, 11 ;  speech  of,  in  favor 
of  non-importation,  157,  200;  ii. 
109;  his  death,  209;  succeeded  by 
Joseph  Story,  463. 

Cuba,  Jefferson's  policy  toward,  ii. 
340,  341. 

Cumberland  Road,  i.  181,  355. 

Gushing,  T.  H.,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
of  Second  Infantry,  i.  246,  311; 
Wilkinson  communicates  Burr's 
designs  to,  313 ;  orders  to,  315. 


DALLAS,  A.  J.,  i.  9;  his  opinion  of 
Jefferson's  second  administration, 
ii.  455. 

Dana,  Samuel,  member  of  Congress 
from  Connecticut,  i.  143,  242;  ii. 
436. 

Dautremont,  M.,  i.  379. 

Daveiss,  Joseph  H.,  United  States 
District  Attorney,  i.  268;  writes  to 
Jefferson  denouncing  the  Spanish 
plot,  270;  accuses  Burr  in  court  of 
setting  on  foot  a  military  expedi 
tion,  277;  renews  his  motion,  282; 
removed  from  office  by  Jefferson, 
294,  309;  and  censured,  337. 

Davis,  Judge  John,  his  opinion  on 
the  constitutionality  of  the  embargo, 
ii.  268  etseq. 

Dayton,  Jonathan,  in  Miranda's  con 
fidence,  i.  189;  informs  Yrujo  of 
Miranda's  expedition,  192;  his  con 
nection  with  Burr,  219;  attempts 
to  obtain  funds  from  Yrujo,  234  et 
seq. ;  funds  received  by  him  from 
the  Spanish  treasury,  245;  his  letter 
to  Wilkinson,  252;  at  Burr's  trial, 
463. 

Dearborn,  Henry,  Secretary  of  War, 
i.  10,  454;  ignorant  of  Jefferson's 
instructions  to  Monroe,  ii.  163. 

Debt,  National,     (See  Finances.) 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  II. 


481 


Decatur,  Stephen,  on  Barren's  court- 
martial,  ii.  21,  24. 

Decrees  of  France.  (See  Berlin, 
Milan,  Bayonne.) 

Decres,  Due,  writes  to  Armstrong  re 
specting  the  Berlin  Decree,  i.  391. 

Denmark,  Napoleon's  demands  upon, 
ii.  63.  (See  Copenhagen.) 

De  Pestre,  one  of  Burr's  officers,  i. 
252;  starts  with  Burr  as  his  chief 
of  staff,  255 ;  sent  by  Burr  to  report 
to  Yrujo,  261;  his  message,  264. 

Deposit,  right  of,  discussed  by  Ce- 
vallos,  i.  26,  27. 

Derbigny,  Pierre,  i.  219,  301,  305. 

Destre"han,  Jean  Noel,  i.  301. 

Detroit,  isolation  of,  i.  14,  15. 

Dexter,  Samuel,  his  argument  against 
the  constitutionality  of  the  em 
bargo,  ii.  268,  270;  takes  the  lead 
in  Boston  town-meeting,  411,  412. 

Dos  de  Maio,  the,  ii.  300  et  seq. ;  its 
effect  in  America.  339  et  seq. 

Douglas,  Captain  John  Erskine,  «f 
the  "Bellona,"  ii.  4;  reports  the 
affair  of  the  "Chesapeake"  to 
Admiral  Berkeley,  25;  his  letter 
to  the  Mayor  of  Norfolk,  28. 

Dreyer,  M.,  Danish  minister  at  Paris, 
ii.  106,  107. 

Duane,  William,  opposes  Governor 
McKean,  i.  9;  hostile  to  Gallatin, 
210;  visits  Blennerhassett  in  prison, 
ii.  464. 

Dundas.     (See  Melville.) 

Dupiester.     (See  De  Pestre.) 

Dupont,  General,  ordered  to  enter 
Spain,  ii.  121,  122. 

Duroc,  Marshal,  i.  386. 


EARLY,  PETER,  member  of  Congress 
from  Georgia,  chairman  of  the  com 
mittee  on  the  slave-trade,  i.  356 ; 
his  bill  for  the  sale  of  slaves  cap 
tured  on  a  slave-ship,  357,  362. 

Easton,    Judge,    writes     concerning 

VOL.  TV.  —  31 


Wilkinson's  connection  with  Mi 
randa,  i.  241. 

Eaton,  General  William,  Burr  reveals 
his  plot  to,  i.  239;  attempts  to  put 
Jefferson  on  his  guard,  242,  244, 
279,  462. 

Education,  public,  favored  by  Jeffer 
son,  i.  346. 

Eldon,  Lord,  his  anecdote  of  King 
George  and  F.  J.  Jackson,  ii.  65, 
96  ;  defends  the  Orders  in  Council, 
320. 

Election,  Presidential,  of  1804,  in 
Massachusetts,  i.  8  ;  Jefferson's 
satisfaction  in,  8;  of  April,  1805, 
in  Massachusetts,  9  ;  autumn, 
of  1805  in  Pennsylvania,  9;  of 
April,  1806,  in  Massachusetts,  207; 
of  April,  1807,  in  Massachusetts, 
ii.  146;  of  April,  1808,  in  Massa 
chusetts,  237-242;  of  May,  1808, 
in  New  York,  283;  Presidential,  of 
1808,  285-287 ;  of  October,  1808,  in 
Pennsylvania,  286;  congressional, 
of  1808,  287. 

Embargo,  suggested  by  Armstrong, 
approved  by  Madison,  i.  75;  fa 
vored  by  Senator  Jackson  in  1805, 
149;  by  John  Randolph,  149;  Jef 
ferson's  first  draft  of  Embargo  Mes 
sage,  ii.  168;  Madison's  draft,  169, 
170;  bill  reported  and  passed  in 
Senate,  172,  173;  moved. by  Ran 
dolph  in  House,  173 ;  becomes  law, 
Dec.  22,  1807,  175,  176;  object  of, 
175, 176, 186, 332;  Senator  Adams's 
resolution  on,  187;  Jefferson's  de 
termination  to  enforce,  249-271, 
273;  difficulties  of  Governor  Sulli 
van  regarding,  253-256;  difficul 
ties  of  Governor  Tompkins  in  New 
York,  259 ;  dissatisfaction  of  Robert 
Smith  with,  261 ;  demand  of  "  pow 
ers  equally  dangerous  and  odious  " 
by  Gallatin,  262;  interference  of 
Justice  Johnson  in  South  Carolina, 
263,  264;  arguments  on  constitu- 


482 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  II. 


tionality  of,  266,  267;  decision  of 
Judge  John  Davis,  268-270;  opin- 
n  of  Joseph  Story  on,  270;  its 
economical  cost,  274, 275;  its  moral 
cost,  276;  its  political  cost,  277-284, 
288  ;  its  failure  to  coerce,  288,  344 ; 
Jefferson's  opinion  of  its  relative 
prejudice  to  England  and  France, 
309;  Jefferson's  opinion  of  its  cost, 
309,  462;  approved  by  Napoleon, 
313;  Armstrong's  opinion  of,  314; 
its  pressure  on  England,  324,  327- 
329;  Canning's  note  on,  334-336; 
W.  C.  Nicholas's  letter  on,  345; 
the  alternative  to  war,  354,  355; 
repeal  of,  438.  (See  Acts  of  Con 
gress.) 

"  Embargo,  The,"  a  satire,  by  Wil 
liam  Cullen  Bryant,  ii.  279. 

Enforcement  Act.  •  *(See  Embargo  and 
Acts  of  Congress.) 

England,  cordial  friendship  with,  5.  8; 
change  of  policy  by  Pitt  in  1804- 
1805,  43-53  (see  Pitt,  Perceval, 
Canning);  alliance  with,  urged  by 
Jefferson,  62-65,  70;  Pitt's  policy 
reversed  by  Fox,  393,  397;  un 
friendly  policy  carried  to  an  ex 
treme  by  Perceval  and  Canning, 
ii.  55  et  seq.;  unfriendly  feeling 
in  1808,  331. 

Eppes,  John  W.,  member  of  Con 
gress  from  Virginia,  i.  339,  351. 

Erskine,  Lord  Chancellor,  i.  393;  his 
speech  against  the  Orders  in  Coun 
cil,  ii.  320. 

Erskine,  David  Montague,  succeeds 
Merry  as  British  minister  at  Wash 
ington,  i.  250,  423  ;  takes  Monroe's 
treaty  to  Madison,  429;  at  the 
White  House,  ii.  35,  36;  his  re 
ports  on  the  "Chesapeake"  excite 
ment,  37,  78,  142,  143;  reports 
intended  commercial  restrictions, 
144;  reports  Jefferson's  conversa 
tion  on  the  "Chesapeake"  nego 
tiation,  December,  1807,  162;  re 


ports  an  embargo  to  be  imposed  in 
expectation  of  a  retaliatory  Order 
in  Council  declaring  a  blockade 
of  France,  175,  176,  332;  accompa 
nies  Rose,  193;  reported  by  Rose, 
199  ;  interview  with  Jefferson, 
Nov.  9,  1808,  351-353 ;  reports  the 
opinion  of  members  of  Jefferson's 
cabinet  on  the  situation  in  Novem 
ber,  1808,  384;  informs  Canning 
of  the  warlike  attitude  of  the  gov 
ernment,  386  ;  reports  Gallatin's 
remarks  as  to  foreign  relations, 
389;  advises  Canning  that  war  is 
imminent,  392,  393;  reports  Madi 
son  for  war,  394;  his  account  of 
the  struggle  for  the  repeal  of  the 
embargo.  443  et  seq. 

Erving,  George  VV.,  as  charye  d'af 
faires  replaces  Pinckney  at  Madrid, 
*i.  37,  377,  388. 

Erwin,  Dr.,  i.  263,  265. 

"Essex,"  Sir  William  Scott's  judg- 
,  ment  in  the  case  of,  i.  44,  45;  re 
ceived  in  the  United  States,  96,  97; 
Madison's  remarks  on,  reported  by 
Merry,  98 ;  remarks  of  "  a  confi 
dential  person,"  99;  result  of,  in 
America,  143  ;  Boston  memorial 
against,  144  ;  Philadelphia  and 
Baltimore  memorials,  144. 

Essex  Junto,  ii.  29,  401,  403,  405,  412, 
442.  462. 

Evans,  Oliver,  his  experiments  with 
a  stern-wheel  steamboat,  i.  217. 

"Evening  Post,"  Gardenier's  sup 
posed  letter  in,  ii.  203. 

Eylau,  the  battle  of,  ii.  62,  105. 


FEKDINAND,  Prince  of  the  Asturias, 
ii.  290;  intrigues  against  his  fa 
ther,  291;  described  by  Napoleon, 
299. 

Ferrand,  General,  protests  against 
the  contraband  trade  with  St. 
Domingo,  i.  88. 


INDEX   TO   VOLS.  T.  AND   II. 


483 


Finances,  national,  in  1805,  i.  12,  18; 
in  1806,  210,  34-3;  in  1807,  ii.  148, 
156;  in  1808,  036. 

Florida,  West,  desire  of  the  southern 
people  to  acquire,  i.  22;  negotia 
tion  for,  in  1805  (see  Monroe); 
Madison's  opinion  of  claim  to,  55, 
56;  not  to  be  turned  into  a  French 
job,  70,  77;  Cabinet  decides  to  offer 
five  millions  for,  78;  Talleyrand's 
plan  for  obtaining,  103;  Talley 
rand's  plan  adopted  by  Jefferson, 
106;  opposed  in  Congress,  133  et 
seq.;  passage  of  Two  Million  Act 
for  purchasing.  138;  Burr's  de 
signs  upon,  232,  234;  source  of 
Talleyrand's  plan.  373;  Napoleon's 
attitude,  374,  375;  Madison's  in 
structions,  375;  Napoleon  defeats 
Talleyrand's  plan,  376-385,  424, 
428;  ii.  114;  Turreau's  views  on, 
i.  426;  American  occupation  in 
vited  by  Napoleon,  ii.  293,  294, 
296,  297,  307;  invitation  acknowl 
edged  by  Madison,  306;  invitation 
denied  by  Napoleon,  311:  seizure 
of,  intended  by  Jefferson,  340. 

Folch,  Governor,  of  West  Florida, 
i.  300. 

Fontainebleau,  treaty  of,  ii.  121. 

Fortifications,  i.  179,  350. 

Fox,  Charles  James,  accession  of,  to 
Foreign  Office,  i.  163,  211 ;  recalls 
Merry,  and  refuses  to  listen  to 
Burr's  schemes,  250;  opens  nego 
tiations  with  Monroe,  394  ;  his 
blockade,  398  ;  illness  of,  406  ; 
death  of,  407. 

France,  perfect  understanding  with, 
i.  8.  (See  Napoleon.) 

Freeman,  Constant,  Lieutenant-Colo 
nel  of  Artillery,  in  command  at 
New  Orleans,  warned  by  Wilkin 
son,  i.  314,  315. 

Friedland,  the  battle  of,  ii.  02,  105. 

Fulton,  Robert,  his  steamboat,  i.  20, 
216;  ii.  135. 


GAINES,  E.  P.,  First  Lieutenant  of 
Second  Infantry,  commanding  at 
Fort  Stoddert,  arrests  Burr,  i.  327/ 
Gallatin,  Albert,  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  remonstrates  with  Jef 
ferson  against  his  allusions  to  New 
England  in  his  second  Inaugural, 
i.  6 ;  his  policy  of  internal  improve 
ments,  18;  ii.  364;  his  view  of 
Monroe's  negotiation  with  Spain, 
i.  65;  opposes  the  idea  of  war,  67; 
opposes  the  offer  of  five  millions 
for  Florida,  78;  criticises  the  draft 
of  Annual  Message,  November, 
1805,114;  success  of  his  financial 
management,  210;  his  policy  of 
discharging  public  debt,  345;  his 
hostility  to  slavery,  362;  prepares 
for  war,  ii  32  et  srq. ;  his  success 
with  the  treasury,  148 ;  modifies 
Jefferson's  Annual  Message  of 
1807,  150;  his  report  Nov.  5,  1807, 
156;  abandons  his  dogma  with  re 
gard  to  a  debt,  157;  opposed  to 
Jefferson's  gunboat  policy,  158: 
wishes  the  embargo  should  be  lim 
ited  as  to  time,  170;  talks  freely 
with  Rose,  197;  asserts  that  war  is 
inevitable  unless  the  Orders  in 
Council  are  repealed,  198;  enforces 
the  embargo,  253;  requires  arbi 
trary  powers  to  enforce  the  em 
bargo,  261  ;  thinks  the  election 
of  Madison  doubtful,  284;  urges 
Jefferson  to  decide  between  em 
bargo  and  war,  355;  his  Annual 
Report  of  1808,  365-367;  favors 
war,  368;  his  plan,  369,  432;  writes 
"Campbell's  Report,''  370,  371; 
his  attitude  as  represented  by  Er- 
skine,  385;  suggests  settlement  to 
Erskine,  387,  388:  Erskine's  re 
port  of  his  conversation,  390;  dis 
avows  Erskine's  report,  391,  his 
legislation  to  enforce  the  embargo, 
398;  presses  his  mensures,  420; 
defeats  bill  for  employing  navy, 


484 


INDEX   TO   VOLS.  I.  AND  II. 


425,  426;  his  analysis  of  the  navy 
coalition,  428;  intended  by  Madi 
son  for  Secretary  of  State,  429; 
opposed  by  Giles,  429,  430;  his 
efforts  to  maintain  discipline,  440; 
explains  the  Non-intercourse  Act 
to  Erskine,  445. 

Gambler,  Lord,  in  command  of  the 
Copenhagen     expedition,    ii.    63;  ! 
bombards   Copenhagen,  65. 

Gardenier,  Barent,  ii.  147;  attacks 
the  Supplementary  Embargo  Bill, 
201;  his  views  on  Campbell's  Re 
port,  375,  447. 

George  III.,  Eldon's  anecdote  of, 
ii.  65. 

Gerry,  Elbridge,  presides  over  a 
"  Chesapeake  "  meeting  in  Boston, 
ii.  29. 

Giles,  William  B.,  senator  from  Vir 
ginia,  i.  126;  introduces  a  bill  to 
suspend  habeas  corpus,  338,  340; 
ready  for  war,  ii.  198 ;  described  by 
Joseph  Story,  205 ;  his  bill  defining 
treason,  206;  his  bill  conferring 
power  to  enforce  the  embargo  by 
the  most  stringent  measures,  398; 
a  member  of  the  senatorial  cabal 
hostile  to  Madison  and  Gallatin, 
428-430 

Gilman,  Nicholas,  senator  from  New 
Hampshire,  i.  139. 

Gloucester  town-meeting  appoints  a 
committee  of  public  safety,  ii.  414.  ' 

Godoy,  Don  Manuel,  defiant  speech 
to  Erving,  i.  38;  offers  to  accept 
American  advances,  381,  382;  op 
posed  to  alliance  with  France,  ii. 
116,  117,  118,  124;  stifles  Prince 
Ferdinand's  intrigue,  291;  attacked 
by  the  people,  298 ;  described  by 
Napoleon,  299. 

Goodrich,  Chauncey.  senator  from 
Connecticut,  i.  461 ;  ii.  146. 

Gordon,  Charles,  appointed  Captain 
of  the  "Chesapeake,"  ii.  5;  drops 
down  the  Potomac,  7;  ready  for 


sea,  8 ;  testimony  of,  11 ;  prepares 
for  action,  16. 

Gore,  Christopher,  letter  to  Picker 
ing,  ii.  405  ;  Pickering's  reply, 
406. 

Graham,  John,  sent  by  Jefferson  to 
inquire  into  Burr's  movements,  i. 
280,281;  goes  to  Chillicothe,  282; 
to  Kentucky,  286. 

Gregg,  Andrew,  member  of  Con 
gress  from  Pennsylvania,  moves 
a  Non-importation  Resolution,  i. 
154;  the  resolution  debated,  155- 
165;  the  resolution  laid  aside,  165, 
396. 

Grenville,  Lord,  denounces  seizure 
of  Spanish  galleons,  i.  46 ;  prime 
minister,  392,  420;  dismissed  from 
office,  421;  charges  ministers  with 
intending  a  war,  ii.  70. 

Grey,  Charles,  Earl  Grey,  denounces 
seizure  of  Spanish  galleons,  i,  47. 
(See  Howick.) 

Gulf-stream  considered  by  Jefferson 
as  American  waters',  i.  129,  405, 
424. 

Gunboats,  arguments  for  and  against, 
i.  352;  Jefferson's  policy  adopted 
by  Congress,  ii.  158-160. 


HABEAS  CORPUS,  bill  for  the  suspen 
sion  of,  defeated  in  Congress,  i. 
338,  340. 

"Halifax,''  the,  desertion  of  seamen 
from,  ii.  2. 

Hall,  Basil,  his  account  of  the  prac 
tice  of  British  frigates  blockading 
New  York,  i.  92. 

Hall,  Captain  of  marines  on  the 
"Chesapeake,"  ii.  11. 

Hampshire  county-meeting  in  Janu 
ary,  1809,  ii.  410. 

Harrison,  William  Henry,  obtains 
Indian  lands,  i.  13. 

Harrowby,  Lord,  i.  47. 

Hawkesbury,  Lord,  Home  Secretary, 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  11. 


485 


his  opinion  on  Spencer  Perceval's 
proposed  order,  ii.  90. 

Hay,  George,  District-Attorney,  con 
ducts  prosecution  of  Burr,  i.  445; 
threatens  the  court  with  impeach 
ment,  466 ;  accuses  Jefferson  of  in 
sincerity,  ii.  131. 

Heath,  William,  Jefferson's  letter  to, 
i.  8,  9,  58. 

Henry,  John,  his  letters  to  H.  W. 
Ryland  in  March,  1808,  ii.  243-248; 
his  letters  sent  by  Sir  James  Craig 
to  Lord  Castlereagh,  246,  248;  sent 
to  Boston  by  Sir  James  Craig  in 
January,  1809,  460;  his  reports, 
461^  .  " 

Herrera,  General,  i.  300;  'hostile  de 
monstrations  of,  304 ;  movements 
of,  310. 

Hillhouse,  James,  senator  from  Con 
necticut,  ii.  146,  405. 

Holland,  James,  member  of  Congress 
from  North  Carolina,  i.  351. 

Holland,  Lord,  i.  407. 

"Horizon,"  American  ship,  con 
demned  by  French  courts  under 
Berlin  Decree,  ii.  82;  judgment  in 
the  case  of  the,  109. 

Hovvick,  Lord,  British  Foreign  Sec 
retary,  i.  407;  his  order  depriving 
neutrals  of  coasting  rights,  i.  416- 
421;  dismissed  from  office,  421 ;  ii. 
79. 

Humphreys,  Captain,  of  the  "  Leo 
pard,"  ii.  4;  his  note  to  Com 
modore  Barren,  12. 

Hunt,  Major,  sounded  by  General 
Wilkinson,  i.  222. 


IMPEACHMENT,  a  farce,  i.  447;  Mar 
shall  threatened  with,  466. 

Impressments  of  American  seamen, 
i.  93,  94,  400;  ii.  144;  Monroe's 
negotiation  upon,  i.  407-409.  422, 
429,  432,  433,438;  included  in  in 
structions  on  the  "Chesapeake" 


affair,  ii.  39,  45,  47,  162-164;  Brit 
ish  proclamation  on,  52,  166;  Jef 
ferson's  intentions  on,  164,  353. 

Impressment  Proclamation.  (See 
Proclamations.) 

Inaugural  Address,  second,  of  Presi 
dent  Jefferson,  i.  1-8. 

Indians,  Jefferson's  parallel  between 
Indians  and  conservatives,  i.  4,  6; 
cessions  of  territory  in  1805,  14; 
relations  of  the  northwestern,  with 
Canada,  15,  16;  of  the  southwest 
ern  with  Florida,  16.  (See  Trea 
ties.) 

Innis,  Judge,  i.  274;  denies  Daveiss' 
motion  against  Burr,  278 ;  humil 
iated  by  Daveiss  and  Marshall,  293. 

Internal  improvements,  Jefferson's 
recommendation  of  a  fund  for,  i. 
2,  346;  ii.  364;  his  anxiety  to  be 
gin,  i.  19  ;  Gallatin's  scheme  of, 
20;  Gallatin's  report  on,  ii.  364. 


JACKSON,  ANDREW,  his  devotion  to 
Burr,  i.  221,  258;  his  unauthorized 
order  of  Oct.  4,  1306,  to  the  Ten 
nessee  militia,  258;  undertakes  the 
building  of  boats,  etc.,  for  Burr, 
274;  to  be  instructed  against  Burr, 
284;  requires  disavowals  from  Burr, 
287;  his  letter  to  Claiborne,  288, 
317 ;  his  quarrel  with  Ad'air,  288  ; 
at  Richmond,  attacks  Jefferson, 
460. 

Jackson,  Francis  James,  British  en 
voy  to  Denmark,  to  demand  the 
delivery  of  the  Danish  fleet,  ii. 
64 ;  Lord  Eldon's  anecdote  concern 
ing,  65. 

Jackson,  Jacob,  Second  Lieutenant 
of  Artillery,  commanding  at  Chick- 
asaw  Bluff,  i.  325. 

Jackson,  Senator  James,  of  Georgia, 
i.  126;  declares  in  favor  of  an  em 
bargo,  149,  176;  his  death,  176. 

Jackson,  John  G.,  member  of  Con- 


486 


INDEX  TO   VOLS.  I.  AND  II. 


gress  from  Virginia,  attacks 
Quincy  in  Congress,  i.  196;  op 
poses  war,  ii.  378. 
Jefferson,  Thomas,  his  second  inau 
guration,  i.  1;  his  Inaugural  Ad 
dress,  1-9;  his  Cabinet,  10;  result 
of  his  Spanish  diplomacy,  38,  39; 
his  letter  to  Madison  respecting 
Monroe's  mission,  54;  his  letter  to 
James  Bowdoin  respecting  the 
Spanish  relations,  57;  writes  to 
Madison  respecting  procedure  with 
Spain,  61;  suggests  a  treaty  with 
England,  63;  favors  Armstrong's 
advice  to  occupy  Texas,  69 ;  writes 
to  Madison  of  plan  for  peaceable 
settlement  by  intervention  of 
France,  75;  his  memorandum  of  a 
Cabinet  meeting,  77;  the  turning- 
point  of  his  second  administration, 
80 ^  his  conversation  with  Merry 
after  the  British  seizures,  101,  his 
memorandum  of  the  new  Span 
ish  policy,  106 ;  his  aversion  to 
war  with  England,  108;  his  Annual 
Message,  1805,  111  et  seq.;  an 
nounces  his  intention  to  retire  at 
the  close  of  his  term,  119;  his  Mes 
sage  applauded  by  the  Federalist 
press,  129;  his  secret  Spanish  mes 
sage,  130;  preserves  secrecy  in 
Congress,  147;  coerced  into  send 
ing  special  mission  to  England, 
150, 152.  433;  conciliates  opposition 
in  Congress,  165;  warns  Monroe 
against  Randolph,  165;  makes  ad 
vances  to  Macon,  167;  Randolph 
attack  on,  172  et  seq.;  closes  Amer 
ican  ports  to  three  British  cruisers. 
200;  his  character  and  position  de 
scribed  by  Turreau,  205 ;  asks  Bid- 
well  to  take  the  leadership  in  the 
House,  207;  his  refusal  to  obey  a 
subpoena,  208,  450;  receives  Burr  at 
the  White~House,  233;  his  seeming 
indifference  to  Burr's  movements, 
266;  his  memoranda  of  the  situa 


tion,  278;  sends  Graham  to  inquire 
into  Burr's  movements,  281 ;  sends 
to  Wilkinson  to  use  active  meas 
ures,  284;  issues  a  proclamation, 
285;  his  letter  to  Secretary  Smith 
regarding  naval  and  military  de 
fences,  332  ;  obliged  to  proceed 
against  Burr,  336;  and  to  defend 
Wilkinson,  341 ;  his  Annual  Mes 
sage,  December,  1806,  345  et  seq.; 
advocates  internal  improvements, 
346;  would  abolish  the  slave-trade, 
347 ;  signs  the  Act  prohibiting  the 
Slave  Trade,  365;  defied  by  Spain, 
388  ;  his  instructions  to  Monroe 
and  Pinkney  regarding  the  treaty, 
401  et  seq.;  determined  on  com 
mercial  restrictions,  423;  refuses 
to  submit  Monroe's  treat}'  to  the 
Senate,  430  et  seq. ;  offers  Monroe 
the  government  of  Orleans  Terri 
tory,  435;  his  letter  to  Bowdoin 
about  Spanish  perfidy  and  injus 
tice,  436;  designs  to  impeach  Mar 
shall,  447  ;*~Tus  irritation  with 
Marshall  and  Burr's  counsel,  4.~><>, 
453T7upports  Wilkinson,  456;  his 
vexation  at  Burr's  acquittal,  470: 
his  proclamation  on  the  '-Chesa 


peake"  affair,  ii.  30;  preparations 
for  war,  32;  his  instructions  to 
Monroe.  39;  the  result  of  his  meas 
ures  of  peaceful  coercion,  97;  his 
genius  for  peace,  130;  his  personal 
friendship  for  Monroe,  130;  his 
confidence  in  his  own  theory,  138; 
s  j~"xlomestic  opposition  to,  insignifi 
cant,  145  et  seq.;  his  strength  in 
Congress,  147;  the  secret  of  his 
success,  148;  his  Annual  Message, 
Oct.  27,  1807,  153;  his  influence. 
155 ;  his  second  Message  concern 
ing  _the_Burr_trial,  156;  his  policy 
as  to  gunboats,  158;  3Tields  to  Can 
ning.  163,  164;  writes  an  embargo 
message,  168;  signs  the  Embargo 
Act,  Dec.  22,  1807,  178;  his  entrea- 


INDEX   TO   VOLS.  I.  AND   II. 


487 


ties  to  Rose  through  Robert  Smith 
188-191  ;  asks  Congress  for  ar 
addition  of  six  thousand  men  to 
the  regular  army,  212;  charged 
with  a  subserviency  to  Napoleon, 
228;  issues  a  proclamation  against 
insurrection  on  the  Canada  fron 
tier,  249;  writes  a  circular  letter 
to  State  governors  respecting  the 
surplus  of  flour  in  their  States, 
252;  writes  to  Governor  Sullivan, 
of  Massachusetts,  to  stop  import 
ing  provisions.  253;  writes  to  Gen 
eral  Dearborn,  256;  his  war  with 
e  Massachusetts  Federalists,  258; 
s. his  popularity  shattered,  269;  ha 
tred  of,  in  England,  331;  orders 
Pinkney  to  offer  a  withdrawal  of 
the  embargo  if  England  would 
withdraw  the  Orders  in  Council, 
333  et  seq. ;  his  attitude  toward 
Spain,  339;  decides  to  propose  no 
new  measures  in  view  of  his  ap 
proaching  retirement,  356 ;  his  lan- 
""•^guage  reported  by  Pickering,  359; 
his  last  Annual  Message,  361  et 
seq.;  advocates  public  improve 
ments,  364;  desires  to  maintain  the 
embargo  until  his  retirement,  432; 
opposition  of  Joseph  Story  and 
others  to,  433 ;  his  letter  to  Thomas 
Mann  Randolph,  442;  signs  the  act 
repealing  the  embargo,  454;  con 
tradictions  of  his  presidency,  454; 
insulted  by  the  address  of  the  Mas- 
sachusetts  legislature,  457 ;  his  fail 
ure  to  overthrow  the  New  England 
Federalists,  461;  submits  in  silence 
to  the  repeal  of  the  embargo,  462; 
his  letter  to  Dearborn  revealing  his 
mortification,  463;  decline  of  his 
influence,  464;  appoints  William 
Short  minister  to  Russia,  465;  the 
nomination  rejected  by  the  Sen 
ate,  466;  his  letter  to  Short,  468: 
his  style  of  life  and  his  debts,  469 
et  seq. ;  quits  Washington,  472 : 


his  address   to  his  fellow-citizens 
in  Virginia,  473. 

Johnson,  Richard  M.,  member  of 
Congress  from  Kentucky,  his  argu 
ment  in  favor  of  the  embargo,  ii. 
266;  opposes  war,  376. 

Johnson,  Justice  William,  of  South 
Carolina,  issues  a  mandamus  to 
compel  the  collector  to  clear  cer 
tain  ships,  ii.  263. 

Jones,  Evan,  i.  300. 

Judiciary,  attempt  to  make  an 
elective,  ii.  205. 

Junot,  marshal  of  France,  ordered 
to  enter  Spain,  ii.  117;  marches 
on  Portugal,  119 ;  enters  Lisbon, 
120,  121  ;  capitulates  at  Cintra, 
315. 


KEENAX,  THOMAS,  member  of  Con 
gress  from  North  Carolina,  i.  356. 

Kerr,  Lewis,  i.  303. 

Key,  Philip  Barton,  member  of  Con 
gress  from  Maryland,  ii.  147;  ad 
vises  a  war  policy,  374. 

King,  Rufus,  i.199;  Pickering  sends 
a  letter  of,  to  Rose,  ii.  234;  candi 
date  for  Vice-President,  285 ;  let 
ters  to  Pickering,  348,  457. 

Kingsbury,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  ar 
rests  Adair,  i.  324. 


LABOUCHERE,  i.  379. 

Lambert,  Travels  of,  a  description  of 

New  York  under  the  embargo,  ii. 

278. 
Latrobe,  Benjamin   H..  architect  of 

the  Capitol,  ii.  152. 
Laussat,  the  French  prefect  at  New 

Orleans,  i.  164;    his  account  of  the 

situation,  2D8. 
'Leandcr,"  British  frigate,  i.  91,  94; 

shot  from,  kills  John  Pierce,  199. 
'Leander,''   the,  Miranda's  ship,  i. 

190. 


488 


INDEX  TO   VOLS.  1.   AND  II. 


Leib,  Michael,  i.  9. 

"Leopard,"  British  frigate,  sent  to 
search  the  "Chesapeake,"  ii.  4; 
accompanies  the  "  Chesapeake  " 
to  sea,  10;  fires  on  the  "Chesa 
peake,"  16;  searches  the  "Chesa 
peake,"  19. 

Lewis  and  Clark,  expedition  of,  i.  12, 
215. 

Lewis,  Captain  of  the  "Leander,"  i. 
265. 

Lewis,  Governor  Morgan,  of  New 
York,  ii.  283. 

Lincoln,  Levi,  Attorney-General,  re 
signs,  i.  10;  governor  of  Massa 
chusetts,  ii.  416. 

Livingston,  Chancellor,  i.  216. 

Livingston,  Edward,  at  New  Orleans, 
i.  300. 

Lloyd,  James,  author  of  the  "Boston 
Memorial,"  i.  144;  elected  to  suc 
ceed  J.  Q.  Adams  as  senator  from 
Massachusetts,  ii.  242. 

Logan,  Dr.,  senator  from  Pennsyl 
vania,  i.  139;  his  proposal  to  pro 
hibit  commerce  with  St.  Domingo, 
88 ;  his  bill  to  prohibit  trade  with 
St.  Domingo,  140;  an  amateur  ne 
gotiator,  ii.  236. 

Logan's  Act,  ii.  236. 

Louisiana,  political  effects  of  pur 
chase  of,  i.  17;  boundaries  of,  33- 
35;  disaffection  in,297  et  seq. ;  dis 
like  of  Claiborne's  administration, 
299;  admitted  to  territorial  rights, 
March  2,  1805,  302. 

Lyman,  Theodore,  ii.  411. 

Lynnhaven  Bay,  ii.  4,  9. 

Lyon,  Matthew,  member  of  Congress 
from  Kentucky,  i.  143,  175  ;  favors 
ships  and  harbor  defences,  180; 
with  Burr,  220. 


MACON,  NATHANIEL,  chosen  Speak 
er,  i.  128;  reappoints  Randolph 
and  Nicholson  on  the  Committee  of 


Ways  and  Means,  128  ;  Jefferson's 
advances  to,  167;  defeats  Bidwell's 
amendment  by  his  castiilg  vote, 
360;  retires  from  his  office,  153; 
letter  on  the  opinions  prevailing 
at  Washington,  ii.  368;  declares 
that  the  embargo  is  the  people's 
choice,  421,  453. 

McKean,  Thomas,  governor  of  Penn 
sylvania,  i.  210. 

McKae,  Alexander,  counsel  for  Burr, 
i.  445. 

Madison,  James,  Secretary  of  State, 
i.  10 ;  writes  to  Jefferson  respecting 
the  claim  to  West  Florida,  55,  60 ; 
his  letter  to  Jefferson  concerning 
Monroe's  failure  at  Madrid,  59; 
proposes  negotiations  and  diplo 
macy,  70;  his  character  as  a  di 
plomatist,  74;  his  pamphlet,  "Ex 
amination  of  the  British  doctrine," 
102,  110;  to  be  Jefferson's  succes 
sor,  120;  his  altercation  with  Casa 
Yrujo,  185  et  seq. ;  his  complica 
tion  with  Miranda,  19D  et  seq. ; 
Turreau  demands  an  explanation 
from,  195;  imposes  impossible  con 
ditions  on  Monroe,  402;  writes  to 
Jefferson  respecting  the  new  in 
structions  to  Monroe,  438 ;  arranges 
with  Rose  a  "bridge"  for  Jeffer 
son,  ii.  191;  sends  his  last  reply 
to  Rose,  196;  notifies  Erskine  that 
the  "Chesapeake"  affair  has  lost 
consequence,  199,  the  caucus  for, 
in  Virginia  and  Washington,  226; 
election  of,  287;  sends  Armstrong 
instructions  in  response  to  Cham- 
pagny's  letter  of  Jan.  15,  1808, 
305;  his  anger  with  Perceval's 
order  of  April  11,  1808,  327; 
threatens  a  declaration  of  war, 
386;  his  opponents  in  Congress, 
428;  inaugurated,  472. 

Malmesbury,  Lord,  ii.  64. 

Marbois,  BarW,  removed  from  office, 
i.  371  et  seq. 


INDEX   TO   VOLS.  I.  AND   11. 


489 


Marriatt,   Joseph,  his  pamphlet    in 

1808,  ii.  333. 

Marshall,  Humphrey,  i.  268. 
Marshall,    John,    Chief-Justice,    his 

definition  of  treason  in  the  case  of 
Bollman  and  Swartwout,  i.  340, 
443 ;  presides  over  the  trial  of  Burr, 
442;  refuses  to  commit  Burr  for 
treason,  and  rebukes  the  Govern 
ment  for  laxity  in  procuring  proof, 
445 ;  threatened  with  removal  from 
office,  447;  and  impeachment,  466, 
470,  471 ;  his  alleged  sympathy 
with  Burr,  461;  his  decision  in 
the  Burr  trial,  467  et  seq. ;  ii.  147; 
menaced  in  Jefferson's  Annual 
Message  of  1807,  155;  Jefferson's 
desire  to  punish,  205;  his  decision 
in  the  case  of  the  United  States  v. 
Fisher  et  «/.,270;  inclines  to  Pick 
ering's  view  of  Jefferson,  348. 

Martin,  Luther,  Burr's  counsel,  i. 
444;  attacks  Jefferson,  449;  angers 
Jefferson,  453;  his  speech  in  the 
Burr  trial,  465. 

Mason,  John  Thompson,  declines  ap 
pointment  as  Attorney-General, 
i.  11. 

Mason,  Jonathan,  ii.  411. 

Massac,  Fort,  i.  222. 

Massachusetts,  feelings  of,  towards 
Virginia  and  Jefferson,  ii.  409;  pro 
ceedings  of  legislature  in  February, 

1809,  416;    address  of    legislature 
in  March,  1809,  456;  "  Patriotick 
Proceedings  "  of,  in  1809,  458,  459. 
(See  Elections.) 

Meade,  Cowles,  governor  of  Missis 
sippi  Territory,  i.  304;  arrests  Burr, 
326. 

Meade,  Lieutenant,  ii.  12. 

Mediterranean  Fund,  i.  137,  182, 
183. 

"Melampus,"  the,  ii  2,  23. 

Melville,  Lord,  First  Lord  of  the 
Admiralty,  i.  235,  238. 

Merry,   Anthony,    British    minister, 


writes  to  his  government  concern 
ing  the  failure  of  the  Spanish 
mission,  i.  96;  his  account  of 
Madison's  conversation,  98;  of  Jef 
ferson's,  101 ;  his  report  cf  the 
sensation  produced  by  the  seizures, 
109;  informs  his  government  re 
specting  the  Non-importation  Reso 
lutions,  150;  takes  Yrujo's  part- 
188;  his  report  to  his  government 
of  the  apprehensions  of  the  Ameri 
cans,  198;  advises  Fox  against 
concessions,  202;  upholds  Burr, 
219;  alarmed  by  the  publicity  of 
Burr's  schemes,  226;  confers  with 
Burr  respecting  his  journey  to  the 
West,  230  et  seq. ;  recalled  by  Fox, 
250;  his  last  interview  with  Burr, 
250. 

Message,  Annual,  of  1805,  i.  Ill  et 
seq.,  128,  129;  special,  on  Spanish 
relations,  Dec.  6,  1805,  115-118, 
130  et  seq. ;  special,  on  British 
spoliations,  145  ;  referred,  146  ; 
Annual,  of  1806,  329,  345;  special, 
of  Jan.  22,  1807,  on  Burr's  con 
spiracy,  337;  Annual,  of  1807,  ii. 
149,  150,  153-156;  special,  of  Nov. 
23,  1807,  on  the  failure  of  Burr's 
trial,  156;  special,  of  Dec.  18, 
1807,  recommending  an  embargo, 
168-170,  228,  229  ;  special,  of  Feb. 
25,  1808,  recommending  an  in 
crease  of  the  regular  army,  212; 
special,  of  March  22  and  30,  1808, 
communicating  papers  relating  to 
England  and  France,  218;  Annual, 
of  Nov.  8,  1808,  361,  364. 

Mexico,  Jefferson's  language  to,  ii. 
340,  341. 

Michigan  Territory,  i.  176. 

Milan  Decree  of  Dec.  17,  1807, 
ii.  126 ;  arrives  in  America.  195 , 
Napoleon's  defence  of,  221  295. 

Mill,  James,  his  reply  to  Spence  and 
Cobbett,  ii.  329. 

Minor  of  Natchez,  i.  224,  225,  315. 


490 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  II. 


Miranda,  Francesco  de,  his  plans  to 
revolutionize  Colombia,  i.  189  et 
seq.;  distrusted  by  Burr,  189,  238; 
visits  Washington,  190;  his  letter 
to  Madison,  191;  sails,  191;  de 
feated  by  the  Spaniards,  209;  re 
turns  to  New  York,  238. 

Miro,  Governor,  i.  269. 

Mitchill,  Dr.  Samuel  L.,  senator  from 
New  York,  i.  126,  139,  430,  431. 

Mobile  Act,  i.  25;  explained  by  Jef 
ferson,  56  ;  Randolph's  explana 
tion  of,  163. 

Mollien,  Nicholas  Francois,  appointed 
Minister  of  the  Treasury  by  Napo 
leon,  i.  371. 

Monroe,  James,  envoy  extraordinary 
to  Spain,  arrives  in  Madrid,  Jan. 
2.  1805,  i.  23;  his  correspondence 
with  Cevallos,  23-36 ;  his  letter  to 
Armstrong,  March  1,  1805,  threat- 
eaing  a  quarrel  with  France,  30; 
leaves  Spain,  37  ;  adopts  Arm 
strong's  views,  40;  returns  to  Lon 
don,  42, 47;  intends  to  return  home 
in  November,  1805,  43;  expects  a 
change  in  British  policy,  43  ;  ne 
gotiations  with  Mulgrave,  47;  ad 
vises  the  President  to  press  on 
England  and  France  at  once,  49; 
his  Spanish  failure  discussed  in 
Cabinet,  58,  65-67  ;  favored  by 
Randolph  for  the  Presidency,  122, 
166  ;  affected  by  Senate  scheme  for 
a  special  mission,  150-152;  warned 
by  Jefferson  against  Randolph, 
165;  has  his  first  interview  with 
Fox,  393;  hurt  by  the  appointment 
of  Pinkney  as  his  associate,  400; 
his  instructions  regarding  the 
treaty,  400  et  seq.  ;  disregards  in 
structions,  and  sii>ns  treaty,  408 
et  seq. ;  embarrasses  Jefferson  by 
his  treaty,  411,  434  ;  his  letter  to 
Colonel  Taylor,  of  Caroline,  defend 
ing  his  treaty,  413 ;  unfortunate 
in  diplomacy,  415  ;  negotiation 


with  Canning  with  regard  to  the 
"Chesapeake  "  affair,  ii.  42  et  seq.; 
leaves  London,  51;  warns  Jefferson 
of  danger  from  England,  71;  sails 
for  home,  128;  Jefferson's  friend 
ship  for,  129;  Pickering's  opinion 
of,  130;  reaches  Washington,  Dec. 
22,  1807,  183;  goes  into  opposition, 
194;  caucus  for,  226,  284;  his  let 
ter  to  Nicholson  on  support  asked 
for  the  embargo,  346. 

Moreau,  General,  Turreau's  note 
about,  i.  82,  83, 

Morales  at  New  Orleans,  i.  300. 

Morgan,  Colonel,  warns  Jefferson  of 
Burr's  declarations,  i.  255,  279. 

"  Morning  Chronicle,"  the,  on  the 
"Chesapeake"  affair,  ii.  41,  54, 
70. 

"Morning  Post,"  the,  on  the  "Ches 
apeake  "  affair,  ii.  41,  44,  53,  54,  70 
et  seq.,  76,  132,  317. 

Mulgrave,  Lord,  British  Foreign 
Secretary,  his  reception  of  Mon 
roe's  complaints  in  1805,  i.  47;  his 
indifference  to  American  affairs 
48;  affirms  the  Rule  of  1756,  48; 
fails  to  answer  Burr's  inquiries 
229,  232 

Murray,  William  A.,  Lieutenant  of 
Artillery,  his  report  of  conversa 
tion  in  New  Orleans  respecting 
Burr's  conspiracy,  i.  303. 


NAPOLKON,  his  intervention  in  Mon 
roe's  Spanish  negotiation,  i.  26, 
29,  30,  32,  41,  82;  not  influenced 
by  corruption  of  his  subordinates, 
42  -,  begins  war  with  Austria  and 
Russia,  73,  76,  77,  103,  forbids 
trade  with  St.  Domingo,  89;  cap 
tures  Ulm  and  enters  Vienna,  106, 
370;  returns  to  Paris,  373;  his  fi 
nancial  measures  in  1806,  372-375; 
defeats  Talleyrand's  plan  for  a 
settlement  between  Spain  and  the 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  II. 


491 


United  States,  383;  wins  the  bat 
tle  of  Jena,  388 ;  issues  the  Decree 
of  Berlin,  389;  makes  the  treaty  of 
Tilsit,  ii.  62,  105;  attacks  Portugal 
and  Denmark,  106;  enforces  his 
Berlin  Decree  against  the  United 
States,  109,  110;  Armstrong's 
story  about  his  attitude  towards 
Florida,  114 ;  orders  his  armies 
into  Spain,  117;  his  proposed 
division  of  Portugal,  119;  offers 
Lucien  the  crown  of  Spain,  124; 
issues  the  decree  of  Milan,  126; 
treats  the  United  States  as  at  war 
with  England,  221,  292,  295,  312; 
seizes  the  Spanish  Court,  298; 
crowns  Joseph  King  of  Spain,  300; 
his  Spanish  plan  for  conquering 
England,  303 ;  issues  the  Bayonne 
Dec'ree,  304. 

"National  Intelligencer"  prints  the 
British  Impressment  Proclama 
tion,  ii.  166, 172, 186;  publishes  the 
Milan  Decree,  195. 

Navy,  i.  113,  178,  180;  tifty  gun 
boats  voted  in  1806,  181;  favored 
by  Jefferson,  201 ;  arguments  for 
and  against  gunboats,  352;  gun 
boats  adopted  in  1807,  ii.  158,  159 ; 
frigates  to  be  laid  up  in  case  of 
war,  159;  frigates  to  be  used  to 
serve  gunboats,  427. 

Navy-yards,  incompetency  of,  ii.  6. 

Nelson,  Roger,  member  of  Congress 
from  Maryland,  i.  350,  353. 

Neutrals,  trade  of,  restricted  by  Pitt 
in  1805,  i.  45  ;  frauds  of,  denounced 
by  James  Stephen,  50  ;  rights  of, 
maintained  by  Madison,  110. 

Newburyport  town-meeting  in  Jan 
uary,  1809.  ii.  410. 

New  England,  its  conservatism,  Jef 
ferson's  opinions  of,  i.  6-9;  town 
ships,  Jefferson's  opinion  of,  ii.  441. 

New  England  Confederation,  the  ten 
dency  to,  ii.  403. 

New  England  Convention,  suggested 


by  H.  G.  Otis,  ii.  403;  its  uncon 
stitutionally,  404;  to  be  concerted 
between  Massachusetts  and  Con 
necticut,  405,  406 ;  to  be  called  by 
the  Massachusetts  legislature,  407. 

New  Orleans  menaced,  i.  17;  Burr's 
confederates  in,  296. 

New  York  blockaded  by  British  frig 
ates,  i.  91;  debate  in  Congress  on 
the  propriety  of  fortifying,  351, 
355;  insurrection  in,  on  account  of 
the  embargo,  ii.  259. 

Nicholas,  Wilson  Cary,  i.  152,  173; 
writes  to  Jefferson  doubting  the 
possibility  of  longer  embargo,  ii. 
345,  346  ;  file-leader  of  the  House, 
428;  urges  Giles  to  withdraw  op 
position  to  Gallatin,  429,  430;  his 
resolution  to  repeal  the  embargo, 
435,  438. 

Nicholl,  Sir  John,  King's  advocate, 
i.  417;  ii.  96. 

Nicholson,  Joseph,  member  of  Con 
gress  from  Maryland,  i.  127,  133. 
135,  154;  his  Resolution  adopted, 
165 ;  appointed  District  Judge,  167. 
180;  remonstrates  with  Gallatin, 
ii.  32. 

Nicklin  and  Griffith,  i.  153. 

Non-importation.  (See  Non-inter 
course.) 

Non-intercourse,  partial,  moved  by 
Senator  Samuel  Smith  in  Febru 
ary,  1806,  i.  146;  debate  on,  147; 
favored  by  Madison,  148,  426 ; 
opposition  to,  150;  Smith's  resolu 
tions  adopted,  151 ;  Gregg's  reso 
lution  of  Jan.  29,  1806,  154, 
155,  165 ;  Nicholson's  resolution, 
Feb.  10,  1806,  154,  155;  Nichol 
son's  resolution  adopted,  165,  166 ; 
Non-importation  Bill  reported. 
March  25,  1805,  175;  passed,  175; 
suspended,  Dec.  19,  1806,  349; 
effect  of,  in  England,  394,  399: 
conditions  of  its  repeal,  401,  436; 
to  remain  suspended,  430,  436, 


492 


INDEX  TO   VOLS.  I.  AND  II. 


437;  favored  by  Jefferson  after 
the  "Chesapeake"  affair,  ii.  34, 
36;  expected  by  Erskine,  144; 
Non-importation  Act  goes  into  ef 
fect,  Dec.  14,  1807,  165  (see  Em 
bargo);  not  avowed  as  a  coercive 
policy  in  Congress,  203,  or  by 
Jefferson,  176,  204;  bill  for  total 
non-intercourse  introduced.  444; 
passed,  453.  (See  Acts.) 
Norfolk,  the  Mayor  of,  forbids  com 
munication  with  the  British  squad 
ron,  ii.  27. 


OGDEN,  owner  of  the  "Leander,"  i. 
190;  indicted  by  Jefferson,  195. 

Ogden,  Peter  V.,  i.  252,  255;  carries 
despatches  to  Burr's  friends  in  New 
Orleans,  295;  arrested  at  Fort  Ad 
ams,  319 ;  discharged  from  custody, 
340. 

Order  in  Council,  of  Jan.  7,  1807, 
called  Lord  Howick's  Order,  i.  416- 
421 ;  ii.  79,  80,  83,  93,  102,  144, 154, 
318;  arrives  in  America,  i.  435;  of 
Nov.  11,  1807,  called  Spencer  Per 
ceval's  Order,  ii.  79-103 ;  its  pub 
lication  in  England,  132;  arrives 
in  America,  186;  a  cause  of  the 
embargo,  108,  175,  176,  186,  332; 
its  object  explained  by  Erskine, 
219;  debate  in  Parliament  in  1808, 
317-321;  parliamentary  inquiry 
into,  322;  new  order  proposed  by 
Perceval,  March  26,  1808,  324; 
approved  by  Bathurst,  325;  op 
posed  by  Castlereagh  and  Canning, 
325,  326;  issued,  April  11,  1808, 
327;  its  effect  on  Madison,  327. 

Otis,  Harrison  Gray,  President  of 
Massachusetts  Senate,  J.  Q.  Ad 
ams's  letter  to,  ii.  241;  his  letter 
to  Josiah  Quincy  suggesting  a 
New  England  Convention,  403 ; 

•  signs  Address  to  the  People,  456. 

Ouvrard,  agent  of  the  French  treas 


ury,  obtains  from  Spain  financial 
concessions,  i.  372;  ruined  .by  Na 
poleon,  374;  his  scheme,  378. 


PARKER,  DANIEL,  offers  the  two 
Floridas,  i.  379. 

Parliament,  session  of  1808,  ii.  317. 

Parsons,  Chief-Justice  Theophilus,  ii. 
29;  his  opinion  of  the  unconstitu 
tionally  of  the  embargo,  411. 

Party,  the  Federalist,  i.  9,  29,  139  ;  ii. 
209,  228,  232,  240,  242,  283,  286, 
408;  the  Republican,  i.  9,  122,  127, 
132;  ii.  209,  214-,  218,  226. 

"Patriotick  Proceedings"  of  Massa 
chusetts  legislature  in  1809,  ii.  458. 

Pennsylvania  politics,  1805,  1.9;  in 
1808,  ii.  286. 

Perceval,  Spencer,  his  comments  on 
Howick's  Order  in  Council,  i.  417, 
421;  ii.  80;  Chancellor  of  the  Ex 
chequer,  55;  character  of ,  56 ;  Syd 
ney  Smith's  caricature  of,  56  et 
seq.,  73;  takes  office  as  Chancellor 
of  Exchequer,  81;  his  paper  on 
the  policy  and  justice  of  retalia 
tion,  83  et  seq. ;  submits  his  paper 
on  retaliation  to  the  Ministry,  88; 
his  letter  to  Charles  Abbot,  97;  his 
orders  approved  in  Council,  102; 
prohibits  the  export  of  cotton  and 
quinine,  323;  affected  by  the  em 
bargo,  324;  his  plan  to  conciliate 
the  Federalists,  324;  carried  into 
effect,  327. 

Perkins,  Thomas  Handasyd,  ii.  411. 

Pickering,  Timothy,  i.  95,  151,  210, 
217;  ii.  29,  146;  praises  Monroe, 
129, 167 ;  won  by  Rose,  184  et  seq.  ; 
cultivated  by  Rose.  232;  exerts 
himself  to  form  a  coalition  with  the 
British  ministry,  234;  his  letter  to 
Governor  Sullivan,  237  et  seq.;  ef 
fect  in  England  of  his  letter  to  his 
constituents,  333  ;  declares  Jeffer 
son  a  tool  of  Napoleon,  347,  442; 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  TT. 


493 


reports  Jefferson's  language  about 
the  embargo,  359, 442 ;  his  triumph, 
401,  409;  described  by  John  Ad 
ams,  402 ;  maintains  relations  with 
Rose,  460. 

Pierce,  John,  killed  by  a  shot  from 
the  "  Leander,"  i.  199. 

Pike,  Zebulon  M.,  Lieutenant  of  First 
Infantry,  explores  the  sources  of 
the  Mississippi,  i.  213;  and  of  the 
Arkansas  and  Red  rivers,  214,  223. 

Pinckney,  Charles,  minister  to  Spain, 
recalled,  but  associated  by  Monroe 
in  negotiation,  i.  23;  returns  home, 
37. 

Pinckney,  C.  C.,  his  treaty  with 
Spain,  38  ;  candidate  for  Presi 
dent,  ii.  285. 

Pinkney,  William,  author  of  the 
Baltimore  u  Memorial,"  i.  144; 
appointed  to  aid  Monroe  in  Lon 
don,  152,  165,  169;  ii.  354;  arrives 
in  London,  i.  400  ;  sole  minister 
in  London,  ii.  162  ;  remonstrates 
against  the  tax  on  American  cot 
ton,  322  ;  his  reply  to  Canning, 
338;  publication  of  Canning's  per 
sonal  letter  to,  419. 

Pitt,  William,  Prime  Minister  of 
England,  his  measures  in  1804  and 
1805  for  restricting  American  com 
merce,  i.  44,  45;  his  coalition  with 
Austria  and  Russia,  73;  Burr  ex 
pects  support  from,  235,  238  ;  death 
of,  163,  211,  245. 

Plymouth  town-meeting  in  January, 
1809,  ii.  414. 

"  Polly,"  rule  established  by  case 
of,  set  aside,  i.  45. 

Porter,  Moses,  Major  of  Artillery, 
i.  246. 

Portland,  Duke  of,  Prime  Minister 
of  England,  ii.  55;  his  opinion  on 
Spencer  Perceval's  proposed  Order 
in  Council,  88. 

Portugal,  her  ports  ordered  to  be 
closed,  ii.  106;  forced  into  war, 


118 ;  divided  by  Napoleon  into 
three  parts,  121. 

Press,  Jefferson's  remarks  on  the,  i.  7. 

Prevost,  Judge,  of  New  Orleans,  i. 
219;  one  of  Burr's  correspondents 
in  New  Orleans,  296,  319,  324. 

Pringle,  John  Julius,  declines  ap 
pointment  as  Attorney-General,  i. 
11. 

Proclamation,  President's,  of  May 
3,  1806,  against  the  "Leander/" 
"Cambrian,"  and  "Driver,"  i. 
200,  201 ;  of  Nov.  27,  1806,  against 
Burr,  283,  285,  289,  290,  292,  325, 
328,  330;  of  July  2,  1807,  on  the 
"Chesapeake"  affair,  ii.  30,  32, 
34,  46,  187,  188;  to  be  recalled, 
192;  of  Oct.  16,  1807,  by  the  King 
of  England,  asserting  the  right  of 
impressment,  52,  166,  168,  169;  of 
April  19,  1808,  declaring  the  coun 
try  on  the  Canadian  frontier  in  a 
state  of  insurrection,  249. 

"  QUERIST,"  papers  by  Blennerhas- 
sett,  i.  257,273,  275.' 

Quincy,  Josiah,  member  of  Congress 
from  Massachusetts,  i.  128,  142; 
in  favor  of  ships  and  harbor  de 
fences,  179  ;  presents  memorials 
in  favor  of  Smith  and  Ogden,  195; 
irritates  opponents,  i.  354,  360,  363; 
ii.  147;  his  contempt  for  Jeffer 
son,  356;  attacks  Campbell's  Re 
port,  372;  attacks  the  advocates  of 
the  embargo,  422;  declares  that  the 
Republicans  ''could  not  be  kicked 
into "  a  declaration  of  war,  423 ; 
on  the  distraction  among  the  Demo 
crats,  440 ;  requires  total  submis 
sion  to  Great  Britain,  446,  453;  his 
account  of  John  Henry,  461. 

RANDOLPH,  EDMUND,  Burr's  counsel, 

i.  444. 
Randolph,  John,  i.  3,  20,  23;  his  an- 


494 


INDEX   TO   VOLS.  T.   AND  II. 


tipathy  to  Madison,  119,  120,  126; 
his  reception  of  Jefferson's  secret 
Spanish  message,  132;  his  war  on 
Madison,  134 ;  opposes  Jefferson's 
plans  of  buying  Florida,136 ;  favors 
an  embargo,  149 ;  opposition  of, 
154;  his  speech  against  the  Non-im 
portation  Resolution  of  Gregg,  158; 
attacks  the  Administration,  159; 
his  account  of  the  Mobile  Act,  163 ; 
goes  formally  into  opposition,  164; 
philippics  against  the  government, 
172  et  seq. ;  his  Resolutions  against 
the  union  of  civil  and  military 
powers,  175;  makes  public  Jeffer 
son's  secret  Message,  179;  his  dis 
like  of  Robert  and  Samuel  Smith, 
180  ;  his  schemes  to  reduce  the 
revenue,  182;  his  object  to  make 
Madison  contemptible,  182;  writes 
to  Monroe  respecting  Burr,  333; 
moves  a  resolution  of  inquiry, 
335;  his  dictatorial  tone  in  Con 
gress,  349;  favors  abandoning  New 
York  in  case  of  attack,  351;  at 
tacks  the  coastwise  prohibition  of 
slave-trade,  364;  his  qualities  and 
faults,  367;  his  influence  destroyed, 
368;  foreman  of  the  jury  in  Burr's 
trial,  448;  desires  to  indict  Wilkin 
son,  457 ;  his  letters  to  Nicholson, 
457;  calls  Jefferson's  proclamation 
in  the  "  Chesapeake "  affair  an 
apology,  ii.  32  ;  upholds  Monroe, 
129;  fails  to  be  reappointocl  on 
the  Ways  and  Means  Committee 
by  Speaker  Varmim,  153;  advo 
cates  and  then  denounces  the  em 
bargo,  174 ;  opposes  Jefferson's 
request  for  an  increase  of  the  regu 
lar  army,  215,  374;  his  speech  on 
war,  38r ;  discord  his  object,  438  ; 
his  claim  of  having  prevented  war, 
451;  his  opinion  of  Jefferson's  sec 
ond  administration,  454. 
Randolph,  T.  J.,  Jefferson's  letter 
to,  ii.  138,  139. 


Randolph,  Thomas  Mann,  i.  183, 
356. 

Ratford,  Jenkin,  a  deserter  from 
the  "Halifax,"  ii.  2;  taken  from 
the  "Chesapeake,"  19;  hanged, 
25. 

Regnier,  Grand  Judge,  announces  the 
enforcement  of  the  Berlin  Decree, 
ii.  169. 

Republican  losses  in  the  election  of 
1808,  ii.  287  ;  revolt,  425.  (See 
Party.) 

"Revenge,"  the,  sails  with  instruc 
tions  to  Monroe  respecting  the 
"Leopard"  outrage,  ii.  39;  re 
turns,  133,  166. 

Roads,  Jefferson's  proposed  fund  for, 
i.  2,  345;  through  the  Creek  and 
Cherokee  county,  14;  Jefferson's 
anxiety  to  begin,  19;  Cumber 
land,  181;  proposed  by  Gallatin, 
ii.  364,  365. 

Rochambeau,  General,  at  St.  Do 
mingo,  i.  87. 

Rodgers,  Captain  John,  ii.  21. 

Rodney,  Caesar  A.,  Attorney-General, 
undertakes  the  prosecution  of  Burr, 
i.  444;  points  out  the  consequences 
to  the  Administration  of  convict 
ing  Wilkinson,  455;  his  opinion 
concerning  Judge  Johnson's  man 
damus,  ii.  264. 

Rose,  George,  ii.  100, 102%. 

Rose,  George  Henry,  sent  as  envoy 
for  the  adjustment  of  the  "Chesa 
peake  "  affair,  ii.  104;  his  ignorance 
of  Canning's  Orders  in  Council, 
133  ;  arrives  at  Norfolk  on  the 
"Statira,"  178;  his  instructions, 
178-182  ;  his  character  and  qual 
ities,  182;  his  description  of  Con 
gress,  184;  explains  to  Madison 
that  Jefferson's  proclamation  is  a 
stumbling-block,  187;  his  letter  to 
Canning,  188;  suggests  the  with 
drawal  of  the  proclamation,  190; 
explains  the  new  proposals  of  Jef- 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  II. 


495 


ferson  to  Canning,  192;  difficulties 
in  the  way  of  following  his  instruc 
tions,  192;  reveals  the  further  dis 
avowals  expected,  193;  breaks  off 
negotiation,  196;  makes  his  parting 
visits,  and  has  free  conversation 
with  Galiatin  and  Smith,  197  ; 
writes  to  Canning  under  Picker 
ing's  influence,  232. 

Rosily,  Admiral,  ii.  298. 

Rule  of  1756,  affirmed  by  Lord  Mul- 
grave.  i.  48;  assumed  by  James 
Stephen,  51,  53;  applied  by  the 
Whigs,  419;  insufficient  to  protect 
British  trade,  ii.  100,  319;  Erskine 
reports  Galiatin  ready  to  concede, 
389. 

Russia,  the  emperor  of.  wishes  to  ex 
change  ministers  with  the  United 
States,  ii.  465  ;  invitation  declined 
by  Senate,  466. 

Ryland,  Herman  W.,  secretary  to 
Sir  James  Craig,  ii.  243,  460. 


ST.  DOMINGO,  independence  de 
clared,  i.  87;  armed  trade  with,  87  ; 
Napoleon's  prohibition  of,  89;  trade 
with,  prohibited  by  act  of  Congress, 
141;  character  of  the  act,  142  ; 
Southern  reasons  for  approving, 
142. 

Salt,  repeal  of  duty  on,  i.  182,  183. 

Sargent,  Daniel,  ii.  413. 

Sauve,  Pierre,  i.  301. 

Scott,  Sir  William,  his  judgment  in 
the  case  of  the  "Essex,"  i.  44,  45, 
47 ;  news  of  judgment  received  in 
America,  95,  96;  opposes  reforms 
in  his  court,  ii.  96;  his  remarks  on 
the  right  of  retaliation,  321. 

Seamen,  British,  in  the  American 
marine,  i.  94;  desertion  of,  ii.  1. 

Sebastian,  Judge,  i.  274 ;  resigns, 
293. 

Senate,  cabal  in,  ii.  428. 

Sheffield,  Lord,  ii.  73. 


Short,  William,  sent  by  Jefferson  as 
minister  to  Russia,  ii.  465;  appoint 
ment  negatived,  466. 

Sidmouth,  Lord  Privy  Seal,  i.  393; 
ii.  73. 

Skipwith,  Fulwar,  American  consul 

at  Paris,  i.  379. 
|  Slave  representation,  ii.  458. 

Slave-trade,  Jefferson  recommends 
iiU  abolishment,  i.  347;  debate  in 
^Congress  on  the  abolition  of,  356. 

Sloan,  James,  member  of  Congress 
from  New  Jersey,  i.  160,  174,  183, 
357;  moves  that  the  seat  of  gov 
ernment  be  moved  to  Philadelphia, 
ii.  208. 

Smilie,  John,  member  of  Congress 
from  Pennsylvania,  i.  359,  362  ; 
ii.  213. 

"Smith  Faction,"  the,  in  Congress, 
ii.  428. 

Smith,  John,  senator  from  Ohio,  i. 
175;  under  the  influence  of  Burr, 
220;  sends  letter  to  Burr  by  Peter 
Taylor,  275 ;  Burr's  reply,  276  ;  re 
fuses  to  testify,  282;  his  complicity 
in  Burr's  schemes  investigated,  ii. 
208. 

Smith,  John  Cotton,  i.  132,  143,  242. 

Smith,  Robert,  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
asks  to  be  made  attorney-general, 
January,  1805,  appointed  and  com 
missioned  as  attorney-general,  but 
continues  secretary  of  the  navy, 
i.  10-12;  his  opinion  on  Monroe's 
Spanish  negotiation,  68;  his  letter 
to  Jefferson  on  Burr's  conspiracy, 
331 ;  wishes  a  call  of  the  Senate  to 
consider  Monroe's  treaty,  432 ;  acts 
as  Jefferson's  intermediator  with 
Rose,  ii.  188-191;  talks  freely  with 
Rose,  197;  dislikes  the  embargo, 
261 ;  his  opinions  reported  by  Er 
skine,  384;  regarded  as  extrava 
gant  by  Galiatin,  425,  428. 

Smith,  Samuel,  senator  from  Mary 
land,  i.  83,  126;  his  Non-Importa- 


496 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  II. 


tion  Resolutions,  146,  150,  151;  his 
wish  for  diplomatic  office,  152,  153; 
his  opposition  to  Armstrong's  ap 
pointment  defeated,  153,  172;  pun 
ished  by  Jefferson,  168,  170;  his 
view  of  the  President's  course, 
169,  170;  writes  to  Nicholas  re 
specting  Burr's  conspiracy,  335; 
annoyed  at  Jefferson's  ignoring 
the  army  in  Annual  Message,  348, 
349;  his"  letters  to  W.  C.  Nicholas 
respecting  Jefferson's  rejection  of 
Monroe's  treaty,  431  et  seq. ;  on 
the  embargo  committee,  ii.  172;  his 
hostility  to  Gallatin,  425,  428. 

Smith,  William  Steuben,  Surveyor  of 
the  Port  of  New  York,  in  Miranda's 
confidence,  i.  189  ;  removed  from 
office  and  indicted,  195,  208  ;  his 
trial,  208;  his  acquittal,  209;  con 
nected  with  Burr,  263,  265. 

Smith  and  Ogden,  case  of,  i.  208,  450. 

Snyder,  Simon,  chosen  governor  of 
Pennsylvania,  ii.  286. 

Spain,  Jefferson's  expectation  of  bick 
ering  with,  i.  8;  Monroe's  negotia 
tion  with,  23-36;  effect  of  Monroe's 
negotiation  with,  on  Jefferson  and 
Madison,  54-79  ;  expected  war 
with,  61,  62,  99,  118,  128, 189  ;  Gal- 
latin's  opinion  of  Monroe's  nego 
tiation  with,  66;  Robert  Smith's 
opinion  of,  68;  negotiation  with, 
not  to  be  converted  into  a  French 
job,  70,  77  ;  Cabinet,  decision  to 
transfer  negotiation  to  Paris,  and 
offer  five  millions  for  West  Florida, 
78;  Merry's  report  on,  96;  Madi 
son's  remarks  to  Merry,  98;  Tal 
leyrand's  proposed  settlement  with, 
103,  106;  accepted  by  Jefferson, 
106 ;  notice  of  unfriendly  relations 
with,  in  Jefferson's  Annual  Mes 
sage  of  1805,  112;  Jefferson's  com 
ments  on,  to  Turreau,  125 ;  Jeffer 
son's  secret  message  on,  Dec.  6, 
1805, 130, 177  ;  Randolph's  remarks 


on  the  policy  toward,  178  ;  rela 
tions  with  French  finance,  372;  her 
"perfidy  and  injustice."  437;  her 
condition  in  1807,  ii.  115,  116;  oc 
cupied  by  French  armies,  119, 122, 
293,  297 ;  collapse  of  government 
in,  298 ;  Joseph  Bonaparte  crowned 
king  of,  300;  revolution  of  the  Dos 
de  Maio,  300-302,  315;  its  effect  in 
America,  339-343.  (See  Florida, 
West.) 

Spence,  Lieutenant,  carries  letters 
from  Bollman  to  Burr,  i.  309. 

Spence,  William,  ii.  69 ;  his  pamph 
let  "Britain  independent  of  Com 
merce,"  329. 

Spoliations,  Spanish,  i.  23  et  seq, ;  in 
1805,  37,  62,  67,  78,  107;  British, 
in  1805,  45,  73,  108;  sensation  ex 
cited  by,  109,  118,  125;  French, 
25,  26,  28,  30,  32,  35,  60,  107 ;  in 
1808,  ii.  312. 

Stanford,  Richnrd,  member  of  Con 
gress  from  North  Carolina,  ii.  214. 

State-rights,  affected  by  Jefferson's 
acts,  i.  3,  18,  19,  346;  ii.  363,  364, 
454;  affected  by  Acts  of  Congress, 
i.  142,  355,  361,  364,  366;  affected 
by  the  system  of  embargo,  ii.  251- 
271,  273,  408-419,  456-459. 

Stephen,  James,  author  of  "War  in 
Disguise,"  i.  50-53;  reprints  Ran 
dolph's  speech,  396  ;  assists  in 
framing  Spencer  Perceval's  Orders 
in  Council,  ii.  57,  100,  102  ;  his 
opinion  of  Brougham's  speech  on 
the  orders,  323. 

Stevens,  John  C.,  experiments  with 
a  screw-propeller,  i.  217. 

Stone,  David,  senator  from  North 
Carolina,  i.  139. 

Story,  Joseph,  describes  Giles,  ii.  205; 
opinion  on  the  constitutionality  of 
the  embargo,  270;  elected  a  mem 
ber  of  Congress  from  Massachu 
setts,  358;  in  opposition  to  Jefferson 
and  the  embargo,  358  ;  letter  de- 


INDEX  TO   VOLS.  I.  AND  II. 


497 


scribing  the  state  of  opinion  at 
Washington,  370 ;  determined  to 
overthrow  the  embargo,  432,  455, 
463. 

Street,  John  Wood's  colleague,  i. 
273. 

Strong,  Caleb,  re-elected  governor  of 
Massachusetts  in  April,  1805,  i.  9 ; 
again  in  April,  1806,  207;  defeated 
in  April,  1807,  ii.  146;  again  in 
April,  1808,  242. 

Sullivan,  James,  governor  of  Massa 
chusetts,  ii.  146;  receives  Picker 
ing's  letter  for  the  State  legisla 
ture,  237;  declines  to  convey  it, 
240;  his  reply,  241;  re-elected,' 242; 
replies  to  Jefferson's  demand  to 
stop  importing  provisions,  254. 

Sullivan,  William,  ii.  411. 

Sumter,  Thomas,  senator  from  South 
Carolina,  i.  139. 

Swartwout,  John,  marshal  of  New 
York,  i.  189  ;  removed  from  office, 
208 ;  Jefferson's  reasons  for  remov 
ing  him,  209. 

Swartwout,  Samuel,  one  of  Burr's 
adventurers,  i.  252,  255,  263,  265 ; 
carries  despatches  to  Wilkinson, 
295;  pursues  General  Wilkinson, 
309 ;  arrives  at  Natchitoches,  and 
delivers  Burr's  letter  to  Wilkinson, 
311 ;  arrested  at  Fort  Adams,  319, 
460  ;  discharged  from  custody,  340. 


TALLEYRAND,  Charles  Maurice  de, 
Napoleon's  minister  for  foreign  re 
lations,  forbids  discussion  of  Span 
ish  spoliation  claims,  i.  26,  30 ; 
rejects  American  claim  to  West 
Florida,  26,  54;  his  share  in  the 
Spanish  negotiations,  34,  41 ;  his 
jobbery,  41;  writes  to  Armstrong 
the  Emperor's  demands  concern 
ing  trade  with  St.  Domingo,  90; 
sends  an  agent  to  Armstrong  to 
suggest  an  arrangement  between 
VOL.  iv.  —  32 


the  United  States  and  Spain,  103 ; 
informs  Armstrong  that  the  King 
of  Spain  refuses  to  alienate  Flor 
ida,  377;  prompts  Armstrong  to 
renew  his  request  for  the  Floridas, 
380;  rebukes  Vandeul  for  precipi 
tancy  in  the  Florida  matter,  384; 
created  Prince  of  Benevento,  385; 
removed  from  office,  ii.  107. 

Taylor,  Josiah,  Lieutenant  of  Second 
Infantry,  i.  303. 

Taylor,  Peter,  evidence  of,  concern  ing 
Blennerhassett's  delusion,  i.  259; 
sent  with  a  warning  letter  to  Burr. 
275. 

Tazewell,  Littleton,  sent  with  a  mes 
sage  to  Captain  Douglas,  ii.  28. 

Tecumthe,  residence  of,  in  1805, 
i.  15. 

Texas,  boundary,  i.  33;  Spanish  def 
inition  of  boundary,  34 ;  included 
in  the  Louisiana  purchase,  40 ; 
Spanish  establishments  in,  to  be 
dislodged,  69,  80;  to  be  confirmed 
to  Spain,  and  hypothecated  to  the 
United  States,  78;  to  be  purchased, 
139. 

Tiffin,  Edward,  governor  of  Ohio,  i. 
282, 286, 289,  334, 335 ;  senator  from 
Ohio,  moves  an  amendment  to  the 
Constitution,  ii.  205. 

Tilsit,  Treaty  of,  ii.  62,  105,  140. 

"  Times,"  the  London,  on  the  "  Ches 
apeake  "  affair,  ii.  44,  54,  132. 

Tompkins,  Daniel  D.,  elected  Gov 
ernor  of  New  York  in  1807,  ii. 
283;  his  attempts  to  enforce  the 
embargo,  249,  259. 

Town-meetings  held  in  Massachusetts 
to  resist  the  embargo,  ii.  410  ;  Jef 
ferson's  opinion  of,  442. 

Trafalgar,  battle  of,  i.  149,  370. 

Treason,  Marshall's  law  of,  i.  443, 
467;  Giles's  bill  for  the  punish 
ment  of,  ii.  205. 

Treasury,  prosperous  condition  of,  in 
1806,  i.  12,  210. 


498 


INDEX   TO   VOLS.  I.  AND  II. 


Treaties,  Indian,  with  Wyandots  and 

others,  July  4,  1805,  "i.  13; 
with  Chickasaws,  July  23,   1805, 

14; 
with  Cherokees,  Oct.  25  and  27, 

1805,  14; 

with  Creeks,  Nov.  14,  1805,  14; 
with  Piankeshaws,  Dec.  30,  1805, 

13. 

Treaty  with  England  of  Nov.   19, 
1794  (Jay's),  i.  401;  Article  XIL 
of,  410 ; " 
with  Spain  of  Oct.  27, 1795  (Pinck- 

ney's),  38; 

of  San  Ildefonso  between  France 
and  Spain,  Oct.  1,  1800  (Ber- 
thier's),  38; 

of  Pressburg  between  France  and 
Austria,  Dec.  26, 1805, 163,  370; 
with  England  of  Dec.  1, 1806  (Mon 
roe's),  409  et  seq.,  422,  429-436, 
438;  ii.  48-51,  129,  144,  154; 
of  Tilsit  between  France  and  Rus 
sia,  July  7,  1807,  62; 
of  Fontainebleau  between  France 

and  Spain,  Oct.  27,  1807,  119. 
Troup,  George  Mclntosh,  member  of 
Congress    from    Georgia,    ii.  213 ; 
opposes  war,  377. 

Trumbull,  Jonathan,  governor  of 
Connecticut,  refuses  to  take  part 
in  carrying  out  the  Enforcement 
Act,  ii.  417,  455;  calls  the  legis 
lature  to  "  interpose,"  418. 
Truxton,  Commodore,  sounded  by 

Burr,  i.  239. 

Turreau,  Louis  Marie,  French  min 
ister  at  Washington,  his  course 
with  Madison  in  the  Spanish  busi 
ness,  i.  81;  his  letter  to  Talley 
rand  on  American  policy  and  na 
tional  character,  84;  his  abrupt 
ness,  86  et  seq. ;  sends  Talleyrand 
an  account  of  Jefferson's  conversa 
tion,  124;  his  part  in  the  Madison- 
Yrujo  matter,  188;  acts  as  Yrujo's 
ally,  194 ;  demands  an  explana 


tion  from  Madison  aoout  Miranda, 
195;  reports  to  Talleyrand  Jeffer 
son's  system  for  an  alliance  of 
nations,  204 ;  writes  concerning 
Jefferson's  character  and  position, 
205;  writes  to  his  government  re 
specting  Burr's  schemes,  226;  his 
comments  on  the  embargo  and 
war,  396 ;  writes  to  his  government 
respecting  English  relations,  424 
et  seq. ;  embarrassed  by  the  Berlin 
Decree,  427;  description  of  an  in 
terview  with  Jefferson  after  the 
"Chesapeake"  affair,  ii.  36;  his 
letter  describing  the  servile  char 
acter  of  Americans,  140;  alarmed 
by  Jefferson's  course,  229 ;  his  let 
ters  to  Champagtvy  complaining 
of  the  embargo,  etc.,  229  et  seq., 
297;  has  long  conversations  with 
Madison  and  Jefferson  respecting 
a  French  alliance,  308 ;  hopes  Amer 
ica  will  declare  war,  396. 


ULM,  capitulation  of,  i.  370. 

University,  Jefferson's  recommenda 
tion  of  a  national,  i.  346,347;  ii. 
365. 


VANDEUL,  M.  DE,  French  charge  at 
Madrid,  confers  with  Godoy  re 
specting  the  cession  of  West  Flor 
ida,  i.  380;  rebuked  by  Talleyrand 
at  Napoleon's  order.  384. 

Varnum,  Joseph  B.,  member  of  Con 
gress  from  Massachusetts,  i.  128; 
chosen  Speaker,  ii.  153. 

Vimieiro,  battle  of,  ii.  315,  340. 


WAR,  Jefferson's  recommendation  of 

a  fund  for,  i.  3. 
"War  in  Disguise,"   pamphlet   by 

James  Stephen,  i.  50 
Warren,  John,  ii.  411. 


INDEX  TO   VOLS.  I.  AND  II. 


499 


Warton,  agent  of  Burr,  i.  288. 

Washington,  expense  of  living  in, 
ii.  109. 

Wellington's  victory  over  Junot  in 
Portugal,  ii.  316. 

Wells,  Maine,  town-meeting  in  Janu 
ary,  1809,  ii.  414. 

West  Indian  Report,  ii.  68. 

"  Western  World,"  the,  i.  273. 

Westmoreland,  Earl  of,  Privy  Seal, 
his  opinion  on  Spencer  Perce 
val's  proposed  Order  in  Council, 
ii.  89. 

Whitby,  Captain,  of  the  "Leander," 
i.  199. 

White,  Samuel,  ii.  146. 

Wickham,  John,  Burr's  counsel,  i. 
444;  his  opening  speech  in  the 
Burr  trial,  465. 

Wilkinson,  General,  i.  176,  209,  249 ; 
sends  Lieutenant  Pike  to  find  the 
sources  of  the  Mississippi,  213. 
and  to  New  Mexico,  214;  Burr's 
friend,  219  et  seq. ;  joins  Burr  at 
Fort  Massac,  222;  author  of  Burr's 
projects  against  Mexico,  223,  234; 
discouraged,  227 ;  receives  cipher 
dispatch  from  Burr,  253;  in  com 
munication  with  the  Spanish  au 
thorities,  262, 263;  Governor  Mirb's 
agent,  269;  denounced  by  Daveiss 
as  a  Spanish  pensioner,  270;  at 
New  Orleans,  297;  Laussat's  opin 
ion  of,  298;  ordered  to  Natchito- 
ches,  310;  receives  Burr's  letter  at 
Natchitoches,  and  communicates 
its  contents  to  Colonel  Gushing, 
312  et  seq. ;  writes  to  Jefferson, 
314 ;  writes  again  to  the  President, 
315;  takes  command  in  New  Or 
leans,  317;  tells  Bollman  his  in 
tention  to  oppose  Burr's  schemes, 
318;  demands  of  Claiborne  the 
supreme  command,  318;  establishes 
a  degree  of  martial  law  in  New 
Orleans,  319;  his  letter  to  Clark, 
321 ;  his  acts,  323 ;  despatches  in 


cluding  his  version  of  Burr's  cipher 
received  by  Jefferson,  336 ;  assailed 
by  Randolph  and  the  Federalists, 
341;  in  the  receipt  of  a  pension 
from  the  King  of  Spain,  342;  ar 
rives  at  the  Burr  trial,  454;  de 
serted  by  Clark,  454;  accused  by 
Major  Bruff,  454;  supported  by 
Jefferson,  456;  escapes  indictment 
for  treason,  457 ;  Randolph  brings 
charges  against,  ii.  208. 

Williams,  David  R.,  member  of  Con 
gress  from  South  Carolina,  i.  358; 
ii.  213 ;  his  argument  in  favor  of 
the  embargo,  266,  378;  declares 
that  the  embargo  is  the  wish  of 
the  South,  421,  426;  on  the  repeal 
of  the  embargo,  436,  439,  448,  450, 
451. 

Williams,  Samuel,  ii.  167;  Pickering 
gives  Rose  a  letter  to,  235. 

Williams,  Timothy,  ii.  117. 

Williamson,  Colonel,  Burr's  agent, 
i.  219,  229,  234,  238. 

Wirt,  William,  counsel  for  govern 
ment,  i.  445 ;  his  eloquence  in  Burr's 
trial,  465;  his  opinion  of  Chief- 
Justice  Marshall,  469. 

Wolcott,  Oliver,  i.  199. 

Wood,  John,  his  career,  i.  272;  made 
editor  of  the  "  Western  World  " 
by  Marshall  and  Daveiss,  273. 

Workman,  Judge,  i.  303,  319. 


YAZOO  claims,  i.  119,  350;  bill  for 
settling  rejected,  177. 

Yrujo,  Carlos  Martinez,  Marquis  of 
Casa  Yrujo,  Spanish  minister  at 
Washington,  his  dismissal  consid 
ered,  i.  73,  74,  79;  criticises  Jef 
ferson's  message,  184;  arrives  in 
Washington,  185 ;  receives  Madi 
son's  letter  asking  his  withdrawal, 
186;  his  reply  and  subsequent 
conduct,  187  et  seq. ;  his  remon 
strances  about  Miranda,  194 ; 


500 


INDEX  TO  VOLS.  I.  AND  II. 


named  minister  to  Milan,  196;  at 
tacks  Madison  in  the  press,  209; 
receives  a  secret  visit  from  Day 
ton,"  233 ;  his  report  respecting 
Burr's  proposal,  236  et  seq. ;  writes 


to  Cevallos  of  Burr's  communica 
tions,  247;  notifies  his  government 
of  Burr's  intentions,  261;  Burr's 
message  to  him,  264  et  seq. ;  letter 
on  Wilkinson,  342. 


END   OF    VOL. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


«^fc*i— • 


•• 


